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Abstract
Sarzgathan, or organisation, has emerged as a central idea in Hindu nationalist ideology.
This thesis examines the development of this idea, culminating in its concrete
expression in the nineteen twenties as the sangathan movement. During the late
nineteenth and early twentieth century, Hinduism was the subject of a constant dialogue
between individuals and groups seeking to define and codify - or orgamse - the religion
in the context of colonial control. I argue that this dialogue forms the context for the
movement of the twenties, and further that it constitutes the means through which the
ideology of Hindu nationalism itself was initially produced.
Organisation is examined on two inter-related levels: first, on the level of political
mobilisation - the way in which Hinduism became organised as a political force; and
secondly, on the level of religious ideology - the way in which orgamsation came to be
articulated as an ideal to which Hindus could legitimately aspire. On both levels, the
protagonists were forced to confront the question of what constitutes Hinduism: what
were its defining characteristics, and where were its boundaries located. Because of
this over-arching question, the two levels developed together, producing a series of
approaches to the organisation of Hinduism, propagated by various groups claiming to
represent the interests of Hindus in the arena of colonial politics. The thesis examines
the following groups as progressive examples of the various approaches: the Arya
Samaj; the Sanatana Dharma Sabhas and the Bharat Dharma Mahamandal; the cow
protection movement of the early eighteen nineties; the shuddhi movement; the Hindu
Sabha movement; the Hindu Mahasabha and the sangathan movement; and the
Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh.
A significant feature of this research is its focus on middle class ideological
development. Through a Gramscian interpretation of the state, it recognises the
importance of the middle class as strategically placed in the domain of hegemonic
politics, close to the focal points of power. On this basis, middle class ideologies are
examined as critical to the development of political discourse in India. In particular, the
study focuses on the competing ideologies of Hindu nationalism and Indian nationalism
as elaborated by this class, and demonstrates a fresh interpretation of the relationship
between these ideologies.
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During the colonial period in India, certain ideas emerged as central to the construction
of modern Hindu identities. In the nineteenth century particularly, middle class
intellectuals interested in social and political issues developed a set of ideas which have
emerged as extremely influential and resonant factors in the formation of these
identities. I am thinking particularly of notions such as the "Golden Age" of Vedic
Hinduism, the Aryan race as the fundamental force that generated Hindu culture, the
slow disintegration and eventual stagnation of that culture during the medieval period,
and the related notions of forced conversion to Islam and destruction of Hindu temples
as the defining events of that particular period. These ideas contributed a great deal to
analyses of the predicament of India both as a subjugated land and as a force in the
development of the modern world; as a result they were also influential in informing
perceptions of what it meant to be a Hindu in this context. In this thesis I will examine
the emergence during the nineteenth and early twentieth century of one influential idea
in the construction of modern Hindu identities. This is the idea of sangathan, or
organisation.
Sangathan has been a particularly significant idea in the development of Hindu
nationalist thought. It is also perceived as an important ideological link between Hindu
nationalism and the entrenchment of communalism in Indian political discourse. The
1920s are recognised as the defining period for this entrenchment, and sangathan was a
dominant theme for Hindu organisations and the Hindu press at this time. Every act of
violence was followed by a call for Hindus to become organised, to display the
'organic' unity which was projected as characterising the Muslim community. In
particular, the idea was expressed as a movement: a concerted attempt, orchestrated by
the Hindu Mahasabha, to consolidate Hinduism, to increase its effectiveness as a
distinct social and political force, by invoking sangathan as an ideal.
In contemporary Hindu nationalist ideology, sangathan is still a central notion. It is
often expressed as the objective of Hindu nationalism; the Rashtriya Swayamsevak
Sangh in particular projects itself as a model organisation for the realised Hindu rashira,
or nation. It has also been identified as a strategy of political mobilisation which has
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long been implemented by Hindu nationalist organisations in electoral politics. 1 This
strategy has placed emphasis on the development and maintenance of a network of
activists "capable of working locally in depth in order to inculcate Hindu nationalist
ideals in the minds of the largest number of people".2
Sangathan, then, appears as an enduring and deep-seated idea in Hindu nationalism.
This thesis analyses the development of the idea, culminating in its concrete expression
in the 1920s. It examines how, during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century,
Hinduism was subjected to a constant examination by individuals and groups seeking
to define and codify the religion as a prerequisite for its ascendance (if not its survival)
in the modem world. This process of examination forms the context for the movement
of the twenties, and in many ways constitutes the means through which Hindu
nationalism itself was produced. It will be illustrated that the image of a threatening and
unified Islam, so dominant during this decade of communal violence, was the latest of a
long line of images and pressures that stimulated Hindus to examine the "shape" of
their religion, the way in which it presented itself within the rapidly changing context of
colonialism. The sangathan of the title, therefore, is not confined to a narrow focus on
the movement of the twenties; it rather encompasses the whole idea of an organised
Hinduism - how it emerged as a central issue for Hindu elites within the colonial
milieu, and what debates informed its development as a seminal idea in the emergence
of Hindu nationalism.
I have arrived at this particular focus after much deliberation as to how to approach the
problem of militant Hinduism as a feature of modem Indian political history. As a
student of the national movement in India, I have previously concentrated on the
development of nationalist ideologies in the period prior to Gandhi's assumption of the
leadership of Congress.3 Inevitably, the study of ideology in Indian nationalism meant
acknowledging the presence of so-called communal ideologies in Indian politics and
society. Situating these ideologies over the same period, however, has proved to be a
veritable minefield in terms of the integration of apparently conflicting positions; it was
a period, as Sudipta Kaviraj has put it, in which society was "humming with political
narratives".4 The focus on sangathan is designed to counter the complexity of this
scenario by tracing the development of one key theme. It is perhaps not surprising that
See C. Jaffrelot, The Hindu Nationalist Movement in india (Viking Penguin India, New Delhi
1996), esp. Chapter 3.
2	 Jaffrelot, The Hindu Nationalist Movement in India, p.135.
J. Zavos, "Ideology and Hegemonic Struggle in the Early National Movement: Some
Case Studies" (Unpublished M.Phil Dissertation, Jawaharlal Nehru University, 1987)
S. Kaviraj, "The Imaginary Institution of India" (in Subaltern Studies VII, Oxford University
Press, Delhi, 1992, pp. 1-39), p. 3.
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this theme was important not only in terms of Hindu nationalism, but also of a variety
of these "humming" political narratives. In this sense, then, the focus on organisation
has provided a means of understanding bow ideologies related to one another in this
critical period of colonial history.
1.1 Objectives and Limitations
A recent study of the Hindu Right in contemporary India has commented:
Within the whole corpus of explanations for communalism, there has
been little work on it as an ideological formation - that is, not just a set
of ideas, but the elaboration of organisational structures that embody
and spread these in effective ways.5
This thesis aims to address this problem by examining the processes through which the
ideology of Hindu nationalism was formulated, and in particular by examining its
relationship to the concept of organisation: in terms of both ideas and material
structures.
Over recent years, the historical analysis of communalism as a feature of Indian politics
has benefited from research which has placed it in an expanded framework of
interpretation. There has been a shift away from the examination of communal
antagonism as an autonomous, self-perpetuating force, and towards the examination of
wider social and political pressures and their relationship with forms of identity in
India.6 One significant result of this has been to liberate the analysis of forms of
communalism from the problematic notion that they constitute a reactionary deviation
from the development of the Indian nation towards modernity. This notion derives
from a particular perception of the status of religion in Indian society, as a signifier of
its "naturalness", removed from the hard realities of economic and political progress.7
It has been common to hear communalism explained, along with forms of
"fundamentalism" in India and other parts of the post-colonial world, as the unfortunate
entry of religion - a private concern - into the public world of politics. 8 This process is
T. Basu, P. Datta, S. Sarkar, T. Sarkar, S. Sen (hereafter Basu et al), Khaki Shortr and
Saffron Flags: A Critique of the Hindu Right (Orient Longman, New Delhi, 1993), p.5.
6	 This point is made and illustrated by R. O'Hanlon, "Historical Approaches to
Communalism: Perspectives from Western India" (in P. Robb [ed.], Society and Ideology
(Oxford University Press, New DeLhi, 1993, pp. 247-266), pp. 248-9.
For an elaboration of this theme, see R. Inden, Imagining India (Blackwell, Oxford, 1990),
esp. Chapter 3, "Hinduism: The Mind of India", pp. 85-130.8	 See, for example, S. Das, "Communal Violence in Twentieth Century Bengal: An
Analytical Framework" (in K.N. Panikkar [ed.], Communalism in India, Manohar, New
Delhi, 1991, pp. 34-50), pp. 34-5; A. Nandy, "Politics of Secularism and the Recovery of
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seen as a feature of the colonial and post-colonial predicament. It is only in this context
that the otherwise tolerant, syncretistic system which is Hinduism deteriorates into an
aggressively exciusivist form of identity politics. It is clear now, however, that far
from causing a convergence of religion and politics, the initial impact of colonialism
was to create a division between these two from about the 1820s onwards. Where pre-
colonial rulers had participated in religious ceremonies and incorporated the dynamics
of religious identity into state politics as a matter of course, the objective of the colonial
state was to present itself as a neutral arbiter, withdrawing from this active role and
attempting to draw a line between politics as the concern of the state, and religion as the
concern of a depoliticised population. This withdrawal had a whole host of
implications, some of which have been considered recently by scholars. 9 One of these
implications was, of course, the creation of a new, "non-religious" political arena in
Indian society, in which the parameters of political expression were controlled by the
state. This "non-religious" political arena was part of what I will term the public space
of colonial India - the space in which the state launched its attempt to gain hegemony
over the indigenous population. What will be examined in this thesis is the paradoxical
articulation of religion within this arena.
In particular, the thesis traces the development of a particular sense of Hindu identity in
this context. I will argue that the state projected a specific image of organisation as a
cultural language - a discourse of organisation - in its attempt to exert hegemony.
Organisation was expressed here as a discourse of modernity. Ideas about Hinduism
which emerged in the public space were subject to the parameters of this discourse.
Organisation came to be perceived as an ideal to which the religion should aspire if it
was to have meaning within this discourse, and, by association, within the modern
world. The key hypothesis of this study is that the ideology of Hindu nationalism was
developed on the basis of the pursuit of this ideal.
Of course, ideas about Hinduism were not the only ideas to emerge and be expressed in
this space. In particular, it was also a productive and influential arena for the
development of Indian nationalism. Considerable space will be given over to the
development of these ideas, as a means of clarifying the relationship between two
Religious Tolerance" (in V. Das [ed.], Mirrors of Violence: Communities, Riots and
Survivors in South Asia, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1990, pp. 69-93), p. 70.
See especially S. Freitag, Collective Action and Community: Public Arenas and the
Emergence of Communalism in North India (Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1990); K. Prior,
"The British Administration of Hinduism" (Unpublished PhD Dissertation, Cambridge, 1990);
and Prior, "Making Histoiy: The Stat&s Intervention in Urban Religious Disputes in the
North Western Provinces in the Early Nineteenth Century" (in Modern Asian Studies Vol. 27,
1993, pp. 179-204).
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dominant ideologies of modern Indian politics: the ideologies of Hindu and Indian
nationalism.
The objectives of the thesis, then, may be expressed sequentially as follows:
(i) to examine the historical development of the idea of organisation as a feature of
Hindu identity in the late nineteenth/early twentieth century
(ii) to examine the articulation of this sense of Hindu identity in political organisations
and movements over the same period.
(iii) to provide a critical analysis of the link between the Hindu reform movements and
Hindu nationalism.
(iv) to establish organisation, or sangathan, as a defining concept in the ideology of
Hindu nationalism.
(v) to explain the relationship between the ideologies of Hindu nationalism and Indian
nationalism by examining their historical development in the context of colonialism.
These objectives are framed within certain limitations. Most importantly, this is a thesis
about ideologies and identities formed primarily within a middle class context. It is a
history of ideas and movements formulated by elites, but not, as I will explain in some
depth in Chapter 2, an elitist history. Through a Gramscian interpretation of the state,
the thesis emphasises the importance of the middle class as strategically placed in the
domain of hegemonic politics, close to the focal points of power. On this basis,
middle class ideologies are examined as critical to the development of political discourse
in India. This middle class focus, however, does not preclude the importance of other
forms of ideology emerging over a similar period of Indian history; it is adopted in the
context of recent developments in the historiography of modern India, and it necessarily
acknowledges the significance of subaltern movements, and the dynamic flow of
ideologies between social blocs.10
A further limitation emanates from this middle class focus. The study does not
concentrate intensely on any one region or city of India. It has a loose focus on
Nagpur, the administrative centre of the Central Provinces from 1861, but it does not
attempt to provide a micro-study of developments in this city. 1 ' As well as again going
10	 The most significant recent attempts to construct histories of the development of non-elite
ideologies that fed into communal conflict are 0. Pandey, The Construction of Communalism
in Colonial North India (Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1990), and Freitag, Collective
Action and Community.
11	 Unlike a recent work which also attempts to examine the development of political ideologies
of the elite: D. Haynes, Rhetoric and Ritual in Colonial India: The Shaping of a Public
Culture in Surat City, 1852 - 1928 (Univ. of California, Berkeley, 1991).
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somewhat against the grain of recent historiographical trends, this limits the ability of
the study to provide a comprehensive environment within which to view locally bound
historical developments. Nagpur is of course significant as the city in which one of the
principal organisational forms of Hindu nationalism - the Rashtriya Swayamsevak
Sangh (RSS) - was first established. This is particularly interesting, because Nagpur
had neither a significant Muslim minority, a history of strong regional identities, nor the
presence of an influential elite-based socio-religious reform movement to encourage the
development of Hindu nationalist ideas. This suggests the independent entrenchment
of middle class ideologies, and it is because of this point that I have determined that the
focus on this city should remain loose. Middle class ideologies always had the
potential to be cross regional, precisely because of their middle class-ness. Their
ramifications were felt across the public space of colonial India, continually intervening
in the development of larger, macro-identities. Movements centred on Punjab or
Bengal, for example, had a significance across the country. As we shall see, they
continually prompted a response from individuals and groups in unrelated areas. The
way in which these responses were articulated tells us a great deal about how ideologies
and macro-identities were formulated.
Finally, this study is limited chronologically. It concentrates on the period 1870 to
1930. Prior to this, certain organisational forms emerged which were significant
articulations of Hinduism in an organised form. In particular, the Brahmo Samaj
(formed in 1828) and the Dharma Sabha (formed in 1831) were significant, and they
will be referred to briefly in Chapter 3. After 1930, furthermore, sangathan continued
to be a highly significant feature of Hindu nationalist ideology, and as indicated earlier
it remains central to the Hindu nationalist world view. Again, this will be referred to
briefly in Chapter 7. The period chosen for this study, however, emphasises the vital
processes through which the idea of sangathan became entrenched in this key position
in relation to Hindu nationalist identity. A good deal of work has examined the
development of Hindu nationalism from the nineteen twenties onwards. In particular,
Christophe Jaifrelot's important study The Hindu Nationalist Movement in India,
which examines its development right up until the nineteen nineties, takes 1925, the
year in which the RSS was established, as its starting point. What I am interested in is
the ideological developments which allowed for the emergence of Hindu nationalism in
this form. On what basis did it emerge, even by the nineteen thirties, as a form of
identity with enough resonance among middle class Hindus to challenge the idea of
individual citizenship, which the Indian National Movement propagated as the basis of
national identity? In this sense the purpose of this study is to focus on the complex
6
ideological developments which make up the "pre-history" 2
 of Hindu nationalist
identity.
1.2 Methodology and Sources
This study is presented as a history of ideologies. It aims to examine the development
of certain ideologies in their historical context. The method of analysis is therefore
specifically textual. Written sources are approached as texts, in the sense that:
A text is not a line of words releasing a "theological" meaning (the
"message" of the Author-God), but a multi-dimensional space in which
a variety of writings, none of them original, blend and clash.13
The text, then, forms a "multi-dimensional space" filled with certain patterns of
discourse, certain networks of ideology. The navigation of this space and its implicit
networks is the principal form of analysis in this study. This approach is taken on the
basis of a definition of ideology which gives it a central position in the formation of
identities and the production of consciousness. 14 And as Gramsci has stated:
Man is above all else mind, consciousness - that is, he is a product of
history, not nature.15
The historical significance of consciousness, as it is expressed here, is informed by
ideology. It is in this sense that I understand Barthes' "variety of writings, none of
them original" as the content of a text. Hence it will be towards the development, the
history, of certain ideologies, and to the pressures and motivations which affect them,
that this study will look - not to individuals as such, their personal or psychological
origins.
Although it is grounded in historical method, the framework for this analysis is inter-
disciplinary. It is undoubtedly a sign of the academic times that secondary material
relevant to this thesis spans a good number of disciplines within the social sciences and
humanities. In particular, history has become increasingly integrated into social science
work. This point is well illustrated by the recent publication of Jaffrelot's The Hindu
Nationalist Movement in India - a comprehensive history written by a political scientist.
This of course is no bad thing. On the one hand the contribution of historians and
historical analysis to the crucial theoretical debates of social science is essential; the
12	 The phrase refers consciously to Christopher Bayly's significant article "The Pre-history of
'Communalism'? Religious Conflict in India 1700-1800" (in Modern Asian Studies Vol. 19
No. 2, 1985, pp. 177-203).
13	 R. Barthes, Image, Music, Text (Fontana, London, 1977), p.146.
14	 On ideology and its significance, see Seclion 2.1.
15	 Gramsci writing in Ii GTIdO, 1916; quoted in C. Boggs, Gramsci's Marxism (Pluto,
London, 1976), p.59.
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efficacy of social science theories, after all, are dependent upon their historical
legitimation, their assimilation into historical perspectives or world views. On the other
hand, history benefits from a closer relationship with social science theory. The
processing of societal models provided by the social sciences constructs new
frameworks for the interpretation of historical data, investing such data - critically -
with new meaning.
In addition, disciplines within the humanities have contributed much to debates over the
development and significance of Hindu nationalism in the context of Indian culture and
politics.' 6 The richness of this work is indicative of the move towards the wider
examination of social and political pressures and their impact on fonns of identity noted
earlier. This thesis situates ideological history within this expanded framework of
interpretation. In particular, it draws on academic perspectives within the fields of
religious studies and political science to inform historical interpretations of issues which
are, after all, concerned with the relationship between religion, culture and politics.
This approach will, it is hoped, produce an integrated perspective on the development
of Hindu nationalist ideology.
As stated above, the study is focused loosely on Nagpur City, the administrative capital
of Central Provinces since its formation in 1861. During the previous eight years,
Nagpur was administered as a separate unit by a commission of officers. Before this, it
had been ruled by the Bhonsla dynasty, initially as a semi-autonomous wing of the
Mahratta empire. The British had maintained a Residency at Nagpur since 1798, and
their influence increased markedly after the Battles of Sitabaldi atid Nagpur in 1817.
They assumed control of the strategic hill of Sitabaldi in the city, and the Resident
"superintended and administered every department of the State through officers
appointed by himself". 17 As with other areas of the Deccan, British influence in
Nagpur was geared increasingly towards the commercialisation of agriculture, in
particular the transfer of land to cotton production for the Lancashire market. 18 Nagpur
City was to become a centre of this cotton trade. Richard Temple, the first Chief
16	 See, for example, P. Lutgendorf, The Life of a Text: Performing the Ramcaritmanas of
Tulsidas (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1991); S. Chandra, The Oppressive
Present: Literature and Social Consciousness in Colonial India, (Oxford University Press,
Delhi, 1992); P. Mitter, Art and Nationalism in Colonial India: Occidental Orientations
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994); J.J. Lipner, "On 'Hindutva' and a 'I-lindu-
Catholic,' with a Moral for our Times" (in Hindu-Christian Studies Bulletin, Vol. 5, 1992,
pp. 1-8.17	 Gazetteer of the Central Provinces Pt. IV: Munda & Nagpore (Chief Commissioner's Office
Press, Nagpur, 1867), p. 252.
18	 See Gazetleer of the Central Provinces (1867), p. 268: 'Large tracts of land hitherto
growing edible grain have been brought under cotton cultivation"; on the commercialisation of
Deccan agriculture, see S. Guha, The Agrarian Economy of the Bombay Deccan 1818-1941
(Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1985).
8
Commissioner of Central Provinces described the city in 1862 as "probably one of the
most ill-kept and unsightly cities in India". 19 It nevertheless grew rapidly, particularly
alter the establishment of the rail link from Bombay in 1867. By 1908, Nagpur had
developed into the "leading industrial and commercial town of the centre of India".20
The 1872 census recorded the population of the city as 84,441. By 1921 this had risen
to 145, 193, despite serious plague epidemics around the turn of the century.2'
As the administrative centre of Central Provinces and Berar, the city also developed a
strong middle class. A quarter of the province's graduates lived in Nagpur. This class,
and indeed the higher echelons of the education system, was dominated by
Maharashtrian Brahmans, a caste with a long intellectual tradition and a history of
administrative employment under the Bhonslas. 22 Consequently the emerging political
leadership in the eighteen nineties and early nineteen hundreds was also drawn from
this caste. The politically conscious working class in Nagpur consisted of the
untouchable Mahar caste, well represented in the cotton industry, and low caste Hindu
and Muslim weavers.23 The 1921 Census recorded the Muslim population as 11.7%,
the Hindu as 81.3%.24 Most Muslims in the city were engaged in industry or trade, 25
and there was no marked tension between Hindus and Muslims before the nineteen
twenties.26
Source material for this study has been collected both in the U.K. and India. A great
deal of evidence has been gathered from newspapers, and provincial government
weekly reviews of the regional press. The published writing of various individuals has
also been studied in some depth: for example, that of Swami Shraddbanand and V.D.
Savarkar, and also a section of the copious writings of M.K. Gandhi. In addition,
private papers have assisted in explaining ideological positions; I have used the diary of
19	
"First Report on the Administration of the Central Provinces upto August 1862", paragraph
51; See Temple Thapers, MSS Eur F86/61 (India Office Library, London - hereafter IOL).
20	 Central Provinces District Gazetleers, Nagpur District, A Volume (R.V. Russell [ed], Times
Press, Bombay, 1908), p. 318.
21	 The population fell from 127, 731 in 1901 to 101, 415 in 1911. See Central Provinces
District Gazeneers, Nagpur District, B Volume: Statistical Tables 1891-1927 (Government
Press, Nagpur, 1928), pp. 8-9.
22	 See D. Baker, Changing Political Leadership in an Indian Province: The Central Provinces aM
&rarl9l 9-1 939 (Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1979), p. 20.
23	 Baker, Changing Political Leadership in an indian Province, p. 17.24	 The Muslim proportion of the population had decreased slightly since 1901, when it was
13.5%. See Central ProvInces District Gazetteers, Nagpur District, B Volume, pp. 8-9.
25	 See Ce,tsus of india 1921 Vol. XI, Central Provinces and Berar, Pt. 2: Tables (Superintendent
Government Printing, Calcutta, 1912), pp. 337-346. Out of a population of 16, 988, the
number of Muslims in industry was 4843 (mostly in cotton ginning and weaving) and in trade
was 3464 (especially general shopkeeping).
26	 See Central Provinces District Gazetteers, Nagpur District, A Volume (1908) pp. 312-3. The
only riots noted in the city were related to the introduction of plague measures in the 1890s.
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B.S. Moonje, and the letters of K.B. Hedgewar in this regard. I have also referred to
the private papers of V.D. Savarkar, B.G. Tilak and Sir Richard Temple. As some of
this work is written in Marathi, I have been assisted in my research by a translator, with
whom I have sifted through and identified relevant material. Most of the material I have
referred to, however, is in English; this again emphasises the cross-regional character
of middle class ideologies, English being the main language of cross-regional
communication for colonial elites. I have also been fortunate enough to be able to
interview certain people involved in the developing Hindu nationalist movement in
Nagpur in the nineteen twenties. These interviews did not follow a set pattern dictated
by a pre-arranged sequence of questions. Rather, they were discussions guided by the
parameters of my research topic, which I explained to interviewees prior to conducting
the interview. The principal objective of interviews was presented as the construction
of a picture of the status of Hindu nationalist ideology in the city at this time, and its
relationship with Indian nationalist politics. Five interviews were conducted during
research trips to India in 1995-6. I have also examined government records in
Nagpur, Bhopal, Delhi and London, mostly as a means of gaining background
infoimation on relevant organisations and movements.
This research has been supplemented by a review of a wide range of secondary
sources. As I have already indicated, literature on nationalism and communalism in
India is particularly rich and sophisticated. This will be illustrated in the review of
theoretical considerations in Chapter 2.
Note on the Presentation of Indian Words
In this thesis I have avoided the use of diacritical marks. Transliteration of words from
Indian languages is indicated simply through italicisation. The plural -s is also
italicised, as in pandits, vyavasthas and so on. This follows a tradition pursued
somewhat silently by writers more interested in clarity of presentation than in accuracy
of pronunciation.27 In reproducing Indian words in Roman script I have tried to be
consistently phonetic. However, as there are more sounds in, for example, Hindi than
there are letters in the Roman script, this system is obviously limited. Pronunciation
may in most cases be checked by reference to R.L. Turner's Comparative Dictionary of
the Indo-Aryan Languages (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1966). Proper names,
either of people, organisations or social groups (including the names of castes) have not
27	 See, for example, R. Cashman, The Myth of the Lokamanya: Tilak and Mass Politics in
Maharashira (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1975); S. Sarkar, Modern India 1885-
1947 (Macmillan India, Delhi, 1983); 0. Pandey, The Construction of Communalism; and
Jaifrelot, The Hindu Nationalist Movement in india - all of whom use this system but none cf
whom comment on transliteration.
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been italicised. Thus, for example, organisations which in the late nineteenth century
began to promote the idea of sanatanadharma as Hindu orthodoxy are known as
Sanatana Dharma Sabhas. There are inevitable anomalies in any system of
transliteration. I have tried to keep resulting misunderstandings to a minimum by
relying on consistency of use, supplemented by a select glossary of Indian words (see
pp. 239-241).
1.3 Plan of Presentation
My thesis is presented in six major chapters (Chapters 2 - 7), each of which is
concluded by a summary. As well as this introductory chapter, there is in addition a
concluding chapter (Chapter 8), where the main findings of my research are
extrapolated and some suggestions of further research are indicated. The chapters are
broadly chronological. Some chapters do, however, examine the same period from
different perspectives. This derives in part from the idea of constructing a dual
narrative, tracing the development of the idea of organisation in both a Hindu and an
Indian nationalist context.
Chapter 2 has developed out of the need to define key concepts at the heart of debates
over Hindu nationalism. Although I initially planned to make definitions a feature of
the introduction, the complexity of some of the terms involved in this study - notably
ideology, hegemony, nationalism, communalism, Hinduism and, of course, sangathan
- persuaded me that an extensive examination would be worthwhile. As well as
establishing definitions, this chapter reviews significant literature related to the study
and builds a theoretical framework for the interpretation of historical data.
Chapter 3 looks at the context of colonialism in the nineteenth century, and the
emergence of organisations that sought to represent Hinduism within this context. It
begins with an examination of the way in which organisation as a feature of British
power was expressed as a cultural force in Indian society. It then looks at the
elaboration, after 1858, of the "discourse of organisation" through which Indians were
encouraged to articulate concerns to the Government. In the context of Hinduism,
these concerns were increasingly focused oil the structure of the religion, and how
various groups were or were not perceived as a part of it. The final section looks at
ideas formulated in response to these concerns, expressed explicitly in terms of
organisation.
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Chapter 4 introduces the idea of a dual focus on the development of ideas of
organisation in Hindu and Indian nationalist contexts. This dual focus is a logical
implication of the definition of Hindu and elite-led Indian nationalism (established in
Chapter 2) as middle class ideologies following similar patterns of development,
strongly influenced by the colonial discourse of organisation. This is illustrated in
relation to Indian nationalism through an examination of the framework of
"moderatism", and its almost immediate challenge by emerging "extremism". The
language of this challenge, it will be shown, was representation - proposing new ways
of representing the people in the nationalist struggle. The chapter then examines the
ramifications of this nationalist debate in terms of the organisation of Hinduism. In
particular, it examines the articulation of conflicting ideas of organisation in movements
towards the end of the nineteenth century, and the implications of these movements in
terms of the projection of a definitive constituency of Hindus.
Chapter 5 extends this analysis by examining developments in the first decade of the
twentieth century. It argues that this was a particularly critical phase in the formulation
of Hindu nationalism, precisely because of the upheavals apparent in the Indian
nationalist movement at this time, and the ways in which the state sought to marginalise
the development of an effective nationalist counter-hegemony. Again, the form of
political representation, and of constituencies to be represented, was at the heart of this
process. In this context the first concerted, systematic attempt to present unified
Hinduism as politically significant was mooted. This attempt was a product of its time,
in that it was dominated by notions of representation, and the nature of the constituency
of Hindus. The chapter will examine how these ideas were expressed, and how they
set the parameters for the projection of organised Hinduism as a nation.
Chapter 6 examines political and ideological developments after the First World War
and in the early nineteen twenties. In this complex arena, it concentrates on two
particular issues of relevance to the development of Hindu nationalism: the emergence
of a new discourse of organisation in Indian politics, as a result of the extension of the
strategy of counter-hegemony by the Congress under Gandhi's leadership; and the
entrenchment of Hindu identity as a feature of middle class politics, largely in response
to the communalisation of politics on a wider plane during this period. These
developments provide the context for the development of Hindu nationalism in the
nineteen twenties.
Chapter 7 concentrates on the development of Hindu nationalism in terms of its
ideology and its organisational presence in Indian politics during the nineteen twenties.
It analyses the concept of sangathan as employed by various proponents of Hindu
12
nationalism, and the extent of its integration with ideas of the organisation of Hinduism
identified in earlier chapters. It then looks at the elaboration of Hindu nationalism in
institutional terms, focusing on the 1-lindu Mahasabha and the Rashtriya Swayamsevak
Sangh. I will argue that these two organisations constitute very different approaches to
the ideal of sangathan, and that this difference is indicative of the eclectic ideological
positions and formations which consistently informed the articulation of Hinduism in
colonial politics.
Chapter 8 concludes my analysis by reviewing the initial objectives of my research and
examining the implications of the arguments put forward in this thesis for the further
study of ideology, Hindu nationalism and related topics. Principally, this thesis is
offered as a contribution to continuing debates on the nature of religious nationalism
and its significance in the modern history of India.
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Chapter Two
Key Concepts and Significant Literature in the Study of
Hindu Nationalism
In this chapter I will examine the key concepts that underpin this history of the idea of
organisation in modem political Hinduism. My objective is to construct a framework
of interpretation, by mapping out and analysing these concepts in the context of
developments in the study of Indian history and communalism. As well as setting the
parameters for the rest of the thesis, this will allow me to establish definitions of
important terms, and to review literature that is relevant to the study. Recent
developments, particularly in the area of modem Indian historiography, have made this
a complex field of analysis.
In the course of this chapter I will examine concepts within the following broad
thematic areas: colonialism and the state; nationalism and communalism; and religion
and Hinduism. In the first instance, however. I will concentrate on ideology, as I have
conceived this project primarily as an ideological history, examining the emergence of a
particularly dynamic ideology in modern India.
2.1 Ideology, Class Interest and Cultural Identity
The work of the Italian marxist Antonio Gramsci (1891-1937) on ideology and the state
has been central to the whole project of cultural studies from the nineteen seventies
onwards, and since the early eighties his ideas have had a profound impact on modern
Indian histoiiography. In this section 1 will examine the nature of this impact.
It is difficult to employ Gramsci's work as a comprehensive framework of analysis.
Because of the circumstances in which it was written, the consistency and rigour that is
normally associated with the marxist approach simply does not exist in Gramsci's
work. 1
 But as Stuart Hall has usefully pointed out, Gramsci's work has had a
"fertilising impact" on the theorisation of superstructural issues within the marxist
This point has been emphasised by Perry Anderson in his critique "The Antinomies of
Antonio Gramsci" (in New Left Review, No. 100, 1976-77, pp. 5-80), p. 28 Anderson has
shown, for example, that Gramsci referred to at least three different forms of the critical
relationship between state, hegemony and civil society in his work.
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tradition, and it is in this sense that I would want to refer to his work here. 2 In
particular, his work on ideology has had a liberating influence on marxist thought.
Gramsci is located as a theorist of "neutral" ideology, a conception that emerged within
marxism from Lenin onwards. 3 This immediately distinguishes his work from that of
Marx, where ideology is perceived as a "negative" instrument of bourgeois capitalist
control, designed to produce a false consciousness in oppressed classes. For Gramsci,
ideology is rather a facet of social reality; it is a means of expressing "a conception of
the world", a conception that is implicit "in all manifestations of individual and
collective life", and generally serves to "cement and unify" any social bloc. 4 Ideology,
in this sense, is as much a part of proletarian reality as it is of bourgeois reality. Indeed
it has an objective (though historically defined) existence, and is related much more
strongly to actual or real consciousness.
Gramsci elicits several important ramifications from this reinterpretation, and it is here
that he begins to depart from Lenin's own "neutralisation" of ideology. Whereas
Lenin's ideologies were rigidly associated with class positions, Gramsci began to
develop the idea that ideologies, having a material structure, were not necessarily
related to particular classes. They frequently cut across class boundaries, forming
discursive frameworks with their own historically configured resonance. This
sensitivity towards class relations and the historical process is a useful insight for the
interpretation of ideological development in colonial India, where the dynamism of
middle class development encompassing a variety of ideologies needs to be
rationalised.
Initially, this is an insight which is problematic, in that it suggests a radical dislocation
of base and superstructure which is incompatible with a marxist critique. The
materialism with which Gramsci invested ideology, however, meant that he always
presented it as a concept associated with historical moments in the political process, a
process necessarily defined by the antagonism of social formations (classes or class
alliances). Stuart Hall has pursued this interpretation:
Ideologies do not become effective as a material force because they
emanate from the needs of fully-formed social classes. But the reverse
is also true.... No ideological conception can ever become materially
2 See Hall, "Gramsci's Relevance for the Study of Race and Ethnicity" (in 1). Morley and
Kuan-Hsing Chen [eds.1, Stuart Hall: Critical Dialogues in Cultural Studies, Routledge,
London, 1996, pp. 411-440), p. 417.
See J. Lorrain, The Concept of ideology (DI Publications, New Delhi, 1979) p. 76-83,
4	 See Gramsci (edited and translated by Q. Hoare and G.N. Smith), Selections from the Prison
Noteboob 0/Antonio Gramsci, (Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1971), p. 328.
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effective unless and until it can be articulated to the field of political and
social forces and to the struggles between different forces at stake.5
Ideology can only be made sense of, be meaningful, for social theorists, if it is situated
in its historical terrain - a terrain defined by class relations. This in itself is an
impeccably marxist approach, and in effect it reclaims Granisci for that tradition. At the
same time it separates him from later elucidations of autonomous ideology, notably in
the work of Louis Althusser.
Two further points need to be emphasised on the basis of Gramsci's approach to
ideology. First, this historically defined dynamism means that classes can easily be
crosscut by a series of conflicting ideologies, reflecting the conflict of perceived
interests at any given moment. As a result the unity of a class is something which
needs to be produced or constructed through the conscious articulation of class-based
ideologies. Secondly, and following on from this, different classes may combine
through what Hall has called a process of "tendential alignment". 6
 Different classes
may be attracted to the same ideology, even though their perception of what that
ideology means may differ. This kind of alignment is again dependent upon historical
conditions.
I have highlighted these points because I believe that they are particularly pertinent in an
analysis of the class at the centre of this thesis - the colonially-constructed Hindu
middle class. This class developed rapidly during the nineteenth century and
established itself as the class of "natural leadership" as India moved towards
independence in the twentieth century. By employing the "fertilising impact" of these
Gramscian ideas, it is hoped that adequate theories of the development of this class can
be established. Of course, this class has been theorised many times before within
Indian historiography, but I believe that Hindu nationalism still poses a major problem
for an understanding of how this class developed.7 Already in this overview of
Gramscian theory, some conceptual space is evident for an understanding of how the
Hall, "The Problem of Ideology: Marxism without Guarantees" (in Morley and Chen, Stuart
Hall Critical Dialogues in Cultural Studies, pp. 25-46), p. 42.6	 ibid.
7	 For examples of a variety of approaches towards the middle class, see B. McCully, English
Education and the Origins of Indian Nationalism (P. Smith, New York, 1966); C.
Heimsath, Indian Nationalism and Hindu Social Reform (Princeton University Press,
Princeton, 1964); A. Seal, Emergence of Indian Nationalism: Competition and
Collaboration in the later Nineteenth Century (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
1968); A.R. Desai, Social Background of indian Nationalism (Popular Prakashan, Bombay,
1976), esp. chapter XI, pp. 174-220. Sumit Sarkar provides a general critique of these
approaches in his Modern India; see esp. chapter 111, pp. 43-100. Douglas Haynes has
developed a significant new "ethnohistorical" approach to middle class politics in his Rhetoric
and Ritual in Colonial India, but the ideology of Hindu nationalism is not examined in detail;
see esp. the chapter on communalism, pp. 261-284.
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middle class managed to produce such radically different ideologies - Hindu
nationalism and Indian nationalism - over the same period of time. One of the principal
objectives of this thesis will be to explain how this development occurred.
In addition, the articulation of Gramscian theories serves to emphasise the complexity
of the process through which ideologies are produced on a material level. Emphasising
this complexity is necessary because of the tendency in some recent work to perceive
the emergence of 1-lindu nationalism as a relatively straightforward 'reflection' of the
interests of a particular group. Most significant is Christophe Jaffrelot's view that
Hindu nationalism "reflects the Brahminical view of the (nineteenth century) high caste
reformers who shaped its ideology".8 Jaffrelot looks to draw a direct line particularly
from the reformism of the Arya Samaj to Hindu nationalists of the twenties and later.9
This formulation draws on conceptions of ideology developed by the anthropologist
Clifford Geertz. Geertz perceives ideology as a conscious "construction of schematic
images of social order" - symbols or metaphors - as a means of rationalising change in
a modernising society.'° Despite his insistence that "the function of ideology is to
make an autonomous politics possible", however, Geertz is curiously reticent in
defining its relationship to class - a point acknowledged by Jaffrclot' 1 - and also to
colonialism, despite the fact that much of his work draws on the ethnology of post-
colonial South East Asia. This reticence engenders a limited perception of ideology. It
emerges as a facet of culture, a reinterpretation appropriated as a means of establishing
and defending that culture in the face of rapid change (for Geertz, this rapidity appears
to be the most significant aspect of change in colonial and post-colonial society).
Although this may be an attractive model for the interpretation of Hindu nationalism, it
does not encompass the complexities of the problem. No model can do so, I would
say, if it does not adequately address such crucial issues as class and colonialism as
factors in this historical development.
Referring back to Gramsci and the extension of his work (particularly in relation to
culture) by Stuart Hall, ideology can be resituated in a far more strategic relation to
culture itself. In this conception, ideology means the "mental frameworks -
the languages, the concepts, categories, imagery of thought, and the
systems of representation - which different classes and social groups
8	 Jaffrelot, The Hindu Nationalist Movement in India, p. 13.
see Jaffrelot, The Hindu Nationalist Movement in India, p. 11.
10	 Geertz, The Interpretation 0/Culture (Fontana, London, 1993), p. 2 18-9.11	 See Jaffrelot, The Hindu Nationalist Movement in India, p.l2: "neither Geertz nor Fallers
places sufficient emphasis on the social background of the reinterpreters who shape
ideologies".
17
deploy in order to make sense of, define, figure out and render
intelligible the way society works.12
The fundamental position that ideology assumes here in relation to people's perception
of the world means that far from being an aspect of culture, ideology is a means
through which culture is defined. What is perceived as culture is dependent upon the
dominance of particular ideologies. To understand the emergence of Hindu nationalism
and its powerful cultural symbolism, therefore, it is necessary to analyse the blend and
clash of ideologies, and their relationship with particular social forces on the historical
terrain of colonial India.
2.2 Hegemony and the Colonial State
In Gramsci's Prison Notebooks, the state is defined as
the entire complex of practical and theoretical activities with which the
ruling class not only justifies and maintains its dominance, but manages
to win the active consensus of those over whom it rules.13
It is in this area of 'active consensus' that the concept of hegemony is located. In
polemical response to the economism of the Second International, and on the basis of
the historical experience of the proletariat in Italy and other western capitalist
formations, Gramsci formulated the concept of hegemony as a mechanism of discursive
dominance over the whole complex of social relations in a given societal formation.
Consent appears in this context as "a psychological state involving some kind of
acceptance - not necessarily explicit - of the socio-political order or of certain vital
aspects of that order". 14 In the western advanced capitalist context, this acceptance is
conceived of as being based on the recognition (implicit or explicit) of national interests:
The development and expansion of the particular (ruling or hegemonic)
group are conceived of, and presented, as being the motor force of a
universal expansion, of a development of all the 'national' energies.15
It is by establishing this consent, by articulating to "its discourse the overwhelming
majority of ideological elements" within society, and hence becoming "the class
expressing the national interest" 16, that a particular class or social bloc becomes
hegemonic. The struggle for domination in society, then, is underwritten by a struggle
to gain hegemonic control over other strategic social blocs.
12	 HaIl, "The Problem of Ideology: Marxism without Guarantees", p. 26.13	 Grainsci, Selections from Prison Notebooks, p. 244.
14	
.7. Femia, Gramsci's Political Thought (Clarendon, Oxford, 1981), p. 37.
15	 C. Mouffe, "Hegemony and Ideology in Gramsci" (in Mouffe [ed.l, Gramsci and Marxist
Theory, Routledge, London, 1979, pp. 168-204), p. 181.
16	 Mouffe, "Hegemony and Ideology in Granisci", p. 195.
18
The difference between domination and hegemony was emphasised by Gramsci in his
later writings. A class may dominate by virtue of its control of repressive state
apparatuses, whilst relinquishing its hegemonic control to a leading group in society.17
Hegemony here is itself an area of struggle, an area where the dynamic ideologies of
different social blocs fight for popular consent.
The state is nevertheless the most powerful player in this area of struggle, because of
the extent of its material structure. Hegemony is attained through the 'expansion of the
state' in terms of the increased sophistication of civil society. 18 In this context civil
society may be perceived as
the private 'network' of the state through which it organises the whole
of social reproduction, permeating all forms of organisations and mass-
consciousness and provoking a 'diffusion of hegemony' at all levels of
society"9
The structure of the state, then, is radically expanded. It is a structure which touches
"all levels of society"; its power must be seen as having an implicit effect on
consciousness, or, more specifically, as moulding the discursive possibilities of the
latter.20 Civil society becomes a means of reproducing ideological domination.
This conception of the state and its relation to society has emerged as influential in
modern Indian historiography over recent years. It is part of a wider project to utilise
Gramscian ideas as a basis for understanding the processes of Indian history. 21 This
project is problematic in terms of the relevance or applicability of Gramscian ideas to a
context of colonial underdevelopment, because Gramsci worked on features of
advanced capitalist development in the West, and especially the development of fascism
in Italy. This has led, for example, to the development of the notion of "semi-
hegemony",22
 which places obvious emphasis on the limitation of hegemony in the
17	 Hall, "Gramsci's Relevance for the Study of Race and Ethnicity", p. 425.18	 C. Ruci.-Ghicksmann, Gramsci and the State (Lawrence and Wishart, London, 980), p. 92.19	 Mouffe, "Grainsci Today" (in Mouffe [ed.], Gramsci and Marxist Theory, Routledge, London,
1979, pp. 1-18). p. 5.20 As Mouffe notes, it is this Graxnscian conception of power that informs the work of Foucault,
Derrida, Said, on the structure of power and knowledge in capitalist and colonialist society; see
"Hegemony and Ideology in Gramsci", p. 201.
21	 See Bipan Chandra, "The Long-Term Dynamics of the Indian National Congress - Presidential
Address" (Proceedings of the Indian History Congress, 1985); Partha Chatterjee's two books,
Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World (Zed Books, London, 1986) and The Nation and
its Fragments, (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1993); Bhagwan Josh and Shashi
Joshi, Struggle for Hegemony in India Vols. I - III (Sage, New Delhi, 1992-4); Shula Marks
and Dagmar Engels (eds.), Contesting Colonial Hegemony in Africa and india (British
Academic Press, London, 1994); and the Subaltern Studies Volumes 1 - VIII (Oxford
University Press, Delhi, 1982-1994). For a cogent critique of the use of Gramscian concepts
in this context, see Aijaz Ahmed, "Fascism and National Culture: Reading Gramsci in the
Days of Hindutva" (Social Scientist, Vol. 21, Nos. 3-4, 1993, pp. 32-68).22	 See Bipan Chandra, "The Long-Term Dynamics of the Indian National Congress", and Josh
& Joshi, Struggle for Hegemony In India Vols. I - Ill.
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colonial context. Force remained the "ultimate sanction" of British rule in India, and at
times of crisis hegemonic rule could be withdrawn to reveal "the mailed fist beneath the
glove".23 The problem with this notion of semi-hegemony is that it says very little
about the actual nature of hegemony in the context of colonialism. The idea of the state
revealing a repressive side is not peculiar to colonialism, nor is the notion of limited
ideological power. Referring again to Hall, it may be seen that Gramscian hegemony is
perceived precisely as an area of struggle within society, and the state is continually
shifting its stance to respond to specific, historically-produced situations. In this
expanded notion of hegemony, "there is no pure case of coercion/consent - only
different combinations of the two dimensions".24 Unless there is something specific in
the nature of colonial coercion, then, it appears that semi-hegemony is an unnecessary
theorisation of the process,
This problem of the relationship between hegemony and coercion is cited by Sudipta
Kaviraj as part of the reason for his reluctance to use the term in an Indian context.25
The polarisation of these terms in modem historiography, he says, renders hegemony
as "an ahistorical taxonomic device" - i.e. any political state of affairs which is not
coercive must therefore be hegemonic, and vice versa. Rightly, he explains that the
Gramscian concept is far more subtle, and constitutes a "deeply historically indexed"
model for state/society relations. Because of this historical indexing, Kaviraj is
reluctant to transplant hegemony from its context of high capitalism; "it must be
resistant", he says, "to an easy shift to an explanation of imperial hegemony, except in
some limited and specific ways."26
Leaving aside for a minute Hall's argument for the 'fertilising impact' of Gramsci's
work, it is useful to examine some of the arguments cited by Kaviraj for this resistance.
First, he notes the lack of any "single order common sense" in "traditional Hindu
society", which prevents the development of a homogemsed culture, the pattem of
development in capitalist hegemony. Whether, this is the pattem of development in
capitalist hegemony, however, is not sufficiently argued. Stuart Hall has noted that
common sense forms a kind of battleground, "on which more coherent ideologies and
philosophies must contend for mastery". 27 This implies a fragmented, shifting notion
of common sense in capitalism. Furthermore, it has been argued by P.K. L)utta that
Gramsci perceived a series of "common senses", representing the world view of
23	 Bipan Chandra, "The Long-Term Dynamics of the Indian National Congress", p. 9.
24	 Hall, "Gramsci's Relevance for the Study of Race and Ethnicity", p. 426.25	 See Sudipta Kaviraj, "On the Construction of Colonial Power Structure, Discourse,
Hegemony" (in Marks and Engels, Contesting Colonial Hegemony, pp. 19-54), pp. 51-4.
26	 Kaviraj, "On the Construction of Colonial Power", p. 52.27	 Hall, "Oramsci's Relevance for the Study of Race and Ethnicity", p. 431.
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competing social blocs in society. 28 The idea of a "single order common sense" in
capitalist hegemony, then, is by no means a given.
Kaviraj 's second limitation is particularly interesting. Because of the alien nature of the
regime, colonial rule was unable to penetrate fully the complex tissue of Indian culture;
its primary means of control, therefore, was through the "forcible integration of the
segmentary productive regimes of rural India into an integrated economy". 29
 This is
not to say that the colonial state did not have a hegemonic arrangement - indeed, Kaviraj
appears to suggest that such an arrangement was inevitable, because ultimately the
ruling class was a part of the bourgeois political order in Europe. But it was limited in
its effect to the new middle class, who "related themselves to imperial authority in a
way reminiscent of the typical hegemonic construction". Unfortunately, Kaviraj
suggests, the middle class failed the state in that it was unable to transmit hegemony,
through a 'trickle down' process, to the myriad forms of subaltern class discourse.
Two points should be made on the basis of Kaviraj's argument here. First, despite his
position in relation to hegemony in India, Kaviraj notes that the state had to have a
hegemonic arrangement, because ultimately it was configured by a political formation
(i.e. British capitalist democracy) with hegemony at its heart. Here stands a case for
the theoretical accommodation of hegemony on its own. 30 Despite making the point,
however, Kaviraj is reluctant to use the term due to what he perceives as the failure of
state hegemony to succeed in India. In a sense this is beside the point. If the state is
configured in this way, it must be considered as a feature of the socio-political terrain.
This is particularly so, of course, in the context of Indian nationalism and its position
vis-a vis the state, but it is also true of other forms of socio-political discourse. The
ramifications of the state's hegemonic arrangement were felt deep within indigenous
society.
This leads us to the second point to be drawn from Kaviraj's argument. Hegemony
may be (reluctantly) admitted in an Indian context, he says, but only in as much as it
affected the middle class. This form of hegemony is reminiscent of what Femia
28	 P.K. Dutta, "Dying Hindus' - Production of Hindu Communal Common Sense in Early 20th
Century Bengal" (in Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 28, No. 25, 19 June 1993,
pp. 1305-1319), p. 1305.29	 Kaviraj, "On the Construction of Colonial Power", p. 53.30	 This is a more convincing argument than the idea that hegemony was an "objective
necessity", because of the sheer size of the subordinate population in relation to the ruling
class (see Bipan Chandra, "The Long-Term Dynamics of the Indian National Congress", p.
10); Kaviraj himself indicates this: "eaiiy nationalist writers often wondered how a large
society like 'India' could be colonised and held by such a small gmup of British people. ...The
simple answer to the puzzle...was that of course there was no pre-existing India which was
conquered by British rule." See "On the Construction of Colonial Power", p. 32.
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identifies as 'minimal hegemony' in Gramsci's work. Gramsci had developed the
concept in the context of the Risorgimento, where "the hegemony of the moderates
extended only to other sections of their own bourgeois class.. .(and) never managed to
reach down to the masses and construct a truly national community." 3 ' Here,
hegemony is extended only to the economic, political, and intellectual elite, whilst
maintaining a principally coercive control over the mass of the population. Whereas
Gramsci recognises the state strategy of the Risorgimento as class alliance, however,
Kaviraj is suggesting not so much an alliance as a structural limitation, born out of the
alien nature of the state - its inability to penetrate indigenous culture. Again, this is
perceived as a 'failure' of the state's hegemonic project - a failure brokered, however,
by the indigenous middle class. As in so much recent histoiiography, this perception is
too ready to dismiss the significance and power of the middle class in colonial society.
Recent emphasis on subaltern movements has re-focused historiographical lenses on
moments of history outside the straightforward narrative of the middle class, male-
dominated national movement - on to the "real" history of India under colonial rule, the
history of popular movements and popular discourse. Welcome though this re-focus
is, it has tended to obscure the vitality of the colonial middle class, and its fascinating
position in the complex of colonial power. The limitation of hegemonic influence that
Kaviraj suggests is, I would say, questionable, but even if this limitation is accepted, it
must still be admitted that hegemony is a significant factor in the structure of colonial
rule, precisely because of the critical position of this middle class.
But what, alter all, was so critical about this position? As has already been suggested,
the point of departure for the construction of hegemony in the colonial context was the
hegemony of the metropolis. The British state, itself developing increasingly
sophisticated hegemonic structures during the nineteenth century, gradually transposed
a mechanism of hegemony in areas of colonial control. As noted earlier, the increasing
influence of hegemony is fostered by the "expansion of the state". The most decisive
role in this process of expansion is played by the bureauracy, an "essential form of
internal organisation of the dominant social bloc, enabling a leading class to root
organically in the masses the state machine that it wields".32 The state's development
of bureaucratic control, so characteristic of British Indian government, hence assumes a
critical position:
As a real link between state and civil society, the bureaucracy appears as
the mediating element in a new society/state relation... . As a factor of
social and political unification, it functions as an instrument of
31	 Femia, Gramsci's Political Thought, p. 47.32	 L. Paggi, quoted in Buci-Glucksmann, Gramsci and the State, p. 102.
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hegemony in the state apparatus and as bureaucratic unification of the
power bloc.33
What is most interesting here is the identification of the bureaucracy as a mediating
force in the formation of a 'new society/state relation'. The complex administrative
structure of the state renders it increasingly abstract, divorced from individuals or
personalities. In India this objectification of the state was facilitated by the development
of other hegemonic cornerstones: features such as the law, the education system and the
development of infrastructure and with it the systematisation of trade. 34 These factors
contributed to the promotion of what Carl Boggs has called a "rational-legal culture"
that attempted to "permeate all spheres of society...rendering the general population
loyal, fragmented and depoliticised". 35 It is in the heart of this "rational-legal culture"
constructed by the state that the middle class - English-educated and profession-oriented
- emerged to fulfil the possibilities of the new terrain. I am not, however, suggesting
here that the middle class was the only class affected by this culture. The influence of
the "rational-legal culture" was necessarily more penetrating than that. But nevertheless
it can be asserted that the middle class secured for themselves the most strategic
positions in the new terrain, They became, as it were, functionaries in the expansion of
the state, and as such held a position of uniqtie power.
Nowhere is this power more evident than in their occupation, or even control, of what I
shall call the "public space" of colonial society. A variety of historians and political
scientists have referred to some form of public terrain as pivotal in Indian socio-political
life during the colonial period. Sandria Freitag has built a strong case for the
emergence of a "public arena" in India after the withdrawal of the East india Company
from its role as patron of religion and collective ritual. This space, from which the state
had consciously retreated as part of its developing strategy of religious neutrality during
the nineteenth century, became an alternative, indigenous arena for the construction of
communal identities.36 Partha Chatterjee has recently drawn a distinction between the
discourse of nationalism in the public and the private domain: the former being a
domain which was governed by the colonial projection of rationalised modernity,
where nationalist efforts served only to" institute and ramify the characteristically
modern forms of disciplinary power". 37 Sudipta Kaviraj also refers to the public
Buci-Glucksmann, ibid.
Bhagwan Josh cites the law as the fundamental cornerstone of hegemonic rule: "This pnnci pie
(the rule of law) became the first plank on which the ideological apparatus and the colonial
state itself was to be evolved." Struggle for Hegemony in India, Vol. II p. 27.
Boggs, Gramsci's Marxism, p. 45.36	 Freitag, Collective Action and Community.
See Chatterjee, The Nation and its Fragments, p. 74-5; this distinction is part of a wider
separation of 'material' and 'spiritual' nationalism in this book - a separation which will be
examined presently.
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sphere as a concept "central to the enterprise of modernity". Kaviraj 'S public realm
"stretches from judicial processes on one side to the consumption of the novel on the
other", and although he has not elaborated it, it is clear that it is an idea of central
significance in the history of ideas of colonial India.38
The scope of Kaviraj's theme here indicates the kind of public space I would like to
develop, and hold as central to the objectives of this thesis, in that I see the images of
organisation to which Hindu nationalists were drawn as images fashioned largely in
this space. The public space to which I will be referring was an element of the
"rational-legal" culture of the state, part of its hegemonic arrangement. 39 As a feature
of the expanding, objectified state, then, the public space was necessarily "non-
religious" - a neutral zone, as it were - although this did not prevent the articulation of
religious issues within it. Indeed, it will be demonstrated that the self-conscious
neutrality of this zone encouraged the articulation of religious issues in a particular
manner.
The function of the public space was to give the indigenous population the opportunity
to address the state - directly or indirectly - in a systematic fashion. This may be
through a variety of channels: the press - the most important feature of the public space;
the law courts; petitions and memorials; literature and art; the actions and policies of
legally-constituted organisations (political, social, religious etc.); and, progressively,
through representation and electoral politics. 40 What distinguishes this space from
Freitag's is that it was a space over which the state attempted to wield self-conscious
authority - widening or narrowing the space, changing its shape in various areas, as it
saw fit, and according to what it perceived as the responsibility of those who used it.41
38	 Kaviraj, "On the Construction of Colonial Power", p. 34, n. 30.
This close relationship between the public space and the state's hegemonic arrangement is a
possible departure from Kaviraj's theme, as it appears to conflict with his perception of the
limited influence of this arrangement.
40	 Josh notes that constitutional development in India was characterised by 'deferred instalment
payment' - successive instalments of representative power being released in 1861, 1892, 1909,
1919, 1935, and finally 1947. See Struggle for Hegemony in India Vol. 11 p. 44.41	 Interestingly, a similar idea is brought out by Kaviraj as a feature of the work of the Bengali
social theorist of the late nineteenth century, Bhudev Mukhopadhyay. Kaviraj notes that
Bhudev saw Western political life as "based on conflict between opposing social forces in a
common public realm," whereas "traditional India did not have such a common public realm
in the strict sense; it contained groups living in their own public arenas, avoiding contact with
others, rather than settling conflicts by appeal to a common sovereign." Resistance to
colonial incursions into indigenous social and economic life, Bhudev suggested, should be
effected through "withdraw(al) from the public realm of the colonial state. Because whatever is
rendered public in this sense, immediately becomes amenable to colonial control." See
Kavizuj, "The Reversal of Orientalism: Bhudev Mukhopadhyay and the Project of Indigenist
Social Theory" (in Dalmia and von Stietencron, Representing Hinduism: The Construction of
Religious Traditions and National Identity, Sage, New Delhi, 1995, pp. 253-279),
pp. 274, 276.
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This is most ably illustrated by the history of press regulation in India - the way in
which repression was periodically used as a means of controlling the thrust of press
comment.42 It is also evident in the manner in which petitions and memorials were
rigidly formularised, subjected to rigorous vetting and arbitrary re-routing, according to
the interpretation of colonial officials.43
This space is also distinguishable from Chatterjee's public domain, in that it
encompasses far more than the articulation of opposition to government. It is a space in
which discourses contend not only with the state, but also with each other, and also,
needless to say, in support of the state. In this sense, it operates as a state-regulated
framework for one form of indigenous debate. At the same time, however, it is a
potentially subversive space, because of its very position as an aspect of hegemonic
control. As Rosalind O'Hanlon has pointed out in her extensive critique of Subaltern
Studies, "colonial discourse" came into being not as a result of straightforward
domination, but rather of struggle between the state, its native informants and those
with influence over the latter. "This struggle", she says,
was the Site not only of contested understandings , but also of deliberate
misrepresentation and manipulation, in which the seemingly omnipotent
classifications of the Orientalist were vulnerable to purposeful
misconstruction and appropriation to uses which he never intended,
precisely because they had incorporated into them the readings and the
political concerns of his native informants.'14
This view gives us an indication of the subtlety of Gramscian hegemony. O'Hanlon
describes it as a site of power governed by struggle or contestation. The colonial
context heightens this element of struggle, precisely because of the alienness of the
ruling elite. Knowledge and its transference from native to master was an area replete
with tension, in which the superior socio-cultural knowledge of the native was
42	 For examples of this process during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, see G.R.
Thursby, Hindu-Muslim Relations in British India: a Study of Controversy, Conflict and
Communal Movements in Northern India 1923-1928 (Brill, Leiden, 1975), Section 1L2,
"Government Control of Publications", pp. 19-31.
A good example of the way in which Memorials and Petitions were adjusted in this manner is
provided by the Government of India's review of Memorials in the late 1880s. This review
was designed to cut down the number of Memorials and Petitions requiring the consideration
of the Central Government, the Secretary of State or the British Parliament; by 1889 Local
Government had the power to withhold petitions on a number of accounts, including "when a
petition contains language which, in the opinion of the Local Government, is disloyal,
disrespectful or improper." See "Memorials to Her Majesty's Secretary of State and
Government of India", Central Provinces Secretariat Records, General Department
Compilation No. 218 of 1889.
'	 R. O'Hanlon, "Recovering the Subject: Subaltern Studies and Histories of Resistance in
Colonial South Asia" (in Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 22, 1988, pp. 189-224), p.217. A
similar point is brought out by Christopher Bayly in his Empire and Information: Intelligence
Gathering and Social Communication in india 1780-1870 (Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 1996); hegemony, he says, was "never absolute", and the creation of colonial
knowledge must be seen as a "dialogic process" (p. 370).
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particularly powerful. The public space constituted the most consistent domain for the
articulation of this struggle: a space where the framework of colonial civil society was
confronted by the knowledge of the indigenous middle class. The tension thus created
is illustrated by the state's attempts to codify religion and caste (to envelop and
neutralise indigenous knowledge) through the census.45 As we shall see in Chapter 4,
setting the boundaries of Hinduism was a consistent problem for colonial officials in
this exercise, particularly in terms of situating low castes and tribal groups in relation to
the religion. A major element of this problem was the propensity of enumerators to
make their own judgements on the issue. The Report on the 1881 Census, for
example, complained that
Many of the more bigoted high caste Hindoos employed as census
enumerators or supervisors objected to record such low persons as of
the Hindoo religion. This was illustrated by numerous instances
brought to my notice of such persons having been recorded as of the
Dher, Mang or Chandal religion by mere repetition of their caste in the
column for religion. Possibly some in their humility and ignorance may
not even have claimed to be of the Hindoo religion. More probably they
were not even asked.46
Here, then, the acquisition of colonial knowledge was disrupted by the intervention of a
self-confidently independent understanding ("bigoted" or otherwise) of the field. The
census enumerators - mostly school teachers and other local professionals, archetypal
members of the colonial middle class47
 - used their position as prime movers in the
public space to translate and transform, unpick and subvert the mechanics of colonial
discourse. In this sense, then, the space must be located as an area of ideological
struggle, in which, again, the middle class holds a privileged position. It is to the
development of the ideologies of nationalism and communalism within this space which
I will now turn.
'	 For elaborations of this theme of the census as a paradigm of colonialist knowledge as power,
see B. Cohn , An Anthropologist among the Historians and Other Essays (Oxford University
Press, Delhi, 1987), esp. chapter 10, "The Census, Social Structure and Objectification in
South Asia", pp. 224-254; also B. Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the
Origins and Spread of Natkmalism (Verso, London, 1991), chapter 10, "Census, Map,
Museum", pp. 163-186.46	 Report on the Census of British india taken on 17 February 1881, Vol. I (HMSO, London
1883), p. 17. This source will be referred to hereafter as Census of India 1881, Vol. I, India.
'	 It should be noted that the position of census enumerator was a voluntary one; it was
therefore limited to those literate Indians with enough leisure to devote time to this activity,
and also those with a sense of the value of the census as a feature of administrative order.
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2.3 Nationalism and Communalism
Many historians of modem India prior to the 1980s made a fundamental linkage
between nationalism, modemisation and the middle class.48 The pattern of nationalist
development held the key to the pattern of modemisation in the country, and this whole
project was overseen by the politically-conscious middle class, mediating the
complexities of modemisation for the rest of the country. This kind of linkage is also
evident in much of the theoretical work that has been done on the concept of
nationalism. It has been summarised in A.D. Smith's Theories of Nationalism. More
recently, Ernest Geliner's work, Nations and Nationalism, and Benedict Anderson's
Imagined Communities have confirmed the power of the linkage, where the old world
of religious sensibility is undermined, supplanted by the modern Weltenschaung of
nationalism, fuelled by the development of the capitalist economy in Europe. 49
 For
Anderson, the middle class connection is exemplified by the centrality of his concept of
"print capitalism", and the consequent liberation of the literate classes from the
limitations of religious truth languages.5°
From the early '80s, however, an important movement in Indian historiography has
disrupted the predominance of this linkage. The defining principle of the Subaltern
Studies series has been to deconstruct the idea that the history of Indian nationalism
consisted of the "spiritual biography of the Indian elite", 51 that the mass of the
population had little or no agency in the struggle for liberation. In its place, Subaltern
Studies has concentrated on constructing a history of nationalism that is disparate,
fragmented, powerfully subversive - the history of working class, peasant, low caste
and women's resistance not only to the state, but to a variety of oppressions within the
framework of colonial society.52 Because of its polemical position in relation to "elite-
based" forms of historiography, one important point about the trajectory of Subaltern
Studies is often overlooked: it does not deny the validity or significance of middle
class/elite history, nor does it posit an empirical separation of elite and subaltern
48	 This is evident, for example, in the analysis of the Marxist A.R. Desai; see his Social
Background of Indian Nationalism, pp. 432-442.
'	 Smith, Theories of Nationalism (Duckworth, London, 1971); Gellner, Nations and
Nationalism (Blackwell, Oxford. 1983); Anderson, imagined Communities.
On religious truth languages and their limitations, see Imagined Communities pp. 12-19 and
pp. 22-23; on the "revolutionary vernacularising thrust" of print capitalism, see pp. 37-46
Guha, "On Some Aspects of the Historiography of Colonial India" (in Gulia [ed.], Subaltern
Studies I, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1982, pp. 1-8), p. 2.52	 See Subaltern Studies I - VIII (Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1982 - 1994); for elaborations
of the fragmentary view of modern Indian history, see Chatterjee, The Nation and its
Fragments, and Pandey, "In Defence of the Fragment: Writing about Hindu-Muslim Riots in
IndiaToday" (Economic and Political Weekly, Annual Number, March 1991, pp. 559-572).
On the history of women in the colonial period, see K. Sangari and S. Vaid (eds.), Recasting
Women: Essays in Colonial History (Kali for Women, New Delhi, 1989).
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politics. As Ranajit Guha states, "there was a great deal of overlap" between these two
domains; an overlap which occasionally manifested itself in anti-imperialist struggle,
"with some splendid results", but also implied a more continuous flow of ideological
formations.53 As has already been made clear, this thesis aims to focus on the
development of ideologies associated with the middle class; a Gramscian interpretation
of the state must recognise the importance of this class, strategically placed in the
domain of hegemonic politics, close to the focal points of power. It is necessary to
state, however, that this emphasis does not imply a contradiction of the significance of
subaltern movements. On the contrary, it is hoped that the analysis will contribute to
historical perspectives on such movements.54
One feature which Subaltern Studies has held in common with what it calls "elitist
historiography" is the centrality of the notion of the "nation-in-making" in modern
Indian history. Guha makes it clear in his opening statement that the "failure of the
nation to come to its own" constitutes the "central problematic" for historians of modern
India.55 The development of the country towards nationhood, then, must form the
framework for the interpretation of history. Communalism in this perspective is seen
as specifically anti-national, a set of ideologies ranged precisely against the emerging
hegemony of the nation as one. This is certainly also true of nationalist and marxist
historiography, if not of the colonialist school. As Peter van der Veer has recently
shown, however, this is a problematic polarisation, in that it places religious
nationalism in the position of a traditional, reactionary force, holding back the
modernity of Indian nationalism. 56 A good deal of work has argued that this
opposition of modernity and tradition is a distorted model, and that traditional social
and political formations are an integral part of the project of modernity. 57
 Van der Veer
53	 Guha, "On Some Aspects of the 1-listonography of Colonial India", p.6; see also G. Pandey,
Construction of Communalism in Colonial North India, p.19.
-	 Part of Rosalind O'Hanlon's critique of Subaltern Studies is based on what she sees as a
failure to adequately accommodate hegemony as a theory of colonial power; see "Recovering
the Subject: Subaltern Studies and 1-listones of Resistance in Colonial South Asia", p.215.
Guha, "On Some Aspects of the Historiography of Colonial India", p.7.
56 Van der Veer, Religious Nationalism: Hindus and Muslims in lndia (University of California
Press, Berkeley, 1994) p.22-3; this point is similarly made by Pandey in "In Defence of the
Fragment: Writing about Hindu-Muslim Riots in India Today", p.559.
''	 See, for example, L. & S. Rudolph, The Modernity of Tradition: Political Development in
India (Chicago University Press, Chicago, 1967); E. Hobsbawm and T. Ranger (eds.), The
Invention of Tradition (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1983); P. Chatterjee,
Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World; T. Raychaudhuri, Europe Reconsidered:
Perceptions of the West in Nineteenth Century Bengal (Oxford University Press, Delhi,
1988); S. KavIraj, "The Reversal of Orientalism", p. 278: Kaviraj points to Bhudev
Mukhopadhyay's awareness of "the historicity of traditions, despite their own pretence of
immutability". "Traditions survive," he continues, "despite their own delusions, by coming
to terms with the unprecedented and surprising in their history." On the relationship between
tradition and modernity particularly in the context of constructions of history in colonial India,
see Kaviraj, The Unhappy Consciousness: Bankimchandra Chattopadhyay and the Formation
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has gone further, by arguing that communalism and nationalism are simply radical and
moderate tendencies within the same ideology of nationalism. "The moderates," he
says, "accept cultural pluralism and equality among different religious communities
within the nation, while the radicals see the nation as the community of co-religionists."
It is all part of the same conception of nationalism, which for van der Veer is based on
pre-colonial notions of religious community.
Although this questioning of the polarity of communalism and nationalism, tradition
and modernity, is helpful, the second part of van der Veer's argument appears to be
dangerously close to the colonialist notion that Indian nationalism was in fact inherently
communal, because of the primordial antagonism of various religious cultures. This is
certainly not an intentional proximity, as he is at pains to point out, but nevertheless his
employment of the model of a linear scale of nationalism limits his options. On this
basis, for example, he rejects the validity of secular nationalism, in that it fails
adequately to accommodate religion as an aspect of Indian national identity. This is an
argument developed from the work of T.N. Madan and other sociologists opposed to
the viability of secularism in Indian society. 58 But it is the linear model that demands
it, as secularism cannot be accommodated in the 'moderate to radical' scale, with its
implication of the common denominator of religious identity.
The problem in identifying communalism as what van der Veer calls "only a form of
nationalism", in which "a common religion . ..is imagined as the basis of group
identity", is that it fails to acknowledge the flexible nature of this term. Whilst he does
refer to Gyanendra Pandey's identification of communalism as "an orientalist term",
produced as a form of colonialist knowledge, van der Veer does not pursue Pandey's
argument, which recognises the fact that communalism is not specific to religiously-
configured communities. It is rather a term that is applied to any form of community
that displays an antagonistic stance towards another community, within a colonial or
post-colonial context - religious, yes, but also linguistic and caste based
communities.59
 This hostility, it must be noted, is always directed primarily towards
communities based on the same kind of signifier as their own. The other of the
communalist is a kind of conceptual echo: a linguistic communalist will direct his
hostility towards another linguistic group; a religious communalist towards another
religion, and so on. Communalism, then, is a fairly stark and simple structure. It is
of Nationalist Discourse in India (Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1995), esp. chapter 4,
"Imaginary History", pp. 107-157.
58	 See T.N. Madan "Secularism in its Place" (in Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 46, No. 4,
1987, pp. 747-759); also A. Nandy, "The Politics of Secularism and the Recovery of
Religious Tolerance".
See Pandey, The Construction of Communalism, p. 6-7.
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defined first and foremost by what is other than itself, and that other is principally some
form of conceptual echo of itself. Because of this simplicity, communalism does not
necessarily generate its own ideology; it is more likely, in fact, to appropriate existing
ideologies to extend its form, deepen its impact.
In this thesis I will work on the premise that Hindu communalism - the most significant
form of communalism in India - draws heavily on ideas which may be termed Hindu
nationalist. Hindu communalism, then, is not the same as Hindu nationalism - it is
rather that the latter provides the ideological tools for the development and extension of
the former. Let me make the distinction clear:
1.Hindu nationalism is defined as a set of ideologies that seek to imagine or construct a
community (i.e. a nation) on the basis of a common culture - a culture configured by a
particular notion of Hinduism.
2. Hindu communalism is an ideological structure that aligns the interests of this
community - social, cultural, political, economic - precisely against the interests of
other religious communities, particularly, of course, the Indian Muslims.
It is important to make this distinction firstly in order to avoid the kind of conceptual
straight jacket supplied both by a straightforward polarisation of nationalism and
communalism, and by van der Veer's linear model. Secondly, it allows for the
exploration of an ideological development in the nineteenth and early twentieth century -
that of Hindu nationalism - which is less teleologically burdened. It is widely accepted
that the nineteen twenties constitute the period in which communalism was crystallised
as a systematic factor in the discourse of Indian politics. 60 What I am saying is that this
crystallisation does not constitute the culmination of a process of ideological
development. It rather must be perceived as a process driven by the interplay of several
historical factors, some of them ideological, but also others that were structural, "event-
led", and even external to indigenous politics. The ideology of Hindu nationalism was
of course a major factor in the process, as shall be illustrated - but its development as au
ideology needs to be divorced from the process, as it had, and still has, its own
existence independent of the framework of communalism.
Having established a distinction between Hindu communalism and Hindu nationalism,
I will now consider the issue of the difference between the latter and Indian
nationalism. The nature and extent of this difference is again a matter of some debate.
As has already been noted, Gyanendra Pandey cites the 1920s as the point at which
nationalism begins to be perceived as the opposite of communalism. Before, this, he
60	 See, for example, Pandey, The Construction of Communalism, p. 233.
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says, there was no Indian nationalism as it is now perceived: "a nationalism that stood
above (or outside) the different religious communities, and took as its unit the
individual Indian citizen".61 Before the radical interjection of communalism forced this
articulation into being, he says, the objectives of community and nation were generally
convergent.62
Partha Chatterjee has also argued for a relatively late distinction between the two
ideological streams. 63 He has written of the significance of the creation of a national
culture prior to the formulation of political nationalism. This national culture is
fashioned in the "spiritual" domain, which is opposed to the "material" domain of
economy, state-craft, science and technology - the domain of western superiority.
Chatterjee situates this formulation of national culture in the "second phase" of
reformism in the nineteenth century, when Indians stopped looking to the state to effect
change in traditional institutions and customs, and began to insist on change through
indigenous channels. When political nationalism emerged after the 1880s, it refocused
nationalist attention on the state, without altering the contrapuntal development of
"spiritual" nationalism as an indigenous project. This dislocated development created
the space for the emergence of a truncated national culture - i.e. the culture of Hindu
nationalism.
Christophe Jaifrelot, on the other hand, appears clear in his recognition of Hindu
nationalism as a distinct ideology emerging around the turn of the century in North and
North West India.64 The development of this ideology constitutes the first stage of
what be calls the "birthing" process of Hindu nationalism. The second stage saw the
emergence of Hindu nationalism as a form of political mobilisation that drew on identity
symbols provided by that ideology. This would appear to be a similar model to that
outlined above, but Jaifrelot further theorises his model, by placing it within the
framework of ethnic nationalism.65
 Ethnicity distinguishes Hindu nationalism from the
universalism of Indian nationalist ideology, with its projection of "all individuals, all
communities living within British India" as the nation.
61	 Pandey, The Construction of Communalism, p. 235.
62	 It follows from this that Pandey does not make an ideological distinction between Hindu
nationalism and Hindu communalism; in fact he has also asserted that Hindu nationalism is a
product of the twenties: see "Which of us are Hindus?" (in 0. Pandey [ed.], Hi ndur and Others:
The Question of identity in India Today. Viking Penguin India, New Delhi, 1993, pp. 238-
273), p. 242.
63	 Chauerjee, The Nation and its Fragments, p. 6-13.
64	 5 Jafflot The Hindu Nationalist Movement in India, pp. 11-19; see also his "Hindu
Nationalism: Strategic Syncretism in Ideology Building" (in Economic and Political Weekly,
Vol. 20, Nos. 12-13, 20-27 March 1993, pp. 517-524); and "The Genesis and Development of
Hindu Nationalism in the Punjab: from the Arya Samaj to the Hindu Sabha 1875-1910"
(Indo-ritisFz Review, Vol. 21, No. 1, 1993, p. 3-39)
65	 See .Jaffrelot, The Hindu Nationalist Movement in india, p. 13.
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The framework of ethnicity obliges Jaffrelot to situate Hindu nationalism in relation to
its attendant tensions: most notably, the tension between primordialist and
instrumentalist approaches to the development of ethnic movements. 66
 As a form of
identity, Jaffrelot states that Hindu nationalism was not primordialist, drawing on an
established sense of ethnicity; yet at the same time, it was not instrumentalist, a cynical
construction of the elite, because it does reinterpret themes drawn from the established
tradition of Hinduism. Jaifrelot rather suggests the ideological construction of Hindu
nationalism as a cultural strategy to defend bralunanical hegemony, largely through the
activities of socio-religious reform organisations like the Arya Samaj.67 As it moves
into its second stage of political mobilisation, however, it is more straightforwardly
interpreted as an instrumentalist movement driven by what he calls "ideologically
minded Hindu elites".
To my mind, this projection of Hindu nationalism as ethnic nationalism is problematic,
and an unnecessary theorisation. First, it leaves little room for the development of the
culture of Indian nationalism - the latter is presented as a rather flat political nationalism
that can have no influence over the development of an exciusivist, combative Hindu
sense of ethnicity. This belies the increasing sophistication of Indian nationalism
towards the end of the nineteenth century, and leads Jaffrelot to describe the extremist
strategy of the Congress nationalists Tilak and Aurobindo as a product of their "Hindu
leanings", rather than of their search for more effective strategies in the development of
the struggle against colonialism. 68 Interpreting extremism in this way is reminiscent of
van der Veer's moderate to radical scale of nationalism. Secondly, his emphasis on
Hindu nationalism as a strategy designed to defend Brahmanic hegemony is particularly
problematic in the context of the Arya Samaj, as in its early years around the turn of the
century this organisation faced fierce resistance from precisely those groups - the
established hierarchies of Hinduism - whose interests it is presented as protecting.
But most significantly, although Jaffrelot presents Hindu nationalism as a distinct
ideology in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, he nevertheless states that it
was not "codified" until the early nineteen twenties. By this he means that it was not
until this period that the ideology was consciously articulated, largely through the
written work of V.D. Savarkar.69 This codification constitutes the "second stage" of
66	 On these approaches, see J. Flutchison and A.D. Smith [eds.J, Ethnicity (Oxford University
Press, Oxford, 1996), esp. part II, "Theories of Ethnicity", pp. 32- 105.67	 Jaffrelot, The Hindu Nationalist Movement in India, p. 13: "Hindu nationalism...largely
reflects the Brahminical view of the high caste reformers who shaped its ideology."
68	 Jaifrelot, The Hindu Nationalist Movement in India, p. 17-18.
69	 Jaffrelot, The Hindu Nationalist Movement in india, p. 25.
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the birth of Hindu nationalism, and although it is perceived as different, in that it
represents a straightforward instrumentalist project of the elite, it is not perceived as a
conceptual difference. Communalism emerges simply as a more extreme form of
Hindu nationalism, and the construct of ethnic nationalism is shown to be implemented
differently, only because of the different demands of those "ideologically minded
Hindu elites". Instrumentalism therefore emerges as so central to the development of
Jaffrelot's construct of Hindu nationalism as communalism, that the elaboration of an
earlier form of the ideology seems irrelevant. In this sense the whole category of ethnic
nationalism, with its accompanying baggage of instrumentalism and primordialism,
appears unhelpful as a way of theorising Hindu nationalism, obscuring rather than
clarifying the development of the ideology.
The idea that Hindu nationalism has a distinct history as an ideology (in the sense
mapped out in section 2.1) which is separate from that of Indian nationalism is
nevertheless one which this study will pursue. I will employ this idea, in conjunction
with the idea of communalism as a framework, rather than an autonomous ideology in
itself, in order to analyse the development of Hindu and Indian nationalism as middle
class ideologies in the pre-twenties period. This model emphasises autonomy, without
the historical necessity of implacable opposition. Indeed, the evidence of the nineteenth
and early twentieth century suggests that the two ideologies followed quite similar
patterns of development, and that very often elements of each were expressed by the
same individual. Cases can be cited from the writings and speeches of such figures as
Lajpat Rai, V.D. Savarkar, M.M. Malaviya, Swami Sbraddhanand, where the two
ideologies are seen to blend and clash7 0 This, I would say, reflects their
contemporaneous development on the discursive terrain of middle class consciousness,
and may be said to support the Subaltern Studies perception of the development of
nationalist ideologies as fragmentary, characterised by fissure and contradiction. How
then, is this distinct or autonomous history of Hindu nationalism to be identified? It is
the contention of this study that whereas Indian nationalism developed out of an
identification of the economic impact of colonialism,71 Hindu nationalism developed
out of the singular impact of colonialism on the Hindu religion. It is to this problem
which I will now turn.
70	 Swami Shraddhanand's enthusiasm for the Rowlait Satyagraha is a case in point Heavily
involved in the struggle in Delhi at this time, he states that: 'Por full twenty days it appeared
that Raruraj had set in. ...goondas had ceased to exist; every Hindu woman was treated like his
own mother, sister or daughter by every Musalman and vice versa"; quoted in J.T.F. Jordens,
Swami Shraddhananda: His Life and Causes (Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1981), p. 111.
71	 The definitive statement of this identification is still Bipan Chandra ts Rise and Growth of
Economic Nationalism in India (Peoples Publishing House, New Delhi, 1966).
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2.4 The Hindu Religion in Colonial India
The introduction to Jaffrelot's important study of the Hindu nationalist movement
remarks on the rise of this ideology as a "challenging phenomenon" for social
scientists, because of the incompatibility of Hinduism's "essential characteristics" with
the kind of "closed and monolithic radicalism" that is normally associated with religious
militancy.72 By this, he means the aspect of fundamentalism that characterises such
movements undertaken in the name of Christianity, Judaism or Islam. In contrast to
these faiths, he says, Hinduism does not appear to have the capacity to homogenise
large groups of people, because it is all along charactensed by social, cultural, doctrinal
differentiation. Hinduism is perceived as an inclusivist tradition, and its tendency has
been to accommodate, rather than resist, the presence of other traditions.
Jaffrelot sees the development of Hindu nationalism as occurring in opposition to this
continuing inclusivism. As has already been noted, he perceives it as emerging out of a
strategy of certain high caste Hindus engaged in reformist activities in the late
nineteenth century. His interpretation, then, pits a paradigmatic traditional inclusivism
precisely against the exciusivism of a self consciously modern, westernising influence.
To support this view, Jaffrelot refers to A.D. Smith's typology of nationalisms,
situating Hindu nationalism as an ethnic nationalism evolving in response to European
modernity.73 Smith's ethnic nationalism posits a doubly socialised intelligentsia -
subject to both modern and traditional influences - resorting to the selective usage of
tradition in order to "ensure the survival of the group's cultural identity". 74 There is a
complexity in this notion of modernity and tradition which is not sufficiently
accommodated in this model. I have already referred to work which draws out this
complexity, challenging the historical immutability of tradition, and increasingly
suggesting it as a concept that is part of the project of modernity. Jaffrelot indicates his
awareness of this work in the text, but his implementation of the Smith model leads to
an insufficiently historicised interpretation of some aspects of tradition. For example,
his citation of the "Golden Age" theory as a construction of elites reforming their
traditions does not take account of the specific history of this theory in the Indian
context. As will be illustrated in Chapter 3, the "Golden Age" was a colonial construct
- an image of the Indian past, of Hindu tradition, formulated by Orientalist scholars,
and utilised by the colonial state as a rationalisation of western domination.
	
72	 See Jaifrelot, The Hindu Nationalist Movement in India, p. 1.
	
"3	 See Smith, Theories 0/Nationalism, chapter 10, pp. 230-254.
	
4	 Smith, Theories of Nationalism, p. 217; see also p. 243: the "reformist" response of the
intelligentsia was to "look back...from the outside to discover what is of essential value in the
ancient tradition."
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Judging by his analysis of Dayananda, this observation is not one with which JaIfrelot
would disagree, but it nevertheless indicates an area which his book does not explore:
the area of what might be called structural transformation. In this area, the parameters
of the elite's selective usage of the Hindu tradition - in this case, their articulation of the
Golden Age - was subject to the rapid development of what was perceived as tradition
during this period, by key social groups. My point is that rather than a certain section
of the elite picking and choosing from the "cultural supermarket" of Hindu tradition in
order to satisfy their own needs, throughout the nineteenth century Hinduism was
developing in such a way, within such a framework, that it became a necessary feature
of elite discourse. In particular, it assumed a key position in precisely that area
identified earlier as strategically central for the development of nationalist ideologies -
the colonial public space.
I will illustrate this point by reference to the impact of the colonial legal system on
Hinduism.75 In 1772 Warren Hastings produced a plan for the effective administration
of Bengal which was designed to establish the Company's rule as a recognisable
authority in this foreign land. Hastings' plan, which he explained in a letter to the
Court of Directors, was to
adapt our Regulations to the Manners and Understandings of the
People, and the Exigencies of the Country, adhering as closely as we
are able to their ancient uses and Institutions.76
The plan, then, was to govern according to the "ancient" practices of the Indians
themselves, and in particular to adhere to a legal system which would be recognised as
such. This was consonant with the policy of non-intervention adopted by the company
in relation to indigenous affairs. It also made particular sense for a commercial
company to adhere to recognisable laws related to property, for here was an area where
'	 I use the term "Hinduism" here for clarity's sake, despite clearly anachronistic connotations.
Defining Hinduism is still a matter of debate for contemporary academics; in the late
eighteenth century it was a barely articulated concept. As Romila Thapar has commented,
"Hinduism of the pre-modern period was...not a uniform monolithic religion, but a
juxtaposition of flexible religious sects." See her "Syndicated Moksha?" (in Seminar No.
313, 1985, pp. 14-22), p. 22. For further accounts of the development of the term
"Hinduism" into a meaningful signifier of a particular religious tradition, and also on the
etymology of "Hindu" in general, see W.C. Smith, The Meaning and End 0/Religion
(SPCK, London, 1978), pp. 63-71; R.E. Frykenberg, "Constructions of Hinduism at the
Nexus of History and Religion" (in Journal of Interdisciplinary History Vol. 23, No. 3, 1993,
pp. 523-550); H. von Stietencron, "Relgious Configurations in Pre-Muslim India and the
Modern Concept of Hinduism" (in V. Dalmia and H. von Stietencron [eds.], Representing
Hinduism: the Construction of Religious Traditions and National Identity (Sage, New Delhi,
1995). On defining Hinduism in the context of contemporary Religious Studies, see B.K.
Smith, "Exorcising the Transcendent: Strategies for Defining Hinduism and Religion" (in
History of Religions, Vol. 27, 1987, pp. 32-55).76	 Quoted in B. Cohn, "The Command of Language and the Language of Command" (in Guha
[ed.], Subaltern Studies IV, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1985, pp. 276-329), p. 289.
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disruption would directly affect the Company's ability to operate. A certain
epistemological assumption underpinned Hastings' plan, which is indicated by this use
of the phrase "ancient uses and institutions". This referred to a notion that the legal
system of the indigenous population had "continued unchanged, from remotest
antiquity".77 This was particularly so in relation to civil law (i.e. including law related
to the issue of property), which under Mughal rule had remained the domain of
"traditional community-based institutions".78 As Derrett points out, this way of
conceiving of law implicitly paralleled sha.stric law with ecclesiastical law in England,
which covered marriage and divorce, property , religious worship, excommunication
and so
The problem for Hastings and other administrators in Bengal was that the repositories
of this law were not specified texts (or scripture), but "professors of the shastra", or
pandits. Much of a pandit learning was based on memorised textual material, acquIred
through the oral tradition of Brahmanic learning. The material used ranged from
"technical shastric material, from epics and legends, and from other treatises of
relatively late date (such as puranas, spurious smritis, againas and tantras)
which...played then a valid part in expounding Hinduism as it was lived, learnt and
understood."80 It was, however, not so much the texts themselves, but rather the fact
that thepandit possessed learning based on these texts, which gave him the authority to
pronounce on legal matters. In addition, the extent to which pandits were relied upon
varied considerably from area to area.81 Local custom articulated through panchayats
was often a far more authoritative basis for the practice of law than the rulings of
pandits, although there was certainly a relationship between the two.82
Initially, British courts dealing with civil claims involving Hindus 83 relied solely on the
vyavasthas (written or formal 'opinions') of recognised pandits. Without proper
recourse to the texts upon which the judgements of pandits were based, and not being
'1'	 Quoted in Cohn, "The Command of Language and the Language of Command", p. 290.78	 M. Kishwar, "Codified Hindu Law: Myth and Reality" (in Economic and Political
Weekly, Vol. 29, No. 33, 13 August 1994, pp. 2145-2161), p. 2145
'	 J.D.M. Derrett., Religion, Law and the State in India (Faber, London, 1968), p. 232-4.80	 ibid. On the oral tradition and the shifting status of written texts in Hinduism, see C.
Mackenzie-Brown, "Purana as Scripture: From Sound to Image of the Holy Woni in the Hindu
Tradition" (in History of Religions Vol. 26, No. 1, 1986-7, pp. 68-86).
81	 Deffett, Religion, Law and the State in india, p. 230.
82	 See Rudolph and Rudolph, Modernity of Tradition, p. 270-1.
83	 i.e. as opposed to Muslims - as the shastric code was perceived as a religious code, it had to be
matched by an equivalent code for Muslims, the Sharia. As the Rudolphs have pointed out,
this was again problematic, particularly in Bengal, "where most Muslims...were Hindu
converts who often continued to use local Hindu law rather than Koranic and traditional law
after their conversion," Rudolph and Rudolph, Modernity of Tradition, p. 270.
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able to recognise the authority of legal precedent (stare decisis) ,84 British judges had no
choice but to accept vyavasthas as the basis for judgements in appropriate cases. There
is a central issue of power here. The vyavastha system localised power in the decisions
of the pandits, as opposed to the judgements of Company officials. This was by no
means acceptable, and very quickly after the implementation of Hastings' plan the
Company began to take steps to circumvent or undermine the localised power of the
pandits.
This implicit power of the pandits in the Company's courts was reflected in the unease
with which they were viewed by officials. On the one hand they were respected as
learned professors of the shastra, yet on the other they were distrusted and felt to be
moulding vyavasthas to suit their own interests. This distrust reflected the widely-held
belief that an original and ancient body of shastric law did exist in textual form, and that
the pandits were deliberately obscuring it in order to maintain their position of power.85
The original body of laws was made doubly obscure by the "corruption" it had suffered
over the centuries as a result of interpretations and commentaries. Much of the project
of Sanskritic Studies which developed around the turn of the century was directed
towards the reconstruction of this original code. The Government Sanskrit College,
established at Benaras in 1791, emphasised above all the study of the Dhar,naShastras,
which dealt specifically with sacred law.86
William Jones, who was appointed as a judge in the Calcutta Supreme Court in 1783,
became the first British official to develop a proper command of Sanskrit, and was
largely responsible for the establishment of the first institution for the study of
Indology, the Asiatic Society of Bengal, in 1784. 87 He was motivated by a desire to
introduce consistency into the legal system, and to preserve the "true" laws of the
indigenous population.88
 As such, his major work was to produce a Code or Digest of
Hindu law which would adequately represent the legal aspects of Dharma Shastra.
Throughout, Jones was concerned with revealing a "pure" form of Hindu law, which
84	 Derrett, Religion, Law and the State in India, p. 235 - this lack of recognition was based on a
similar system in British ecclesiastical courts.
85	 Hinduism as a faith deliberately obscured by Bralimans was a common assumption in the 18th
century. See, for example, Alexander Dow, "A Dissertation Concerning the J-Iindoos", in P.S.
Marshall (ed.), The British Discovery of Hinduism in the Eighteenth Century (Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, 1970), pp. 107 - 139; Dow speaks of the "impenetrable veil of
mystery with which the Brahinins industriously cover their religious tenets and philosophy'",
and notes that they are "at so much pains to conceal (their faith)from foreigners" (pp. 107-8).
86	 Nita Kumar, "Sanskrit Pandits and the Modernisation of Sanskrit Education in the 19th-2Oth
Centuries" (Unpublished Seminar Paper, SOAS, London, 1993), p. 13.
87	 See Inden, Imagining India, p. 44.
88	 Derrett, Religion, Law and the State in India, p. 244.
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would allow European judges to make judgements which they could be certain were
correct.
The structure of Jones' thought is revealing. He was intent on "discovering" or
"reconstituting" a system of law which was the true form of that system within the
parameters of Hinduism. Without this, the indigenous population would not be able to
receive properjustice. The true form of the system could only reside in a text, and not
an individual or collective memory, because the latter necessitated interpretation, and
interpretation implicitly suggested the corruption of the original. Text, then, was
central, and since the shastric texts were essentially religious texts, this emphasis on
texts meant an emphasis on scripture. Again, as interpretation implied corruption, the
greatest authority, the truest form of the text, must be the oldest. Antiquity embodied in
scripture was equated with the "real" tradition of the Hindus.
In this way, the system of law which emerged during the nineteenth century developed
a character of immutability based on its association with tradition. Significantly, the
value of this notion of tradition was measured by reference to texts perceived as
scripture, preferably "ancient" scripture. To invoke the rule of law, then, was to call up
a specific discourse of tradition. There are several ways in which this discourse of
tradition began to penetrate the idea of Hindu religiosity. The most obvious is the
critical position of scripture, and of the need to verify actions and events by reference to
this scripture. This is illustrated most pertinently by the debate over sati during the first
three decades of the nineteenth century, particularly between 1818, when Rammohun
Roy published his first work on the subject, and 1829 when it was outlawed by
Bentinck's government.
Recent research by Lata Maui has presented this debate in a light which relates directly
to the foregoing analysis of the development of Hindu law. 89 Math has analysed the
discursive parameters within which the debate over the abolition of sati was articulated;
this analysis indicates just how pervasive the colonial discourse of tradition had become
89	 See Mani's two articles: "The Production of an Official Discourse on Sati in Early 19th
Century Bengal" (in Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 21, No. 17, 26 April 1986,
pp. 32-40; and "Contentious Traditions: the Debate on Sati in Colonial India" (in K. Sangari
and S. Vaid [eds.], Recasting Women: Essays in Colonial History, Kali for Women, New
Delhi, 1989, pp. 88-126). Sheldon Pollock has produced an interesting critique of Mani's
work in his "Deep Orientalism? Notes on Sanskrit and Power beyond the Raj" (in P. van der
Veer and C. Breckenridge [eds.1, Orientalism and the Postcolonial Predicament: Perspectives
on South Asia, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 1993, pp. 76-133). Pollock's
critique is based on his wider argument that "post-orientalist" analysis has hitherto ignored or
even obscured the dynamics of power evident in precolonial social relations. Specifically in
relation to Mani's analysis, he argues against textual tradition as a colonial construct, pointing
to "perhaps a millennium of debate in India over what constitutes 'traditional' textuality and
how local practices interact with that textuality." (p. 100).
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within a relatively short period of time. Initially, the most striking element of her work
is the illustration of how colonial officials and indigenous reformers committed to the
abolition of sati argued not on the basis that it was "cruel" or "barbaric" or "against the
practice of civil society", but rather that it was not sanctioned by authoritative scripture.
As Mam states, quoting from the 1821 Parliamentary Papers on Hindoo Widows, "the
civilising mission of colonisation was thus seen to lie in . ..giving back to the natives
the truths of their own 'little read and less understood shaster'."90
Official attempts to establish the scriptural efficacy of sail involved extensive use of the
vyavastha system noted earlier in the formative structure of the legal system. Mani's
own citations of sail-related vyavasthas illustrate that they referred to custom as well as
scriptural sources, and also that they were expressed explicitly as interpretations, rather
than expressions of absolute truth.91 These aspects were marginalised as evidence, and
in the case of vyavasthas based on custom were often required to be revised.
Throughout the period of debate and formal consideration by the state, then, scriptural
authority was reinforced as the most legitimate form of authority, the repository of
truth.
This attitude is consonant with the discourse of tradition illustrated as underpinning the
construction of the legal system. The mission of the state was perceived as reviving the
moribund culture of India, to reformulate it as a civilised yet still exotic country, as
appeared to be depicted in its scriptures. What is interesting is that Math illustrates the
pro-sail lobby as accepting these parameters, and arguing with the same intensity on
the basis of scriptural authority. The final pro-sail petition of 1830 was accompanied
by "a paper of authorities" described as "a translation of a decision of the legal points
declaring the practice of suttee lawful and expedient" •92 Scriptural references were
described as "legal points", and the approval of scripture rendered the practice of sail
"lawful". The issue to which this petition was directed is, of course, whether or not
sail should be outlawed, but even so, the implementation of legal vocabulary to
describe what the pro-sail lobby perceived as an explicitly religious practice is striking.
Law intervenes in Hinduism to the extent that it signifies what is and what is not part of
the religion. The mechanism through which this decision process occurs is scripture,
which becomes both a repository of religious faith and a legally-binding authority.
Because of its association with the law, scripture begins to outstrip other signifiers of
90	 Mani, "Contentious Tra1itions", p. 95.91	 See Mani, "The Production of an Official Discourse on Sati in Early 19th Century Bengal",
p. 37.
92	 Quoted in Mani, "Contentious Traditions", p. 115.
39
religious faith, becoming the ultimate authority, the objective representation of
religiosity.
The significance of the sati debate in our context is partly that it is conducted precisely
in the developing public space of colonial India. This is true not only in terms of its
airing in the law courts and in petitions to the government, but also in terms of the
press, where it was widely discussed, and views were frequently expressed as
indications of "public opinion". 93 Within this space, the parameters of what constitutes
Hinduism are by the 1820s being widely scrutinised and discussed, and a certain
perception of these parameters is already dominant. It is important to note,
furthermore, that this perception is not confined to those described as reformers - it is
also prevalent among those described as orthodox. This needs to be emphasised,
because of the tendency to perceive the objectification of Hinduism as a scripture-based
faith at this time as a reformist concern. My argument is that this process occurred
within the public space, as a result of the structural transformation of Hinduism under
the impact of colonial rule. It was therefore a process that affected a far wider spectrum
of indigenous opinion: not only reformist, but also those who were consciously anti-
reformist; and beyond this, those who actively engaged the public space through one
process or another. Because of this key position of the public space, it can also be
concluded that the middle class were at the heart of this developing perception of
Hinduism.
Interestingly, this point is supported by one of the most significant developments that
occurred in the context of the sail debate; it also leads us into the final area of
clarification in this chapter. This is the emergence of divergent organisations in
Calcutta claiming to represent the "true" Hindu tradition. The Brahmo Samaj, of
course, developed into a major reforming organisation, driven by a succession of
brilliant minds. In the context of the sati debate, however, the establishment of the
Dharma Sabha as an organisation to protect the interests of "orthodoxy" was an equally
significant event. Both these organisations drew on new perceptions of what
constituted Hinduism; both were drawn from the Calcutta middle class. In addition,
both were modern political formations, conforming to the conventions of what
constituted an organisation within the context of the colonial state. It is to this area of
organisation, and to the Hindu nationalist concept of sangathan, which I will now turn.
93	 For some examples of this kind of debate, see S.D. Collet, The Lfe and Letters of Raja
Rammohun Roy (Sadharan Brahmo Samaj, Calcutta, 1962 - 1st ed. 1900), p. 261; Collet
notes among other comments that of the Asiatic Journal of June 1830, which stated that "the
Government had satisfied itself that the majority of the native community was decidedly
opposed to the practice."
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2.5 Organisation and Sangathan
Organisation is central to this thesis on two inter-related levels: first, on the level of
political mobilisation - the way in which Hindus became organised as a political force;
and secondly, on the level of religious ideology - the way in which organisation came
to be articulated as an ideal to which Hindus could legitimately aspire. It is significant,
then, on both a political and a religious level. On both levels, the protagonists were
forced to confront the question of what constitutes Hinduism: what were its defining
characteristics, and where were its boundaries located. Because of this over-arching
question, I would suggest, the two levels developed together, mutually informing
debate and development in the area of organisation. It is not until the 1920s, however,
that this process produced the conscious articulation of sangathan, as both a religious
and a political movement.
The sangathan movement of the mid- 1920s was intimately linked to the ascendance of
the Hindu Mahasabha as a political force and the Malkana shuddhi campaign to
reconvert a certain group of nominal Muslims in western United Provinces with clear
links into existing Rajput castes. In this context, the sangathan movement was
articulated as a means of consolidating Hindu society, of unifying Hinduism, in
response to the perceived unity of Indian Muslims. 94 Sangathan was generally
popularised by the Hindu Mahasabha at this time, and in particular it was spelt out as a
programme of development by the Arya Samajist Swami Shraddhanand.95 In history
and political science literature, accounts of the movement generally trace its roots to the
emergence of the Sabha movement in the Punjab in the first decade of the twentieth
century.96
 Although it will be illustrated that this Sabha movement was influential in
the development of sangathan, my thesis will look to integrate this as part of' a more
long-term development of the idea in both religious and political terms.
Sangathan is derived from the Sanskrit prefix sam, "together", and the verbal root ghat,
"to form or mould".97 This is evident in the more strict Sanskritic use of sañgha4an,
As Mushirul Hasan has pointed out, the 'organic' unity of Indian Islam was very much a
fabricated image - Indian Muslims were at this time subject to numerous divisions; see his
Nationalism and Communal Politics in India 1885-1 930 (Manohar, New Delhi, 1991),
p. 12-13.
Shraridhanand,Hindu Sangaihan - Saviour of the Dying Race (Delhi, Aijun Press, 1926); this
was followed a little later by Bhai Parmanand's Hindu Sangaihan (Central Hindu Yuvak
Sabha, Lahore, 1936).
96	 See Incira Prakash, Review 0/the History and Work of the Hindu Mahosabha and the Hindu
Sanghatan Movement (Akhil Bhartiya Hindu Mahasabha, Delhi, 1938); J.T.F. Jordens,
Swami Shraddizananda, p.135; Thursby, Hindu-Muslim Relations in British India, p. 159;
Jaffrelot, "Hindu Nationalism: Strategic Syncretism in Ideology Building".
See R.L. Turner, Comparative Dictionary of the Indo-Aryan Languages, pp. 237 and 746.
The conjunction is evident, for example, in samgha(ayati, "joins together", and saznghaa,
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"organisation, formation, constitution, composition."98 In its more general Hindi form
- sãngathan- which will be adhered to in this thesis, it is translated as "(the act or
process of) organisation (or an organised body or system or society)." 99 A review of
religious studies literature reveals that it is not recognised as a significant feature of
Hinduism. 100 This lack of treatment of suggests that, if indeed the idea of organisation
that sangathan denotes can be established as a central feature of Hindu nationalist
ideology, it was not derived from traditional forms of religiosity, and further that the
structure of Hindu nationalism was not based on recognisable institutions in
Hinduism. 10 1 Where the notion of organisation or unification in modern Hinduism is
discussed in religious studies literature, it is often linked strongly to the reform
movements, especially the Arya Samaj, and through these, to the influence of
Christianity.' 02
 Again, although these were undoubtedly important influences, it will
be illustrated in this thesis that organisation was a wider concern, forced into the arena
of public debate by a variety of images and pressures associated with the context of
colonialism. I will argue that organisation had a direct impact on the presentation of
both religion and politics in this context.
It is in this sense that! will be developing the idea of a "discourse of organisation" as a
feature of colonial India. As has been illustrated, the hegemonic arrangement of the
colonial state served to produce a kind of rational-legal culture. In Chapter 3 I will
"fitting and joining of timber". I am grateful to Dr. Rupert Gethin for drawing my attention
to this point.
98	 See M. Chaturvedi and B.N. Tiwari, A Practica.1 Hindi -English Dictionary (National
Publishing House, Dcliii, 1970), p. 641. This form is employed by V.D. Savarkar and Indra
Prakash in the latter's Review of the History and Work of the Hindu Mahasabha and the Hindu
Sanghatan Movement. Also, this was explained to me in an interview as the correct Sanskrit
pronunciation by the RSS swaywnsevak and Sanskrit scholar Dr. S.B. Warnekar; interview
conducted 22 April 1996.
99	 Chaturvedi and Tiwari, A Practical Hindi-English Dictionary, p. 640.
100	 Organisation as a feature of Indian religious tradition is associated more with the Buddhist and
Jam notions of .sungha, "any number of people living together for a certain purpose, a society,
association, company, community", especially in terms of a monastic order or sect. See
Monier-Williams, A Sanskrit - English Dictionary (Clarendon, Oxford, 1899) p.1129.
Neither Monier-Williams nor the following works mention the idea of sangathan, referring
only to sangha as an organisational concept in Buddhist and Jam contexts: J.L. Brockington,
The Sacred Thread: Hinduism in its Continuity and Diversity (Edinburgh University Press,
Edinburgh, 1981); K. Klostermaier, A Survey of Hinduism (State University of New York
Press, Albany, 1989); J.3. Lipner, Hindus: Their Beliefs and Practices (Routledge, London,
1994); K.M. Sen, Hinduism (Penguin, London, 1961); R.C. Zaehner, Hinduism, Oxford
University Press, Oxford, 1966).
101	 This point, which will be discussed in detail in Chapter 7, counters the argument of some
non-religious studies literature that the RSS was modelled on Hindu notions of the "sect" and
asceticism; see, for example, Jaffrelot, Hindu Nationalist Movement in India, pp. 35-45, and
"Hindu Nationalism: Strategic Syncretism in Ideology Building", pp. 521-522.
102	 A recent example is provided by Heinrich Von Stietencron, "Religious Configurations in Pre-
Muslim India and the Modern Concept of Hinduism", p. 79; see also D. Gold, "Organised
Hinduisms: From Vedic Truth to Hindu Nation" (in M. Marty and R Appleby [eds.],
Fundasnentalisms Observed, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1994, pp. 531-593),
p. 533.
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examine some of the ways in which this rational-legal culture was expressed. It will be
illustrated that the state persistently projected organisation as the key facet of this culture
- it was a means of articulating power, in that the projected organisation of the state was
contrasted to the disorganisation of society. In fact this projection has already been
alluded to in relation to the Orientalist approach to Hinduism: an attempt to establish
some order, some organisation, by reconstituting the scriptural truths of the religion's
"little read and less understood shaster", and in so doing to undermine the inconsistent,
disorganised authority of piiestly interpretation.
This projection of organisation bad critical implications for modes of articulation in
what has been defined as the public space of colonial India - an element of the rational-
legal culture, and the space in which the indigenous population had the opportunity to
address the state, and each other in relation to the state, in a systematic fashion.
Organisation constituted a central feature of this space, not only in the sense that
Societies, Sabhas, Samajes increasingly provided an appropriate platform for
addressing the state on issues of indigenous rights, but also in the sense that
organisation within this context implied representation. A Sabha that petitioned the
government on the "legality" of beef sales in a particular market, for example, did so on
the basis that its view was representative of a constituency. The Nagpur Gorakshini
Sabha, which petitioned the Government of India in July 1894 on the issue of cow
protection, did so on behalf of "the inhabitants of Nagpur and the adjoining
districts." 103 The Sabha - a self-appointed collection of lawyers, bankers, landowners
and the like - could not seriously claim to stand for such a wide constituency, but the
accuracy of representative claims was not necessarily the point. The idea of
representation was necessary in order to legitimise the claims of the Sabha, to give them
meaning, within the public space. It is in this sense that I am referring to organisation
as a discourse: a means through which issues, claims - the putative expression of the
people's "rights" - are given meaning within the public space of colonial India.
The idea of a discourse of organisation is presented as configured by the hegemonic
arrangement of the colonial state. As such it is not a static concept: it developed
historically, and increasingly became the site of struggle as the power and
sophistication of Indian nationalism was extended around the turn of the century. It
may be defined consistently, however, as the accepted or recognisable way of "being
public" within the parameters of the public space. For overtly political organisations
like the Congress, of course, this also meant the way of "being political" in the public
space. Increasingly, this political implication was also to become central to the
103	 Home Department Public, July 1894, "A" Proceedings (hereafter abbreviated as A Progs), no.
302 (National Archives of India - hereafter abbreviated as NAI)
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alignment of religious organisations in this context. The reason for this was the
articulation of religion as a "right", as expressed in the example given above from
Nagpur. In Chapter 3 this idea of religion as a "right" will be examined in more detail,
as the discourse of organisation became more elaborate in the second half of the
nineteenth century.
2.6 Summary of Discussion
In this chapter a series of key points have been discussed. These may be summarised
as follows:
1. Ideology is defined as a "framework" for the perception of the world; it therefore has
a fundamental role in identity formation.
2. The relationship between class and ideology is not deterministic, and ideology has an
objective, material existence. In its materialism, however, ideology is historically
configured, and is therefore given meaning only by its association with particular
classes or social blocs.
3. Ideologies may be projected by elements within classes - i.e. class unity is by no
means a given - and equally, ideological alliances between classes are possible, as are
"tendential alignments", through which different classes align themselves to the same
ideology, without necessarily having the same interpretation of that ideology.
4. Hegemony is the means by which the state produces consent within society. This
active consent is achieved by means of the expansion of the state, in terms of the
increased sophistication of civil society. Hegemony is nevertheless an area of struggle
between the ruling class and other social blocs in society; the fact that the state has
produced the cornerstones of hegemony through its own expansion simply means that
it occupies the most strategic terrain in this struggle.
5. Despite the fact that Gramsci developed the idea of hegemony in a western capitalist
context, it is a valid model in the interpretation of Indian colonial society. In the first
instance, this premise is supported by the fact that the ruling class of colonial society
was drawn from the bourgeois political order in Europe - an increasingly hegemonic
order.
6. The English-educated, profession-oriented middle class held a position of power
within the begemonic arrangement of the colonial state, precisely because of its
proximity to, or even integration with, those elements of civil society that began to
develop across the existing web of Indian society.
7. Central to the state's hegemonic arrangement was the development of a public
space. A space where the indigenous population could address the state, as well as
each other on matters related to the state. Although this space was ultimately controlled
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by the state, it was also the site of independent indigenous comment - an opportunity to
develop subversive ideologies in direct relation to the discourse of colonialism.
8. Elite-led Indian and Hindu nationalism developed as ideologies within this context.
Although intimately related, they must be differentiated, in as much as their objectives
are distinct, and, more importantly, the pressures that brought them into being were
separate.
9. Hindu nationalism must also be distinguished from Hindu communalism. Whereas
the former constitutes an ideology, the latter constitutes a simple "framework" within
which this ideology operates from the twenties onwards.
10. Hindu nationalism developed as an Ideology out of the singular impact of
colonialism on the Hindu religion. This impact produced "structural transformation" of
Hinduism in terms of its relationship to society. In particular, authority within
Hinduism - the essence of the faith - was relocated in scripture, with antiquity forming
the index of this authority.
11. This transformation of Hinduism was felt particularly among the middle class,
because it was effected principally through the legal framework of colonial rule, and so
reverberated most strongly in the public space.
12. Because of the nature of this transformation, it is not correct to place emphasis on
reformism as the sole source of innovation in terms of religious ideology in the
nineteenth century. Instead, emphasis should be placed on the development of
ideologies within the public space, mediated by the middle class. These ideologies
were both reformist and non-reformist.
13.Organisation is important in this context, because of the operation of the discourse
of orgamsation in the public space. First, if issues of religion were to be addressed to
the state, they needed to be "packaged" within organisations that the state would
recognise. Secondly, organisation as expressed in this context began to be perceived as
synonymous with the "revitalisation" of the Hindu religion (i.e. the revitalisation of the
"true" tradition as embodied in the text).
14. It is this perception which developed into the idea of sangathan, and it is on the
basis of this idea that the ideology of Hindu nationalism is constructed. How the idea
developed, then, constitutes the principal concern of this thesis.
These points are established as a framework for this thesis. As such, they will be
subject to review in the course of the study. In the next chapter I will examine the
development of the underlying discourse of organisation in colonial India, the initial
pressures on the Hindu religion to conform to this discourse, and the ramifications on
the religion as articulated by the middle class.
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Chapter Three
The State and the Hindu Religion in the Nineteenth Century
The development of the colonial state in India was a gradual process, characterised by
trial and error. 1 The East India Company had a clear enough objective - profit - but its
approach was tempered by a hypersensitivity towards local social and commercial
relations. Initially, this was due to the concern that the disruption of these relations
may affect the ability of the Company to extract profit. As one scholar has commented,
"for the British it was clear that an orderly marketplace was an issue of primary
importance".2 From the 1780s onwards, however, the power of the Company was
gradually curtailed by the British state, with the Crown taking increasing responsibility
for aspects of government. As this responsibility grew, the activities of the Company
became more and more subject to scrutinisation by liberal forces within the British
establishment; forces which were determined to enforce the already extant view that the
role of the British in India was primarily to improve the lot of the indigenous, "heathen"
population.3 The ensuing struggle between liberal and conservative forces within the
establishment - symbolised by the impeachment trial of Warren Hastings - has been
presented in a recent account as a struggle to assert the predominance of certain
ideologies of British identity in the context of rapid capitalist development and
European expansion.4
The conditions of possibility for this debate, however, were provided by the growing
realisation of the strength of British power in India. By the turn of the century, this fact
was felt keenly by officials within India. H. Straching, for example, Judge and
Magistrate in Midnapore, writes in 1802 that "the power of the Bengal Government
appears to me, of all governments, the most unquestionably despotic over its subjects.
The submission of the natives is perfect and unqualified; so complete as to preclude the
necessity of concern or intimidation of any kind." 5 The underlying feeling, therefore,
This is particularly well illustrated by Prior in "Making History"; and by Bernard Cohn in
"The Command of Language and the Language of Command".
2	 Fusfield, "Communal Conflict in Delhi: 1803-1930" (in Indian Economic and Social History
Review, Vol.XIX, No.2, 1982, pp. 181-200), p. 187.
3	 See T. Metcalf, Ideologies c/the Raj (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994; series
title: The New Cambridge History of India ; 3.4), p. 17.
Metcalf, Ideologies c/the Raj , pp.15-19; especially the Whig-inspired ideology of private
property as the foundation of progressive civil society.
"Answers to Interrogatories of the Governor General to the Judges of Circuit and Zillah
Judges, in Bengal; respecting the effects of the New System of Revenue, and of Judicial
Administration; Papers on Police, Missionaries, Hindu Religion and Infanticide", House of
Commons Parliamentary Papers 1812-13, Vol IX. 1, p. 31; the "Interrogatories" consist of a
series of 39 enormously varied questions, ranging from detailed inquiries into the working of
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is one of "unquestionable despotism", leading to an increasingly confident attitude
towards Indian society and the possibility of intervention within it.6 The
implementation of liberal ideologies could only come as a result of the manifestation of
this power within India.
What, then, was the impact of this manifestation of power on colonial society? The
conception of Hinduism as a religion was an area in which the power of the emerging
state was undoubtedly influentiaL7 During the nineteenth century, movements towards
the articulation of Hinduism as a single religious tradition, to be compared with other
"World Religions", are clearly evident. 8
 Certain elements of "Western culture" -
notably Christianity and rationalism - are often presented as agents in the development
of these movements, although the processes through which this kind of cultural
interaction occurred are still a matter of debate. 9 My objective in this chapter is, in a
sense, to divert attention from this direct correlation between explicit cultural forces and
the law courts and police to general calls for opinions on the moral character of the
population, the likelihood of insurrection, local attitudes towards the concept of private
property and the state of economic, civic and social improvement in the various distncts.
Straching's reply is amongst the lengthiest, running to detailed pages of information and
opinion. He makes a further interesting contribution to the above debate when he states that
"Our government...appears to me very strong, and secure from serious internal commotion,
although the natives can hardly be said to be attached to it, for none of them understand it. No
government ever stood more independent of public opinion" (p. 27).
6	 This attitude is illustrated well by official comment during the debate over the criminalisation
of satE. British power, it was felt, was now a settled fact, and change could therefore be
effected without fear of opposition. See, for example, the comment of R.N.0 Hamilton,
Acting Magistrate of Benaras, in August 1826:
"At no period , since the introduction of European supremacy, has the British power been so
exalted and permanently fixed as at the present; wars have ceased; the factious and turbulent
spirit of cabal and discontent has been aroused, excited and crushed; the whole country, in
every direction, is in the enjoyment of the most perfect tranquility and soundest peace; the
recollection of the only stay, on which discord and revolt could rest a hope, remains only as a
warning and proof of the utter uselessness of opposition, and the nothingness of the best
concerted schemes when brought in contact with British power; such a season, then, may
surely be deemed peculiarly apt for the introduction of a law, having for its object the
termination and extinction of the most revolting and most lamentable sacrifice, and thereby
casting away a reproach, which cannot but be attached to its longer sufferance...".
"Correspondence Relative to Burning of Hindoo Widows on the Funeral Piles of their
Husbands", House 0/Commons Parliamentary Papers, 1830, Vol. XXVIII.783, pp. 901-2.
On the development of the term Hinduism as a signifier of a single religious tradition, see
also Chapter 2, note 75.
8	 It is important to emphasise plurality here; there was no single movement towards the
expression of Hinduism as a given entity. This is a point which has recently been drawn out
by Vasudha Dalmia "there were, in fact, many points of departure for the variant
representations of Hinduism, as it was being articulated in the second half of the nineteenth
century, each of which claimed equal validity." See Dalmia, "'The Only Real Religion of the
Hindus': Vaisnava Self-representation in the Late Nineteenth Century" (in Dalmia and Von
Stietencron, Representing HInduism, pp. 176-210), p. 176.
Jaffrelot's "stigmatise and emulate" model is one such process; on this model, see Section
6.2.1 of this thesis. For an overview of issues involved in debates over cultural interaction,
see U. King, "Some Reflections on Sociological Approaches to the Study of Modem
Hinduism" (in Numen: International Review of the History of Religions, Vol. 36, No. 1,
1989, pp. 72-97).
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new departures in the signification of Hinduism. I will concentrate instead on the
manifestation of colonial power as a significant cultural force in itself. In particular,
ideas about organisation, and the way in which the colonial state was organised in
relation to society, operated as a central theme of this cultural force. The theme of
organisation developed in the second half of the nineteenth century into an important
discourse in the articulation of colonial power. It is in this context that organisation
was to emerge as a critical element in the representation of Hinduism as a single
religious tradition.
3.1 The Organisation of the State and the Disorganisation of Society
In the first instance, I will look at the way in which the colonial state deployed
organisation as a cultural force. I will argue that specific images of organisation and
disorganisation brokered British power in cultural terms. These images were
particularly focused on the elements of the state which effectively delivered the British
challenge in this arena of culture: namely, the "cornerstones" of the hegemomc
arrangement, the key elements in the production of the rational-legal culture.
3.1.1 Hegemonic Cornerstones as Images of Organisation
In Chapter 2 it was noted that the development of hegemonic power was based upon
the "expansion of the state" - the development of features of civil society identified as
hegemonic cornerstones. Bureaucracy was cited as playing the most decisive role in
this process of expansion, but other cornerstones were also identified: the legal system,
the education system, and aspects of infrastructural development. All these were
aspects of the state which were expansive, expressing the progressive power of the
state. This expression occurred in a particular cultural language. My contention in this
section is that this was the language of organisation, and I will support the contention
by examining these cornerstones as cultural expressions of organisation.
(a) Law
As we have seen,' 0 the establishment of a definitive body of "Hindu" and "Muslim"
law was accepted as a necessary task of colonial rule, and men such as N.B. Halhed
and William Jones set about "discovering" the ancient texts that contained this law. Not
only were the texts identified, they were also ordered in terms of significance according
to antiquity. In this way, the state attempted to establish a legal system recognisable to
10	 See Section 2.4.
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itself, its European officers and the British establishment as rational and just. As
Bernard Cohn has noted, this process meant "ignor(ing) local indigenous adjudication
procedures and model(ling) the process of adjudication in the courts on that of the
British law courts of the period"." The sacred significance of this systematised law
was signposted as early as 1793 by Cornwallis, when he declared that the Government
itself, despite its "unquestionable despotism", would be subject to the rule of law.12
Presenting law in this manner facilitated the construction of the "framework of a new
state consciously projected as based purely on rules, procedures and principles." 13 The
framework, in other words, for the projection of impersonal or neutral organisation as a
defining characteristic of British power.
This image of the law was reinforced by the introduction of codes of civil and criminal
procedure in the 1860s. These codes standardised the approach - or subjection - of any
individual to the law. The steady construction of this framework was perceived as
having a profound impact on the indigenous population. As James Fitzjames Stephen,
legal member of the Viceroy's Council from 1869 to 1872, articulated it:
The establishment of a system of law which regulates the most
important parts of the daily life of the people constitutes in itself a moral
conquest more striking, more durable, and far more solid, than the
physical conquest which rendered it possible. It exercises an influence
over the minds of the people in many ways comparable to that of a new
religion.'4
The first sentence here indicates the way in which "regulation" - or, in our terms,
organisation - was perceived specifically as an aspect of domination. The second
sentence locates it implicitly as an ideological force. The impact of this force is
exemplified by the nature of unrest during the colonial period. Josh has noted the way
in which peasant unrest was consistently articulated within the framework of legal
rights.' 5
 In this thesis it will be noted consistently in relation to religious disputes and
communal unrest. It constitutes a rational, organised force in society, to which any
class or social bloc could relate.
(b) Aspecrs of infrastructural Development: Communication and Movement
One of the most striking features of colonial development during the second half of the
nineteenth century was the growth of the rail network across British India. This
growth was fuelled by a massive investment of British capital, "the largest single unit
11	 Bernard Cohn, An Anthropologist Among the Historians, p. 568.
12	 Cited in Bhagwan Josh, The Struggle for Hegemony in India Vol. It, p. 27.
13	 ibid.
14	 Quoted in Metcalf, Ideologies of the Raj, p. 39.
15	 See Josh, The Struggle for Hegemony in India Vol. II, pp. 35-6.
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of international investment in the nineteenth century".' 6
 The ramifications of this
development are obviously far-reaching and complex, both in terms of the colonial
economy and the political and social unification of the subcontinent.' 7 In the present
context, I want to emphasise the way in which the network shifted perceptions of travel
and its role in the organisation of society. This is well illustrated by contrasting two
policies of the colonial government.
The first concerns what the government termed 'wandering tribes' - bands of
sannyasis, vagrants and itinerant traders who moved about the country, following
pilgrimage or trading routes. As one scholar has suggested, this kind of movement
represented "an alternative structure of social and political organisation" to the
arrangement of the colonial state, which was inherently threatening. 18 Increasingly, the
"dangerousness" of a particular community was justified on the basis that "they do not
lead a settled life" or "they always move from place to place for the ostensible purpose
of their trade". 19 In 1871, the government introduced the Criminal Tribes Act as a
means of eradicating this practice. Under this legislation, the government
"indiscriminately identified entire groups as offenders, making few distinctions
between the different kinds of peripatetics, such as pastoral nomads, bards, minstrels,
mendicants and traders, and between castes and tribes."20 Groups identified as
criminal under the terms of this act were subject to a regime of pass carrying, restricted
movement and in some cases enforced settlement; any unauthorised movement led to
imprisonment.2'
This severe restriction of "disorderly" movement can be contrasted to the development
of rail travel as a viable prospect for most Indians. Travel governed by clock-time,
16	 Bipan Chandra, Rise and Growth of Economic Nationalism, p. 176.
17	 On the economic impact, see Chandra, Rise and Growth of Economic Nationalism, pp. 178-
90; on social and political significance, see A.R. Desai, Social Backgound ofIndian
Nationalism, pp. 131-34.
18	 S. Freitag, "Collective Crime and Authority in North India" (in A. Yang [ed.), Crime and
Criminality in British India, University of Arizona Press, Tucson, 1985, pp. 140-164),
p. 157.19	 Statements of Madras Government officials quoted in M. Radhakrishnan, "Surveillance and
Settlements under the Criminal Tribes Act in Madras" (in Indian Economic and Social History
Review, Vol. 29 No. 2, 1992, pp. 171-198), p. 176.
20	 See Yang, "Dangerous Castes and Tribes: the Criminal Tribes Act and the Magahiya Doms of
Northeast India" (in Yang [ed.], Crune and Criminality in British India, pp. 108-127), p. 116.
The Bengal government classified "sunnyassees" under the Act as "religious mendicants who
wander about the country (and who) live by begging, cheating and pilfering."
21	 On the implementation of the Criminal Tribes Act and its implications, see also S. Freitag,
"Crime and Criminality in the Social Order of Colonial North India" (in Modem Asian
Studies, Vol. 25, No. 2, 1991, pp. 227-261; M. Radhakrishnan, "The Criminal Tribes Act in
Madras Presidency: Implications for Itinerant Trading Communities" (in indian Economic and
Social History Review, Vol. 26, No. 3, 1989, pp. 270-295); and Metcalf, Ideologies of the
Raj, p. 123-4.
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according to regular schedules, became an increasingly integral feature of everyday life.
In particular, rail travel became a significant factor in the regulation of large movements
of people. This is reflected in shifts in the nature of pilgrimage during the late
nineteenth century. Festivals at major pilgrimage sites such as Allahabad, Benaras and
Ayodhya grew in size due to increased accessibility, and became major feats of
administrative organisation. 22 Similarly in the early twentieth century, as Indian
nationalism developed into a mass movement, the government concentrated on rail
travel as a means of regulating movement, accommodating unrest. During the Flag
Satyagraha in Nagpur in 1923, for example, the provincial government attempted to
diffuse the situation by preventing potential satyagrahis from other areas reaching
Nagpur; they did this by vetting passengers at stations on the outskirts of the city. 23 In
this way, stations became focal points for the monitoring and regulation of large
movements of people. Symbols, as it were, of a cultural intervention governed by the
notion of organisation.
(c) Education
Education is again a familiar area for an examination of the colonial impact in India.
Such examination, however, tends to focus on the Anglicist/Orientalist debate in the
1820s and early 30s, and the subsequent adoption of English as the medium of
instruction for Higher Education after 1835. The structure of the British approach to
education, however, is also significant. This is evident in the educational initiatives of
the Company prior to the Resolution of 1835. Bernard Cohn, for example, has
highlighted the format of colleges set up in Calcutta and Benaras in the late eighteenth
century:
The British conceived of education as taking place in 'institutions',
meaning a building with physically divided spaces marking off one
'class' of students from another, as well as teachers from students.
There were to be fixed positions of professors, teachers and assistants,
who taught regular classes in subjects. The students' progress had to be
regularly examined to measure their acquisition of fixed bodies of
knowledge. The end of the process was marked by prizes and
certification which attested to the students command of a specifla'ble
body of knowledge.24
Despite the fact that both the Calcutta Madrassa and the Sanskrit College in Benaras
were projects designed to promote education based on indigenous knowledge, they
were organised within a specific cultural framework. Without this, they would not
have had meaning within the colonial project As Cohn continues, these colleges had to
22	 See Katherine Prior, "The British Administration of Hinduism", pp. 80-86.
23	 See TarunaMaharashira, 14 July 1923, in Report on Indian Papers Published in the Central
Provinces and Berar, 1923 (NAT).
24	 Cohn, "The Command of Language and the Language of Command", p.3 19.
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be governed by a "British metalogic of regularity, uniformity and. ..fiscal
responsibility."
The influence of organisation is again evident at a later stage in the development of the
colonial education system. The 'trickle-down' strategy that the government adopted as
part of the Anglicist vision of 1835 was recognised as failing by 1854. As a result, a
new total system of education, from primary to university, was established in
accordance with the Education Despatch of Sir Charles Wood. This Despatch
envisaged a system built in collaboration with private organisations, financed by a
system of grants-in-aid. The system developed into a huge educational bureaucracy,
monitoring the effectiveness of institutions, paying out grants and considering
applications for fresh aid.25 This system encouraged the growth of institutions in
response to the requirements of provincial bureaucracies, in that the process of applying
for and maintaining grants-in-aid was governed by rules, which did much to mould the
shape of educational development. In Madras Presidency, for example, a "teacher
certificate" system regulated grants on the basis of teachers' qualifications, in Bombay,
a "payment by results" system paid out grants on the basis of students' success in
examinations. Through this "helter-skelter of instructions and multiplicity of official
interpretations" the grants-in-aid system expanded to encompass some 79% of
educational institutions in British India by 1900.26
(d) Bureaucracy
The education system developed, then, as a facet of a burgeoning bureaucracy. Many
of its products - English-educated, middle class young men - would look to this
bureaucracy as a means of employment. Partly because of this significance for the
middle class, and partly because of its key position in the expansion of the state,
bureaucracy constitutes the most enduring image of colonial organisation. Thomas
Metcalf has il1utrated how the bureaucracy became a kind of tool for the organisation
of colonial society, through the acquisition and processing of information. Even by
1820, he states, "the Raj was already based far more on direct observation and
measurement in the Indian countryside than on the citation of Sanskrit texts." 27
 The
bureaucracy in effect defined the division of British India into presidencies, provinces,
divisions and districts. It controlled the development of municipalities, infrastructure,
natural resource exploitation and trade through a myriad of departments that were
continually formed, amalgamated, split and reformed.
25	 See J. Brown, Modern India: the Origins 0/an Asian Democracy (Oxford University
Press, Oxford, 1994), p. 123.
26	 See A. Misra, Grants in Aid of Education in India (Macmillan, Delhi, 1973), p. 8-27.
27	 Metcalf , Ideologies of the Raj, p. 26.
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Although not accountable to the people, the bureaucracy was nevertheless accountable
to itself, and so generated enormous quantities of records detailing its own workings.
It is in this area of record keeping that the indigenous middle class was utilised as a
facet of colonial organisation. The position of clerk became the most recognisable
source of employment for middle class Indians completing their education. With
executive power remaining largely in the hands of British civil servants, the lot of
departmental clerks was an endless process of organising and reproducing information
in triplicate or quadruplicate.
The oppressive nature of this culture of organisation has been brought out recently by
Sumit Sarkar in a study of the effect of European clock-time in colonial India.28
Interestingly, Sarkar points to three specific sites where the introduction of clock-time
had a resounding impact: railways, schools and government offices. Whereas in the
first two contexts, time discipline was accepted relatively uncritically, he says, in
government offices it was often perceived as a means of oppressing the lower
bureaucracy, through such factors as severe punishment for lateness and the extension
of the working day. This led in Calcutta in 1905, for example, to a white collar
industrial dispute. What it reveals in our context is again the fascinating position of the
middle class in relation to colonial discourse. The very proximity of this class to the
cornerstones of colonial hegemony enables them to disrupt elements of the discourse
that inform this hegemony. Yet at the same time, their predicament is illustrated by the
pervasive nature of colonial discourse - Sarkar's citation of the uncontroversial nature
of time discipline in the rail and education systems indicates the way in which images of
organisation had become entrenched in the expanded colonial state. In addition, middle
class attempts to confront time discipline as oppression in relation to bureaucratic
employment left them vulnerable to further layers of colonial discourse structured
around the idea of organisation. These layers, to which I will now turn, were the
Orientalist projections of Indian society as fundamentally disorganised.
3.1.2 Disorganisation and the Duality of Hinduism
Images of European organisation and order were made meaningful for coloniser and
colonised by placing them in the context of indigenous disorder. Images of disorder
were projected through a number of lenses - as Metcalf describes it, an "array of
polarities" 29
 - which both reinforced and legitimised the ascendance of British
28	 S. Sarkar, Colonial Times: Clocks and Kaliyuga in Nineteenth Century Bengal (Seminar
delivered at SOAS, London, 20 June 1996).
29	 Metcalf , Ideologies of the Raj, p. 6.
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"rational" rule. Effeminacy, indolence, deceitfulness, the closed nature of the village
economy: all these images were projected as elemental features of a drifting, changeless
society.30
Most important in the present context is the colonial projection of Hinduism. It has
been noted in Chapter 2 how the colonial legal system was constructed through a search
for the "true" or "revealed" texts of Hinduism. This was the central thrust of the
Orientalist approach to Hinduism, and it implied a duality, a setting apart of this
"essence" from the morass of popular Hindu practice. In the academic fields of
anthropology and comparative religion, this idea that a culture can be understood as two
interlinked but essentially separate traditions has been extremely influential.31
Variations of this model have persistently informed methods of understanding religions
and cultures, and it clearly underpins the work of Jones and other Orientalists.
We can begin to understand its significance by looking briefly at the history of the
model itself. Benedict Anderson locates its emergence as an effect of European
expansion. The realisation of the rich variety of forms of human knowledge and
experience that expansion precipitated meant that world religions were forced to
confront each other, and so define themselves in relation to each other. As Anderson
demonstrates through the writing of Marco Polo, the faith of the Christians began to be
conceived of not as true, so much as truest.32 In a sense, then, expansion created the
field of comparative religion, and the field demanded some index through which
comparisons could be made. Isolating textual traditions was a means of providing this
index. It provided a field of reference for the comparison of the great religious faiths.
Max Muller states the position clearly in 1874:
Although each individual believer is responsible for his religion, no
religion can be made responsible for each individual believer. Even if
we adopt the theory of development in religion, and grant to every
thinking man his right of private interpretation, there remains, and there
must always remain, to the historian of religion, an appeal to the statutes
of the original code with which each religion stands and falls, and by
which alone it can justly be judged.33
30	 For work on the production of these images, see Metcalf, Ideologies of the Raj; Ronald Inden,
imagining India ; Mrinalini Sinha, Colonial masculinity : the 'manly Engllsh,nan' and the
'effeminate Bengali' in the late nineteenth century (Manchester University Press, Manchester,
1995).
31	 This influence is immediately evident, for example, in the anthropological model of Great and
Little Traditions, as first defined by Robert Redfield in Peasant Society and Culture
(University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1956). Redfield's idea was that "in a civilisation there
is a great tradition of the reflective few and there is a little tradition of the unreflective many"
(p. 70).32	 see Anderson, Imagined Communities, p. 16-17.
Max Muller, Chips from a German Workshop Vol.1V (Longman, London, 1880) p. 316-7.
54
Muller recognises the dynamism of religious practice, but nevertheless maintains that
the "true form" of the religion, the one to be studied most persistently by historians of
religion, was that encased within "the statutes of the original code". The text becomes
the embodiment of the religion, the basis upon which it is perceived as "A World
Religion" or "A Great Religious Tradition". The structure which elevates the text to
this position is of course generated by the structure of Christianity, and particularly
Protestant Christianity, with its central emphasis on the New Testament.
In their efforts to understand Hinduism, the Orientalists constructed an essential
tradition based on its most ancient texts. The Aryan society that apparently produced
these texts was consequently projected as representing a so-called Golden Age in the
history of India. Kopf points out that this Golden Age construct reflected the
preoccupation of early Orientalists like Jones with classical civilisation in Europe - the
Golden Age of Greece and Rome.34 The work of Jones is replete with allusions to the
latter, and by linking Sanskrit to European languages he began to construct a common
history for indian and European civilisation. The most critical point in the present
context, however, is not the linking of Indian to European civilisation (although this
was indeed to become an enduring and influential image in nineteenth century
Hinduism) but rather the de-linking of the former from the actual practices of
contemporary Hinduism. The glorification of Aryan civilisation as the depository of a
true or normative form of Hinduism necessitated the projection of its contemporary
legacy as a degenerate, debased form, permeated with superstition and idolatry, and
indicative of the degeneration of indigenous society.
Two distinct levels of Hinduism, then, are constructed, which configure much of the
thinking on Hinduism during the nineteenth century. Monier Williams, for example,
refers to contemporary Hinduism in 1891 as "Brahminism run to seed and spread out
into a confused tangle of divine personalities and incarnations. The one system is the
rank and luxuriant outcome of the other." Again, Alfred Lyall comments in 1884 that
popular Hinduism was "a whole vegetation of cognate beliefs sprouting up in every
stage of growth beneath the shadow of the great orthodox traditions and allegories of
Brahminisrn."35 As a development of this model, Ronald Inden has identified three
levels in what he calls the "rationalising of the Hindu jungle". Level one is
Brahminism, the religion of the intellectual priesthood. Level two is devotional theism,
D. Kopf, British Orientalism and the Bengal Renaissance (University of California Press.
Berkeley, 1969) pp. 38-9.
-	 Both quoted in Metcalf, Ideologies of the Raf, p. 136. The idea of Hinduism as a jungle, so
evident in these examples, is perceived by Ronald Inden as one of two enduring metaphors
used in Indology to denote the religion; the other being the sponge; see Imagining India, pp.
8&87.
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the religion of the emotional laity. Level three is animism, the folk tradition of a
"changeless religion of survival".36
The subtext of degeneration in the Orientalist conception of Hinduism was, ironically,
strengthened by the archetypal exponent of its supposed antithesis, James Mill. Mill's
work can be perceived as the inspiration of a generation of Anglicists who battled with
and eventually defeated Orientalism in the critical field of educational policy during the
1830s. His seminal work A History of British India appeared in 1818, and was
destined to become a standard text for Indian Civil Servants. Rooted firmly in
utilitarian notions of evolutionary political and societal progress, Mill's history
effectively rubbished the idea of Aryan civilisation as a golden era, stating that its
ritualistic, ceremonial achievements were configured by a primitive despotism which
was antithetical to progress. The most enduring feature of Mill's history, however,
was his division of Indian history into three distinct eras: the Hindu, Muslim and
British eras. There is an obvious shift in the method of categorisation here. Mill does
not call the third era the Christian era - this would not make sense, because for Mill
British rule was essentially secular and based on the rule of neutral, equalising law.
Previous periods of Indian history, however, are characterised by the religious
affiliation of the dynasties - although even this is not strictly adhered to: no "Buddhist
era", for example, is signified. Many historians have illustrated the fallacy of this
categorisation,38
 but it was undoubtedly influential in nineteenth century India as a
structure for the interpretation of Indian history. The intellectual elite who had co-
operated with the Orientalists now had a framework for understanding the degeneration
of Hinduism necessarily implied by the existence of the Golden Age. The "Muslim
period" came to be perceived as the "dark ages" of Hinduism, in which religious and
social persecution precipitated the decline into oppressive casteism, idolatry,
superstition - all the signifiers of this contemporary degeneracy.
The images of colonial organisation discussed in the first half of this section
represented a kind of bulwark of modernity, the antithesis of images such as degenerate
Hinduism. The contrasting of these images - the organisation of the state and the
disorganisation of society - was enormously influential in the development of middle
class ideologies during the second half of the nineteenth century and the early twentieth
century. This is evident, for example, in the accepted frameworks of nationalist
36	 See laden, Imagining India, p. 89,
Mill, A History of Iritish India (reprinted University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1975).
38	 See Romila Thapar, Harbans Mukhia & Bipan Chandra., Communalism and the writing of
Indian history (People's Publishing House. Delhi, 1969).
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bistoriography over this period. 39 Before considering how this influence was
manifested in terms of middle class perceptions of Flinduism, it is necessary to examine
some further factors which impacted on the predicament of this class, creating pressure
on the idea of Hinduism in relation to colonial modernity.
3.2 The Pressure to Organise
Pressure exerted on Hinduism in this context was manifested, unsurprisingly, as a
pressure to organise. There were two sources of this pressure during the second half
of the nineteenth century which were particularly explicit. One was the increasing
incursion of aggressive new religious influences - principally Hindu and Christian - on
the established structure of the religion. The other was the increased significance of the
colonial discourse of organisation. The organisation of the state and the disorganisation
of society provided the groundwork for the production of this discourse. As the
expansion of the state progressed in the first half of the nineteenth century, methods of
"being public", of articulating issues and concerns in the public space, were
increasingly subject to its parameters. The most significant events in the development
of the discourse, however, occurred in the aftermath of the 1857 Rebellion. This revolt
against the order and organisation of the Empire was followed by an elaboration of the
hegemonic arrangement which raised the profile of the colonial discourse of
organisation.
3.2.1 1858: Developing the Colonial Discourse of Organisation
In 1858 the Government of India Act formally transferred ultimate authority in India
from the East India Company to the Crown. Henceforth the Court of Directors was
replaced by a Secretary of State for India (i.e. a minister within the British Cabinet),
assisted by a Council of India comprised mostly of recently returned officials from the
subcontinent. Despite the unparliamentary nature of the Council, the Act projected the
idea that the Queen's Parliament in Britain formed the ultimate authority in India. At the
apex of imperial power, a representative body held sway, a body that operated through
the language and institutions of democracy. The fact that this body was representative
See B. Chandra, "Historians of Modem India and Communalism", in Communalism and
the writing of Indian history ; and Thapar, Interpreting Earlylndia (Oxford University Press,
Delhi, 1992), esp. chapter 1, "Ideology and the Interpretation of Early Indian History", pp. 1-
22; for wider examinations of the growth of middle class ideologies in the context of colonial
control, see B. Parekh, ColoniaIism Tradition and Reform: An Analysis of Gandhi's Political
Discourse (Sage, New Delhi, 1989), chapter 2: "Hindu Responses to British Rule", pp. 34-70;
and K.N Panikkar, 'Presidential Address" (in Proceedings of the Indian History Congress.
38th, 1975, pp. 365-399).
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of the British and not the Indian people was not the point; what was created was an
impression of representation, justice and benevolence in the wake of the Rebellion.
This impression was precisely reflected in the Queen's Proclamation of 1 November
1858. As she explained in a letter to Lord Derby, the first Secretary of State for India,
Victoria wanted the document to "breathe feelings of generosity, benevolence and
religious feeling, pointing out the privileges which the Indians will receive in being
placed on an equality with the subjects of the British Crown."40
 In consonance with
the assumption that the Rebellion was largely the result of an excessive display of
religious passion, the Proclamation dwelt upon the communication of these "feelings"
in relation to religion, emphasising the state's neutrality towards indigenous religion
whilst also affirming the monarch's own faith in Christianity:
Firmly relying ourselves on the truth of Christianity, and
acknowledging with gratitude the solace of religion, we disclaim alike
the right and desire to impose our convictions on any of our subjects.
We declare it to be our royal will and pleasure that none be in any wise
favoured, none molested or disquieted, by reason of their religious faith
or observances, but that all shall enjoy the equal and impartial protection
of the law; and we do strictly charge and enjoin all those who may be in
authority under us that they abstain from all interference with the
religious belief or worship of any of our subjects on pain of our highest
displeasure.4'
Here, religious observance is articulated as a "right", enjoying the "equal and impartial
protection of the law". It is situated within a framework of theoretical "Subjecthood"
governed by the rule of law. The Queen's Government in India was established by
law, and the indigenous population assumed a kind of quasi-legal status in relation to
the metropolis through their recognition as the Queen's subjects. "The Company's
Government is at an end," stated a contemporary newspaper, "the name has followed
the substance, and now the inhabitants of this country can in truth declare they are the
subjects to Her Most Gracious Majesty the Queen." 42 These subjects practised their
own religion as a legal right.
Two principal points can be drawn from the Proclamation. First, it established the
idioms of constitutional liberalism as the appropriate language of politics in colonial
India. At a public meeting in Calcutta in November 1858, the Proclamation was
described as based on "the justest, the broadest principles... . Humanity, Mercy,
40	 Queen Victoria to Lord Derby, 15/8/58, in C.H. Philips, The Evolution of India and Pakistan
1858-1947: Select Docwnents (Oxford University Press, London, 1962; Vol. IV of Select
Documents on the HLitory of India and Pakistan . genemi editor, C.H. Philips), p. 10.
41	 Philips. The Evolution of India and Pakistan, p. 11.
42	 Bombay Telegraph and Courier 9 November 1858.
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Justice breathe through every line."43
 The Calcutta-based Hindoo Patriot commented
that "the Sovereign Will has ordained that Her auspicious reign will be marked by the
promotion of all works of public utility, by the introduction of general reforms and by
the.. .amelioration of Her subjects irrespective of colour or creed of which no
distinction is professed to be observed."44 A vital element of the colonial discourse of
organisation was consolidated here. The Proclamation provided a reference point for
the articulation of "representative" politics in India as a feature of the colonial state. As
we shall see, it was persistently invoked in this way. For early nationalists in
particular, the Proclamation came to be perceived as a statement of civil rights. As the
Bengali Surendranath Banerjea stated in 1892, it was the "Magna Carta of our rights
and privileges".45
 Although it was little more than a statement of intent, the
Proclamation provided the justification for the assertion of these rights and privileges.
This assertion, then, was symbolic - it had nothing constitutional to refer to; only the
equally symbolic "Humanity, Mercy, Justice" of the Queen's statement.
Secondly, the Proclamation established religion as central to this symbolic projection of
rights and privileges. The reason for the prominence of religion can be explained
through British preoccupations in the wake of the 1857 Rebellion, and through the
underlying assumption that religion, degenerate though it may be, was the motor force
of Indian civilisation and social relations.46 What is most significant is that it brings
religion into the realm of colonial politics in a quite explicit manner, a manner
articulated through the idioms of constitutional liberalism as explained above.
An interesting example of this is provided by Partha Chatterjee's lengthy citation from
the memoirs of the Bengali nationalist, Bepinchandra Pal.47 Recalling his student days
in Calcutta shortly before his death in 1932, Pal describes the operation of student
boarding houses in the 1870s as "small republics.., managed on strictly democratic
lines". Disputes were settled by a "Court" of the whole "House", with offenders being
'	 Speech by Rangopaul Ghose, reported in Bombay Telegraph and Courier, 25 November
1858.
	
4	 Hindoo Patriot, 11 November 1858; see B. Ghose, Selections from English Periodicals of
Nineteenth Century Bengal. Vol. V (Papyrus, Calcutta, 1980), p. 91.
Speech at 1892 Congress; see S. Banerjee, Speeches Vol 4 (Calcutta, n.d.), p. 67.
	
46	 The belief that outraged religious feelings constituted the principal motivation for the
Rebellion was by no means reflected in indigenous press comment at the time, which tended
to look towards British arrogance and the exclusivity of the administration as the principal
cause; see, for example, articles in the Hindoo Patriot on 18 November and 9 December 1858,
and 6 January 1859, quoted in Ghose, Selections from English Periodicals, pp. 97-110.
Indeed, it should be emphasised that the Proclamation was not generally perceived as a
panacea in the Indian press in 1858. In the context of continued unrest associated with the
1857 Rebellion, it received comparatively little attention in terms of editorials. As the earlier
citation from Baneijea indicates, however, its significance was established for later reference.
	
"	 Bepinchandra Pal, Memories of My Life and Tunes (1932), quoted in Chatterjee, The Nation
and its Fragments, pp. 11-13.
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threatened with expulsion. Most interesting is Pal's description of debate over the food
conventions of the house mess:
The composition of our mess called for some sort of a compromise
between the so-called orthodox and the Brahmo and other heterodox
members of our republic. So a rule was passed by the unanimous vote
of the whole "House", that no member should bring food to the
house...which outraged the feelings of Hindu orthodoxy. It was
however clearly understood that the members of the mess, as a body
and even individually, would not interfere with what anyone took
outside the house.
As Chatterjee explains it, the blending here of idioms of "European civic and political
life" with what may be termed the traditional issues of commensality and food
sensibility reflect the "imbrication of two discourses" - the discourses of elite and
subaltern politics. Although Chatterjee's objective - the mutual implication of elite and
subaltern domains - is very much in line with the aims of this thesis, it is nevertheless
difficult in this instance to detect subalternity in the citation from Pal. The implication is
that the "orthodox" sensibility over food pollution is to be perceived as subaltern,
whilst the idioms of European civic and political life, the framework of the mini
republic, are to be perceived as elite. Returning to the themes of Chapter 2, it is easy to
see here a reverberation of the tradition/modernity model as the wellspring of the social
dynamic. Pal's fellow students are presented as articulating both elite (modern) and
subaltern (traditional) ideologies - the inherent tension between the two constitutes the
force through which decisions are made, society is moved on, but there is nevertheless
an implication of dissatisfaction, of the traditional intervention "holding back" the
forces of modernity. Considering the aims of the Subaltern Studies group, this is
perhaps an unhelpful perception of the subaltern intervention.
By emphasising the position of religion in relation to politics as indicated by the
Proclamation, the implications of the passage emerge as somewhat different. The
students in Pal's mess are very much a part of the elite of late nineteenth century
Calcutta. Their construction of a mini republic reflects their belief in the language and
institutions of representation; the same language and institutions projected symbolically
by the Proclamation (upto a point, of course - it is doubtful whether Victoria would
have been impressed by the idea of a mini republic operating in Calcutta, at the heart of
colonial power!). This discourse is brought to bear on all aspects of life within the mini
republic, including those related to food. Those described by Pal as "orthodox" are as
much a part of this project as any one else; indeed, judging by the result of the vote,
they were in a position of strength. The point is that the whole community respected the
idioms of representational politics as a valid framework for the organisation of their
collective life, and the issue of comrnensality and food sensibility was an integral part
of this life - as integral and as "modern" as the payment of the rent and the punishment
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of offenders against the democratic rules of the "House". The domain of religious
observance and cultural norms - a domain described by Chatterjee as "utterly
incongruous with that of civil society" - is in this elite context a domain influenced by
facets of colonial hegemony, a point which is resoundingly confirmed by the
prominence given to religion by the Proclamation. Representation and the rights of
individuals - the idioms that informed the colonial discourse of organisation - have a
legitimate presence in this domain.
After 1858, then, the discourse of organisation emerged as a more elaborate feature of
the state's hegemonic arrangement. The Proclamation presented the idea of rights and
the representation of these rights as a feature of Imperial citizenship, or more accurately
Subjecthood, sanctioned by the rule of law. The transfer of power to the Crown and
the institution of a Secretary of State for India answerable to Parliament appeared to
confirm the proximity of representative institutions to the processes of government in
India. These features emphasised the notion of "symbolic representation" as a means
of articulating indigenous concerns. The "right" of religious freedom confirmed by the
Proclamation created the space for the articulation of religion in this manner. It is in
this sense that the developing discourse of organisation increasingly acts as a pressure
on Hinduism to become organised in the public space. As issues of religion became
more prominent in this space during the second half of the nineteenth century, Hindus
were increasingly required to articulate their concerns within this framework. It became
the established, recogni sable format for meaningful expression within this space.
3.2.2 Pressures on the Structure of Hinduism in the Public Space
Certain factors encouraged Hindus to assert their religious rights far more forcefully in
the public space. Often, this assertion revolved around the position of women in Hindu
society. The debate over sati, examined in Chapter 2, is one example of this. It was
followed by a succession of legal challenges and Government interventions on issues
such as widow remarriage, the age of consent and conjugal rights. 48 My focus,
however, is on issues which questioned the structure of Hinduism in the developing
public space, and particularly the predicament of low castes and untouchables in
relation to this structure. It is these issues which forced Hindus to examine the "shape"
of their religion quite explicitly in terms of organisation and disorganisation.
48	 For examples see Cii Heimsath, Indian Nationalism and Hindu Social Reform (Princeton
University Press, Princeton, 1964), esp. chapter VII, "Origins and Enactment of the Age of
Consent Bill", pp. 147-175; S. Chandra, The Oppressive Present: Literature and Social
consciousness in Colonial India, pp. 71-115; S. Chandra, "Whose Laws? - Notes on a
Nineteenth Century Hindu Case of Conjugal Rights" (in V. Dalmia and H. von Stietencron
[eds.], Representing Hinduism, pp. 154-175).
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(a) Missionary Activity
The pattern of conversion from Hinduism to Christianity during the later decades of the
nineteenth century constitutes the most overt pressure on this level. Whereas the early
years of missionary activity had concentrated upon the conversion of high caste
individuals, from the 1860s onwards missions in various parts of India began to
convert low caste groups. Indeed, these groups were often converted as a caste bloc,
following the decision of caste elders to take the step. 49 This trend has been termed
"mass movement".50 Census figures confirm rapid increases in the Christian
population between 1871 and 1901, and most reports record the predominance of low
caste converts as a feature of this increase. 51 It is beyond the scope of this study to
examine the motivations behind low caste conversion during this period. Some
research has pointed to a proliferation of localised reasons, 52 whilst others have
emphasised common factors such as the perceived egalitarian approach of Christianity,
and a general desire amongst low castes for self respect.53 The significance of mass
movements in the present context is that they presented a picture of Hinduism as a
religion being eroded from its base upwards. In addition, low caste conversion begged
the question of who were the converted - were low castes and untouchables Hindus, or
'animists', as many tribal groups, for example, were described in census reports?
Two interrelated narratives, therefore, are indicated by the success of mass movements
towards Christianity. First, the vulnerability of Hinduism, due to the oppression of
low caste groups. Secondly, the question of the shape of Hinduism, how it defined its
boundaries and maintained its own identity. The prominence of misskiiary successes
in census returns (see Section 4.2.1 on this) ensured that these issues were tangible in
the public space - a source of increasing debate in the press. They were also, of
course, issues which very much concerned the Hindu reform movements.
'	 See D.B. Forrester, Caste and Christianity: Attitudes and Policies on Caste of Anglo-Saxon
Protestant Missions in India (Curzon Press, London, 1979), p. 69.50	 See J.W Pickett, Christian Mass Movements in India, A Study with Recommendations
(Abingdon Press, Lucknow, 1933), p. 21: "Who first called them 'mass movements' we have
not discovered. The term did not gain wide currency until the early years of this century. We
have searched more than a hundred volumes of reports from missions in which these
movements developed during the latter half of the nineteenth century without finding a single
use of the term before 1892."
See Census of India 1901, Vol. I, India, Pt. 1: Report (Government Printing Office, Calcutta,
1903), pp.387-92. The Bengal Report, for example, is quoted as noting that "the classes most
receptive of Christianity are those who are outside the Hindu system or whom Hinduism
regards as degraded."
52	 See G. Oddie, "Christian Conversion in the Telugu Country 1860-1900: A Case of One
Protestant Movement in the Godavery-Krishna Delta" (in indian Economic and Social History
Review, Vol.12, 1975, pp.61-79).




In later sections, nineteenth century reformism will be examined as part of the
movement to transform Hinduism through organisation. Here, however, it will be
examined not as an agent, but as an "external" pressure on the structure of Hinduism.
Understanding how this pressure was exerted entails the identification of the defining
characteristics of reformism in this context.
The historiography of Hindu reformism locates it as a feature of colonial society from
the early nineteenth century. A classic account will begin with the work of Rammohun
Roy and perhaps Henry Derozio, move through the Brahmo Samaj in its various
forms, the Prarthana Samaj as its Western Indian counterpart, the Arya Samaj and the
Ramakrishna Mission, before slipping into the more eclectic movements of the
twentieth century.54 The historiographical models that determine this narrative are
instructive. Eighteenth century Hinduism is presented as a degenerate form, along
much the same lines as those projected by Orientalists. The reformers are then Cast as
modernisers, inculcating a more humane or ethical religiosity, characterised by the
insistence on a personal relationship between the individual and God. Often, reformism
is located as a kind of Indian version of the Protestant reformation in Europe.55
The hegemonic text of this trend is J.N. Farquhar's Modern Religious Movements In
JpiJj,56 Although encompassing a far broader spectrum of movements during the
See, for example, A.R. Desal, Social Background of indian Nationalism, chapter XVII,
pp. 281-307; B. Chandra, M. Mukherjee, A. Mukherjee, KN. Panikkar, S. Mahajan (hereafter
Chandra et at), India's Struggle for Independence (Penguin, Delhi, 1989), chapter 6, pp. 82-90;
G. Richards, A Sourcebook of Modern Hinduism (Curzon Press, London, 1985) - Richards'
book is presented as a collection of "modern Hindu writers who may be considered to be
inheritors of the religious and social traditions of India and who have made an important
conthbution to the renaissance of Hinduism and the reformation of Indian society" (p. ix).
The writers covered are Rammohun Roy, Debendranath Tagore, Keshub Chandra Sen.
Dayananda, Ramakrishna, Vivekananda, M.G. Ranade, G.K. (3okhale, RabindranathTagore,
M.K Gandhi, Aurobindo Ghose, S. Radhakrishnan and Vinoba Bhave. See also K.
Klostermaier, A Survey of Hinduism, pp.388-392, although it should be noted that
Klostennaier sounds a cautionary note at the beginning of his discussion of reform
movements, placing them in the context of a far wider "traditional" Hinduism which remained
both current and vital.
See for example Desai, Social Background of Indian Nationalism, p.282, and K. W. Jones,
Arya Dharm: Hindu Consciousness in Nineteenth Century Punjab (Manhohar, Delhi, 1976),
p. 36-7. Jones describes Dayananda's tour of Punjab in 1877-8 as being opposed by the
"beleagured forces of orthodoxy." "Dayanand would have his say," Jones continues, "and
orthodoxy its answer, in this the most basic of all struggles." Susan Bayly has recently
commented on this kind of approach to nineteenth century Hindu reformism: "So-called Hindu
'revivalism' has...been viewed teleologically as a 'modernising' Protestant-style 'reformation'
launched against a Catholic-style 'Hindu' establishment." S. Bayly, "Hindu 'modernisers' and
the 'public' arena: indigenous critiques of caste in colonial India" (Unpublished Seminar Paper,
SOAS, London, 1993), p. 39.
56	 Farquhar, Modern Religious MovemenLs in India (Munshiram Manoharlal, Delhi, 1967; first
published Macmillan, 1915); Jones calls this book "the single authoritative source on
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nineteenth century, Farquhar articulates the notion of western-inspired ethical reform,
held back by a "reactionary" orthodoxy. The resurgence of this reactionary force, he
concludes, indicates a "continuous and steadily increasing inner decay" in Hinduism,
which he equates with "the revival of the ancient religions of the Roman Empire in the
early Christian centuries".57 Farquhar identifies colonial influence as the source of
progressive elements in the nineteenth century movements ("the stimulating influences
are almost exclusively Western..." 58); he also focuses on middle class movements,
particularly the Brahmo Samaj, as agents of progress. As such his approach may be
said to be elitist in the sense identified by the Subaltern Studies group. Progressive
reform is defined by its proximity to European conceptions of modern society: the
eradication of caste, the emancipation of women, the condemnation of idolatry,
individual communion with God; all efforts to promote such causes as these were to be
identified as reformist, as long as they were articulated within a "modernist" or middle
class framework. The problem for this kind of historiography emerges when the same
causes were promoted outside of such frameworks, using non-western idioms. As
research into pre-colonial India is extended, it is becoming increasingly clear that such
causes were espoused by numerous Hindu movements, particularly those within the
bhakti tradition.59 What then constitutes reformism in the nineteenth century is
rendered problematic.
Some attempt to relocate the particular attributes of reformism in the colonial era has
been made by Kenneth Jones, in his Socio-Religious Reform Movements in British
India, a sweeping review of movements in the nineteenth century. Jones begins his
survey with the exemplified statement that there was nothing new in the idea of socio-
religious reform in British India. India had, indeed, been the site of a remarkable array
of reformist movements over a period of some three millennia. He then goes on to
assert the singular character of nineteenth century reform, by making a conceptual
distinction between "transitional" and "acculturative" movements. Transitional
movements "had their origins in the pre-colonial world and arose from indigenous
forms of socio-religious dissent", and displayed a "lack of concern with adjusting
socio-religious movements since its publication" - see Socio-Religious Reform Movements
in British India (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989; series title: New Cambridge
History of India, 3.1), p.228; an interesting critique of Farquhar's work and its influence can
be found in Lutgendorf, The Life of a Text, pp. 360-362.
Farquhar, Modern Religious Movements in india, p. 431, 445.58	 Farquhar, Modern Religious Movements in India, p. 43.
59	 For example, on the developement of the idea of individual communion with God, often
identified as the most fundamental contribution of the west or Chrisitanity to Hindu
reformism, see C. Mackenzie-Brown, 'Purana as Scripture: From Sound to Image of the Holy
Word in the Hindu Tradition" (in History of Religions, Vol.26, No. 1, 1986-7, pp. 68 - 86).
See also Lipner, Hindus: their Religious Beliefs and Practices, pp. 136-143; and Lutgendorf,
The Life of a Text.
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concepts and programmes to the colonial world". Acculturative movements were
driven largely by "English-educated South Asians influenced by the specific culture of
England", and sought an accommodation of "the personal position cf...members within
the colonial world".60 The key distinguishing concept here is what Jones calls the
"colonial milieu": a space where "indigenous civilisations of South Asia caine into
active contact with British culture". Movements that emerged within this milieu were
acculturative; those outside it were transitional. Jones perceives that there is no
substantive difference between the two forms - acculturative movements rested as much
on "the indigenous heritage of social and religious protest" as did transitional, and were
"in no way...totally new or without roots in the general high cultures of South Asia and
the specific sub-cultures of a given region". The difference, then, is defined through
the "point of origin" of a given movement - i.e. whether it stems from inside or outside
of the colonial milieu.61
The conceptual framework enables Jones to accommodate a whole host of movements
which have been marginalised in the historiography of religious reform. This is in
itself an important contribution to understandings of the nineteenth century.
Nevertheless there appears to be little significance in the framework if the central idea of
a colonial milieu is not sufficiently theorised. Distinguishing movements on the basis
of their origins being inside or outside this milieu reduces the framework to the status
of a taxonomic device, which becomes increasingly irrelevant in the complex
ideological environment of the twentieth century. Consequently, in his discussion of
later movements, and also in his discussion of communalism and religious nationalism,
Jones is unable to utilise the conceptual framework he has mapped out for the
interpretation of the nineteenth century.62 The precise significance of reformism as an
aspect of historical development is therefore obscured.63
How, then, can one elaborate the distinctive character of nineteenth century reformism?
A more fruitful approach is to examine the structural implications of some of these
60	 Jones, Socio-Religious Reform Movements in British India, p. 3.61	 Jones, Socio-Religious Reform Movements in British India , pp. 3-4.
62	 See Jones, Socia-Religious Reform Movements in British India , pp. 184-209 and 218-221.
63	 One result of this is the loss of an opportunity to elaborate the idea of subalternity in the
context of religious reform. This would be most interesting, in the light of the above
identification of the historiography of reformism as elitist. It is also interesting to note that
Jones has to locate nearly all movements generated by low castes as transitional, because of
the obvious limitations of the colonial milieu. The only exception is the Swami Narayana
movement in Kerala, which is classed as acculturative due to the involvement of some western
educated Izhavas, although this involvement was not extant until the twentieth century. See
Socio-Re!igious Reform Movements in British IndIa , pp. 179-182. The very modern low
caste movement of the late nineteenth century in western India, however, which was led by
Jotirao Phule and institutionalised in the Satyashodak Samaj, is not taken into account by
Jones. See Section 4.2.2 on this movement.
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movements for Hinduism. This approach may be developed from the starting point of
recognising the particular quality of orthodoxy in Hinduism; for if we are to define
reformism, it is necessaiy in the first instance to identify what exactly is to be reformed.
The idea of orthodoxy is itself a contentious and complex issue in modern Hinduism.
Much of this complexity arises from relatively recent historical developments, which
may be said to have been generated by the intervention of the text as a means of
defining religious identity - the idea that the "true" or "real" form of the religion could
be located as a kind of doctrinal core. 64
 Some modern sociological and anthropological
approaches to Hinduism, however, have attempted to cut across this dominance of the
text.65 In some cases this has led to a reconfiguration of orthodoxy, defining it through
the construction of regionally-specific frameworks. Two institutional structures - caste
and Sampradaya - form this framework. Together, these structures define a code of
practice and a range of doctrinal truth that has a direct influence over svadharma or
individual, personal dhanna. Klaus Klostermaier argues strongly for the recognition of
doctrinal orthodoxy controlled locally by caste paizchayats and Sanpradayas:
Although there has never been one central authority in Hinduism strong
enough to decide the issue categorically, the numerous heads of the
various Hindu churches have nevertheless established very rigorous
canons from within which their understanding of orthodoxy is defined.
.The caste pancayats and the leaders of sampradays have always
exercised control over their members, carefully watching them and
enforcing their views of orthodoxy.66
Anncharlotte Eschmann is less convinced by the existence of doctrinal orthodoxy, but
she also asserts that "there are institutions defining and supervising orthodoxy
but. ..they are of consequence only within a certain place or region and are usually
linked with a certain caste." 67 In both cases, orthodoxy is configured by regional
"establishments", formed through the interaction - to a greater or lesser degree - of
dominant caste and Sainpradaya institutions.
64	 See Inden, imagining India, pp. 105-8 for an account of the projection of Shankaracharya's
Advaita Vedanta as the core of Hinduism; for a wider dicussion of this idea, see T.
Fitzgerald, "Hinduism and the World Religions Fallacy" (in Religion, Vol. 20, No. 2, 1990,
pp. 101-118).65	 See Fitzgerald, Hinduism and the World Religions Fallacy"; R. King, Religious Studies
and the Sacred Text: Limitations 0/the World Religions Approach (Unpublished Seminar
Paper, Bristol, 1994); U. King, "Sociological Approaches to the Study of Modern Hinduism"
(in Social Action Vol.32, 1982, pp. 427-448); C.J. Fuller, The Camphor Flame: Popular
Hinduism and Society in India (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1992), especially
chapter one, pp. 3-28; and J.J. Lipner, Hindus: Their Religious Beliefs and Practices.66	 Klostermaier, A Survey of Hinduism, p. 59.
67	 A. Eschmann, "Religion, Reaction and Change: the Role of Sects in Hinduism" (Unpublished
Seminar Paper, Kandy, 1973), p. 4.
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Interestingly, however, an implicit fluidity is also recognised as a feature of these
institutions. Eschmann has developed this idea by illustrating how Sampradayas
developed as repositories of a whole range of views in relation to Hindu religiosity:
for instance the school founded by Sankaracarya, generally
considered to be one of the most venerable and orthodox manifestations
of Hinduism, is called Sampraiaya as well as dissenting and protesting
communities like, for instance, Virasaivism. The latter 'radical
Sampradays', as one might call them, introduced not only doctrinal
changes, but are or at least were advocates of considerable social
changes. They challenge orthodoxy, by for instance not admitting
image worship or by not recognising and even deliberately trespassing
caste barriers.68
Despite such aspects as non-recognition of caste, denying image worship and so on,
the radical Sampradayas are nevertheless part of the institutional structure of Hinduism.
They exist alongside caste, and generate doctrinal, ritual and even social change from
the coterminous position of the ashram or matha, mostly through a gradual adjustment
of religious practice. There is, however, no structural opposition between caste and
Saznpradaya (i.e. in the manner of Church vs. sect in Christianity), and the
Sampra&iya, even in its radical manifestation, will not necessarily have a
transformative effect on the system as a whole. For example, the core of Virashaiva
teaching is its refusal to recognise the concept of ritual pollution. Nevertheless,
Virashaivas operate within the caste system, and even recognise caste distinctions
among themselves.69 Virashaivas, or Lingayats as they are more commonly known,
have been encompassed by the system their teachings have sought to repudiate, and
now operate as a separate caste or set of sub-castes in their own right. The radical
Samprc&aya of the twelfth century has become institutionalised as part of the structure
of Hinduism.
Eschmann states as an "astonishing fact" that the 19th century reform movements did
not build on the work of radical Sampradayas. "Not only was the fundamental
openness of the Hindu tradition not at all considered," she notes, "even tenets
coinciding with the aims of modem thought were at first not taken up." 70 Here then,
the distinction between Jones' transitional and acculturative movements is beginning to
acquire depth. Eschmann cites as an example of her point the Satya Mahima Dharma
movement, a movement identified by Jones as transitional. 71
 This movement was
widespread in Orissa, and also reached into Andhra Pradesh, Bengal and Assam
68	 Eschmann, "Religion, Reaction and Change", p. 3.
69	 See C. Parvathamma, Politics & religion : a study of historical interaction
between socio-poli:ical relationships in a Mysore village (Sterling, New Delhi, 1971),
pp.xviii-xix: "the non-observance of caste distinctions based on ritual status is retained only in
theory by veerasaivas"
70	 Eschmann, "Religion, Reaction and Change", p. 6.
71	 See Jones, Socio-Religious Reform Movements, p. 131-5.
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during the second half of the nineteenth century. The movement was avowedly
monotheistic, critical of idol worship and of Brahmanic practice, as also of the
institution of caste as a whole. 72 Much of the teachings of Mahima Gosain, the
founder of the movement, was drawn from the medieval Vaishnavite school of
Pancasakha, which was also an Orissan, anti-Brahman tradition. 73 Here, then, is a
movement which expressed similar principles to an acculturative movement like the
Arya Samaj, operating, expanding, during much the same period. Yet there was no
connection between them, and no recognition of a common goal. Even after the
dramatic incident in 1881, when Mahima Dharm devotees attempted to burn the main
idol in the Jagannath temple in Pun, there appears to have been little response from the
Arya Samaj.74
The distinction between Mahima Dharma and the Arya Samaj is primarily structural.
The former emanated from a Sainprackiya; its self image located it within what
Eschmann calls "the living Hindu tradition". The latter, on the other hand, cannot be
situated within this structure; it was "not only...against tradition, but, so to speak,
completely without tradition".75 Structurally, it attempted to provide an alternative
framework for the expression of religious truth; alternative, that is, in the sense of
appropriating the functions (i.e. as opposed to simply criticising or rejecting the
functions) of the existing framework provided by caste and Sampradaya institutions.
Presently I examine precisely how this alternative framework was constructed. What it
illustrates here is that the growing prominence of reformism in the nineteenth century
constituted a particular pressure on the tradition of Hinduism, concentrating on the
structure of that tradition as exemplified by the caste-Sainpradaya nexus. In a similar
fashion to Christian mass movements, therefore, reformism focused attention and
debate on the shape of Hinduism, on how it was organised in relation to other religions
and to society. At the same time, the development of representation as a feature of the
discourse of organisation encouraged the articulation of this debate in the public space
within specific parameters. I will now examine the nature of the movements and
debates that emerged.
72	 ibid.
See Eschmann, Kulke & Tripathi (eds.), The cult ofJagannath and the regional tradition of
Oisra (Manohar, Delhi, 1978), p. 389-90.
I have been unable to locate any comment on this incident, which occurred on 9 March 1881,
in the Punjabi press.
'	 see Eschmann, "Religion, Reaction and Change", p. 7.
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3.3 Establishing Patterns of Organisation: Hindu Movements in the
Nineteenth Centuiy
The earliest examples of Hinduism articulated in modem organisational frameworks
were formulated in the first half of the nineteenth century in Calcutta, the seat of the
colonial government and the hub of the expanding state. The Brabmo Samaj, formed
by Rammohun Roy in 1828 as the Brahmo Sabha, is commonly cited as the first
reforming organisation in India. Until 1830, it was little more than an informal weekly
gathering of Bengali Brahmans in a private Calcutta residence. 76 The organisation was
consolidated through the construction of a permanent Brahmo building, which was run
by a board of trustees appointed to "conduct the affairs of the Samaj". In addition, a
trust deed was drawn up which gave legal definition to the organisation. 77
 By the end
of 1830, however, Rammohun had left for England and the organisation, lacking his
guiding energy, "faded almost to extinction".78
More significant at this stage was the formation of the Calcutta Dharma Sabha in 1831.
It was formed by those elements of the Calcutta intelligentsia who had petitioned
Parliament early in 1830 opposing Bentinck's sail decree, and as such it is commonly
cited as the first orthodox institution of the colonial era. 79 Its main weapon in its stated
objective of defending Hindu tradition was to formulate petitions and memorials
addressed to authority. As such, it developed an appropriate form for this kind of
political expression: it included "a president, a board of directors, a secretary, and a
treasurer, and the members regularly organised committees for special purposes"; in
addition, the Sabha "conducted its meetings according to strict rules of parliamentary
procedure".8° When the Brahmo Samaj was revived in the early 1840s by
Debendranath Tagore, it followed a similar pattern of development, establishing the
Brahmo covenant as a formal basis for membership, and merging the structure of the
Samaj with that of the Tattvabodhini Sabha, Debendranath's "highly effective
organisation" geared towards resisting the encroachment of missionary influence in
Bengal.8 ' Both organisations drew their membership from the same social bloc: the
Calcutta bhadralok, a land-owning, high caste bloc, with vested interests in British
rule, and after 1835, almost invariably English educated.
76	 A house was rented for the purpose; see Farquhar, Modern Religious Movements, p. 34.
'	 See F.L. Damen, Crisis and Religious Renewal in the Brahmo Samaj 1860-1884 (Katholieke
Universiteit Leuven, Leuven, 1983) p. 25.
78	 Jones, Socio-Religious Reform Movements, p. 33.
'	 Jones, Socio-Religious Reform Movements, p. 32; for an account of the emergence of the
Dharma Sabha, see D. Kopf, British Orientalism and the Bengal Renaissance, p. 270-2.
80	 Kopf, British Orientalism and the Bengal Renaissance, p. 271.
81	 See D. Kopf, The Brahmo Samaj and the Shaping of the Modern Indian Mind (Princeton
University Press, Princeton, 1979), p. 162.
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Here, then, is an example of the influence of the state's legal-representative culture on
the presentation of Hinduism in the public domain, where the primacy of organisation
is evident. Hindus operating within the realm of colonial civil society articulated their
concerns through the formation of bodies which had a coherent meaning within this
context. These bodies were modern in the sense that they were governed by
constitutions and aims and objectives, they had secretaries, executive boards and
membership lists, and they employed techniques such as subscription campaigns,
public meetings and petitions to authority. Within this framework, the Brahmo Samaj
"represented" a reforming, modernising constituency, and the Dharma Sabha
"represented" a traditional, orthodox constituency. The constituencies were projected
in order to legitimise or give meaning to these organisations within the public space,
despite the lack of any tangible evidence that such constituencies existed.
Both the Dharma Sabha and the Brahmo Samaj were limited by the comparatively
isolated social status of their adherents. Nevertheless their form and their position in
relation to the colonial public domain illustrates the pattern of organisation which was to
develop in the later nineteenth century, in the context of some of the images and
pressures on Hinduism noted above. Even at this early stage, the pattern is marked by
a template of polarisation, which sees the presentation of reformism and orthodoxy as
opposing constituencies in a projected "community of Hindus". 82 This examination of
the development of Hindu movements will concentrate on the elaboration of these
oppositional positions: how they articulated themselves in relation to each other and to
the wider world of Hinduism.
3.3.1 Reformism: The Transformative Structure of the Arya Samaj
Dayananda completed the first edition of his major work Satyarth Pakash, or "Light of
Truth", in 1875. This work articulated the basic principles of the Arya Samaj creed: the
belief in a single, unitary God, the identification of the Vedas as the embodiment of
complete truth, and the logical inference that the age of Vedic religion constituted the
Golden Age not only of Hinduism, but of all religion. Dayananda hence perceived his
82	 The ideological proximity of the Brahmo Samaj and the Dharma Sabha which this
template of polarisation tended to obscure was nevertheless evident in the late 1840s, when the
two organisations collaborated to establish the Hindu Charitable Association as a counter to
missionary educational advances. In this Association, the President of the executive board was
Radhakanta Deb (the leading figure of Dharma Sabha "orthodoxy"), while the Secretary was
Debendranath. Here, in a sense, was an early indication of the tendency to symbolise the
"community of Hindus" by establishing a spectrum of representatives in one orgamsation.
See Chapter 5 on this tendency in the Hindu Sabha movement.
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work as the re-introduction of Vedic practices in Hinduism, and the opening up of this
practice to the whole populace. As Lajpat Rai comments in 1914:
It may be difficult for us to visualise that in the second half of the 19th
century the Vedas were a sealed book in India, and no one could even
read them, much less quote them in open debate attended by all
communities, Hindus and non-Hindus alike. At present the Vedas are
being read, studied and commented upon by all classes and castes of
Hindus. This is the greatest service rendered by Dayanand to the cause
of religious and intellectual as well as social freedom in India, and this
alone entitles him to be called the Saviour of Hindu India.83
As a Samajist himself, one can expect Lajpat Rai to over-emphasise the achievements of
the Swami. Nevertheless this passage gives an indication of the kind of impact
Dayananda's teaching attempted to effect. What Lajpat Rai describes is a process of
"textualisation" of the Vedas. In certain (admittedly small) sections of Indian society,
Vedic texts are by the second decade of the twentieth century being "read, studied and
commented upon by all classes and castes of Hindus". The Vedas are projected as the
"Book" of Hinduism, in the same manner as the Koran or the Bible are projected as the
"Book", the embodiment, of Islam and Christianity.
At the same time, however, Day ananda maintained his belief in Sanskrit as the language
of revelation. As such any serious comment on or study of the Vedas required a
thorough knowledge of Sanskiit.84 Dayananda was dismissive of any form of learning
which was not supported by this knowledge,85 and this was indeed a natural corollary
to his belief in the Vedas as the depository of absolute truth. Dayananda perceived
Sanskrit as a universal language, the "mother of all tongues", 86 and as such it was the
appropriate language for the expression of the truths of the Vedas. 87 In effect, Sanskrit
became the objective vehicle of truth in the text, as opposed to the subjective and
mystical authority of Brahmanical utterance noted in Chapter 2. Access to religious
truth was shifted, in that any individual who accepted Dayananda's teaching and who
was sufficiently educated could contemplate the universal truths of the Vedas directly.
This reformulation formed the basis of Dayananda's rejection of the contemporary
caste system in favour of an idealised vision of society structured in accordance with
83	 Lajpat Rai, A History of the Arya Samaj (Orient Longman, New Delhi, 1992), pp. 54-55. It
should be noted , however, that Dayananda specified equal access as a necessity in the
contemporary, "fallen" state of Hinduism; if society was properly structured (i.e according to
the four Vanzas) then Shudras would be denied the right to study the Vedas. See Jordens,
Dayananda Saraswati: His Life and Ideas (Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1978), p. 104.84	 See Lajpat Rai, A History of the Arga Samaj, pp. 55-56.
85	 See, for example, his dismissive attitude towards Guru Nanak on this basis - Jordens,
Dayananda Saraswati, p. 135.86	 Quoted in Jordens, Dayananda Saraswati, p. 104.
87	 It should be noted here, however, that Dayananda was also a committed supporter of the idea
of 1-lindi as a national language in India.
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the Yajur Veda's four varnas: Brahmans, Kshatriyas, Vaishyas and Shudras.
Dayananda's interpretation of varna-vyavastha cited merit, not birth, as the determining
factor in the system:
All individuals should be placed in different Classes according to their
qualification, accomplishments and character. By adopting this system
all will advance in every respect, because the higher Classes will be in
constant fear of their children being degraded to the Sudra Class, if they
are not properly educated. The same fear will also make the children
acquire knowledge and culture. Whilst the lower Classes will be
stimulated to exert themselves for admission into the Classes above
them.88
In reality , this system upheld the notion of an elite socio-religious group - the
Brahmans remained the "mediators" of religious truth - but it was an elite defined not
by the "closed" signifier of birth, but rather by the more accessible notion of an
appropriate education. This of course had a very particular significance for the
emerging colonial middle class.
As such, Christophe Jaffrelot's characterisation of the Arya Samaj as employing a
strategy of "reform and defence" of hierarchical , Brahmanical Hinduism is somewhat
misleading. He suggests that Dayananda, as a Brahman, was primarily concerned to
maintain the existing social hierarchy - what he perceived as the "core of the Hindu
tradition". Thus, "even though he considered the Brahmans to be responsible for the
development of superstitions and the decline of Hindu society, the alternative social
model he proposed was based largely on the traditional - mainly Brahmanical - world
view... •"89 For Jaffrelot, then, Dayananda's work represents a reformulation of
existing structures of oppression, and as such it appears as an appropriate antecedent to
the reactionary tendencies of Hindu nationalism.
My contention is that by shifting the weight of religious authority on to the written text
of the Vedas in Sanskrit, Dayananda had necessarily to subvert the position of the
existing caste structure. Of course, the institution of varna-vyavastha would maintain
the position of Brahmans as the elite of the structure, but this elite maintains its
authority through its relationship with the text of religious truth, rather than through the
"natural" superiority of birth. It was exactly this departure from the "traditional -
mainly Brahmanical - world view" in the area of caste that was to cause so much
tension between the Arya Samaj and the wider world of Hinduism during the first forty
years of its existence.
88	 Dayananda Saraswati (Ed: C.Bharadwaja), Light of Truth or An English Translation of
SaLyarrh Prakosh (Arya Saniaj, Madras, 1932).








Jaffrelot cites Dayananda's emphasis on the importance of the meritocratic varna system
as indicative of a strategy of emulation of the western tradition, in that it represents an
expression of "individualistic values".90 Emulation - the "paradoxical imitation of the
Other" - is perceived as strengthening the position of Hinduism in its confrontation with
the aggressive proselytising of Christianity:
(Arya Samaj practices) contain a mimetic dimension, in so far as they
imply a reform of Hinduism inspired by the values of its western
opponents. However, this imitation entails a strategy of assimilating
those cultural traits which give the opponent his superiority and prestige
in order to resist him more effectively, while pretending to discover
such traits in one's own 'original civilisation'.91
The strategy of emulation leads us here to a notion of Dayananda "pretending" to
discover individualism in the Aryan varna model in order to appropriate what were
perceived as superior western values. Whether this is a meaningful statement or not is
difficult to prove. It is, moreover, indicative of the kind of problems posed by locating
"cultural traits" as the principal area of emulation. The SatyarthPrakash certainly refers
to western values such as duty, discipline and patriotism (although not, explicitly,
individualism) as causes of European advancement,92 but are these formative or
motivating factors in Dayananda's work? Do they, in any case, constitute anything
new in terms of the cultural response to colonialism? Such emulation had alter all been
a central feature of Brahmo Samaj ideology since the 1830s.
It is rather in the structure of Day ananda's interpretation of Hinduism that the most
critical mimesis can be identified. Through his "foregrounding of the Vedas",93
Dayananda developed a system whereby religious texts were deemed as either arsha
(the Vedas and any text based on a proper understanding of the Vedas - such as Manu
Smriti), or unarsha (generally products of the post-Mahabharata period, with no
connection to the Vedas)2 4 In short, Dayananda attempted to establish a Hindu canon,
and he frequently used this principle to refute pandits in debate. Daniel Gold cites this
canonical principle as "directly influenced by western models" and "an idea with little
precedent in Hindu thought". 95 Anncharlotte Eschmann does perceive an existing
Jaffrelot, The Hindu Nationalist Movement in india, p. 16.
ibid.
Dayananda Saraswati, Light of Truth, p. 469-70.
The phrase is used by Uma Chakravarty as a characteristic of 19th Century reform
movements; see her essay: "What ever happened to the Vedic Dasi? Orientalism, Nationalism
and a Script for the Past" (in Sangari and Vaid [eds.], Recasting Women: Essays in Colonial
History , Kali For Women, New Delhi, 1989, pp. 27-87), p. 33.
See Jones, Socio-Religious Reform Movements, p.96; Daniel Gold, "Organised Hinduisms",
p. 542-4; Dayananda, Light of Truth, p. 733.
Gold, "Organised Hinduisms", p.S44; in addition Gold cites rational theism and a scientific
approach to religious texts as central to Dayananda's understanding of Hinduism. Although
these aspects are not directly attributed to a strategy of emulation, they were nevertheless
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canon in Hinduism, but it is a canon consisting of "two parts, the second of which -
astonishing (sic) enough- is still unfinished". 96 The Sinriti canon (including the
Ramayana and Mahabharata, the Puranas etc.) is identified by Eschmann as an open,
flexible canon that encourages change in Hinduism; the nature of Dayananda's canon
was closed, fixed by its insistence on Vedic authority.
This establishment of a fixed canonical core reiterates the emphasis of Dayananda's
work on the objective, timeless text of the Vedas in Sanskrit. As stated earlier, this
shift in the weight of religious authority was inherently transformative, and as such was
immediately subversive to the existing caste structure.
The transformative nature of Dayananda's creed was reflected in the structure and
character of his principle legacy, the Arya Samaj. The Arya Samaj was established in
Bombay in 1875, and subsequently had its most profound impact in the Punjab.
Dayananda travelled to the Punjab in 1877, and the Lahore Samaj was established
within two months of his arrival. The membership was dominated by trading castes -
Aroras, Bamas and particularly Khatris. These, however, were trading castes with a
difference: it was exactly these castes that formed the basis of the rapidly emerging
English educated elite in the Punjab, fulfilling the new demands of government
bureaucracy, the legal system and the education system in the Province. 97 As Jordens
has illustrated, the Lahore Samaj was driven by "some of the best-educated Punjabis,"
many of whom held positions of power within the colonial milieu.98
The Lahore Samaj was to become the central unit in the development of the Samaj
structure throughout the Punjab during the 1880s and 1890s. The Punjab was then to
become the basis for extension into other provinces, particularly the United Provinces.
The fundamental element of the Samaj structure was the local branch organisation. Any
nine individuals (male or female) willing to accept the Ten Principles of the Arya Samaj
(see below) could set up a local branch. Each member would in normal circumstances
contribute 1% of their income as subscription to the branch to which they belonged.
The centre of local Samaj activity was the Samaj Mandir, or meeting house, which was
generally a building funded by donation. The Arya Samaj as a whole developed as a
loose pyramidal structure, with the local branches forming a wide base, affiliated to
"congruent with beliefs found in western Protestantism", and therefom added to the evangelical
flavour of Dayananda's work.
	
96	 Eschmann, "Religion, Reaction and Change", p. 5.
	
"	 See R. Kumar, "The Rowlatt Satyagraha in Lahore", in Kumar, Essays in the SociaL History
ofModern india (Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1983, pp. 148-212) p. 156; n.b. English
education had not been instituted in the Punjab until 1856.
	
98	 Jordens, Dayananda Saraswali, p. 173.
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Provincial Sabhas which in turn were affiliated to a central Sabha. 99 This basic
structure had been articulated by Dayananda in the 28 rules of the Bombay Samaj in
1875. 100 In the Punjab a further element was added, in that the Samaj became
committed to an expansive policy of establishing educational institutions, which further
concretised the organisation's presence in the Province.
Expansion was also aided by the considerable elasticity of the Ten Principles (Niyams)
which came to form the basis of Samaj membership after the establishment of the
Lahore branch. The Bombay Samaj's 28 Rules had included guidelines on ethics,
methods of worship and constitutional matters, as well as questions of creed. 101 The
Lahore Principles dealt only in a very general way with matters of creed and morality,
and not at all with methods of worship, organisation, constitution etc. As Graham
notes, "one could apparently be an Arya Samajist while following practically all the
social customs of orthodox Hinduism." 102 What this means, of course, is that
Samajists would not jeopardise their caste status by agreeing to the Ten Principles. The
importance of this has been illustrated by Jones, when he contrasts the status of Aryas
in Punjabi society with that of Brahmo Samajists. The latter suffered a degree of social
boycott as a result of the radical manifestation of their creed. In particular, Brahmos
were caricatured as "anti-national" in their adoption of all things European, and almost
non-Hindu in their approach to Christ and Mohammed. 103 Arya Samajists, on the
other hand, remained integrated within the wider world of Hinduism, through their
consistent maintenance of caste status.
At the same time, two factors were critical in maintaining the transformative character of
the Samaj. First, despite the generic character of the Ten Principles articulated at
Lahore, Principle Three clearly emphasised an aspect of Dayananda's teaching that has
been identified as critical:
See Veena Dua, "The Arya Samaj and Punjab Politics" (in Economic and Political Weekly,
Vol. 5, Non. 43-44, 24 October 1970, pp. 1787-1791), pp. 1788-9.
100	 Rule three of the Bombay Samaj stated: "There shall be a Principal Arya Sainaj in each
province, and the other Arya Samajes shall be its branches, all connected with one another.";
quoted in J.R. Graham, "The Arya Samaj as a Reformation in Hinduism with Special
Reference to Caste" (Unpublished PhD Dissertation, Yale, 1942), p. 162. It should be noted,
however, that when expansion really took hold in the Punjab, individual samajes retained a
high degree of autonomy within this structure.
101	 See Graham, "The Arya Samaj as a Reformation in Hinduism", p. 164.102	 Graham, "The Arya Samaj as a Reformation in Hinduism", p. 197.
103 See Jones, AryaDhann, p. 40-43; it should also be noted that the Brahmo Samaj was a
Bengali-dominated organisation, at a time when Bengalis were still cast as the principal
beneficiaries of employment in the Punjabi bureaucracy.
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The Vedas are the books of all true Knowledge. It is the paramount
duty of all Aryas to read them and to instruct others in them, to hear
them read, and to recite them to others.'04
There has been a tendency to emphasise the first part of this statement, as the only
statement in the Principles that alludes to the status of the Vedas. 105 What is perhaps
more interesting is the second half, which affirms the study, discussion and even
preaching of the Vedas as the 'paramount duty of all Aryas". The critical importance of
the fixed, textual canon is evident here, as is the necessity of "spreading the word" of
the new canon. As noted earlier, it is exactly this assertion that challenges fundamental
elements of Brahmanical Hinduism.
The second critical factor was the Samaj Mandir. The Mandir developed as the basic
institutional unit of the Arya Samaj; the focal point of each branch organisation,
however large or small, where all of its regular activities were held. Principal among
these activities was the weekly service, which consisted of Vedic ritual, singing of
hymns, prayers and a sermon. These services were open to the public. In addition, the
Mandir was the venue for Samaj committee meetings, and for elections to that
committee. It would also be used for specialist services, such as marriage ceremonies,
and also for regular classes. Most important of these latter were classes in Hindi and
Sanskrit, which each Samaj was theoretically obliged to arrange for those of its
members not conversant with either of these two core languages. 106
 In effect, the
Samaj Mandir assumed the position of a church-like organisation, tending to the needs
of the "congregation" of local Samajists. This parallel was consciously perceived by
contemporary Samajists. For example, when Lajpat Rai commented on public access
to Samaj services, he said that "anybody can come into the Church of God and occupy
whatever seat be likes". 107
 This kind of language was easily projected onto the Arya
Samaj as a whole; for example, in a speech in 1908, Lala Munshi Ram (later Swami
Shraddhanand) referred to the Samaj as the "Vedic Church", and called on Aryas to
"cultivate the grace of faith, and bear the cross".108
The conception of a church-like structure had implications in terms of the Samaj's
transformative trajectory. What distinguishes the nineteenth century reform
movements, as I have said, was their construction of an alternative framework, outside
the traditional structure of Hinduism. The church-like structure of the Samaj constitutes
the material articulation of this alternative framework. Eschmann has noted that caste in
104	 Quoted in Jones, AryaDharm, Appendix 1, p. 321.105	 See, for example, Jordens, Dayananda Saraswati, p.175; Jones, Arya Dharpn, p. 37.106	 See Lajpat Rai, A History of the Arya Sarnaj, p.158-9.
107	 Lajpat Ral, A History of the Arya Samaf, p. 157.
108	 Quoted in Jordens, Swa,niShradd/urnanda, pp. 87-8.
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Hinduism performs many similar functions to the Church in Christianity. Duties such
as the selection and training of priests, the trusteeship of sacraments such as marriage,
the admission of individuals by birth and the power to excommunicate them, are all
either general caste responsibilities or recognised as the preserve of certain castes.
These functions are also characteristic of the Church in Christianity.' 09
 By
constructing an institutional space similar to that of the Church, the Arya Samaj aligned
itself in direct confrontation to the institutional function of the caste system. It is here,
then, on the level of the organisation of Hinduism, that the transformative potential of
Dayananda's ideology was manifested.
33.2 Orthodoxy: Sanatana Dharma Sabhas and the Bharat Dharma Mahamandal
Earlier, it was suggested that the pattern of organisation that emerged in Hinduism
during the nineteenth century was marked by a template of polarisation, meaning the
development of movements and bodies in opposition to each other. This pattern is
certainly evident as the Arya Samaj expanded its network in the north west, as it was
shadowed by the development of "orthodox" institutions, the Sanatana Dharma Sabhas
and their umbrella organisation, the Bharat Dharma Mahamandal. As has been shown,
orthodoxy is a somewhat complex idea in Hinduism: it must be understood in terms of
local or regional frameworks, by reference to caste and Saznpradaya configurations.
Indeed, it has also been illustrated that the transformative potential of reformism - the
feature that distinguishes it as reforming - is based upon the challenge to this structural
arrangement. Orthodoxy as symbolised by sanatana dharma, however, is a somewhat
different idea, in that it seeks to project a monolithic establishment: orthodoxy in a pan-
Hindu context, or, more appropriately, as a pan-Hindu constituency.
Recent work by Vasudha Dalmia has focused on the development of a self-consciously
modern image of orthodoxy in Benaras during the late 1860s and 1870s. In particular
she has concentrated on the work of Bharatendu Harischandra and his attempts to
formulate a standardised Vaishnavite approach to the "true" form of Hindu belief and
practice.' 10 Harischandra fashioned his approach through his journals, and through
his involvement in two organisations, the Kashi Dharma Sabha and the Tadiya Samaj.
The Kashi Dharma Sabha had been instigated in the late 1860s by the Maharaja of
Benaras, and Harischandra was its executive secretary during its early years. One of its
principal concerns was the dispensation of vyavasthas, religious ordinances. This of
109	 See Eschmann, "Religion, Reaction and Change", p. 5.110	 See Dalmia, "The Only Real Religion of the Hindus"; Dalmia, "The Modernity of Tradition:
Harischandra of Banaras and the Defence of Hindu Dharma" (Unpublished Seminar Paper,
SOAS, London, 1993); and Dalmia, The Nationalisation ofHindu Tradition: Bharatendu
Harischandra and Nineteen1hCenluryBanaras (Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1997).
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course had long been a recognised function of individual pandits, guided by their own
Sampradaya -based theology. Dalmia states that the Maharaja sought to provide this
system with an organised structure through the establishment of the Dharma Sabha.
She illustrates how the Sabha exercised its authority, mostly by making rulings on
issues of ritual practice. These rulings were widely accepted, it would appear, due to
their association with Benaras and the Maharaja, but the thrust of the organisation is
nevertheless clear: to establish a body with the authority to define correct or standard
procedure within the Hindu religion.
Because of its basis in the vyavastha tradition, the Sabha's authority encompassed ritual
practice; Harischandra, however, was by the early eighteen seventies more interested in
establishing a doctrinal standard in Hinduism. He attempted to consolidate the doctrinal
approach of key Vaishnavite Sampradays through the articulation of a common base in
monotheism and bhakti. 111 The Tadiya Samaj was the organisational form for this. It
is clear that Harischandra and his associates in the Tadiya Samaj were motivated by a
concern for the predicament of Hinduism as a whole within the context of colonial rule.
This concern was precisely expressed in 1872 as a need to counter the heterogeneity of
Hinduism, which prevented the presentation of a united front, an effective "Hindu
public opinion"." 2 The colonial public space, then, was influential in the articulation
of this formulaic orthodoxy. But it also drew on the traditional authority of the
Sampradaya structure, and the "natural" authority of Benaras as the theological centre
of Hinduism.
This sophisticated attempt to reformulate tradition in a modern, nationalist context is
quite different to the approach of the Sanatana Dharma Sabhas that emerged in the late
eighteen seventies, and to the idea of sanatana dharina as a symbol of orthodoxy. In
the Punjab Census Report for 1891, the Census Superintendent notes the tendency of
"orthodox Hindus...to record themselves as orthodox by sect." Whilst specifying
numbers returned as brahmachari (592), smartak (123) and karm kandi (838), he then
goes on to comment that
a still larger number were entered as Sanathan-dharmi, but I have not
thought it worthwhile to record their numbers: the term merely implies
that they belong to the 'old school', and it is generally used in
contradistinction to the followers of the Arya Samaj. In Lahore City I
found at the commencement of the preliminary enumeration that almost
everybody who was not an Arya was being recorded as a Sanathan-
dharmi, which was a view of the meaning of our 'sect-column' that
would have deprived it of its main interest. The term is generally used
111	 See Dalmia, "The Only Real Religion of the Hindus", pp. 188-9.112	
"b1ic Opinion in India", an editorial published in Hariscandra's journal Kavivacansudha,
quoted at length in Dalmia, "The Only Real Religion of the Hindus", p. 186-7.
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now-a-days in contradistinction to the Aryas, and there are numerous
societies and clubs which under this title do what they can to maintain
the orthodox faith.1'3
Three points should be noted from this comment: first, "not being an Arya" is identified
as the common characteristic of "sanathan-dharmis"; secondly, the non-Arya Lahori
Hindus, were being recorded as "sanathan-dharmis", as opposed to positively stating
their allegiance - this implies the conscious intervention of census enumerators, similar
to that noted in Chapter 2 in the recording of Hindus in the Central Provinces; and
thirdly, "numerous societies and clubs" are cited as "maintaining the orthodox faith".
The Census Superintendent outlines an idea with little apparent substance, actively
promoted by middle class agents, and manifested in modern organisational forms. In
addition, it may be said that the spread of this new formulation mirrored that of the
Arya Samaj, as it is first mentioned in the Punjab report, before spreading to the United
Provinces report somewhat later. 114 The simple image of a reactive, conservative force
is nevertheless somewhat misleading. Pandit Shraddha Ram, the most prominent early
"Sanatani", was a proactive and by no means conventional campaigner. As early as
1875 he had established the Hindu Dharm Prakashik Sabha, "dedicated to the defence
of Hindu orthodoxy"." 5 This organisation was established in the specific context of
Ludhiana, where Kanhya Lal Alakhdari's reformist Niti Prakash Sabha had been
operating since 1873. Prior to this, however, he had been working in collaboration
with Alakhdari in Amritsar on a campaign to purify Hindu practice. In addition, as
early as 1874 he had performed several shuddhi ceremonies to reclaim converted
Hjndus.116
The establishment of the Ludhiana organisations is an early indication of the way in
which nominally reformist and orthodox bodies developed together during this period.
These organisations all recruited from the same pooi of educated, profession-orientated
middle castes - Khatris, Aroras and Banias." 7 From the outset, they were concerned
113	 Census of India 1891, Vol. XIX, Punjab and its Feudatories, Pt. 1: Report ( Superintendant
Government Printing, Calcutta, 1892), p. 171-2.114	 Its sudden popularity evidently still baffled the Punjab Census Superintendant in 1901, as he
states "how the phrase has become so widespread I cannot explain"; Census of India 1901,
Vol. XVII, Punjab and its Feudatories, and the North-West Frontier Province, P11: Report
(Government Central Printing, Simla, 1902), p.1 15. First mention in the U.P. Census
Report is in 1911, when 8861 were returned as sanatana dharmis by sect, and the
Superintendant noted: "The phrase is used chiefly in opposition to the Arya Samaj. ...All but
25 are found in the three western divisions where Aryaism is most prevalent...." See Census
of India 1911, Vol. XV, United Provinces of Agra and Oudh, p1 1 (Superintendant
Government Printing, Allahabad, 1912), p. 131.115	 Jones, AryaDharm, p. 28.
116	 Shuddhi was performed by Shraddha Ram at Sialkot, Mian Mir, Jullundar, Phagwara,
Phillaur, Ludhiana, Ambala and Saharanpur; see ibid.
117	 N.B It would be an interesting extension of this observation to research the relative level of
government employment within comparable Sanatani and Arya organisations. Whether there
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not only with attacking or defending various aspects of ritual practice and social
custom, but also with issues which engendered a consensus across the spectrum of
organised, literate Hinduism in the public domain. Jones notes that it is often difficult
to trace the development of the "competing" networks of Arya and Sanatani
organisations, because of the tendency to use the same terminology and the confluence
of objectives among these organisations. 118 The classic notion of a furious debate
between Aryas and Sanatanis over the issue of image worship is underwritten
throughout this period by a consistent consensus on issues such as cow protection, the
promotion of Sanskrit and Hindi, the need to purify practice and curb expenditure on
ritual, and to a certain extent, the necessity of shuddhi.
How, then, did the Sanatana Dharma Sabhas distinguish themselves as orthodox?
Unlike Harischandra's attempt to develop a homogenising doctrinal core, the Punjabi
Sabhas generated doctrinal statements - beyond the vague invocation of sruti-smriti or
ved-upanishad-itihas-purana - only in response to reformist concerns. No core
theology was developed, to be referred to by any well-read Sanatani in a debate with an
Arya. Instead, Sanatanis relied on learned individuals like Shraddha Ram to travel
from district to district, refuting the arguments of Dayananda and other reformers as
they arose. This is significant, because of the emphasis it placed on practice and
structure - as opposed to doctrine - as the defining elements of Hindu tradition. The
main areas of Arya criticism in the 1880s were image worship and the position of
Brahmans in Hindu society. Consequently, image worship and established caste
hierarchies were identified as core features of the tradition signified by sanatana
dhar,na, and defended by Sanatana Dharma Sabhas.
This is reflected in the most ambitious projection of orthodoxy during the late
nineteenth century, the Bharat Dharma Mahamandal. This organisation first met at
Hardwar in 1887, and is said to have been the work of Pandit Din Dayal Sharma.119
Unsurprisingly, given the prevalent mood at this time, the Government interpreted the
Mahamandal as another manifestation of the cow protection movement. 120
 It did,
however, appear to have wider aims, projecting itself as a central umbrella organisation
for the network of Sanatana Dharma Sabhas that were by this time well established in
Punjab and North Western Provinces. Promoting the second meeting of the
is, for example, a greater representation of 'middle appointments' (vernacular literacy required)
amongst Sanatanists, and 'higher appointments' (English required) amongst Aryas.
118	 See Jones, A!ya Dharjn, p. 111, ii. 56.
119	 See "Proposed Deputation of the Bharat Dharma Mahamandal Society to the King's
Coronation", Foreign Department, Internal, B Progs, June 1902, Nos 112-114 (NAI).
120	 See ibid., which states that the Mahamandal was founded "in connection with kine killing"
and notes that Din Dayal "has done all in his power to prevent kine killing"; on the cow
protection movement, see Section 4.3.1 of this thesis.
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Mahamandal in 1889, Sharma is reported to have publicised the expansion of the Sabba
network from under 100 to more than 200 since the foundation of the Mahamandal. In
addition, the organisation was said to have preserved Sanskrit manuscripts by placing
them in "the libraries of the Dharma Sabhas"; improving "old indigenous Sanskrit
schools" and opening new ones; appointing "learned Brahmins...to lecture on orthodox
Hindu religion"; and generally making efforts to "refute the new propaganda of the
modern Hindu sects". 121 The Mahamandal developed into a Congress-style
organisation,' 22 meeting fairly consistently on an annual basis, and attended by
delegates representing affiliated Sabhas. It projected several Hindu Rajas as patrons
and figureheads of a revivified Hinduism. By 1902, the Mahamandal claimed as its
constituency "the whole of the orthodox classes of the Hindus in India"123
Subjects of discussion at the 1900 session of the Mahamandal, held at Delhi, give an
indication of the issues that defined this orthodoxy. The worship of images, use of
"Devanagri language", obedience due to Pandi-ts and Brahmans, the lack of Shastric
authority for widow remarriage, the need for a Sanskrit College "in which the old
Hindu laws and c. were to be taught".' 24 The agenda, then, was dominated by issues
of practice and structure; the lack of any doctrinal core is evident in this body
representative of orthodoxy.
3.3.3 Defining Approaches to the Organisation of Hinduism
The above examinations illustrate that reformist and orthodox positions, despite having
a great deal in common and sharing the same "broad 'discursive field' of 'Hindu'
religious thought",' 25 were nevertheless distinct on one level: the level of organisation
or structure. By this I mean not their own organisation or structure, although this was
to become a prominent issue in the development of the Hindu nationalist movement in
the twentieth century. Rather, I am referring to their relationship with and attitude
towards the organisation or structure of Hinduism itself: how they perceived the
"shape" of the religion, and how this shape might evolve. As noted earlier, the
121 Bharat Bandhu (Aligarh) 28 December 1888; quoted in Selections from Vernacular
Newspapers: North Western Provinces, Oudh, Central Provinces, Central India and
Rajputana, 1889.
122	 The Mahrazta notes on 6 March 1892 that the constitution of the Mahamandal 'closely
resembles that of the National Congress".
123	 Letter from Rai Baroda K. Lahiri, Secretary, Bharat Dharrna Mahamandal, Aligarh, to Chief
Secretary to the United Provinces Government, 31 March 1902; Home Department, Public, A
Progs, May 1902, no. 260 (NA!).
124	 Extract from CSB Abstract No.35, dated 5 December 1900, quoted in Foreign Department,
Internal, B Frogs, June 1902, Nos 112-114 (NA!)
125	 The observation is Susan Bayly's, in "Hindu 'modernisers' and the 'public' arena indigenous
critiques of caste in colonial India", p. 39.
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pressures on Hinduism at this time were pressures which focused attention on this
shape, and in particular on the issue of caste. For Aryas, the main pressure was the
threat of Christianity. They explained the evident success of Christian missionaries by
focusing on two central factors: first, the passive, disorganised nature of Hinduism,
with its proliferation of subcastes, which made it vulnerable to aggressive missionary
activity; secondly, the oppression of certain groups as a result of this proliferation and
the corrupt power of the Brahmans, which rendered these groups willing to accept
Christianity. Both of these factors were underpinned by a sub-text of the degeneration
of Hinduism, its fall from the Vedic Golden Age. For the Sanatanis, both missionaries
and reformers created the pressure, but the issues were essentially the same: the
disorganised nature of Hinduism and the problem of low caste oppression. Again, this
was a symptom of degeneracy in Hinduism, and the principal objective was to counter
this degeneracy. The combined problems of disorganisation and oppression had to be
addressed, whilst at the same time defending the existing caste structure as a
fundamental aspect of Hindu tradition.
The difference in approach of Aryas and Sanatams to these problems is crucial to an
understanding of the dynamics of Hindu politics as it developed in the twentieth
century. The Arya approach was based on its transformative potential. It meant
working towards a vertical restructuring of society, reflecting Dayananda's
interpretation of the Vedic notion of varnashrainadhanna, and the objective accessibility
of the 'core' of Hinduism, the Vedic canon. Hinduism would be unified by means of
an overhaul which would see the gradual diminution of the oppressive elements of the
structure, bringing it progressively into line with the Vedic ideal - as we shall see,
shuddhi was to become the principal means of achieving this overhaul. The Sanatani
approach, on the other hand, had no doctrinal source. Indeed, its success depended on
the relegation of doctrine to a position of secondary importance, as doctrinal difference
was precisely what the idea of a pan-Hindu orthodoxy could not confront. Instead, it
focused on a kind of horizontal binding together of the existing structure, driven by the
notion that all castes have an organic role in Hindu society and therefore demand
respect. Respect for low castes, untouchables and women was accompanied by a
commitment to an improvement of their conditions, but not a change of their status in
relation to the rest of Hindu society.
The way in which this difference of approach was articulated is exemplified by the
publication of a pamphlet entitled An Old Hindu's Hope in Calcutta early in 1889. The
increasing sophistication of the public space is illustrated by the fact that this pamphlet
had an impact across British India. It was reported at length, for example, in the
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Bombay-based Marathi/English weekly Native Opinion in May 1889.126 The Opinion
stated that the pamphlet laments the fissiparous tendencies of Hindu society, fuelled by
caste and doctrinal antagonisms. As a remedy, it advocates unity "under the banner
inscribed with the words Iswara o Matribhum", God and Motherland. Unity should be
given a material form through the organisation of a Maha Hindu Samiti, in which "no
sectarian religious discussion will be allowed. Only subjects relating to the religious
rights and privileges of Hindus in general will be deemed legitimate subjects...". The
pamphlet then goes on to list some such subjects: the promotion of Hindi and
Devanagri, the protection of cows, the promotion of swadeshi and the establishment of
a Sanskrit University. Discussion of social questions, on the other hand, would be
"totally avoided", apart from those "relating to sanitation, temperance, education, and
c." The Opinion rounds off its lengthy reportage by calling this "a laudable
undertaking" and opining that the Maha Hindu Samiti "exists on paper only". The
Maha Hindu Samiti, then, is presented as a means of binding together Hindus under a
common banner. What have already been identified as consensual issues would form
the basis of the Samiti's work, and neither "sectarian (religious) interests" nor "social
questions" would be allowed to disrupt this work. In effect, the pamphlet is an
articulation of the horizontal organisation of Hinduism.
The Lahore-based Tribune, also reporting on the pamphlet in May 1889, presents a
somewhat different approach to that of the approving Native Opinion. 127 The paper
interpreted the proposition to avoid "sectarian religious discussion" and exclude social
issues not as a means of promoting unity, but rather as rendering the Maha Samiti
"altogetherobjectiess":
We should have seen some meaning in Old Hindu's proposals if he
instead of practically excluding all religious questions and formally
excluding all social questions, had made them the principal questions to
be dealt with by his Maha Samiti. Such questions the National
Congress cannot discuss, nor can Hindus, Mahommeclans and
Christians discuss such questions together. Such objects could only
give a Hindu National Congress a raison d'elre; and we doubt not by
discussing religious and social issues we could gradually introduce
reform in the Hindu religious and social practices.
The Tribune does see a role for a pan-Hindu organisation, which it articulates in the
style of the Indian National Congress - a political body, addressing itself to the state,
founded some three years earlier. The objective of this pan-Hindu organisation,
however, should be precisely to address the issues which are excluded in the objectives
of the Maha Hindu Samiti. Here, then, is a divergent view of the perceived route to the
126	 Native Opinion 16 May 1889.
127	 Tribune 18 May 1889.
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orgamsation of Hinduism. It is a view based on the vertical reorganisation of the
religion, expressed as the need to confront the issue of reform.
The language in both approaches is that of representation. The Tribune's reference to
the Congress is indicative of its acceptance that a pan-Hindu body should be structured
as a modern political organisation, meaningful within the public space. Similarly, the
direct reference to the 'rights and privileges' of Hindus in the pamphlet indicates how
this notion of organisation was projected as a means of promoting the status of Hindus
as Subjects of the Queen, in the sense articulated in the Proclamation. 128 In both cases,
the putative Samiti was cast as representing the interests of Hindus as a homogeneous
group, recognisable within the framework of the colonial state.' 29 This common idea
of representation was to become the site of struggle between the two approaches,
horizontal and vertical as both sought to define the constituency of Hindus in
consonance with these conflicting ideas of organisation.
3.4 Summary of Discussion
What has been examined in this chapter is the development of perceptions and
manifestations of Hinduism in the context of the expanding colonial state in the
nineteenth century. I began by looking at a series of images projected by the state
which had a lasting impact on colonial society. These images were constructed within
the framework of a discourse of organisation as a fundamental asset of the colonial
power, and of European civilisation in general. Conversely, the state projected the
image of Indian society as fundamentally disorganised, under threat of anarchy if
British power were to be withdrawn. Hinduism as a stagnant jungle, a once great
religious system gone to seed, was a constituent component of this image. As facets of
the state's hegemonic arrangement, these images had their most immediate impact
amongst the growing middle class population.
128	 Interestingly, The Tribune reacts strongly to Old Hindu's citation of rights and privileges,
summoning up the spirit of the Proclamation in the process: "Why," it asks, "has anyone
assailed these rights and privileges? We live under the tolerant government of England, under
which the meanest man can and does practise his own religion in perfect safety. There is no
forcing of beef down the Hindu's throat now, nor ham down the Mahomedans."
129	 This idea of representation was also at the heart of a debate engendered by the response of the
Hindu daily to the pamphlet (See especially the editorial in the Hindu on 10 May 1889). The
newspaper's criticism of the idea of a Maha Hindu Samiti being dominated by orthodoxy
prompted "Old Hindu" himself to intervene. His letter to the Hindu commented: "if the
majority of (the Samiti's) members do not belong to (the orthodox) class, it would have no
representative character, as men holding heterodox opinions constitute but a fraction of the
Hindu community of India." Reproduced in IndianMirror, 22 May 1889.
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I then examined the mounting pressures which were brought to bear on this debased
image of Hinduism. First, a pressure emanating from within the colonial state, as it
became more elaborate, more expansive, in the wake of the Mutiny. This was the
development of the discourse of organisation, and with it the increased prominence of
the idea of representation as an idiom of power in the public space. After 1858 the
British Parliament, through the Secretary of State, was far more directly associated with
executive power in India. In addition the Queen's Proclamation promoted the "rights"
of Indians as Subjects of the British Empire. These aspects served to emphasise
representation as a language of power in colonial India, and so encouraged the
articulation of concerns as emanating from constituencies. Petitions to the govermnent
were therefore couched as "representing the views" of the "residents of Nagpur and the
surrounding areas," for example, in order to give them more impact within a state that
projected the language and institutions of representation at its centre. The fact that
Indians' "rights" as set out in the Proclamation were expressed first and foremost in
religious terms - the right to practice one's religion as sacrosanct - meant that this idiom
of power was particularly pertinent for those with religious concerns.
Other pressures developing during the nineteenth century forced these concerns
increasingly into the public space. In the context of Hinduism, these pressures were:
first, shifts in the pattern of Christian missionary activity, towards the conversion of
low caste groups as opposed to high caste individuals; and secondly, the growth of the
reform movements which aligned themselves specifically against the established
structure of the religion. Both these pressures focused concern on the issue of
structure, and the predicament of low castes and untouchables in relation to this
structure.
The third section of this chapter has examined how these concerns were articulated by
middle class Indians in the second half of the nineteenth century. I have described the
emergence of organisations concerned with Hinduism within the public space as being
governed by a "template of polarisation". The opposing ideas of orthodoxy and
reformism were in this sense "called into being" by each other. This is not to deny the
innovative zeal of such figures as Dayananda. Rather, it suggests that movements
developed a specific significance within the public space: they were articulated as
reformist or orthodox on the basis of the discourse of organisation, and they were
given meaning by the respective projection of modern, reforming and traditional,
orthodox constituencies of Hindus. Both demanded the existence of the other in order
to substantiate this position within the public space.
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In fact, however, what has been illustrated is that both types of organisation were
equally modern, and that both focused on the same problem of the organisation of
Hinduism. The distinction between the two groups, exemplified here by the Arya
Samaj and the Sanatana Dharma movement, lies in their approach to this problem. I
have characterised the distinction as that between vertical and horizontal organisation:
the alignment of the Arya Samaj in relation to Hinduism meant that it had the potential
to effect a vertical restructuring of Hindu society, by transforming the nature of caste
and its relationship to religiosity; the Sanatanis sought a horizontal "binding together"
of Hindu society, which implicitly accepted the established position of caste within it.
The next chapter will be structured around two movements in the 1890s which
concretised the different approaches, giving them a material existence in the
development towards a specifically Hindu politics.
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Chapter Four
Indian Nationalism and Representations of Hinduism towards
the End of the Nineteenth Century
Having examined the formulation of ideas of the organisation of Hinduism during the
late nineteenth century, I will now look at the implementation of these ideas; how they
were articulated towards the end of the century as concrete movements. Two particular
movements were influenced by the divergent approaches - horizontal and vertical -
which have been identified in the formulation of ideas of organisation: first, the cow
protection movement, which swept across much of north, west and central India during
the 1880s and early 1890s; and secondly, the shuddhi movement, which became
increasingly significant as an issue of both social reform and politics from the late
1880s onwards.
These movements must be placed in the context of the emerging ideology of elite-led
Indian nationalism. Ideas of organisation and representation were also significant
factors in the shaping of this ideology. As well as reflecting the continued elaboration
and expansion of the colonial public space during the final three decades of the
nineteenth century, the way in which Indian nationalism established itself in this
environment demonstrated a growing understanding of the nature of colonial hegemony
and the means of countering it. This was to have significant ramifications for the
articulation of Hindu organisation in the same environment.
4.1 The Development of Nationalist Organisation
It is now well understood that the foundation of the Indian National Congress in 1885
was neither a sudden event nor the sole work of an individual Englishman hoping to
provide a "safety valve" for volatile political aspirations.' Recent accounts have rather
presented it as a significant act in a process of elite political formation which bad been
fairly well established during the 1870s.2 The two most significant political
organisations to emerge during this decade were the Sarvajanik Sabha and the Indian
1	 For an account of how these ideas became entrenched as features of Congress history, see B.
Chandra Ct a!, India's Struggle/or Independence, pp. 61-70.
2	 See, for example, Chandra et a!, India's Siruggleforindependence, pp. 71-81.
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Association. It was these orgamsations which did much to establish the Maharashtra-
Bengal axis that characterised the Congress in its early phase.3
4.1.1 Early Indian Nationalism and the State
The Sarvajanik Sabha was established in Poona in 1870 with a significant membership
criterion. This was that each member was required to hold a letter of representation,
signed by fifty men from Poona and surrounding districts, who appointed the member
to act as their spokesman in the dealings of the Sabha. This criterion meant that the
Sabha had a firm representative base, albeit within a limited social context. By 1871,
the Sabha could confidently claim to represent the views of some 17,000 citizens of
Poona.4
 This representative quality was not appreciated by the Bombay government, a
view reflected in an article on the Sabha in the Englishman: "It is well to realise that we
are not yet prepared to govern India by means of popular representation, and that
anything which approaches to a bonafide representative body will necessarily exercise
a power incompatible with the existing system of administration." 5 In consonance with
this view, the Government kept a close watch on the Sabha and subjected it to mild
harassment during the 1870s.6
In many ways the Indian Association, established in Calcutta in 1876, constitutes a
more typical example of political formation at this time. Surendranath Banerjea, the
prominent Calcuttan moderate and architect of the Association, describes its aim as "to
represent the views of the educated middle class community and inspire them with a
living interest in public affairs." 7 At the same time, the Association had as one of its
principal objectives the "unification of the Indian races and peoples upon the basis of
common political interests and aspirations." 8 The most important phase of this activity
came a year after the Association's foundation, when the Secretary of State, Lord
Salisbury, reduced the maximum age limit for entrants in the ICS examination. This
effectively discriminated against Indians hoping to gain entry, due in part to the greater
organisation entailed in preparing for and attending examinations in London. During
the summer of 1877 Banerjea was sent as "special delegate" of the Indian Association
on a lecture tour to galvanise "public" protest against the measure. As a result, says
See ibid; also S. Sarkar, Modern India, pp. 88-95.
See R. O'Hanlon, Caste, Conflict and Ideology: Mahatma Jotirao Phule and Low Caste
Protest in Nineteenth Century Western india (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
1985), p. 190.
The Englishman 18 May 1875, quoted in O'Hanlon, Caste, Conflict and Ideology, p. 191
6	 Most famously by transferring M.G. Ranade, the leading light of the Sabha, from his post as
a judge in Poona; see O'Hanlon, Caste, Conflict and Ideology, p. 191.
S. Banerjea, A Nation in Making (Oxford University Press, Bombay, 1963), p. 37.
8	 Banerjea, A Nation in Making, p. 39.
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Banerjea, organisations similar to the Indian Association were formed "at Lahore,
Meerut, Allahabad, Cawnpore and Lucknow. Thus a network of organisations was
started, and the foundations were well and truly laid...for united and concerted action
among our representative men, over an area extending from Calcutta to Lahore."9
This early political initiative, then, was replete with representative idioms. The
Association was founded in order to represent "the educated middle class community",
which in turn was assumed to represent "the political interests and aspirations" of the
Indian people as a whole. When Banerjea embarked on his lecture tour he was sent as
a "special delegate", and the organisations subsequently set up in cities across the
northern plains were constituted by "representative men". Unlike the Sarvajanik
Sabha, the Indian Association had no representative mechanism built into its
membership criteria. The symbolic invocation of representation was nevertheless
persistently expressed as central to the sell image of the Association, in order to give it
meaning within the public space in which it operated. Precisely because of this
symbolic character, the representative claims of the Indian Association did not attract
the same opprobrium as those of the Sarvajanik Sabha; they were not "incompatible
with the existing system of administration", because they were expressed within the
parameters of the discourse of organisation.
This same pattern is evident in the Congress. In its early years this organisation had
little infrastructure; it was simply a gathering of prominent professional people every
year, "in what became a great social occasion as well as a political assembly."° The
proceedings of the Congress, however, were nevertheless "conducted democratically,
issues being decided through debate and discussion and occasionally through
voting."" Representation again assumes a symbolic quality in this context.
This is not to say that Congress nor many of the individuals that energetically pursued
nationalist politics during the eighteen eighties and nineties were not genuinely
concerned at the plight of the country. Several historical studies have illustrated the
sophisticated and trenchant nature of what is known as the "moderate" critique of
colonialism, particularly in relation to economic exploitation.' 2
 Moderate ideology is
rather distinguished from later positions through its perception of the colonial state.
Moderates such as Banerjea and G.K. Gokhale were convinced by the hegemonic claim
of the state, that it operated ultimately in the interests of the Indian people. There was a
Banetjea, A Nation in Making. p. 44.
10	 Sarkar, Modern India, p. 89.
11	 B. Chandra et al, India's Struggle/or Independence, p. 78.
12	 See Bipan Chandra, Rise and Growth of Economic Nationalism in India.
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conviction that the Imperial mission as articulated in Victoria's Proclamation was a
legalistic principle - Banerjea's "Magna Carta" - at the heart of British rule. "If it is at
once admitted," Banerjea states in 1877, "that she (Britain) has no mission here, we are
driven to the conclusion that the English Empire rests not upon the principles of justice
and truth, or upon the willing allegiance of a subject people, but upon pure, simple,
unmitigated brute force."3
The mission was the basis of Banerjea's loyalty and his vision of the British Indian
state as lawful, constitutional and ruling in the interests of the people. The fact that the
state did not always live up to these principles of justice and truth was an exasperating
feature of the colonial predicament. In an editorial in the Bengatee in 1898, Banerjea
noted that "the peculiar character of the struggle is that we are fighting with Englishmen
for the preservation of English principles in the government of the country, and the
bureaucracy is apparently resolved to fall back upon oriental methods in the government
of an oriental country." 14 The complaint, then, is of the difference between the
professed lofty projections of liberal imperialism and the material existence of colonial
government. It is a virtual recognition of the structure of colonial hegemonic rule, and
of the inherent contradiction at its base. At the same time, this contradiction is
articulated entirely in its own tenns: the characterisation of oppressive government as
"oriental" - the "Other" of western lawful and constitutional government - being an
integral feature of the hegemonic project.' 5
 What is indicated here is the intimate
relation between moderatism and the hegemonic arrangement of the state. One might
even characterise this moderatism more accurately as "hegemonic nationalism". The
symbolic representation that has been illustrated as central to moderatism is also -
through the discourse of organisation - intimately connected to this hegemonic
arrangement.
4.1.2 Beginnings of Mass Mobilisation as Nationalist Strategy: B.G. Tilak and the
Search for Contact in the 1890s
Almost immediately, however, some elements of the Indian national movement began
to diverge from this "hegemonic nationalism", challenging the parameters of the
discourse of organisation in the process. The work of the Maharashtrian nationalist
13	 Speech at Calcutta 28 April 1877; S. Banerjea, Speeches Vol.1, p. 67.
14	 Bengalee 10 December 1898.
15	 In the sense demonstrated in Section 3.1 - contrasting the organisation of the state with the
disorganisation of society. G.K. Gokhale later rationalised this apparent contradiction in
colonial government as the distinction between 'narrow' and 'noble' Imperialism; see, for
example, his speech at Madras 25 July 1904, in Ambedkar and Karve [eds], Speeches and
Writings of G.K Gokhale Vol 2 (Asia Publishing House, Bombay, 1966), p. 177.
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B.G. Tilak during the nineties illustrates this development. Tilak's career has been
studied by several historians. Nationalist historiography has viewed him as an icon of
the freedom struggle - the first nationalist to genuinely reach out to the people.' 6 Some
western historians have been rather more circumspect, viewing his work, particularly in
relation to the Ganapati and Shivaji festivals, as irresponsible dabbling in religio-
political mobilisation. 17 This view recalls the imperialist commentator Valentine
Chirol, who cites the Ganapati festival in his Indian Unrest as a prime example of
Tilak's "reactionary" politics, an unethical and power hungry appeal to "popular
superstitions" •18 In more recent years some historians, pursuing the lead of the
Subaltern Studies group, have decried this emphasis on Tilak's work altogether, citing
its narrow focus on movements which were elite-led, with its implication that without
elite agency subaltern consciousness remained mute or irrationally violent.19
Although I find this complaint eminently justifiable, it should by now be clear that! am
not prepared to accept that the history of elites (as opposed to elite historiography) is
rendered insignificant by Subaltern Studies. Tilak's actions during the 1890s demand
attention, precisely because of their ramifications in the realm of elite-led politics.
These ramifications, however, do not revolve around the notion of Tilak's supposed
manipulation of subaltern consciousness - "raising the demon", as it were, of some
supposedly innate Hindu or Marathi chauvinism - but rather around his exploration of
new methods of political representation in the public space of colonial India. Tilak's
work began to challenge the accepted discursive structure of how a public organisation
should operate; a structure which accommodates all the organisational forms - both
political and religious - studied so far in this thesis.
Tilak turned his attention to the Ganapati festival in Poona in 1894. The festival is an
annual event popular in Maharashtra, which celebrates the elephant-headed deity
Ganesh. Tilak's intervention aimed to infuse the festival with a political message, and
he attempted to effect this through a positive restructuring of the way the festival was
celebrated. The central feature of this restructuring was to encourage celebration on a
community level (i.e. neighbourhood or caste communities), as opposed to the more
established emphasis on an extended family or immediate neighbourly basis. 20 To use
16	 See, for example, D.V. Tahmankar, Lokananya Tilak: Father of indian Unrest and Maker of
Modern India (Murray, London, 1956); S.L Karandikar, Lokamanya Eta! Gangadhar Tilak: the
Hercules and Prometheus ofModern India (Poona, 1957).
17	 See R.I. Cashman, The Myth of the Lokamanya, p.66. 97; S. Wolpert, TilakandGokizale:
Revolution and Reform in the Making of Modern India (University of California Press,
Berkeley, 1962), pp. 68-70.
18	 Chirol, Indian Unrest (MacMillan, London, 1910), p. 40.
9	 See especially Sandria Freitag, Collective Action and Community, pp. 7-13.
20	 For a detailed account, see Cashinan, The Myth of the Lokamanya, P. 76-77.
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Freitag's terminology, this was an attempt to push Ganapati further into the "public
arena".2 ' Within this "popularised" context, Tilak introduced the familiar concept of
melas, or singing parties, designed to deliver the "messages" which would provide
political direction to the festival.
Once this basic restructuring had been established, it is important to note that the
festival was left largely to shape itself on a local level. Although a central co-ordinating
body was formed in 1896, caste or neighbourhood Ganapati committees were left to
their own devices, collecting their own subscriptions and organising their own
leadership and melas. This would suggest that the politicisation of Ganapati did indeed
have a subaltern element. As a project of the nationalist elite, it is clear that it was
perceived by Tilak as an alternative to the structure of politics within Congress:
This work will not be as strenuous and expensive as the work of
Congress. The educated people can achieve results through these
national festivals which it would be impossible for the Congress to
achieve. ...Will it not be possible for political activities to enter the
humblest cottages of the villages through such means?22
Considering the urban nature of the movement, this was a somewhat ambitious claim,
but it nevertheless illustrates the way in which Ganapati was perceived as a means of
extending the representative quality of nationalism.
This may again be perceived in Tilak's attempts to launch a movement in the name of
Shivaji, the Kshatriya hero who carved the Maratha kingdom out of the Mughal Empire
in the late seventeenth century. The Shivaji movement was launched on the basis of a
call to restore and renew the dilapidated memorial to Shivaji at Raigad. As Rosalind
O'Hanlon has shown, towards the end of the nineteenth century Shivaji became a
pliable historical tool in the presentation of a variety of ideological stances.23 In this
context, Tilak was only resorting to available materials to achieve his objective.
As well as appealing to princely states, Tilak conducted a campaign through his Marathi
newspaper Kesari to encourage popular donation to the restoration fund. Even the
smallest donations were acknowledged in the columns of Kesari, and this strategy
proved to be enormously successful. Of the sum of rupees 15 000 collected by the end
of 1895, as much as 80% was received in contributions under one rupee. The total
number of contributions amounted to nearly 60 000.24 The significance of these
21	 On Freitag's public arena, see Section 2.2 of this thesis.
22	 Kesari 8 September 1896; quoted in Cashman, The Myth of the Lokamanya, p. 79.
23	 See O'Hanlon, Caste, Conflict and Ideology, chapter 10, pp. 164-186.
24	 Mahrana 31 December 1895; quoted in Cashman, The Myth of the Loka.rnanya, p. 101.
92
figures is articulated by Tilak in connection with the Paisa Fund, which was initiated in
1900 on the same principle as the Shivaji fund:
The Paisa Fund teaches all people how to utilise their money and bodily
power to the national object.... When these two things are yoked to
any wagon, no official class will have in its hands the power to stop the
motion of that wagon.25
The fund-raising principle is articulated here as a means of raising levels of
consciousness; its significance lies not so much in the achievement of the objective, as
in the educative and consciousness-raising functions of individual commitment. As
with the Ganapati movement, the emphasis was on mobilising interest and support for
elite-led nationalism in non-elite sectors of the population, and so reifying the idea of a
nationalist constituency - increasing the legitimacy of elite claims to represent the
people.
Ultimately, both the Ganapati and Shivaji festivals were limited as political movements
by the lack of an adequate infrastructure. This was a point which Tilak himself
evidently acknowledged, as much of his later work was based on the expansion and
use of effective political networks.26 What it illustrates here is the pattern of elite
nationalist activity - moving away from the symbolic representation that characterised
the hegemonic nationalism of the moderates, and towards a counter-hegemonic attempt
to raise consciousness and so reify the nationalist constituency. This pattern of activity
was to have a profound impact on the organisation of Hinduism as a political force, and
also on the state's perception of seemingly a-political movements. Certain other factors
during this period were increasing the pressure on Hinduism to organise as an
ideological entity. Before examining Hindu movements themselves, therefore, I will
examine two of these factors as of definitive significance: the growing impact of the
census, and the increasing prominence of low caste mobilisation.
4.2 Undermining Hindu Organisation in the Public Space
4.2.1 The Census and the Taxonomy of Hinduism
The All India Census was first taken in 1871, and as the decennial series unfolded, a
variety of commentators began to detect demographic patterns and trends which were to
have significant political ramifications. Perhaps the most important in our context is the
"dying race" theory, which was first articulated in a series of articles in the Bengalee in
25	 Quoted in V.P. Varma, Life and Philosophy of Lokarnanya Tilak (Agra, 1978), p. 210.
26	 See J. Zavos, "Ideology and Hegemonic Struggle in the Early National Movement TM , Chapter
4, pp. 103-162.
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1909, written by Colonel U.N. Mukherji.27 This theory will be examined in Chapter
5. In this Section, I want to concentrate on the initial impact of the census; in
particular, its implicit questioning of the whole idea of Hinduism as a viable category in
the framework of colonial ethnography. 28
Quantifying Hinduism, defining its limits, emerged as a consistent and perplexing
problem in census reports. Attempts to gain a full picture of religious affiliation for the
census of 1881 were seriously hampered by confusion over what constituted inclusion
in the Hindu religion. The 1881 Report states that:
There were instances where the column in the enumerator's schedule, in
which religion should have been entered, was filled up, not with any
designation of any known religion, but with either the name of a caste or
the title of a sect.29
This practice was so prevalent in Central Provinces that Drysdale, the Provincial
Census Superintendent, felt it necessary to list a large number of responses, grouping
them under his own title of "Hindu". The list consisted of thirty castes, four sects,
eight devotional groups and five groups that the Superintendent could only categorise
as "others".30 The Report also records the remarks of Mr. Kitts, Census
Superintendent for Berar, who first complains of the "vagueness of the term Hindoo",
and then goes on to describe the sometimes farcical attempts to pin down the affiliation
of certain hill tribes:
When the hill people were pressed for a reply as to what their religion
was, sometimes after much parleying, they said either they were
Hindoos, or that they knew nothing about religion; that they were arani
log, ignorant people. All they knew was, they were Korkus by caste.
...Nowhere, as far as I can discover, did a single individual assert that
there was such a distinct and separate thing as a Korku religion; he
merely answered to the effect 'I am a Korku, but I do not know what
my religion is called. I worship Mahadeo, Hunuman, Byram-Bai,
Chand, Suraj and the Bhagwant, who is the author of my religion, call it
what you please'. 31
27	 Mukheiji constructed an argument to show that Hindus would disappear altogether from India
within a given number of years. He based this argument on Census figures 1871-1901. For a
thorough analysis of Mukherji's work, see P.K.Dutta, "Dying Hindus", p. 1306-7; on the
dying race theory in this thesis, see Section 5.2.
28	 A good deal of excellent scholarly work has been accomplished on the census in India - see,
for example, B. Cohn, An Anthropologist among the Historians and Other Essays, especially
the essay "The Census, Social Structure and Objectification in South Asia", pp. 224-254; S.
Kaviraj, "The Imaginary Institution of India" (in Subaltern Studies VII, Oxford University
Press, Delhi, 1992, pp. 1-39); N.G Barrier [ed.], The Census in India: New Perspectives
(Manohar, New Delhi, 1981); on the census as a facet of colonial rule in general 4 see B.
Anderson, Imagined Communities, chapter 10, pp. 163-186.
29	 Census of India 1881, Vol. I, India, p. 17.
30	 Census of India 1881, Vol. 1, India, p. 18.
31	 Census of India 1881, Vol. I, India, p.19.
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The state and its representatives, then, faced a problem which was created specifically
by the Orientalist perception of Hinduism. On the basis of this perception, Hinduism
should have been a recognisable, material feature of Indian society. The census
revealed that this was by no means a settled fact. The blurred boundary between
Hinduism and animism illustrates this point. Kitts' exasperation at the inability of bill
tribes to define their religion, or even to care about how it should be defined ("call it
what you please"), is indicative of the uncertainty with which these two categories were
applied.
The report on the 1901 census reiterated the problem. The Superintendent R.V.
Russell commented on the proclaimed Hinduism of the rural population of Seoni
district that "whether they are Vaishnavas, or Shaivas, or Shaktas, they know as much
as the man in the moon does."32 Russell attempted to by-pass the problem by defining
contemporary Hinduism as "not so much a religion as a social system", which was
governed by caste. This led him to suggest that: "as to the religion of the majority of
the people who are called Hindus, if they can be said to have one religion at all, it
would appear to be more correct to consider it as Animism than anything else."33
Popular religious belief, then, "resemble(d) generally the religion or the superstitions of
any other comparatively primitive races", the only difference being that "they are more
numerous and complex because the population is large."34
 This view virtually
consigned contemporary Hinduism - as a religion - to the status of a historical residue,
with Russell concluding that "the Hindus of the present day are more backward than
their forefathers, whose beliefs are portrayed in the Vedic hymns." 35 The conclusion
indicates the trajectory of Russell's analysis. He attempts to follow the logic of the
duality of Hinduism proposed by the Orientalists, locating the normative form of the
religion in Vedic antiquity. Not unnaturally, therefore, he ends up by claiming that
Hinduism is practised only "at a few of the great religious centres", with the majority of
the population having "regressed" to a semi-primitive animism. Even for Russell this
was too radical a conclusion to articulate statistically, and he goes on to explain that in
practise he instructed his enumerators to record a person as a Hindu "if (he) said he
worshipped Mahadeo..., and if he revered the tribal gods, the name of the tribe was to
be entered in the column of religion."36
32	 See Census of India 1901, Vol. XIII, Central Provinces Pt. 1: Report (Secretariat Press,
Nagpur, 1902), p. 78.33	 Census of India 1901, Vol. XIII, Central Provinces Pt. 1, p. 90,99.
34	 Census of India 1901, Vol. XIII, Central Provinces Pt, 1, p. 90.
33	 Census of India 1901, Vol. XIII, Central Provinces Pt. I, p. 92.
36	 Census of India 1901, Vol. XIII, Central Provinces Pt. 1, p. 95.
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This practical uncertainty over the boundary between Hinduism and animism was
exacerbated by the actions of some high caste enumerators, whose inclination was to
actively exclude low castes and tribals from a Hindu identity. This is evident in a
passage already quoted from the 1881 Report (see Section 2.2) where Drysdale states
that
Many of the more bigoted high caste Hindoos employed as census
enumerators or supervisors objected to record such low persons as of
the Hindoo religion. This was illustrated by numerous instances
brought to my notice of such persons having been recorded as of the
Dher, Mang or Chandal religion by mere repetition of their caste in the
column for religion. Possibly some in their humility and ignorance may
not even have claimed to be of the Hindoo religion. More probably they
were not even asked.37
As with Russell, a specific perception of what constitutes Hinduism is at work here.
Drysdale configured Hinduism as a system with definable limits, which in this case
clearly encompassed low caste groups such as Dhers, Mangs and Chandals. These
limits of Hinduism were only obscured for the Superintendent by the characteristic
"bigotry" or "ignorance" of its various adherents.
Whatever the assumptions of officials like Drysdale, however, the questioning of social
and religious relations by the subject peoples is implicit in the operation of the census.
Low caste groups were forced to consider the relationship between their own sense of
religious reality and the imperceptible, macrocosmic notion of Hinduism. High caste
elites, like the enumerators cited above, were forced to confront the question of the
limits of their religious community. If Hinduism was to be perceived objectively, as a
world religion or a great religious tradition, where precisely did this tradition end and
the morass of "primitive" animism and superstition begin?38
In the present context, two dilemmas for elite Hindus emerged which are particularly
interesting. First, the census highlighted the dilemma of how to project a positive
image of Hinduism in a world religious context if it was characterised by a caste system
which was manifestly oppressive. This was exactly the dilemma addressed by the
reform movements, and by the development of the idea of a vertical re-organisation of
Hinduism which would eradicate this oppressive element. The second dilemma was far
more widely experienced, and was far more specifically a political dilemma. By
quantifying caste and religious communities, the census inevitably placed the emphasis
on numerical size as a means of assessing political importance. As we shall see, the
"communal principle" introduced in the Morley-Minto Reforms of 1909 confirmed this
Census of India 1881, Vol. I, India, p. 17
38	 For further examples of this, see 0. Pandey, "Which of Us are Hindus?", p. 246. Pandey in
fact notes that in Tamil Nadu "the term Hindu is used to this day to differentiate upper caste
Hindus (the Thndus') from untouchables or Harijans...".
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trend. Limiting the size of Hinduism by rejecting the "Hinduness" of low caste and
untouchable groups, or indeed by questioning the practical validity of Hinduism as a
category of religion altogether, in the manner of Russell, was hence a threat to the
political influence of high caste Hindus.
This was precisely the dilemma addressed by the putative orthodoxy of the late
nineteenth century, and by the development of the idea of horizoiital re-organisation,
making the ties between high caste and low caste, urban and rural an explicit, if not
positive, feature of the Hindu tradition.
4.2.2 A Challenge to Middle Class Pretensions
Insecurity over the numerical size of the Hindu religion was exacerbated by the
increasing prominence of low caste mobilisation39 towards the end of the nineteenth
century. Again, this was particularly a feature of western India, where low caste
traditions were buttressed by the growing strength of the supra-caste Maratha identity
amongst cultivating castes.40 As with general religious reform movements, it is
important to emphasise the fact that low caste movements per se were by no means a
new phenomenon in the late nineteenth century.4 ' What was new, however, was the
notion of low caste mobilisation through the singularly colonial avenue of social
reform. Social reform meant addressing issues of customary practice - the position of
widows, child marriage, female infanticide, low caste oppression, to name but a few -
without necessarily invoking a religious justification. Social questions had of course
been a feature of religious reform movements throughout the nineteenth century, and in
practice it is difficult to distinguish the two (hence the epithet "socio-religious reform"),
as any attempt to effect social reform had inevitable ramifications within Hinduism.
A conceptual distinction is nevertheless evident. An example is provided by the
pamphlet examined in Chapter 3, An Old Hindu's Hope. Although the author stated
that all issues which may disrupt the unity of the proposed Maha Hindu Samiti should
be disallowed, he nevertheless felt constrained to categorise these issues: "sectarian
religious questions" were articulated separately to "social" questions. This conceptual
In this thesis I will use the term "low caste" in the context of movements, consciousness etc.
in a generic sense, to signify the resistance of low castes, untouchables and adiwisir (tribals)
to high caste oppression.
40	 On the Maratha-kunbi (cultivator) identity, see O'Hanlon, Caste, Conflict and Ideology,
chapter two, pp. 15-49; see especially p. 45: "The tendency for ordinary kunbis to call
themselves Marathas was most noticeable in the Pune area - the birthplace of non-Brahman
ideology."
41	 See, for example, the medieval Orissan anti-brahman movement associated with the
Vaisnavite school of Pancasakha, cited in Section 3.2.2.
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separation was very much a ramification of Orientalism, in that it was based on the
identification of Hinduism as a religion tied to a series of texts, which in turn produced
the series of intellectual and spiritual traditions of Brabmanical history. "Social" issues,
on the other hand, were a feature of the degeneracy that affected both contemporary
society and religious practice. It was these social issues which the missionaries
focused on, whilst studiously avoiding direct assaults on Hindu texts. The state also
relied on this separation to make incursions into contemporary practice, whilst
maintaining the policy of neutrality in relation to religion.42
In the present context, one central characteristic of social reform during this period is
significant: motivation and leadership of indigenous initiatives was almost entirely
confined to the middle class. This is illustrated by Tilak's objection to the strong links
between the Social Conference and the Congress during the mid-1890s. They held
their annual sessions in the same jxindai, and many Congressmen also attended the
Conference. Tilak's complaint was that the Social Conference was so strongly
identified with the elite that it was positively detrimental to the nationalist objective of
widening its constituency. In 1895, when the joint Congress/Conference sessions
were to be held in Poona, Tilak commented: "If we could be convinced that the
conference could do any good even to a microscopic minority of the masses, we should
be content to leave it alone."43 As a concern of the elite, however, it could not have
this effect. It could not therefore be accommodated as part of Tilak's programme for
the expansion of nationalism.'
Tilak's dismissal of social reform, however, was challenged by the work of Jotirao
Phule and other low caste reformers of the late nineteenth century. Phule was born in
1827; his family belonged to the Mali caste, a cultivating caste ranking as Shudra in the
varna scheme.45 He was educated in mission schools, and as early as 1848 he opened
a school for low caste girls in Poona. Over the following decades he launched and
developed a network of reform projects, largely in the area of low caste education.
This work was underpinned by the steady development of an ideology of positive low
caste identity, based on the projection of ancient Shudra and zli-Shudra (untouchable)
nobility, destroyed by the brutality of high caste oppression. In his 1875 publication
42	 This, for example, was the thinking behind the Age of Consent Bill, introduced in 1890 to
raise the marriageable age of consent for women from ten to twelve years. Although this bill
became law, it raised a storm of protest articulated through caste and religious channels. See
Cashman, The Myth of the Lokamanya, pp. 56-8; Heimsath, Indian Nationalism and Hindu
Social Reform, pp. 147-175.
Mthratta 24 November 1895; in Report on the Native Press, Bombay, No.48 of 1895.
''	 Protest against the link between Congress and the Social Conference in Poona in 1895 led to
the latter being moved to a separate site in the city; see Wolpert, Tilak and Gokhale, p. 76.
O'Hanlon, Caste, Conflict and ideology, p. 105.
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Slavery, Phule reinterprets the coming of Aryan civilisation as the beginning of this
caste oppression. Shudras and adi-Shudras were presented as the Kshatriyas of a
previous age, downtrodden by the Aryan invaders. In this perception of Hindu
history, the Golden Age was re-located as the pre-Aryan realm of Kshatriyas under the
benign rule of King Bali. The Shudras and adi-Shudras were presented as the true
descendants of this Golden Age.46
In effect, Phule retains the structure of orientalist discourse on Indian history - an
enormously influential discourse, as we have seen, amongst middle class, high caste
Hindus - but completely inverts its meaning to emphasise low castes as the original,
hence "genuine", inhabitants of the subcontinent. This strategy implicitly undermines
the status of ideologies seeking to organise Hinduism both horizontally and vertically,
because it subverts the actual quality of the varna structure that underpins both
approaches.47
A further area where Phule's work challenged the established pattern of middle class
discourse on Hinduism was precisely that of organisation and representation. Phule
formed the Satyashodak Samaj, or "Truth Seeking Society", in 1873. The Samaj
worked to promote low caste consciousness and increase awareness of Brahman
oppression. It also worked to increase low caste access to education and to oppose
certain customs and practices associated with low castes, such as liquor drinking and
meat eating.48 Politically, the Satyashodak Samaj set itself up in opposition to the
Sarvajarnk Sabha, which Phule labelled the "bhat (Brahman) Sabha".49 The Samaj
was nevertheless structured along the classic lines of nineteenth century reform
movements. It had a management committee and regular meetings, voting procedures
and a stipulated financial commitment for members. Indeed, of the 28 rules of the
Samaj drawn up shortly after its inauguration, no less than 20 dealt with matters of
internal organisation. Phule's Samaj, then, cast a familiar profile in the public domain.
What is interesting is that it used this profile to make ambitious statements of its
representative quality, which specifically contradicted those of high caste social and
political organisations. Particularly from 1882 onwards, Phule turned his attention to
46	 O'Hanlon, Caste, Conflict and ideology, p. 149.
There is nevertheless evidence that Phule co-operated to a certain extent with the Arya
Samaj. In 1875 he took part with a group of his fnends in a rally in Poona given in honour
of Dayananda. Their involvement appears to have been limited to the role of a "protection
force" in the face of strong opposition to Dayananda from the Poona religious establishment.
Ideological support for the Swami was muted even on this occasion. See D. Keer, Mahaima
Jotirao Phooley:faiher of the Indian Social Revolution (Popular Prakashan, Bombay, 1964),
p. 139; O'Hanlon, Caste, Conflict and ideology, p. 223.
48	 O'Hanlon, Caste, Conflict and ideology, pp. 231-6.
9	 Keer, Mahatma Jotirao Phooley, p. 109.
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the rural districts around Poona, and members of the Samaj began to deliver lectures in
villages and small district towns. The emphasis of Phule's writings also began to shift:
away from the gulf between low castes and Brahmans, and towards that between the
rural poor and the educated elite. 50 In effect, the Satyashodak Samaj now began to
project itself as the representative of this massive constituency: the cultivators and
labourers of rural Maharashtra. In so doing, it explicitly opposed the claims of the
Sarvajanik Sabha to represent this constituency, and implicitly opposed the idea of an
organised Hinduism - vertical or horizontal - as a means of unifying the country. As
Phule states in the Cultivators Whip-Cord, written during 1882-3:
It will be unity so long as it serves their purpose, and then it will be me
here and you over there again. It's just like the old saying: We'll eat
your seed-corn, and use mine for planting - this is how the Brahmans
look after themselves. But if our learned Aryans really want to build
unity amongst all the people, and improve the country, then they will
have to get rid of this vile religion of winners and losers.5'
Significantly, then, Phule tied his questioning of the representative claims of the
Sarvajanik Sabha into the very idea of an organised, Brahmanic Hinduism. How could
this organisation be representative of the people, if it was simultaneously representative
of this "vile religion of winners and losers"? This was the very antithesis of what the
ideologues of organised Hinduism were trying to promote.
The issue of representation emerged as one of the principal complaints of the non-
Bralunan movement from the late 1880s onwards. The 1889 Congress at Allahabad,
for example, was challenged by a non-Brabman campaign centred in Poona, based on
the unrepresentative character of this so-called national body. The campaign culminated
in a rally held concurrent with the Congress session. Three of the four resolutions
approved by this meeting emphasised the unrepresentative nature of the Congress (the
fourth called on the government to introduce compulsory education for all). As one of
the resolutions stated, "this National Congress is just composed of a handful of upper
class and educated people. Therefore it should not represent its decisions as those of
the whole nation".52
Representation, then, emerges as a central bone of contention between the non-
Brahman and Brahman-dominated organisations in western India. Representation, that
50	 O'Hanlon, Caste, Conflict and Ideology, p. 258.51	 Quoted in O'I-Ianlon, Caste, Conflict and Ideology, p. 26752	 Resolution 3, quoted in OHanlon, Caste, Conflict and Ideology, p. 285; the other resolutions
read: "1. If 99 out of every 100 people in the population have never even heard of the National
Congress, it cannot be called a National Congress, meaning chosen by the nation and
respected by the nation. 2. The nation has not elected this National Congress, and does not
regard it as such; therefore its decisions cannot be said to be approved by the country at large.
4. The Government should begin to introduce compulsory education for all."
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is, of the people to the state. Both the Satyashodak Samaj and the Sarvajanik Sabha
claimed to represent the views of the rural population of Maharashtra to the Bombay
Government. In so doing, both assumed a form consonant with the colonial discourse
of organisation - quasi-constitutional bodies largely unhampered by material structures
of representation (as we have seen, even the Sabha's modest attempts to extend their
representative quality drew a sharp retort from the governing classes, which perceived
such structures as "incompatible with the existing administration"). Phule and his
contemporaries were therefore left to fight it out in this realm of symbolic
representation, where the strength of representative claims could be sanctioned only by
Government recognition. Ironically, the significance of the Satyashodak Samaj in this
context is that it was quite easily accommodated by a strong current of colonialist
thought, which perceived Indian society as hopelessly fractured and Brahmanism as
irretrievably corrupt. As such, it seriously challenged the validity of elite-based
organisations even within this narrow domain of symbolic representation.
In addition, it has been noted that low caste mobilisation within this framework
implicitly challenged the legitimacy of ideological developments towards the
organisation of Hinduism. This challenge was enhanced by the suggestion, often
encouraged by Phule's opponents in Poona, that members of the Satyashodak Samaj
were no longer Hindus. O'Hanlon notes that members were reluctant to cut themselves
off from Hinduism altogether, but nevertheless the rejection of many of the recognised
trappings of caste Hinduism placed them on the fringes of the religion. 53 As this
positioning was articulated very much in the public space, it helped to focus attention
exactly on that issue of where the limits of Hinduism lay, in a similar manner to the
census.
Two principal conclusions, then, can be drawn from this section. First, in the narrow
domain of symbolic representation - a domain mapped out for the indigenous
population by the state - a dynamism is evident in the claims and counter-claims of
various organisations. This dynamism naturally focused attention on the structures of
representation, and the reality or otherwise of the projected constituency. This was a
process which echoed developments in Indian nationalism. Secondly, the ideologies of
organised Hinduism, both horizontal and vertical, were actively challenged by new
forces in the public space, which persistently drew attention to the fuzzy edges of
Hinduism, and to the apparent lack of harmony in its central structures. In this sense,
the viability of a Brahrnan dominated, internally coherent community of Hindus was
brought into question even during this early period.
O'Hanlon, Caste, Conflict and Ideology, p. 239.
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4.3 Practising the Organisation of Hinduism
In the late 1880s and 1890s two major movements did much to counter this challenge to
middle class pretensions. These were the cow protection movement and the shuddhi
movement. In both, middle class elements aimed to concretise the projected
"community of Hindus", by actively practising the organisation of Hinduism. Their
divergent approaches to this task reflect the distinction between horizontal and vertical
organisation identified in Chapter 3.
4.3.1 Cow Protection as Horizontal Organisation
In recent years, a good deal of scholarly work has examined cow protection as a
movement associated with the articulation of the Hindu community during the period
i88O-i92O. My intention in this section is not to replicate this material by giving my
own account of how the movement developed, but rather to work from it, by
examining some specific issues related to the movement in the wider framework of this
thesis.
As Gyanendra Pandey has pointed out, one of the principal subtexts of the literature on
cow protection has been to establish it as an issue which bridged problematic gaps in
the development of communalist consciousness - in particular, the gap between urban
and rural Hindus, and that between elite and mass consciousness.55 This whole area is
replete with problems, as Pandey has to some extent illustrated through his account of
cow protection in the Bhojpuri region. Here, he says, cow protection did not represent
the construction of new political alliances, new forms of consciousness; it was, rather,
the strength of local caste and community organisation (that) mattered,
and.. .the feeling of belonging to a wider 'Hindu' or 'Muslim'
community did not mean.. .that 'Hindus' and 'Muslims' responded
automatically and in unvarying ways to every appeal for action on behalf
of 'Hindu' and 'Muslim' interests.56
5-	 See Pandey, The Construction of Communalism, p. 162, n. 9 for a good listing of this
work. Apart from Pandey's book, I have found the following particularly useful in
constructing a picture of the cow protection movement during the 1890s: McLane. Indian
Nationalism and the Early Congress; A. Yang, "Sacred Symbol and Sacred Space in Rumi
India Community Mobilisation in the 'Anti-Cow Killing' Riot of 1893" (in Comparative
Studies in Society and History, Vol. 22, No. 4, 1980, pp. 576-596); S. Freitag, "Sacred
symbol as Mobilising Agency: The North Indian Search for a 'Hindu' Community (in
Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 22, No. 4, 1980, pp. 597-625); and P.
Robb, "The Challenge of Gau Mata: British Policy and Religious Change in India, 1880-
1916" (in Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 20, No. 2, 1986, pp. 285-319).
Pandey, The Construction of Communalism, p. 163.
56	 Pandey, The Construction of Communalism, p. 198-9.
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Beyond these problems of local communal dynamics, which may be seen as a feature
of fragmented development associated with Subaltern Studies, it is also necessary to
emphasise problems associated with the location of communalism - the ideology - in
this process of bridging the gaps. There is a teleological focus on cow protection as a
"cause" of communal rioting across the northern plains, which overshadows the spread
of the movement over a much wider area of colonial India, employing a less specifically
confrontational ideology. This focus produces a common anomaly in the literature on
cow protection: the perception of the movement as emanating from the aggressive
proselytising network of the Arya Samaj, whilst at the same time acknowledging its
strength in areas where that organisation was weak. This anomaly is epitomised by the
frequent statement that the headquarters of the movement was located in Nagpur, a city
with minimal Samaj activity and little Hindu-Muslim tension during this period,57
without exploring the relationship between this centre and the rapidly unfolding
violence of the northern plains.58
My argument in this section builds on the idea that cow protection during this period
was not so much a movement as a series of movements, inspired by fragmentary
ideological interests. This of course is very much the point that Pandey makes through
his study of the Bhojpuri region. Where I would like to extend it is by arguing that one
of these fragmentary interests was the horizontal organisation of Hinduism; an elite-
based ideology that attempted to encompass cow protection as a means of reifying its
vision of Hinduism as one. The Nagpur Sabha constitutes an example of this kind of
mobilisation, particularly in its attempt to project itself as the headquarters of a
nationwide movement. Although this kind of mobiisation is not so easily described as
communalist, because of its generally non-confrontational approach, it is nevertheless a
significant step in the development of Hindu nationalism, as it is defined in Chapter 2
of this thesis.
	
"	 By 1901 there were no more than 406 Arya Samajis in the whole of Central Provinces, a rise
from 275 in 1891. Most Samajis were based in the 1-lindi-speaking Jubbulpore district in the
north. See Census of India 1901, Vol. XIII, Central Provinces Pt 1, p.99. The lack of
Hindu-Muslim tension in the region at this time may be gauged by the Secretary of the
Nagpur Gaurakshini Sabha's comment to the local government that "it is...no small
satisfaction to (the Sabha) that the Central Provinces have enjoyed an entire freedom from
those religious outbreaks, which disturbed the peace of other parts of India." Letter from
Gopal Hurry Bhide, Sabha Secretary, to Revenue Secretary to the Chief Commissioner,
Central Provinces; see Central Provinces Secretariat General Home Department. B Progs, June
1894, Nos. 49-53 (Nagpur).
	
58	 See, for example, Pandey, The Construction of Communalism, p. 164: "Stimulated by the
writing and activities of Swami Dayanand Sarawati, the movement found organisational form
in the Gaurakshini Sabhas (Cow Protection Societies) of the early 1880s, first established in
Punjab and then spreading to other parts of northern and central India. Nagpur in the Central
Provinces was described as being the headquarters of the Gaurakshini movement at the end of
the decade.
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I will identify three areas of change in the way in which cow protection was articulated
towards the end of the nineteenth century, which indicate the trajectory of this
intervention of the ideology of horizontal organisation. The first concerns the location
of cow protection as an issue in the public space. Katherine Prior has noted colonial
involvement in cow protection disputes in the early nineteenth century as a means of
establishing local custom.59 This in itself, she suggests, led to the strengthening of the
role of the cow as a symbol of Hinduness. In addition, it established the involvement
of the state in a particular way, in that disputes were subjected to the "neutral"
arbitration of the rule of law. The 1egaJiy of people's actions in relation to cows -
selling them, slaughtering them, eating them, conveying them (both dead and alive) in
public places, and of course protecting them - came increasingly to be seen as the
central issue in disputes. By the 1880s, cows per se were frequently relegated to a
secondary level of importance in these legal battles. Early in 1881, for example, the
newspapers of the northern plains engaged each other in a long debate over a recent
incident during id in Mirzapur. The major issue was not kine killing itself, but rather
the perception that the magistrate of Mirzapur acted in favour of Muslims in resolving
the dispute. The Kavi Vachan Sudha, a Hindi weekly published in Benaras, argued
that "Mussalmans should not sacrifice kine in honour of the Id festival, as is obvious
from ajudgement recorded by the magistrate of Benaras on the 30th April 1840, which
was confirmed by the Sadr Nizainat of Agra on 17 March 1841. Their religion asks
them to sacrifice sheep, camels, and c...".6°
in conjunction with this emphasis on law as a defining feature, the state's projection of
religious neutrality was a prominent reference point in cow protection disputes. This is
well illustrated by press comment on incidents in princely states, which of course were
subject to local legal frameworks. Again in 1881, for example, the Punjab press
responded to an incident in Bahawalpur state, which led to riots and the destruction of
Hindu temples. Many newspapers in Lahore were unable to envisage the Muslim
Nawab meting out appropriate justice, and so called on the colonial government to
"interfere and protect them (the Hindus of Bahawalpur) from the oppression of the
Mussalman", because "a European would show no partiality to the Mussalmans or
Hindus".6'
Here then, we see the progressive entrenchment of cow protection as an issue in the
public space. Although it had occupied this space to some extent throughout the
Prior, "Making History", pp. 191-203.
60	 Kavi Vachan Sudha 28 Februaiy 1881. Selections from the Vernacular Newspapers, punjab,
North West Provinces, Oudh, Central Provinces and Berar, 1881, Na 125.
61	 ibid; Miitr Vilas 28 March 1881; Anjuman-i-Punjab 28 March 1881.
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nineteenth century, towards the end of the century it became increasingly bound up
with law, and the neutrality of the state projected by this law; issues which were
articulated persistently in the indigenous press. As such, the participation of colonial
elites in cow protection was ensured; if nothing else, they provided the interface
between those involved in cow protection disputes and those that they hoped to
influence: the state, and the "public" as represented by the newspapers.
Secondly, the 1880s witnessed the growth of a new kind of cow protection, which
indicates the active involvement of elite-based ideology. This was the introduction of
programmes for the improvement of pastoral care and cattle usage in villages. As the
Mahratta expressed it in 1889, the main problem in relation to cow protection was
"education of the people as to proper husbandry techniques...(because) our animals, as
they appear, are wretched looking skeletons fit for shooting." 62 This kind of cow
protection reflected the concerns of middle class organisations; in particular the concern
to educate and increase awareness amongst rural populations. The Nagpur Gauraksbini
Sabha was particularly renowned for promoting this kind of work. The leading lights
of the Nagpur Sabha, Gopal Han Bhide and C. Narayanswami Naidu - both lawyers -
toured the countryside giving lectures on the economic benefits of cow protection, and
eventually instructed a body of lecturers to extend this work.63 This kind of semi-
philanthropic cow protection aligns the Nagpur Sabha with other middle class
organisations attempting to extend their influence in the mofussil. As such, John
McLane's claim that the economic emphasis of the Sabha was responsible for its
support base amongst the middle class ("Maratha Brahmin pleaders and other
prominent persons"), which is roundly criticised by Pandey as classic elitist
historiography,64
 appears to carry some weight. This support, however, was
engendered not on the basis of the 'bourgeois economic interests' of the elite, as
Pandey somewhat mischievously suggests is McLane's point,65
 but rather on the
62	 Mahratta 7 July 1889.
See D.F McCracken's "Note on the Agitation Against Cow Killing", Home Dept Public,
December 1893, No. 210, p. 10 (NAI). The establishment of institutions to train preachers
on cow protection was also one of the aims of the projected all-India movement of which the
Nagpur Sabha was to be the central body; see "Proceedings of the Sixth Anniversary of the
Gorakshim Sabha, Nagpur"; Central Provinces Secretariat General Home Department, B
Progs, June 1894, Nos. 49-53 (Nagpur). See also J. McLane, Indian Nationalism and the
Early Congress (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1977), p. 286.
64	 See Pandey, The Construction of Communalism, p. 18-9.
65	 Pandey makes this suggestion by quoting McLane's point that "it was the economic emphasis
of the Sabha's activites which accounted for the widespread support given to the (Cow
protection) movement..." as evidence of a historiographical reduction of the causes of
M sectarian outbreaks" to the level of elite economic interests; it is only several paragraphs later
that he quotes the whole of McLane's sentence - "it was the economic emphasis of the Sabha's
activites which accounted for the widespread support given to the (Cow protection) movement
in the Central Provinces by Maratha Brahmin pleaders and other prominent persons" - by
which time the link between McLane and this spurious bourgeois economism is already
established. See McLane, Indian Nationalism and the Early Congress, p. 287.
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presentation of the movement in a recognisable middle class framework. This is not to
deny the validity of other motivating factors in the movement as a whole, nor the
independent involvement of other classes with their own mobilising strategies.
Pandey's work in particular has made these points clear. My argument is that the
emphasis of the Nagpur Sabha's activities reflect the concerns of middle class
advocates of cow protection in the Central Provinces. The Nagpur Sabha, in terms of
its trajectory and its strategy of mobilisation, was a middle class organisation.66
This point is supported by the nature of the organisation's structure, which constitutes
the third area of change in cow protection in the 1880s and 1890s. The Nagpur Sabha
was an archetypal middle class body, recognisable in the public space. It had a quasi-
representational character, and also ran its own press and newspaper. Apart from its
rural education programme, one of its principal means of operating was to petition
government. In May 1894, for example, it submitted a Memorial calling for the
regularisation of government response to disputes over cow slaughter, in the light of
recent unprecedented riots across the northern plains (whilst at the same time, it may be
added, thanking local government for its "liberal policy of non-interference" with cow
protection societies in Central Provinces). This Memorial begins with a familiar
invocation:
By the grace of God, peoples of various races, faiths and creeds have
been brought together under the rule of Her Majesty the Empress of
India and they have been ever since enjoying an impartial treatment in
matters of religion, under that celebrated Proclamation of 1858, known
to them more as a charter of religious liberty than for anything else.67
Implicitly citing the "rights" of Hindus under the Proclamation, then, the Sabha's
Memorial attempted to represent the concern of all cow protection societies at the
government's failure to produce consistent rulings on cow protection disputes. This
Memorial was part of the strategy of the Nagpur Sabha to present Itself as the
"headquarters" of the movement, a strategy formalised at the Sixth Anniversary
Meeting of the Sabha in January 1894. Invitations to this meeting were sent to "all the
cow protection societies of this country", and in response "over fifty delegates...
66	 Again, this did not preclude the involvement of other classes in the Sabha; this was, after all
precisely the objective of the strategy of mobilisation in the districts. David Baker records
that within a year of the establishment of the Sabha in 1888, "there were forty-nine similar
bodies in the province, some in the district and tahsil (revenue subdivision) towns of the
region, where malguzars (proprietary heads of rural estates) and moneylenders were amongst
the most enthusiastic members." Baker, Colonialism in an Indian Hinterland 1820-1920
(Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1993), p. 323.67	
"Memorial from the Chainnan of a Public Meeting of the inhabitants of Nagpur and the
adjoining Districts, praying that definite rules be framed for the guidance of District Officers
in the matter of kine slaughter"; Home Department Public July 1894, Part A Nos. 301-304
(NAI).
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attended the anniversary to represent their respective Sabhas... •"68 In fact the
delegates were predominantly from the Maharashtra region, with Nagpur District
providing thirty of the total of fifty-five delegates (sixteen of these represented Nagpur
City itself).69 Nevertheless they "unanimously expressed a desire that the Nagpur
Gorakshini Sabha should be made the central body of the cow protection movement, so
as to give coherence, vitality and united strength to the disconnected efforts now being
made all over India." The government response was characteristically suspicious of
such representative claims: "I do not think it would be wise," one note comments, "to
recognise the right of these Mahrattas to speak for the North-Western Provinces, or
inteifere in any matters occurring there". 70 It appears, however, that the government's
anxiety was largely unfounded. In effect, this was an attempt by the Nagpur Sabha to
stretch a symbolic representative role over a wide ranging and extremely dynamic
movement, which showed little inclination, at least outside Central Provinces, to be led
in this manner.71
In the north cow protection was channelled through a variety of political and social
structures. Caste was a major conduit, and various caste organisations did much to
shape the quality of the movement, as Pandey has illustrated. The Arya Samaj also
played a key role in sustaining the movement, following the publication of Dayananda's
Gokurananidhi, or "Ocean of Kindness to the Cow", in 1881. This publication drew
on the wide public debate over cow protection at this time, particularly in the wake of
the incident at Mirzapur noted above, and may be perceived as part of the Swami's
strategy to maintain strong links into the wider world of Hinduism. 72 Part of its effect
was to galvanise local Samajes into setting up Gaurakshini Sabhas in their localities.
For the first time, the Samaj network was implemented as the framework of a wider
movement. As we shall see, this was to become an increasingly important role for the
Samaj in the development of organised Hinduism, a role which would draw it closer to
horizontal organisation, despite the vertical implications of Arya ideology. In the
68	 See "Proceedings of the Sixth Anniversary of the Gorakshini Sabha, Nagpur"; Central
Provinces Secretariat General Home Department, B Progs, June 1894, Nos. 49-53 (Nagpur).
69	 Delegates were from (where there was more than one, the number of delegates is given in
brackets): Bombay (7), Famkabad, Darbhanga, Sitamadhi, Jalgam (2), Dharwar, Bhandara,
Koihapur, Poona, Raipur, Bela (2), Harda, Bori (2), Saoner, Dhamangam, Katol (2), Khapa,
Kelod (2), Wardha, Umrer, Chatrapur (2), Dhapewara (2), Patasaongi (2), Arvi, Salara, Nagpur
(16). See ibid.
70	 Home Department Public July 1894, Part A Nos 301-304; 'Keep with' papers, note initialled
A.P.M, dated 10 July 1894 (NAI).
71	 Apart from the point gleaned from Pandey's work that this movement was fragmentary, driven
by a series of disparate motivations, one should also note the counter-claims of the Allahabad
Sabha to lead the movement see Mahra#a 30 June 1889, Native Opinion 16 September
1888 for reports of speeches by Sriman Swami which allude to the 'Central Committee' at
Allahabad.
72	 On Gokurananidhi, see Jordens, DayanandaSaroswati, p. 220-2; on the strategy of
maintaining links with the wider world of Hinduism, see this thesis, Section 3.3.1.
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present context, it is significant to note that the Samaj collaborated with Sanatana
Dharma Sabhas over cow protection,73 despite evident ideological antagonism over
other issues during this period. In addition, the Samaj never claimed leadership of the
movement, despite its key role in the Punjab and western North West Provinces. Both
these points may be seen as evidence of the significance of horizontal organisation as a
key factor in middle class participation in the movement. The Arya Samaj subsumed
ideological objections to Sanatani interpretations of Hinduism, on the basis that the
movement had the potential to galvanise a wide cross-section of people as Hindus.
Similarly, it avoided alienating these people by assuming a low profile approach - cow
protection, if it was to achieve this galvanising objective, could not be perceived as a
reformist project.
The Nagpur Sabha, on the other hand, had no such qualms about asserting a leadership
role, as it had no reformist connotations. Its assertions may have had little practical
impact in the north, but the headquarters self-image is nevertheless significant, because
it again indicates the way in which horizontal organisation, as an ideology, influenced
middle class involvement in cow protection. The Nagpur Sabha lay at the heart of a
vibrant movement within the Central Provinces, and it used this position to project a
wider representative role. Apart from their instruction on pastoral care, the Sabha's
lecturers were reported to have distributed literature which reflected this concern for
horizontal organisation. D.F. McCracken, in his confidential Note on the Agitation
against Cow Killing of 1893, notes that lecturers "expatiate on the glories of the Hindu
regime in the past when no kine-slaughter was permitted, and appeal to Hindus to
protect the cow, by distributing pamphlets, leaflets and pictures of the cow with
representations of the various gods in every part of its body. Some cartoons represent
the cow about to be slaughtered by a butcher and all the different castes of Hindus
standing around and crying out to him to desist." 74 The last point illustrates the way in
which the cow was projected as a collective responsibility of Hindus.
Middle class involvement in the cow protection movement, then, may be said to
represent a fairly inchoate attempt to put into practice the horizontal organisation of
Hinduism. The increasing entrenchment of cow protection in the public space
presented the middle class with an unprecedented opportunity to assume control of a
movement that had developed amongst trading, banking and landowning castes, and
involved other sections of the population through a myriad of caste-based structures of
See McCracken's "Note on the Agitation Against Cow Killing", op. cit, p. 10.
"	 ibid.
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mobilisation and enforcement.75 The ideological developments which had produced
the notion of the Maha Hindu Samiti and the "organic" unity of Hinduism could now be
articulated under the aegis of a genuinely universal symbol, which seemed to
encompass common ideas of what it meant to be a Hindu. As is clear from scholarly
research on the cow protection movement, however, this middle class ideology was
never able to assume a leadership role. I would suggest that one of the principal
reasons for this failure was the limited development of middle class notions of
organisation during this period. The Nagpur Sabha asserted its leadership on the basis
of symbolic representation, a strategy which was unable to accommodate independently
developed caste and local community based structures. Clearly, if the organic unity of
Hinduism was to become a reality, it either had to be articulated differently, or a more
efficient means of representing this unity needed to be developed.
4.3.2 Shuddhi as Vertical Organisation
The shuddhi movement, developing over much the same period as the cow protection
movement, did attempt to articulate the unity of Hinduism in a different manner; a
manner based on the vertical re-structuring of Hindu society. This was a unity which
implied the transformation of the religion, as envisioned by Dayananda in the Satyarth
Prakash.
Shuddlzi means "pure" or "free from error", and is associated in Hinduism with the
natural state of an individual in the performance of dharma. In the nineteenth century,
however, the term began to assume a more specific ritual meaning. This meaning arose
initially out of a singularly colonial situation, in that it referred to the ritual processes
required of high caste Hindus who had travelled abroad, and in so doing naturally came
into contact with polluting materials or persons. The flow of high caste, high class
individuals to Britain to receive education demanded the formulation of ceremonial
codes which allowed for full caste rehabilitation on their return.76 Purification assumed
the form of a standard ritual process signifying the re-entry of the individual into a
situation where he could perform his dharma and resume normal social relations. Caste
here is articulated as the defining framework of religiosity (as well as of normal social
interaction). A polluted individual regains access to religious truths by readmission to
For government reports on these structures, see McCraken's "Note on the Agitation Against
Cow Killing", pp. 10-11, and the "Note on the Cow Protection Agitation in the Gorakhpur
District", Home Department Public, A Progs, December 1893, Nos.212-3 (NAI).
76	 See Jordens, 'Reconversion to Hinduism: The Shuddhi of the Arya Samaj" (in G.A. Oddie
[ed.J, Religion in South Asia: Religious Conversion and Revival Movements in South Asia
in Medieval and Modern Tunes, Curzon Press, London, 1977, pp. 145-162), p.145; Sikand
and Katju, "Mass Conversions to Hinduism among Indian Muslims" (Economic and Political
Weekly, Vol. 29, No. 34, 20 August 1994, pp. 2214-2219) p. 2215.
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his caste. Interestingly, then, shuddhi as ceremonial code reiterates the notion noted
earlier (see Section 33.1) that caste functions as a church-like institution in Hinduism.
The establishment of a ceremonial process of this kind created theoretical space for the
purification of individuals who for some reason had been outcasted. Jordens notes
such an occasion in 1850 in Bombay, where a Brahman boy was outcast due to his
extended stay in a non-Hindu (Christian) house. 77 The boy's father secured doctrinal
authority for the re-establishment of caste status after purification rites had been
performed, in the form of agreement from certain pandits, and from the Shankarachaiya
of Karvir Math. In practice, however, this re-admission failed due to the continued
social boycott of the family in Bombay. Far more radical were the developments in
Calcutta during the early 1850s. Here, the Dharma Sabha was encouraging debate over
means of reaccepting high caste Christian converts, many of them the wayward Sons of
powerful bhadraloki families. The Sabha sponsored meetings along these lines,
including a large public meeting attended by two hundred pandits and several hundred
others in May 1851. The following year a "Society for the Deliverance of Hindu
Apostates" was formed, which set up a public reacceptance ceremony. Four hundred
people were assembled on 5 May 1852 "to form a native House of Commons,
discussing, deliberating and determining upon the question at issue with the greatest
eagerness, zeal and unanimity." Of the six applicants for reacceptance, "four were
restored to the privileges of the caste and two were driven out with contempt and
disdain."78
This kind of occasion remained as a fairly isolated occurrence, however, until the late
1870s, when the Arya Samaj began to project shuddhi as a process of conversion. As
in Bengal, the aggressive nature of Christian missionary activity in the Punjab formed
the context for these ceremonies. Dayananda appeared acutely aware of the need to
defend Hinduism against this threat. His main defence strategy was doctrinal
refutation, comparing and contrasting the anomalies of Christian doctrine with the
scientific truths of the Vedas. Shuddhi emerged as a further defence strategy, and
Dayananda effected two such ceremonies in the north. The first was performed in
Jullundar in 1877. The subject was a Christian convert. The second was performed in
Dehra Dun two years later, where the subject was a born Muslim.79
''	 Jordens, "Reconversion to Hinduism", p. 146.78	 Bengal Hurkuru, quoted in M.M. Au, The Bengali Reaction to Christian Missionary
Activities 1 833-1 857 (Mehrub Publications, Chittagong, 1965), p. 97-100.
'	 Au, The Bengali Reaction to Christian Missionary Activities, p. 146-7.
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Dayananda's implementation of shuddhi as a strategy of conversion was immediately
controversial, because it focused attention yet again on the vexed question of
boundaries and essential characteristics of Hinduism. What, alter all, defined a believer
in Hinduism, other than their caste status? How could a convert be perceived as a
Hindu, if he or she had no caste? In terms of Dayananda's creed, of course, this
problem could be surmounted. The value of his limited scriptural tradition as the core
of Hinduism was precisely that boundaries and characteristics were easily identified.
Shuddhi fits easily into the logic of merit-based varnavyavastha, in that converted
individuals would be assigned to their appropriate varna on the basis of their
knowledge and practice of "pure" Hinduism. This was of course only a theoretical
position in the late 1870s, which may have been cold comfort to Dayananda's converts.
What the Arya Samaj could provide, however, was the Samaj Mandir, an institutional
focus which was not defined by caste. It constituted the material representation of their
new religious community, as well as a place to worship and to study.
Again, this is not to say that the Samaj Mandir provided a casteless haven for converts.
It has already been noted that the Arya Samaj remained integrated into the wider world
of Hinduism in the most crucial sense, in that Aryas maintained their caste status.
Because of this, shuddhi developed as an Arya institution that continually questioned
the organisation's practices and its relationship with that wider world. This is indicated
by the first attempt at a standardisation of the shuddhi ceremony, developed by the
Amritsar Samaj in the early 1880s. 80 The Amritsar shuddhi was devised in association
with a local pandit, Tulsi Ram, and included a trip to Hardwar, where "alter bath, they
would get themselves purified by taking water made holy with cow dung by paying Rs.
5-4-0". 81 This kind of practice was entirely against the teaching of Dayananda, and
appears extraordinary in the context of numerous attacks on Brahman ritual and
"superstition" in Aryajournals at this time.82 This apparent contradiction is indicative
of the awkward position of the Samaj. Shuddhi was, alter all, not an issue of doctrinal
debate, but rather one of purity and impurity. It operated on the limits of acceptability
with regard to the caste structure. The involvement of locally recognised orthodoxy -
as represented by Tulsi Ram - and practices associated with that orthodoxy at least gave
80	 Au, The Bengali Reaction to Christian Missionary Activities, p. 149; see also R.K. Ghai,
The Shuddhi Movement in India (Commonwealth Publications, New Delhi, 1990), pp. 46-7,
quoting from the Arya Pairika 22 August 1885: "The Amntsar Arya Samaj has taken the lead
in this matter, and Hindu society must be grateful to that Sainaj. Very much is due in this
direction to Pundit Tulsi Ram of Amritsar, who takes deep interest in Hindu society and
deeply aware [sic] of the necessity of this reform, carries it into practice."
81	 Noted by Swami Shraddhanand in his Diwy; and quoted by Ghai, The Shuddhi Movement,
p. 47.
82	 See Jones, AryaDharm, p. 110 for examples of this.
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some insurance that Samajists would not themselves be outcast as a result of their
involvement with shuddhi.
The nature of shuddhis carried out by the Amritsar Samaj and other Samajes during the
1880s and early 1890s was also relatively uncontroversial; they were generally
straightforward purifications or reconversions of individuals, who could be
rehabilitated quite smoothly into their former castes.83
 There was, nevertheless, a good
deal of resistance even within the Arya Samaj to full integration with converts at this
time.84
Despite this resistance, an increasingly independent streak began to emerge in shuddhi
practice. This shift in attitude is indicated as early as 1888 by comment in the Arya
press that ritual aspects were "degrading", and that "a true Arya would never bow
down to such unmeaning ceremonies and their selfish advocates, the Brahmans". 85 In
1890 the Montgomery Samaj refused to send a Muslim convert to Hardwar,86
 and in
1893 the Amritsar Samaj again led the way by changing its ceremony to conform to a
"purely Vedic formula", consisting of shaving of the head, havan, explanation of the
Gayarri, investiture with holy thread, explanation of Samaj duties and distribution of
sherbet to all present at the ceremony.87
 This new streamlined ceremony, eliminating
all priestly involvement, was to prove the vehicle for a fundamental change in the nature
of shuddht.
Before going on to examine this change, however, it is necessary to look briefly at a
further development in the early 1890s which was critically linked to the shuddhi
movement. This was the debate initiated by militant Aryas around the formation of an
Arya biradri, or caste, which led to the formation of a new organisation within the
Samaj, the Arya Bhratri Sabha. The Sabha attempted to promote the notion of the Arya
Samaj as a separate social order, which would implement Dayananda's notion of merit-
based varnavyavastha. 88 This new order was perceived as a means of overcoming the
problem of how to integrate Arya converts. Counter-argument revolved around the fact
that this would certainly lead to excommunication and isolation, a consequence which
most caste Aryas could not contemplate. The debate engendered by the Arya Bhratri
Sabha indicates the significance of shuddhi to the reforming trajectory of the Arya
83	 For examples of shuda7ti during this period, see Jones, Arya Dharm, p. 131, and Ghai, The
Shuddhi Movement, pp. 45-6.
See J.R. Graham, "The Arya Samaj as a Reformation in Hinduism", p. 463.
85	 Arya Patrika 21 August 1888, quoted in Ghai, The Shziddhi Movement, p. 48.
86	 Tribune 28 May 1890, quoted in Jones, AryaDharm, p. 134.
87	 Graham, "The Atya Samaj as a Reformation in Hinduism", p. 463-5.88	 See Graham, "The Arya Samaj as a Reformation in Hinduism", pp. 478-9.
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Samaj, in that it consistently emphasised this contradictory relationship between the
Samaj and caste as the central organising principle of contemporary Hinduism.
As the Sabha-inspired debate over caste and the Samaj continued, a two-fold shift in the
nature of shuddhi ceremonies began to emerge. 89 First, from 1896 onwards the
practice of individual ceremonies was superseded by multiple or mass purifications.
Secondly, the subjects of shuddhi ceremonies were increasingly low-caste Hindus or
untouchables, as opposed to Christians or Muslims.90
 The focus moves away from the
notion of reclaiming those lost to other religions, and towards the notion of improving
the predicament of groups nominally associated with Hinduism, by investing them with
full (twice-born) caste status. The first significant shuddhi of this kind occurred in
1900, when the Lahore Samaj performed shuddhi for a group of Rahtia Sikhs, an
untouchable caste similar to the Hindu Chamar caste. 9 ' This action was followed
rapidly by further shuddhis amongst Rahtias, as well as Ods and Meghs. By 1903
large numbers of low castes and untouchables were being purified at mass ceremonies
in the districts of Punjab, Kashmir and U.P.92
The shift in emphasis towards the mass purification of low caste communities provided
the Arya Samaj with a viable strategy for reform, along the lines indicated by
Dayananda's transformative trajectory. The Samaj could now point to the practical
application of the Swami's vision of a reorganised Hinduism. Not only did this kind of
shuddhi work towards the eradication of caste oppression associated with the
corruption of contemporary Brahmanism; it also implicitly acknowledged the
framework of merit-based varna, as the purification ceremony also implied the
purification of low caste practice, as a feature of their new twice-born status. In short,
it was a vehicle for the vertical restructuring of Hinduism, which would - at least
theoretically - clearly define its boundaries. In addition, shuddhi could now be
projected not only as a strategy of conversion, but also as a kind of pre-emptive strike
against the threat of Christian missionary conversions of low caste groups.
The implicit contradiction between vertical and horizontal conceptions of the
organisation of Hinduism was now made manifest. For Sanatanis, the shift in
89	 Graham posits a causitive relationship between the debate and the shift; "The Arya Samaj as a
Reformation in Hinduism". p. 490.
90	 See Jordens, "Reconversion to Hinduism", p. 150; Ghai, The Shuddhi Movement, p. 56 - a
family of over 200 outcasted Sikhs were purified in a village in Gurdaspur Distirct; this
shuddizi was undertaken by the Lahore Shuddhi Sabha, a joint Arya-Sikh operation.
91	 See Jordens, "Reconversion to Hinduism", p. 151; Ghai, The Shuddhi Movement, p. 69.
92	 For fascinating insights into shuddIzi during this period, see the extensive quotation of eye-
witness accounts by two women, Serala Dcvi and Muriel Lester, in Graham, "The Arya Samaj
as a Reformation in Hinduism' pp. 500-504 (n.b. Dcvi's account is taken from an article
entitled "Social Service in the Punjab", Indian Review, 18 May 1918).
113
emphasis meant a direct assault on the structure they sought to defend as a fundamental
component of Hindu tradition. Shuddhi had come to be perceived as a means of
reclaiming or converting individuals from the "foreign" religions of Christianity and
Islam - the involvement of establishmentpandits and ritualised ceremonies reflected and
reinforced this perception. The new trend in Arya practice, however, shattered the
image. How could low caste groups be converted or reclaimed, if they were already a
feature of Hindu society? The question again focuses directly on the boundaries of
Hinduism as the critical area of dispute for these developing ideologies. The
implications of the reformist challenge to the maintenance of the established structure of
Hinduism were such that there was immediate and strong resistance. 93 The
concretisation of this conceptual opposition set the parameters for middle class debates
in the early twentieth century on the development of Hinduism as both a political force
and a socio-religious entity.
4.4 Summary of Discussion
This chapter has examined the way in which ideologies of organisation and
representation began to develop as substantive features of Indian social and political
life. The first section demonstrates the way in which this development was central to
the emergence of elite-led nationalism as a political force. Organisations like the
Sarvajanik Sabha and the Indian Association naturally addressed themselves to the
state; their whole objective was to persuade the state to adopt policies that reflected the
principles and visions of British liberal imperialism. I have called this type of
nationalism "hegemonic", because it could succeed, make progress, only within the
logic of colonial hegemony. The organisational form of hegemonic nationalism was
characterised by symbolic representation - a constant invocation of "the people",
"public opinion" and other representative idioms - which reflected precisely the state's
hegemonic discourse of organisation.
Although the National Congress developed within this framework, it was almost
immediately subjected to a questioning of its representative character. During the 1890s
some nationalists began to search for alternative structures which would improve the
representative quality of Congress. More adequate structures of representation, it was
realised by B.G. Tilak and others, would have the dual effect of increasing the
legitimacy of the Congress claim to speak for the people, and expanding the base - the
constituency - of nationalist support. In practice movements like the Ganapati festival
See Ghai, The Shuddhi Movement, p. 69.
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failed to provide this kind of structure, but they nevertheless represent an attempt by
nationalists to break free of the logic of hegemonic nationalism - to produce an elite-
driven counter-hegemony, based on more legitimate claims to speak for the people.
Movements towards counter-hegemony, of course, were antithetical to the state, and
the state was soon to strike back against the representative claims of Indian nationalists,
with significant ramifications for Hindu nationalists.
The second section has examined the development of further pressures on Hinduism
towards the end of the nineteenth century, which again centred on the issue of caste,
and its role in defining the shape of the Hindu religion. Both the census and low caste
mobilisation highlight for high caste reformers and politicians alike the increasingly
vexed issue of low caste status in a religious system without definite boundaries. This
issue was again articulated as an issue of representation. The Census appeared to
emphasise the fragmentary nature of Hinduism, calling into question the right of elite
reformers and organisational spokesmen to speak for Hindus and the Hindu religion.
The work of Jotirao Phule reinforced this, by actively challenging the representative
claims of elite organisations like the Sarvajanik Sabha and the Congress. Because of
the hegemonic presence of the discourse of organisation in the public space, the
language of representation was used to challenge oppression on both a religious and a
political level. The Satyashodak Samaj used the same idioms and structural
interventions to challenge both the Brahman dominance of Hinduism and the middle
class, urban dominance of politics. The Shudras and cd-Shudras, and the rural masses
are blended in a blanket rejection of the high caste urban elite's search for viable
constituencies.
The third section examined how these high caste urban elites sought to counter this
challenge, by actively practising the organisation of Hinduism. Both the cow
protection and the shuddhi movements witnessed elite attempts to unify Hinduism, and
so to reify the constituency of Hindus. Colonial elites became increasingly involved in
cow protection disputes during the nineteenth century, as the course of these disputes
was entrenched more and more firmly in the public space. During the 1880s and early
1890s the massive upsurge in cow protection activity was accompanied and sometimes
motivated by attempts to appropriate the cow as a symbol of the horizontal organisation
of Hinduism - the religion being projected as bound together by a common, overriding
concern for bovine welfare. This attempt to project a common symbol of 1-linduness,
however, was never underpinned by adequate structures of organisation. Middle class
attempts to assume a leadership role were largely confined to symbolic invocations of
the Hindu "people" or "nation", which clearly failed to penetrate the more concrete
structures of caste and local communities. Ironically, the one major exception to this
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was the Arya Samaj, which effectively employed its branch structure to mobilise and
sustain cow protection throughout the north-west. Because of its image as a reformist
organisation, however, the Samaj was never able to project this role onto a wider stage
- its influence remained largely in those areas in which it already had a presence.
This image as a reformist organisation was undoubtedly strengthened by its leading role
in the development of shuddhi. Here, the Samaj came increasingly to assume the
transformative role that Dayananda had envisioned it would fulfil. With the shift in
emphasis towards low castes and untouchables, shuddhi came to represent an attempt
to vertically re-organise Hinduism, and in so doing, to reify the constituency of Hindus
by re-drawing the lines or boundaries of definition. Unsurprisingly, this attempt met
with solid opposition from within Hinduism, an opposition which produced a natural
limitation on the success of this movement. Gradually, the Arya Samaj was to realise
its ambivalent position in the construction of a modem Hindu identity - on the one hand
pressing for the transformation of Hindu structures, the eradication of caste-based
oppression; and on the other committed to the unification of Hinduism, and to the
maintenance of its own position at the forefront of elite-led Hindu consciousness. The
development of political Hinduism only accentuated this ambivalence.
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Chapter Five
Imagining the Constituency of Hindus in the Early Twentieth
Century
The position of the Arya Samaj is indicative of a wider ambivalence for the nascent
ideology of Hindu nationalism in the field of Indian politics. Alter the turn of the
century, the idea of organised Hinduism began to assume an increasingly significant
role in projections and counter-projections of the Indian people, which were central to
contemporary political discourse. In this chapter I will examine how this discourse
developed, and how organised Hinduism sought to establish a position within the
framework it provided. In addition, I will examine further pressures on the
conceptualisation of Hinduism, which again accentuated the urgency of those
advocating the organisation of Hinduism - both vertically and horizontally - to develop
their ideas in practice.
The organisational focus for this chapter will be the Hindu Sabha movement. The
Sabha emerged in this highly pressurised context as the first concerted and practical
attempt to overcome the differences of approach to the conceptual unification of
Hinduism. My argument will be that the pressure to organise politically was such that
organisation itself began to emerge as a paramount objective. The tacit subsumption of
ideological differences which this caused implicitly favoured horizontal organisation,
with its belief in the maintenance of the status quo. Henceforth the organisation of
Hinduism began to be seen less as a process subject to ideological debate over the way
the religion related to modernity, and more as a kind of self-referential symbol of Hindu
salvation. Underpinning this transition, it will be argued, was the imagining of a
constituency of Hindus in colonial politics. Consciously, I am referring to an imagined
constituency as opposed to community, because it is necessary to emphasise the
specifically political nature of the process. 1 Hindus were imagined as a social bloc in
order to fulfil a particular role in developing political discourse. Understanding how
this process of imagining occurred is a major objective of this chapter.
I would not, however, dispense with Benedict Anderson's notion of imagined communities
altogether; indeed, I think that in the context of the increasing significance of the horizontal
organisation of Hinduism, Anderson's definition of community as a "deep, horizontal
comradeship" that overrides "actual inequality and exploitation" may be particularly useful.
See Anderson, Imagined Communities, p. 7.
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5.1 The Dynamism of Indian Nationalism
In the first instance, I will look at the dynamism of Indian nationalism around the turn
of the century, which did much to shift the parameters of political discourse in which
the constituency of Hindus was articulated.
5.1.1 Tilak and Nationalist Strategies of Confrontation
In July 1895 Tilak engineered a take-over of the Poona Sarvajanik Sabha. This take-
over not only articulated definitively the lines of moderate/extremist opposition in
Maharashtra,2 but also provided Tilak with an established structure, a recognised
political body through which to work. His previous work had been conducted either
within existing moderate dominated bodies, especially Congress, through his
newspapers, or through the limited potential of the "festival" structure, as in both the
Ganapati and Shivaji movements. The Sabha provided him with an orgainsational base
through which he could launch further campaigns: the advent of famine during the
winter of 1896 provided the opportunity to utilise this structure.
The famine of 1896-97 was severe throughout India, and particularly so in certain
districts of the Bombay Presidency. Famine Relief Codes which had been drawn up
initially in 1883 were brought into operation in the context of this unremitting and
widespread famine. The thrust of Tilak's campaign was simply to ensure that the
provisions of the Code in Bombay Presidency were upheld, during a period when
district officials were also under pressure to maintain a flow of revenue for the
Presidency. The situation, then, constitutes an illustration of the central colonial
contradiction between the interests of the state and those of the people. On the one
hand, the interests of the people were represented by the provisions for famine relief;
on the other, the interests of the state were represented by the need to maintain revenue
collection. Tilak's campaign effectively worked to expose this contradiction.
A significant feature of the Sabha's activity during the famine campaign was its
extensive penetration of rural districts, whilst maintaining a co-ordinating focus at
Poona. This latter was maintained not only through the central offices of the Sabha,
but also through the columns of the Kesari and Mahratta, which regularly supplied
theoretical meaning to the Sabha's immediate objectives, and reported the movement of
Sabha workers in the districts throughout the campaign. The role of the newspapers is
2	 The takeover was followed by the establishment of the Deccan Sabha to represent the interests
of moderate and liberal opinion in Poona; see S. Wolpert Tilak and GokhaLe, p. 77.
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important, because it cast this rural campaign firnily as an issue within the public space.
In the same manner as middle class involvement in the cow protection movement, the
basic thrust of the famine campaign remained educative throughout. In December 1896
the Kesarl stated that "the rayat [peasant cultivatorj requires to be taught what his basic
rights are and how he should seek to enforce them". 3 Where the campaign differed
from cow protection, however, was in the political implications of its educative role: in
the context of the famine, teaching the rayat his basic rights meant exposing the
contradiction between his interests and those of the state.
One of the most interesting features of the Campaign was the drive to create genuine
rural political organisations, and to politicise pre-existing local bodies. In December
1896 Tilak wrote:
The Kesari advises the leaders of the people in various talukas to form
themselves into committees to watch the progress of the famine
operations in their respective centres and to ventilate the grievances of
the rayats and the workmen employed on the relief works in such a way
as to ensure speedy redress.4
To encourage this feature, the Sabha produced and distributed through its agents a
number of pamphlets, including 6000 copies of the Famine Code translated into
Marathi, as well as standardised petitions for the remission of land revenue. 5 This
attempt to initiate organic political organisations among the peasantry reflects a
perception of the fundamental importance of the peasants' role in the maintenance of
British rule. The perception was not, of course, new in itself; what was new was the
attempt to encourage political expression through peasant-led organisations. To
disrupt, in effect, the established discourse of political organisation. Thus Tilak:
The country's emancipation can only be achieved by removing the
clouds of lethargy and indifference which have been hanging over the
peasant ... . We must remove these clouds, and for that we must
completely identify ourselves with the peasant... 6
The "removal of clouds" constitutes, in this context, an articulation of the need to
counter state hegemony at its very base. In many ways - not least the appeal for the
establishment of peasant-based political structures - the famine campaign represents an
attempt to transform this articulation into political reality.
The work of the Poona Sarvajanik Sabha during this period pushed against the
boundaries of the colonial public space. Its exposure of the Government's failure to
Kesari, 5 December 1896, Report on the Native Press in Bombay Presidency (hereafter RNP
Born) No. 51 of 1896.
Kesari, 22 December 1896, RNP Born No. 52 of 1896.
Cashman, The Myth of the Lokamanya. p. 129.
6	 Quoted in D.V. Tahmankar. Lokamanya Tilak, p. 73.
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deal effectively with the famine situation was obviously counter-productive to the
interests of the state, and its attempts at mobilisation of the rayats challenged existing
models of political organisation. This is reflected clearly in the uneasy official response
to the Sabha's activities. In the early months of 1897 several individual agents of the
Sabha were prosecuted on a local level. In March the Bombay Government took one
fascinating step further: it withdrew the Sabha's status as a recognised public body.
This was an attempt to marginalise the Sabha by asserting that it no longer had a
position within the public space - in the eyes of the state, it had stepped beyond the
limits of what was acceptable, even meaningful, within this space.
As we have seen, however, the public space was also full of independent indigenous
discourse. Tilak was able to utilise the state's actions specifically to expose the limits
of state hegemony. The Mzhraita described those government officers who had
effected prosecutions of Sabha agents as "the worst enemies of the people". 7 On the
withdrawal of public status, the Kesari comments:
The Sabha's activity has been an eyesore to the Government for some
months past. They could not reply to its well-reasoned representation
regarding the administration of famine relief. They could not legally
convict any of its agents in a court of law. So they have by
departmental procedure deprived the Sabha of all right to recognition as
a public body...
"Departmental procedure" is contrasted to the rule of law; the Kesari represents the
Government as moving outside the area of its own hegemonic project, in order to
suppress the "well-reasoned" activity of the Sabha. Some days later, the Kesari
concluded from this action that the "interests of our present rulers aid the people are
generally found not to harmonise".9 The Government, then, was forced into a
confrontation through which Tilak was able to illustrate dramatically the realities of the
contradiction between the interests of the state and those of the people.
The famine campaign articulated a strategy of confrontation which was to have a lasting
impact on the development of the national movement. This was reflected in the
successes and failures of the next major confrontation with the state in India - the
boycott and swadeshi movement against the partition of Bengal.
Tilak's involvement as a key figure in the 1905-08 campaign against the partition of
Bengal is indicative of an emerging trend of considerable significance in the national
movement. The focus of his work up to this time had been regional, in that all his
Mahratta, 21 February 1897, RNP Born No. 9 of 1897.
8	 Kesari, 23 March 1897; RNP Born No. 13 of 1897.
Kesari, 6 April 1897; RNP Born No. 15 of 1897.
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campaign work - including of course the famine campaign - had concentrated on the
specific context of the Deccan. The partition of Bengal was again, obviously, a
regional issue, yet resistance to it was articulated to some extent on an all-India level.
The articulation of a nationwide campaign, and the conflict between nationalists which
it produced, is evidence of a shift in the defining characteristics of the elite-led
movement, away form its regional bases, and towards an identification along party
lines. Hence Tilak was involved in the anti-partition campaign specifically as a
representative of the extremist party - he identified himself with a network of
ideological perspectives and objectives manifested in a particular strategy of
confrontation. In contrast to the moderate bloc in Congress, this strategy was
specifically counter-hegemonic.
The strategy of boycott and swadeshi as employed during this struggle was based
primarily upon an economic resistance to colonialism. The central focus of the
movement was the boycott of Lancashire cloth (and other British goods) and the
parallel encouragement of indigenous industries. The boycott was extended from this
base into a more sophisticated network of boycotts (a "doctrine of passive resistance",
as it was called by the Bengali extremist Aurobindo Ghose), encompassing education,
justice and administration. The central economic focus was employed despite the fact
that partition was not primarily an economic issue. Boycott was rather a strategic
response. Economic exploitation was presented as having a central political
significance, and the emphasis of the movement was persistently on the political
comprehension of the economic relations of colonialism. As Tilak wrote in 1905:
Exclude the boycott from the swadeshi movement and the latter becomes
lifeless. People will not persevere in the swadeshi movement, unless
they burn with indignation at Manchester forcing upon us thirty crores
worth of piece-goods and robbing the country of so much wealth.'°
In this context the immediate objectives of the movement - i.e. the rejection of all things
British and the promotion of all things indigenous - assumed almost a symbolic
significance. As Tilak stated in relation to the administrative boycott:
if universal boycott is impossible, enforce it as far as practicable. It may
not be feasible to boycott Government service altogether, but that is no
reason why we should not try to impress upon the minds of the people
that Government service exercises a debasing influence upon
character.'1
The literal success of the boycott was not the issue here. Its principal objective was
rather to increase popular consciousness of - to "impress upon the minds of the people"
10	 Kesari 26 September 1905; RNP Born No. 39 of 1905.
11	 Kesari, 19 February 1907; RNP Born No. 8 of 1907 (my italics).
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- the damaging implications of British rule. In this sense boycott and swadeshi may be
defined as an emphatic strategy of counter-hegemony.
Such a strategy demanded the development of an appropriate structural or
organisational base. It is clear that in the anti-partition movement Tilak recognised this
necessity from an early stage. In September 1905 the Kesari urged that
we should...take advantage of the present agitated state of the public
mind and establish a central Bureau for the collection and dissemination
of information regarding indigenous and non-British manufactures.
This Bureau should have its branches all over the country, and
unremitting efforts should be made to keep up the movement not only
by means of lectures and meetings, but also by the introduction of new
industries in our midst.12
This vision of a nationwide swadeshi organisation can be contrasted to Tilak's own
experience of structural limitations in the Deccan. It is evident that his involvement in
the anti-partition movement was seriously hampered by the lack of adequate machinery
and concerted policy. This is best illustrated by the limitation of his activity in Bombay
City, the stronghold of Pherozshah Mehta and the Bombay Presidency Association. As
the commercial centre of the Deccan, and the nucleus of the Indian Cotton industries,
Bombay presented itself as natural (as well as vital) ground for the propagation of
boycott and swadeshi. Tilak was able to enlist the support of some of the millowners
in Bombay; he established the Bombay Swadeshi Co-operative Stores in May 1906;
and he drew considerable support from the proletariat and petty-bourgeoisie, as is
illustrated by the six day general strike in Bombay following his conviction in the 1908
Sedition trial. 13 His attempt to draw the bloc-support of the millowners, however, was
scuttled by Dinshaw Wacha, 14 and in general his efforts lacked cohesion and continuity
in the absence of established, workable political channels. Ultimately, in accordance
with the overall results in Bengal, the swadeshi movement in Bombay City was not
sustained.
5.1.2 The Battlefield of Representation: Extremists, Moderates and Constitutional
Reform
Despite the limited success of the counter-hegemonic strategy, the parameters of debate,
the possibilities of elite nationalism, had nevertheless developed significantly. The
work of Tilak and others during the boycott and swadeshi campaign was grounded on
12	 Kesari, 12 September 1905; RNP Born No. 37 of 1905.
13	 See Chichenov, "Tilak's Trial and the Bombay Political Strike of 1908" (in N.M.
Goldberg and 1.M Reisner, TikiJc and the Struggle for Indian Freedom, People's Publishing
House, New Delhi, 1966, pp. 545-626).
14	 See Cashman , The Myth of the Lokamanya, p. 175
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the principle of popular involvement - popular involvement not as objectors to specific
features of government policy, but as nationalists opposed to the whole character of the
colonial state. Consequently, the organisational structures that they sought to employ
were directed not towards government, seeking redress, but towards the people,
seeking the expansion of the constituency of Indian nationalists.
This was undoubtedly a shift of discursive focus, but it must be placed in the context of
the struggle for control of Congress machinery during the anti-partition campaign. In
practice, the only potential avenue for politicians like Tilak to implement such structural
transformations was through Congress. The latter at least had a skeletal national
framework upon which to work. It was, however, controlled by moderates committed
to the maintenance of symbolic representation as the principal means of conducting
politics. The split in Congress which occurred at the Surat session In 1907 effectively
expelled the extremist strategy from Congress channels. The practical impact of this
discursive shift was therefore limited.
The state had nevertheless to confront the growing counter-hegemonic potential of elite-
led nationalism. It did so by attempting to marginalise extremism and actively
accommodate moderatism, through the strategic offer of constitutional reform. Reform
was an indication of political progress, signalling an affirmation of moderate methods.
Why turn to new forms of articulating nationalism, the state in effect declared to the
middle classes, when the old forms have reaped reward.
For the moderate Congress, the promise of reforms was an equally critical affirmation.
As G.K. Gokhale commented to the Secretary of State, John Morley, in 1908, without
reforms "the extremists will have their own way; confusion, danger, ruin will
follow". 15 Because of this pressure, the actual content of the reforms was of less
significance to the moderates than the concept, the image, of reform taking place. This
is reflected in the Act which eventually emerged in 1909 (known as the Morley-Minto
reforms) alter four years of deliberation. 16 Other than the formal recognition of
separate Muslim interests, it appears that the Act had no substantial transformational
effects on the structure of Indian government.' 7 The enlarged Legislative Councils
were merely a surface concession; they lacked, through the composition of their new
15	 Morley to Minto 4 December 1908, quoted inS. Wolpert, TilakandGokhale, p. 237.
16	 On this question of image, it is interesting to note Morley's comment to Minto as early as
June 1906: "Not one whit more than you do I think it desirable or possible, or even
conceivable, to adapt English political institutions to the nations who inhabit India."
Nevertheless, he continues, "the spirit of English institutions is a different thing... ." Quoted
in Wolpert, Tilak and Gokhale, p. 186.
17	 For an overview of the content of the reforms, see Sarkar, Modern India, pp. 137-144.
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non-official majorities, any real substance of power. Minto, the Viceroy, admitted in
1909 that "in fact I always thought our proposals are very conservative in many ways,
and was surprised at the good reception they met with from Congress circles." 18 A
few months before the Bill was due to pass through Parliament, Morley wondered
whether "we shall not be laughed out of court for producing a mouse from the
labouring mountain."19
The moderates were nevertheless wholly committed to the successful working of the
reforms, and this commitment drew them more and more into the state's hegemonic
arrangement. When the 1908 Indian Newspapers (Incitement to Offences) Bill was
being framed, for example, Morley prevailed on the Viceroy to water this oppressive
measure down in order to protect the moderates from extremist "attack". "Such an
attack is sure to come, " he writes, "and it is our business.., not to do anything that will
give substance to extremist taunts and reproaches against their moderate opponents."20
It was "the business" of the state, then, to protect the status of the moderates within the
national movement. The point is made more explicit by Lord Hardinge, Minto's
successor, in relation to the 1911 retention of the Seditious Meetings Act. Hardinge
again agreed to soften the act in deference to Gokhale and other elected members of the
Imperial Legislative Council, commenting that
We must be careful not to reduce the Act to an absolute nullity. Still,
some impression would be made if the amendments to the Act were
moved and accepted in open Council, so that the non-officials might get
the credit for having effected something, and the government might
appear to have made some concession to opinions in the Council.21
The Viceroy is not concerned so much with bowing to opposition within his Council,
as with giving the "appearance", creating the "impression", of having done so.
Interestingly, this is consonant with the moderates' concern, noted above, for the
appearance of reform, rather than their specific content.
In both cases, the reforms represent an attempt to reiterate symbolic representation as a
meaningful framework for the expression of political aspirations, in the context of the
emergence of a counter-hegemonic discourse in middle class nationalism. The
moderates' pursuit of a vision of noble imperialism of the kind promised in 1858
resulted in the effective neutralisation of their opposition to the colonial state, and also
in their partial assimilation into the actual structure of state hegemony.
18	 Minto to Lansdowne 18 March 1909; quoted in B.R. Nanda, Golthale:the Indian Moderates
andtheBritishRaj (Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1977), p. 318.
19	 Morley to Minto 6 August 1908; quoted in Wolpert, Tilak and Gokhale, p. 237.20	 Morley to Minto 28 May 1908, quoted in Nanda, Gokhate, p. 303.21	 Quoted in Nanda, Gokhale, p. 383 (emphasis added).
124
One interesting and often cited feature of the Indian Councils Act of 1909 was the
institution of exclusive Muslim colleges in the electorate for Provincial Legislative
Councils.22 This of course explicitly affirmed the recognition of a Muslim
constituency; just as surely, it also affirmed the recognition of a Hindu constituency. In
presenting the reforms to the House of Lords in 1909, Morley stated that
Only let us not forget that the difference between Mahommedanism and
Hinduism is not a mere difference of articles of religious faith. It is a
difference in life, in tradition, in history, in all the social things as well
as articles of belief that constitute a community... .
Morley's perception illustrates well the reason why the "communal principle" was used
as the basis for the programme of constitutional reform in India. For the state, religion
was the defining principle of Indian identity, Indian history and culture. This
religiosity, furthermore, was a condition which percolated all strata of Indian society,
including the middle class. When discussing the advisability of admitting an Indian to
the Viceroy's Executive Council as part of the reform package, Minto expressed his
doubts by stating that "one must remember that such a colleague would necessarily
become acquainted with all our State secrets, both interior and foreign, and that it is
difficult to dissociate any Native, however able, from the influences of religion...".
Minto could not conceive of an Indian contribution to the ultimate decision-making
body of the colonial state which was not articulated first and foremost from the
standpoint of religion.
This is perhaps not surprising, given the pattern of colonialist thought on the nature of
Indian society. It must also, however, be placed in the context of the above analysis of
the Act as an attempt to reiterate symbolic representation as the language of political
expression in colonial India. The Muslim and Hindu constituencies that the Act called
up were in this sense no different to the kind of constituencies we have already noted
in, for example, the Nagpur Gaurakshini Sabha's approaches to government: symbolic
constituencies, which gave meaning to the expression of indigenous "rights" within the
colonial discourse of organisation. There is no doubt, however, that the government's
invocation of these constituencies in 1909 was significant in mobilising already
somewhat urgent attempts to reify the community of Hindus. Indeed, the Morley-
Minto reforms appear In this context to be part of a wider ideological trend, which
22	 See, for example, Chandra et al, India's Struggle/or Independence, p. 142. This aspect of the
Act is cited as representing "the real purpose" of the reform package, a government attempt to
"divide the nationalist ranks and to check the growing unity among Indians by encouraging the
growth of Muslim communalism".
23	 Morley on Indian Councils Bill, 23 February 1909; in Philips, The Evolution 0/India and
Pakistan, p. 86.
24	 Minto to Morley, 5/7/06; see Philips, The Evolution of India and Pakistan, p. 75.
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focused attention on the precise size of this community. An examination of this trend
returns us to familiar territory.
5.2 Caste and the Census: The Development of Hindu Consciousness
in the Public Space
Progressively in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, the idea that numbers,
demographic majorities and minorities, were directly related to power in the colonial
polity was becoming embedded as a feature of Hindu consciousness in the public
space. The trend may be perceived as a development of the ideological concern to
identify the boundaries and precise qualities of Hinduism which has been noted as
central to middle class conceptions of their religion. Enumeration was a natural
correlation of such concerns: if one could identify exactly what Hinduism was and
where its limits lay, one could also begin to understand exactly how big it was in
objective terms. The principal means of approaching such questions was through the
census, which by the early twentieth century had developed into a powerful signifier of
the nature of Indian society. Nowhere was this power more evident, in fact, than in
debates over the demography of Hinduism.
5.2.1 The Gait Circular
In November 1910 (i.e. just prior to the 1911 census), the Tribune of Lahore published
a note prepared by EA. Gait, the Commissioner of the Census, entitled "The Census
Returns of Hindus". Gait's note pointed to the difficulty experienced previously by
census officers in acquiring accurate statistics relating to the size of the Hindu
population, because of the grey area on the boundaries of Hinduism occupied by low
caste and adivasi groups. "It is obviously absurd," he says, "to enter without comment
as Hindus persons who do not worship the Hindu gods and are not admitted to Hindu
temples, and who are not regarded by others, and do not themselves profess to be,
Hindus."25 The note then goes on to suggest that the approach of census officers could
be standardised by the application of a series of set questions to be put to the potential
Hindu. The questions he suggests related to such matters as the particular gods they
worshipped, their access to temples and shrines, and their attitude towards
untouchability.26
25	 Tribune 12 Nov. 1910; the editorial commented that it was publishing the note as no paper
had yet done so and "there seems to be a great deal of feeling on the subject and several papers
have commented upon it in the dark...."
26	 See ibid; Gait's suggested questions - there were six in all - were meant to be commented
upon and amended: "I should be glad to know which of them is regarded by the best opinion in
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Historiographically, what is known as the Gait Circular has been presented as a classic
policy of divide and rule.27 Although the publication of the note in the indigenous
press would suggest this,28 it must also be set in the context of the genuine difficulty
experienced by census officials attempting to enumerate Hinduism, as noted in Chapter
4. In this context the Gait Circular has some meaning as a standardising model for this
process of enumeration. Its implementation in the 1911 census, however, did not
appear to have clarified the situation. The Superintendent of Census Operations for
Central Provinces and Berar, J.T. Marten, notes almost apologetically that "the
question...as to what tests can be applied to differentiate a Hindu from a non-Hindu is
not without considerable difficulty... "29 Other Superintendents were equally
circumspect, being unable to produce clear or consistent results.30 Despite Gait's
efforts, then, the "considerable difficulty" associated with defining Hinduism was to
remain a feature of the census.
The ramifications of the Gait Circular, however, inevitably stretched beyond the fine-
tuning of colonial ethnogTaphy. As Lajpat Rai describes it
One fine morning the learned pandits of Kasbi rose to learn that their
orthodoxy stood the chance of losing the allegiance of six crores of
human beings who, the Government and its advisors were told, were
not Hindus, in so far as other Hindus would not acknowledge them as
such, and would not even touch	 31
each province, etc., as the most decisive, or whether there are any others which should be
substituted for them."
27	 Jones cites the Gait Circular as classic divide and rule - see his Arya Dhann, p. 306; P.K.
Dutla calls it "a blatant act of colonial engineering" - see his "Dying Hindus", p. 1306; it is
interesting to note that the Circular was accompanied by a further suggested innovation - the
separation of Hindi and Urdu in the language column; see Selections from the Native
Newspapers published in United Provinces 1911, Nos. 1&2.
28	 The Tribune 12 November 1910, along with numerous other papers, attributed Gait's note to
the intervention of the Muslim League.
29	 Marten tested 82 castes whose strength exceeded 1% of the population of Central Provinces
and Berar. Of these 19% were said to deny the supremacy of Brahmans; 43% did not receive a
mantra from a Braliman or other guru; 20% denied the authority of the Vedas; 22% did not
worship "the great Hindu gods"; 25% were denied access to temples; and 33% ale beef. See
Census of India 1911, Vol. X, Central Provinces and Berar Part 1: Report (Superintendent
Government Printing, Calcutta, 1912), p. 73.
30	 The United Provinces report states that there were "very few in this province...who, whilst
returning themselves as of the Hindu religion, do not fulfil any of the prescribed tests. It is
very rare indeed that no test at all is fulfilled by any one tribe." See Census of India 1911
Vol. XV, United Provinces of Agra and Oudh Part 1: Report (Government Press, Allahabad,
1912), p. 123. The Bombay report shows little enthusiasm for the project, listing castes that
could be excluded without enumerating them in proportion to the Hindu population. See
Census of India 1911 Vol. II, Bombay, Part 1: Report (Government Central Press, Bombay,
1912), p. 65-6. Without the slightest hint of irony, the Punjab report consistently excluded
not untouchables or tribals, but reformist groups such as Arya Saniajis, Brahmo Samajis and
Dev Dharmis. See Census of India 1911 Vol. XIV, Punjab, Part 1: Report (Civil and
Military Gazette Press, Lahore, 1912), p. 109.31	 Lajpat Rai, A History of the Arya Samaf, p. 124.
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Rai makes this point in the context of his commentary on low caste shuddhi as an Arya
contribution to Hinduism. The Circular "galvanised the dying body of orthodox
Flinduism into sympathy with its untouchable population". Despite this claim, there is
no evidence of direct involvement of orthodox organisations in untouchable or low
caste shuddhi in the wake of the Gait Circular. Such organisations were still unable to
surmount the problem of how to accommodate purified untouchables and low castes
within the institutional structure of caste.32 The general attitude remained tacit
acceptance of the Arya-Ied Shuddhi Sabha, as long as newly purified groups remained
in the relative backwater of the Samaj 's local structure (the Samaj Mandir), and that the
groups purified remained relatively 'soft targets' in terms of the level of their
untouchability. The Gait Circular nevertheless exacerbated the problem of the
legitimacy of high caste, middle class Hindus as the representatives of a religion
inclusive of manifestly oppressed groups.33 In this sense, the Circular was perceived
as a direct challenge to the power of the Hindu elite, and it was a challenge articulated
specifically through the institution of caste.
5.2.2 The Dying Race Theory
Caste and the census were also at the heart of the significant literature produced during
this period by Colonel U.N. Mukherji of Calcutta. In 1909 Mukherji published a series
of articles in the Bengalee, which later appeared as a pamphlet entitled Hindus - A
Dying Race. Two years later, in direct response to the Gait Circular, Mukherji
produced a further publication entitled Hinduism and the Coming Census: Christianity
and Hinduism. 34 An indication of the impact of Mukherji's work is provided by
Swami Shraddhanand's description of his meeting with the Colonel during this period:
It was in February 1912 while standing in the spacious hail of the
Aryasamaj in Calcutta, that a Bengali gentleman, dressed in European
habits, was introduced, as Colonel U. Mukerji of the I.M.S, to me. His
dress at first prejudiced me against him, but when he spoke to me of the
pamphlet on which he was engaged and worked out mathematically how
32	 See AryaPatrika 4 January 1911. Although the Patrika talks approvingly of the galvanising
effect of the Gait Circular on Sanatana Dharma Sabhas, it is unable to give examples of
Sanatani involvement in shuddhi. Instead, it notes that Sanatanis have "declared it in bold and
unambiguous terms that the Depressed classes are part and parcel of the body politic," citing
as an example the establishment of "a school for low classes" linked to Central Hindu
College, Benaras. Quoted in Jones, Arya Dhann, p. 309.
See Punjab Native Newspaper Reports (hereafter PNNR) 1910, pp. 1018 - 1092 for numerous
examples of the anxiety of the Hindu press over this issue; local Hindu Sabhas (see Section
5.3), for example, were exhorted by the Parkash of Lahore (15 November 1910) to "adopt
resolutions declaring the [depressedi classes to be their kith and kin, while the Punjab Hindu
Sabha should, on the strength of this unanimous declaration, submit a representation to
Government protesting against the proposed division of the Hindu community."
U.N. Mukheiji, Hindus - A Dying Race (M. Bannetjee, Calcutta 1909); and Hinduism and the
Comihg Census: ChrIstianity and Hinduism (Srikali Ghosh, Calcutta, 1911).
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within the next 420 years the Indo-Aryan race would be wiped off the
face of the earth unless steps were taken to save it, I learnt to respect his
patriotism and resolved mentally that I would never be led away by mere
appearance in judging of the worth of a man in future.
Colonel Mukerji read out to me the following extract from Census of
India report', vol. 1, page 122:-
In the whole of India the proportion of Hindus to the total population
has fallen in 30 years from 74 to 69 percent, but this is partly due to the
inclusion at each succeeding Census of new areas in which Hindus, if
they are found at all, are a minority." I agreed with Colonel Mukerji in
holding that the addition of new areas was immaterial when we had to
consider the actual decline of Hindus in number throughout the whole
continent of India. Thus did Colonel Mukerji work out the problem:-
Taking 5 per cent to be the actual proportion of the decline of Hindus
within thirty years, their present number of 69 per cent will be
swallowed up within 14 x 30 = 420 years, if no efforts were made to
put a stop to the present decline. I was impressed with the facts placed
by Colonel Mukerji before me and as I was already interested in the
work of reconversion of Hindus from Muhammadanism and
Christianity I began a special study of the subject.35
This study was to bear fruit some fourteen years later in Shraddhanand's influential
work Hindu Sangathan: Saviour of the Dying Race. By this time (1926), the idea of
demographic decline had become entrenched as a core feature of Hindu nationalism,
and as P.K. Datta has illustrated, it began to assume a symbolic, rhetorical quality
which subordinated the unwieldy burden of statistical evidence.36
This, however, was a later development. In 1912, it is precisely the "scientific"
character of Mukherji's calculations which make them significant in the growing
pressure to organise. The encounter between the urbane bhadraloki Mukherji, member
of the Indian Medical Services and son-in-law of Sir Surendrananth Banerjea, with
Mahatma Munshiram,37 the fiery Arya and founder of the Gurukul movement,
represents a classic meeting of divergent ideological streams of middle class India.
Munshiram's natural inclination was to scorn Mukherji and his "European habits" -
here was a reminder of everything he had cast off when he began work on the Gurukul
at Kangri in 1901. Yet he was soon swayed by the force of Mukherji's argument, and
admonished himself for being "led away by mere appearance". Mukherji and
Munshiram were united by a classic middle class rationalism, supported by the
authoritative documentation of the census. The force of this rationalism was its
apparent support for conceptual assumptions that underpinned the idea of an organised
Hinduism: Hinduism as degenerate, a fragmented religion with a disparate, lacklustre
Swami Shmddhanand,HinduSangathan, pp. 14-15.
36	 As Datta puts it, "the retention of the emotional at the cost of the mathematical"; see "Dying
Hindus". p. 1315.
Swami Shraddhanand was the name assumed by Munshiram when he took sannyas in 1917.
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following unconscious of the community that their faith constituted. Demographic
decline reflected this degeneracy, and increased the urgency with which it needed to be
countered. According to Mukherji, it was not simply a question of moral turpitude; it
was a question of survival.
In A Dying Race Mukherji focused on the plight of low castes as the well-spring of
Hindu degeneracy. When discussing the Bagdi caste, he comments: "he is lazy,
thriftless, unreliable.... Hope, ambition, self-respect, self-reliance have no meaning
for him, and things have been like this ever since he has been a bagdi." And then,
significantly, "there is no object for which they can unite". 38 Against this, Mukheiji
presents two images of organisation. First, the organisation of the colonial masters.
An Englishman, he says, is "a unit, and generally a very intelligent unit of a huge
organisation where everyone, irrespective of rank or class, has a common idea and a
common object." Secondly, the organisation of Islam in India, which he relates to
what he perceives as Islam's privileged position in the colonial order. This
"superiority," he claims "is entirely due to their religious revival and systematic moral
training."39
The image of organised Islam is of course particularly potent, because it is Islam which
would replace Hinduism as the principal religio-social force as a result of demographic
decline. In Mukherji's enduring phrase: "they count their gains - we calculate our
losses".40 This competitive demography indicates what I would perceive as a new
alignment for the idea of Hindu organisation; a specifically communal alignment, in its
implicit antagonism towards Islam. Hinduism and Islam are represented as directly
competing social blocs - they are polarised symbolically, in a similar way to the
polarisation of Aryas and Sanatanis as reformist and conservative in the 1880s. This of
course was a polarisation that was supported by the symbolic constituencies mooted in
the Morley-Minto reform package. For middle class Hindus, the material existence of
these constituencies could only be enhanced by the apparent scientific quality of
Mukherji's initial proposition. Suddenly, one could talk about the Hindus as an
objective force, with clearly defined boundaries - admittedly these boundaries were
shrinking, under attack from external forces, but at least they were there, "proven" by
the authority of the census.
38	 Quoted in Datta, "Dying Hindus", p. 1308.
-	 Datta, "Dying Hindus", p. 1307.
40	 For Datta's account of the significance of this phrase in communal literature, see "Dying
Hindus", p. 1305.
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The concentration in A Dying Race on the problem of low caste degeneracy begs the
question of caste reform. Mukheiji confronts this head on, calling for the reform of
Brahmanism as a prerequisite to Brakman-led low caste reform. This would entail the
eradication of untouchability, but not the wholesale disruption of the caste system. It is
assumed that the reform of Brahmanism would in itself be a powerful enough force to
produce a single Hindu society. Interestingly, the slightly later Hinduism and the
Coming Census eschews this need for reform. This publication, of course, was
produced in response to the Gait Circular, which threatened to remove low castes from
the Hindu equation altogether. The "scientific" ethnography which Mukherji used in
1909 to establish the dying race theory now turned against him, through the simple
and, as we have seen, quite extensively employed practice of census authorities shifting
the goal posts, making their own pronouncements on where the limits of Hinduism lay.
Mukherji now presented Hinduism as idealised pluralism, in which even untouchability
was justified as part of an organic whole.41
There is a shift here in Mukherji's perspective which may be seen as a shift from a
vertical to a horizontal approach to the organisation of Hinduism. This reflects the
increasingly dominant position of the latter in the ideology of Hindu politics, as the
issue of numbers became more entrenched as a signifier of power. The discourse of
organisation encouraged the production of idioms of representation which could easily
accommodate these vast projections of community as constituencies. Horizontal
organisation could address this kind of constituency far more immediately than the
long-term projections of vertical organisation, entailing wholesale reform and all its
possible ramifications.
5.3 The Hindu Sabha Movement: Organisation as Paramount
Objective
The emerging dominance of horizontal organisation is precisely what is indicated by the
Hindu Sabha movement. This movement developed during the first decade of the
twentieth century as an explicitly political attempt to represent "Hindu interests" in the
increasingly dynamic arena of colonial power.
41	 See Datta, "Dying Hindus", p. 1310.
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5.3.1 Beginnings of the Movement: the Hindu Sahaik Sabbas
Although various organisations emerged towards the end of the century which
attempted to encompass Hindus as a constituency,42 it was the Punjabi organisations -
Arya, Sanatani and also Sikh - which initiated concrete moves towards the projection of
this level of representation, as the political context began to shift in the early 1900s.
From 1906 a series of Hindu Sahaik Sabhas were established which consisted of "the
cream of the Arya, Brahmo, Theosophist, Sikh, Sanatanist Societies... . "' The
principal aim of these Sabhas was to "protect the interests of the Hindus by stimulating
in them the feelings of self-respect, self-help and mutual co-operation so that by a
combined effort there would be some chance of promoting the moral, intellectual, social
and material welfare of the individuals of which the nation is composed." The first
significant Sabha was established in Lahore, at a meeting held on 4 August 1906.
This meeting framed a series of objectives:
1. To promote brotherly feelings amongst the various sections of the
Hindu community;
2. To help destitute and disabled Hindus;
3. To act as Trustees for charitable, religious, educational and other
purposes of such properties as may be entrusted to the Sabha;
4. To improve the moral, intellectual and material condition of the
Hindus;
5. Generally to protect, promote and represent the interests of the Hindu
community.45
Shortly afterwards, these were supplemented by a sixth objective: "To help the
establishment of similar Sabhas in other important towns of India."46 I have quoted all
six objectives of the Lahore Sabha because I believe they indicate remarkably well the
somewhat unfocused trajectory of the Sabha movement. Beyond the desire to expand,
it is difficult to extrapolate any definite programme of action from them. Despite the
fact that the Arya Samaj was influential in setting up the Sabha, then, the Lahore
objectives reflect the preoccupation of horizontal organisation precisely: the need to
bind together, to "protect, promote and represent", whilst avoiding any action
disruptive of established social practice.
42	 Most notably, as we have seen, the Nagpur (3aumlcshini Sabha.
Tribune, 24 August 1906.
44	 The Tribune of 2 October 1906 claimed that the first Sabha was established at Srinagar in
June 1906.
'	 Tribune 24 August 1906.
46	 Tribune, 25 August 1906.
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The Lahore Sabha was followed by similar organisations established at Multan,
Sialkot, Gujranwala and Lyallpur.47 The common theme was collaboration: inaugurai
meetings were attended by the "heads of all sections" coming together to "work with
co-operation on a single platform". 48 The idea, then, was to create a conglomeration of
organisations which together would form a spectrum of religious affiliation. As long as
the spectrum presented a coherent image, it could claim to "represent the interests of the
Hindu community." The constituency of Hindus is created by binding together in one
organisation a seiies of existing organisations which purported to represent the various
components of this larger constituency. Although it is a somewhat more elaborate
mechanism, this image replicates the kind of symbolic representation projected by the
Nagpur Gaurakshini Stbha. This point is supported by the fact that the kind of
organisations involved were almost exclusively middle class: the Tribune's list above
confirms this doubly, by emphasising the elitism of those involved ("the cream of the
Arya, Brahmo, Theosophist..."etc.). A significant ideological convergence is apparent
in this image. Horizontal organisation meshes with symbolic representation, to the
extent that the latter constitutes the means of achieving the former. At the same time,
the coherent image, the apparent unity, becomes the touchstone for the Sabha
movement's representative claims. The two ideological forms begin to develop
together, mutually affirming their legitimacy within the colonial discourse of
organisation.
One direct result of this was that sanatanadharma emerged as central to the coherence
of the Sabha movement. Projecting a spectrum of Hinduism meant providing a
strategically central position to orthodoxy, with its implication of the largest
constituency of Hindus. Sanatanadharnza had by the turn of the century become
entrenched in the public space as a signifier of this orthodoxy, represented by the
Sanatana Dharma Sabhas and the Bharat Dharma Mahainandal. 49 Consequently these
organisations were powerful movers in the character of unified Hinduism projected by
the Sabha movement.50
47	 Cas rrn..ntc n T..'h..a thi-n,,nhcn,t antanhar I tY' . rn.,n, s.f thaca CahhacSJI..%, U#tAJU1IIO LU LI S(fl45&C USIA JLS5IflJLU IJS1JUSSSUUfl.fl I FSJ'.J, SWILL7 '.JS IJIL% IJWJSAIU fl 'i%#
established in the wake of a provincial tour by Pandit Ram Bhaj Datta and his wife Sarala
Devi. Datta was an Arya of the "College faction", who in 1907 was to become the first
President of the Punjab-based Bharat Shuddhi Sabha, established to "devote itself exclusively
to (shuddhi) work" and claiming to represent "the vanous Hindu societies" and so have the
sympathy of "the entire Hindu population". Passages are from a speech delivered by Datta in
Allahabad in 1911, quoted in Ghai, The Shuddhi Movement in India, p. 80. On Datta see also
Jaffrelot, "The Genesis and Development of Hindu Nationalism in the Punjab", p. 26.
48
	
See Tribune 8 September, 2 September 1906.
49
	
Re. the claim made by the Bharat Dharma Mahamandal in 1902 to represent "the whole of the
orthodox classes of the Hindus in India"; op. cit. Chapter 3, n. 116.
50
	
In making this point I am arguing against the line taken particularly by Jaffrelot that the
Sabha movement was an extension of Arya Sarnaj ideology; see Jaffrelot, "The Genesis and
Development of Hindu Nationalism in the Punjab", pp. 26-33.
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5.3.2 "Self Abnegation": Defining the Structure of Hindu Politics
In the context of the Congress split in 1907, and the constitutional reforms of 1909, the
movement gathered pace despite its rather vague beginnings. Work was focused on the
reform package, and on the Punjab Alienation of Land Act of 1901, which was
perceived as particularly discriminating against the urban-based Hindu middle class.51
As well as addressing communications to both the provincial and central govermnents
on these issues during 1909,52 the Sabha made its presence felt by voicing concern
over the reform package to the Viceroy in person, as part of a welcome address during
a short visit to Lahore in April. The address was reported to have "touched the Viceroy
to the quick and led His Excellency to remark that the questions raised in it did not suit
the occasion."53 This incident was widely commented on in the press, and the Sabha
consolidated the resulting heightened profile by preparing for a Provincial Hindu
Conference in Lahore in October 1909, as a demonstration of the unity of Hindus in
Punjab.
A prime mover in these preparations for the Conference was Lala Lal Chand, the first
prominent leader of the fully established Sabha movement. Lal Chand was a well-
known Samajist of the "College branch". He was also ajudge in Lahore and one of the
founders of the Punjab National Bank.54 Beginning in February 1909, he published a
series of articles in The Punjabee under the title Self-Abnegcuion in Politics, which have
since gained stature as a "foundation text" of the Sabha movement. 55 The somewhat
obscure title refers to the attitude of Hindus towards politics, which (land perceived as
self-denying, always allowing the claims of other forces in society to take precedence.
The concession of separate Muslim electorates in the Morley-Minto reforms is
presented as the apotheosis of the tendency.
51	 For a summary of the provisions of this Act and its implications, see Jaffrelot, "The Genesis
and Development of Hindu Nationalism in the Punjab", pp. 22-23; for morn detailed accounts
see N.G Bamer, "The Punjab Disturbances of 1907: the response of the British Government
in India to Agrarian unrest" (in Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 1, No. 4, 1967, pp. 353-383); aed
Bather, The Punjab Alienation of Land Bill of 1900 (Duke University, Durham, 1966).
52	 In April and July; see Jaffrelot, "The Genesis and Development of Hindu Nationalism in the
Punjab", p. 27.
Jhang Sial 17 April 1909; PNNR 1909. For further examples of press comment, see the
Rindusian and the Watan, 16 April 1909, in PNNR.
4	 Jaffrelot, "The Genesis and Development of 1-lindu Nationalism in the Punjab", p. 27.
They were later published in book form: Lal Chand, Self-Abnegation in Politics (Central
Yuvak Sabha, Lahore, 1938); Jaifrelot has gone as far as to describe Self Abnegation as a
Hindu version of the two nation theory - see "The Genesis and Development of Hindu
Nationalism in the Punjab", p. 28.
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Blame for this loss of self-assertion is laid fairly and squarely at the door of the
Congress, an organisation that "makes the Hindu forget that he is a Hindu and tends to
swamp his communal individuality (sic!) into an Indian ideal, thus making him break
with all his past traditions and past glory."56 The Congress ideal of a composite
nationhood, he continues, "was not only erroneous to start with, but .. .has become
impossible under the declared hostile attitude of the other community." The only way
forward, then, was "to start anew on a fresh basis, abandoning, if not pulling down,
the fabric which instead of giving political shelter and refuge has exposed the (Hindu)
community to winds and hailstorms from every quarter."57
Lal Chand's agenda was explicitly political. His articles reiterate again and again the
point that "the object is not to discuss the general amelioration of the Hindu community
in its various aspects," but rather "the political aspect of the Hindu community under its
present environments."58 As such, he largely sidesteps the issue of what precisely
constitutes the Hindu community which he is addressing. Beyond the invocation of
fairly widely understood notions of Hindu history, and an attempt at defming patriotism
in terms of community as opposed to territory,59
 Lal Chand does not appear to be
particularly concerned with the issue of how to consolidate Hindu society. As a leading
Arya, this may appear to be inappropriate, but Self-Abnegation needs to be viewed in
its own context. In particular, the Morley-Minto reforms need to be seen not only in
terms of the recognition of separate Muslim interests, but also in terms of the increasing
impotence of Congress moderatism, and the related ideological struggle to assert
counter-hegemony as the strategic focus of Indian nationalism. La! Chand rejects the
latter in no uncertain terms. His understanding of politics is "in the sense of relations
between the governed and the governors;" he does not therefore endorse politics based
on the "uprooting of these relations." 60 "It is mere tall talk," he continues, "to speak of
self-growth and self-development" when the community is so weak. Because of this it
is of "paramount importance to reconcile, and not to make needlessly antagonistic, the
powers that be."61 Later he refers to the split in Congress at Surat in 1907 as a result
of the clash of these opposing strategies towards the state:
Self-help [i.e. swadeshi and the rejection of state-centred politics]
...threatened at one time to cause a split in the Congress camp and not
improbably did cause the split. The advocates of the theory would
	
56	 Chand, Self Abnegation in Politics, p. 112-3.
	
''	 Chand, Self Abnegation in Politics, p. 113.
	
58	 Chand, Self Abnegation in Politics, p. 98 [emphasis in original].
Chand, Self Abnegatwn in Politics, p. 102-3; this is a notion which L.ajpat Rai had been
advocating even in 1899, a point noted by Jaffrelot, "The Genesis and Development of Hindu
Nationalism in the Punjab", p. 32.
	
60	 Chand, Self Abnegation in Politics, p. 99.
	61	 Chand, Self Abnegation in Politics, p. 100.
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discredit their opponents by calling them mendicants. Their scheme was
to make no appeals to Government nor send any memorials, but to
achieve political ascendancy without Government help. The theory is
attractive in form as it appeals to self-pride but I, at any rate, am at a loss
to understand how resolutions passed at meetings will redress the
grievances unless it is intended - whether so addressed in form or not -
that these should reach Government and induce it to take measures for
redress.62
The politics of extremism, then, do not fall within the purview of this prominent judge
of Lahore.
The moderate Congress, however, had also patently failed to deliver any tangible
political gain, beyond the provision of separate electorates. "When the time came for
rewarding the labours a little, the substantial portion of the reward was assigned to the
other community."63 The problem, however, lay not in the structure of Congress
politics - i.e. the "appeal to the authorities...to address the wrong" - but rather on the
projection of the Congress constituency (through, of course, symbolic representation)
as a united nation. When La! Chand talks of starting anew, of pulling down the fabric
of contemporary politics, he is referring largely to the substitution of this constituency
for a Hindu constituency:
Weak and disunited we are and divided into various sects. But the
remedy lies in bringing the sections on a common political platform
where they would realise that they are merely branches of the same
stock and community, and not lead them further astray and to teach them
as if no such community exists or has a political status.64
Here again we see the convergence of symbolic representation and horizontal
organisation. The ideological meshing noted above is reproduced. In this context, the
appropriation of the existing structure of politics (i.e. that which has been termed
"hegemonic nationalism") is the logical means of representing the imagined
constituency of Hindus. Thus Lal Chand, at the very end of his series of letters,
proposes:
the substitution of Hindu Sabbas for Congress Committees, of a Hindu
press for the Congress press, organisation of a Hindu Defence Fund
with regular offices and machinery for collecting information and
seeking redress by self-help, self-ameliorations and petitions and
memorials supplemented by agitation in the press and advocacy through
trusted leaders in matters both special and common but dominated
primarily by regard for Hindu interests.65
62	 Chand, Self Abnegation in Politics, p. 109; Chand continues: 'The fallacy of the position
taken up is rendered absolutely self-evident by actual results. An attempt to boycott
Government service and even honorary service failed miserably...'.
63	 Chand, Self Abnegation in Politics, p. 112.64	 Chand, Self Abnegation in Politics, p. 118.
65	 Chand, Self Abuegation in Politics, p. 125.
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It is possible that Lal Chand's approach in Self Abnegation was influenced by the
Government's crack-down on Arya involvement in politics following the Punjab
disturbances of 190'7.66 Certainly he places great emphasis on his objection to the
Congress demand for self government within the Commonwealth as an "impracticable
demand and a pure source of irritation," and is keen at other points to emphasise his
loyalty.67 It is in any case perhaps not surprising that such a prominent citizen of the
British Indian state should be anything other than an advocate of strictly constitutional
politics. What is interesting is that this dry and somewhat unwieldy series of articles
should emerge as what Jaffrelot calls the "ideological charter of the Hindu Sabha."68
As Hindu politics emerged, it became fused to the idea of symbolic representation, a
method of structuring politics which avoided the thorny question of who precisely was
being represented. Conforming precisely to the state's own idea of how a political
organisation should operate (not only in the sense of symbolic representation, indeed,
but also of course in the sense that the projected constituency was - in some sense at
least - religious), La! Chand's vision of the Hindu Sabha intended to call the
constituency of Hindus into being simply through the power of political articulation in
the colonial public space.
5.3.3 The 1909 Hindu Conference: Establishing the Paramount Objective
In April 1909, whilst the "ideological charter" of the Sabha was still unravelling in the
pages of the Punjabee, the prospects for the establishment of this unified Hindu
constituency in the Punjab were rocked by events in the district town of Hoshiarpur.
The local Arya Samaj performed a shuddhi ceremony during April to purify a group of
Chamars. As stated earlier, the general attitude of high caste Hindus in the Punjab was
to tolerate Arya shuddhi ceremonies, as long as the groups purified were relatively "soft
targets" in terms of their caste status. The Hoshiarpur shuddhi , however, targeted the
particularly untouchable Chamars. As a result it provoked a vicious backlash
orchestrated by the local Sanatana Dharma Sabha, which led to extensive comment in
the Punjabi press. The Lahore-based Akhbar-i-Am published a letter from Bawa
Narain Singh of Hoshiarpur, which announced the outcasting of local Samaj members
with the ominous statement: "Aryas should begin by sinking their own wells or they
will die from thirst." 69 The Hoshiarpur-based flak reported that a group of Aryas
66	 See Jones, AiyaDhann, pp. 269-279 on this Government crackdown.
67	 Chand, Self Abnegation in Politics, p.1 16; see also, for example, p. 99.68	 Jaffrelot, "The Genesis and Development of Hindu Nationalism in the Punjab", p. 28.
Akhbar-i--Am, 5 May 1909; see PNNR No. 19 of 1909. Bawa Narain Singh's opposition is
indicative of the way in which low caste shuddizi polansed middle class Hindu opinion - some
twenty years earlier Singh had been publicly thanked by the Amritsar Arya Sainaj for his
donation of Rs. 80000 to the local Dayanand Anglo Vedic College; see Qaisari 16 May
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who had gone to fetch water were "given a severe beating by about 40 Sanatanists",
and also that a secret society called the Sudhar Sabha had been established "to parade
the streets in groups of from five to ten persons and...belabour with lathis solitary
Samajists they may meet".70 This hostility towards the Samaj was also expressed on a
more general level, and collaboration in the Sabha movement was called into question.
The editor of the Lahore-based Hindu Sanatan Dharam Gazette, for example, launched
a bitter invective against the Samaj, concluding that "Sanatanists should have nothing to
do with Hindu Sabhas, the Punjabi organisers of which consist mostly of Aryas," and
that "these bodies (i.e. the Sabhas) will prove extremely injurious to the interests of
Hindus."71
The response of the Arya Samaj is an interesting reflection of the dilemma it faced in its
relationship with Sanatanis during this period. The Hoshiarpur Samaj immediately
appealed to the powerful Lahore Samaj for help in its predicament. The Lahore Samaj
then attempted to use the new Hindu Sabha machinery to effect a rapprochement.72
This is indicative of the Aryas' commitment to the idea of wider organisation, and to the
Sabha movement as a means of diffusing tension. But it was not the oniy form of
response. Two or three weeks alter the Hoshiarpur incident, Lajpat Rai wrote an article
in the Arya Gazette which was far more openly confrontational. Rai attacked caste as
"one of the chief causes of the national and social ruin which has overtaken Hindus,"
although he did qualify this by noting that "in olden times the (iiina) system was not
characterised by its present rigidity," thus remaining within the broad ambit of Arya
doctrine. He then appealed to his fellow Aryas to continue their shuddhi work,
"bearing in mind that the seed which they are sowing is being sown by order of God",
and predicted that "the Sanatanists, who thirst for the blood of the Aryas, will eat of
(the fruits of their labours) and offer prayers for the latter." 73 This then presents an
alternative view of the development of Hindu unity, in which the reformist principles of
the Arya Samaj are ascendant, and in particular the transformation of Hindu society
constitutes the basis for future unity.74 It is clear from these reactions to Hoshiarpur
1885, in Selections from the Vernacular Newspapers in the Punjab, North Western
Provinces, Oudh, Central Provinces, Central India and Rajputana, 1885.
70	 Tilak 6May 1909; see PNNR No. 21 of 1909.
71	 Hindu Sanatana Dharam Gazette, 28 April 1909; see PNNR No. 19 of 1909; Aiyas are
described as "the killers of kine", and "the character of their women is open to objection"; the
SatyarthPrakash is described as "a sinful and filthy book".
72	 See ibid: "...the Lahore Samaj intends bringing pressure to bear on the Sanatan Dharam
Sabha, Hoshiarpur, through the Hindu Sabha".
Arya Gazette 20 May 1909, quoted in PNNR No. 21 of 1909.
Certainly the Hoshiarpur Samaj appeared to survive the storm of 1909 and cany on with its
shuddhi programme amongst Chamars. The Report on the Punjab Census 1911 notes that
"Information received from the Hoshiarpur district shows that 722 persons of the Kabirpanthi
sect (Chamar by caste) have been elevated by the Arya Samaj in 49 villages of the Hoshiarpur
and Kangra Districts within the last four years". See Census of India 1911, Vol. XIV, Punjab
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that shuddhi was an issue at the heart of the debate over the nature of Hindu unity,
Hindu organisation. Against this vibrant, sometimes violent backdrop of ideological
confrontation, then, the first Hindu Conference was held in October.
Although the Conference was not held until the 21st and 22nd of October, from early in
that month the press began setting the tone. In particular, the Arya daily the Pun]abee
began collecting comments from the national press which indicated that the Sabha
movement "has made its infant existence, albeit devoid of any achievements, felt."75
For example, it quoted admiringly from the Reis and Rayyat,76 which had suggested a
(admittedly somewhat vague) definition of the parameters of Hindu unity in anticipation
of the Conference: "the Hindus scattered all over the Indian peninsula are divided into
various forms. But there is the bedrock of uniformity in the belief in the Vedas and
some other essential dogmas"77 A few days later, an approving article in the Bengalee
was extensively quoted. This article compares the unity of the Sabha movement to the
fractious recent history of Congress nationalism: "While the echoes of the Congress
controversy continue to reach our ears, the great Hindu community of the Punjab are
silently maturing their plans and are slowly but steadily moving forward towards the
formation of a great Hindu federation." The Bengalee also had a suggestion for the
defining principle of unification in this federation: "Race, and not religion, ought to be
the guiding principle of the organisation. For the Hindu is the most tolerant of human
beings and the Hindu faith the most comprehensive that one can think of, embracing
within its fold the believers in cults and creeds of the widest divergence." 78 Although it
may not have rung true in Hoshiarpur, this idea of tolerant "unity in diversity", based
on a range of unifying principles, was the overriding theme of pre-Conference
comment. A confirmation of this unity, it appeared, was the most significant, the most
sought after objective that the Conference could aspire to. As the Punjabee's Special
Conference Issue commented, "This is the first time, we believe, in the history of
modem India, that the Hindus as a body have sought to give expression to their
communal consciousness, as distinguished from the detached movement of sects and
castes. "'
The importance of sanatana dharma to the efficacy of this unity is indicated by the
allocation of posts at the 1909 Conference. Although Lal Chand was Chair of the
Pt. 1, p. 152. Ghai also notes that one of the Kabirpanthi Chamars went on to become an
MP, and one a prominent figure in the Sabha movement; see, The Shuddhi Movement in
India, p. 75, n. 137.
Pwzjabee, 7 October 1909.
76	 A Calcutta English language weekly.
1	 Pwzjabee, 5 October 1909.
78	 Punjabee, 9 October 1909.
Punjabee, Special Conference Issue 23 October 1909.
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Reception Committee, the Presidency was offered to Sir C.P. Chatterjee, "a patron of
the Sanatana Dharma Sabha."8° As well as his association with orthodoxy, the non-
Punjabi Chatterjee signified the importance of communal identity over regional identity;
he was "a Hindu first and a Bengali afterwards."81
The Conference was attended by some 3000 persons on each day. Although it was a
provincial Conference, delegates were also drawn from the North West Frontier
Province, with "some visitors from UP and other parts of the country." 82 The
importance of Sanatani sensibilities is again signified by the careful segregation of
participants in the panda! according to caste.83 The unity of Hinduism was not to be
threatened by delegates' anxieties over potential pollution through the proximity of
other delegates.
Lal Chand's address to the Conference indicates many of the concerns and dilemmas
that defined organised Hinduism at this time. He began by referring to Mukherji's
Hindus: A Dying Race as a reflection of the resurgence of "Hindu self-consciousness."
"Numbers carry great weight in this age," he commented, "...and help materially in
deciding the fate of any struggle. The progress of a community is now as much
measured by its numerical strength as by its moral and economic achievements." 84 He
then went on to urge the point made in Self Abnegation, that for Hindus defining this
community was simply a question of articulating it on the level of colonial politics.
Although he did refer to the "needless corrosive differences" of sub-caste in his critique
of contemporary Hindu society, as any good Arya of the time would, his solution was
based firmly in the realm of symbolic representation. "All that is needed", he says, "is
to advocate the interests of the community at large and the moment we realise this
germinal idea, this sacred obligation, ...all self-imposed differences and schisms will
vanish away like chaff." As soon as Hinduism is presented as united, then,
divisiveness will disappear. The image of organised Hinduism assumes the status of
principal political objective in Chand's vision of the Sabha movement.
The nature of this image of organised Hinduism, furthermore, is unequivocally
horizontal. Commenting on the predicament of low castes and untouchables, Lal
Chand states:
80	 Punjabee, 4 November 1909.
81	 Pw/abee, 26 October 1909.
82	 ibid.
83	 ibid: "Every incomer was taken to the place specially reserved for gentlemen of his class by an
obliging and energetic volunteer".
84	 Punjabee, Special Conference Issue, 23 October 1909.
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It is not pressed that the feet be given the status of the head, but it is
certainly enjoined that their position as essential parts of the "sacred"
living body be duly recognised, that they be not neglected and do
receive their proper share of nourishment, education and enlightenment,
to enable them to perform their own function to the best advantage of the
community and the body politic.85
No change in status for low castes and untouchables, then, but an entitlement to respect
for their position and role in society. This is the main thrust, as we have seen, of ideas
of the horizontal organisation of Hinduism - in particular it reflects the Sanatani attitude
towards caste.
The influence of Sanatani concerns is also evident in the resolutions that emerged from
the Conference. Not surprisingly, consensual issues were prominent: the promotion of
Sanskrit and Hindi, support for cow protection and ayurvedic medicine, the promotion
of "brotherly feelings" among Hindus and a commitment "to consolidate and strengthen
the sense of common nationality". These were accompanied by more hard-nosed
resolutions regarding the Punjab Alienation of Land Act and representation in
Legislative Councils, which reflected the new political presence indicated by Self
Abnegation. Several resolutions, however, were not put before the Conference,
ostensibly through lack of time. These included Arya issues such as support for
widows, low caste amelioration and the removal of sub-caste distinctions. 86 The idea
that these resolutions were dropped not due to lack of time but due to "strife
apprehended over them between the orthodox and the unorthodox" was denied at length
after the Conference,87 but undoubtedly the need for consensus Was a prominent
factor, and the Punjabee rounded off its denial of the above with a reminder that the
main objective was "union as opposed to division". As we shall see, this emphasis on
the need for consolidation at all costs was to emerge as the defining principle of Hindu
nationalism, to which all other issues were subordinated.
One of the resolutions which was approved was that calling for the establishment of
Hindu Sabhas "all over the country," and to hold an annual all-India Hindu
Conference. This may be seen as an extension of the point noted in relation to the
objectives of the Lahore Sabha in 1906, that the desire to expand stands out as a
definite feature of the movement. Certainly the Conference appears to have been
widely reported in the national press. The Punjabee continued Its championing of the
cause by reproducing comments on the Conference from papers published across the
85	 ibid.
86	 Punjabee, 26 October 1909.
87	 See Pzmjabee, 30 October 1909.
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subcontinent.88
 Generally, the comments welcomed the Sabha movement particularly
in the context of constitutional reform, and the perceived anti-Hindu/pro-Muslim bias of
the Government. After 1909, the Sabha movement nevertheless developed somewhat
haphazardly. In 1911 the first Hindu Sabha was established in UP, and here it
developed largely independent of the Arya Samaj. 89 By 1915 enough momentum had
been generated to establish the All India Hindu Sabha, as a representative body for local
and provincial Sabhas. It is this body which was to become fully active in the early
nineteen twenties as the Hindu Mahasabha.9°
5.4 Summary of Discussion
In the first section of this chapter it has been illustrated how the state was confronted by
ideological challenges which were specifically counter-hegemonic. Tilak's work
during this period was examined as an example of how this counter-hegemonic strategy
developed. In both the famine campaign and the anti-partition agitation, he sought
primarily to expose the contradiction between the interests of the state and the putative
Indian nation. This, then, was an ideological objective. It sought to transform the
"mental frameworks", to use Hall's phrase, which different social groups used to make
sense of the world.91 This of course assumes that the social groups targeted by Tilak -
land-owning peasants during 1896-7, and the industrial bourgeoisie, workers, and
lower middle class government servants during 1905-1908 - had mental frameworks
which were dominated by the hegemonic influence of the state. Historiographically, it
is unviable to make such an assumption without supplying a large body of evidence to
support it. I am not, however, presenting it as a point of historiography. It is
presented rather as an assumption of middle class tiationalists like Tilak, increasingly
committed to ideological struggle as the central strategy of confrontation with the state.
My point is that regardless of the objective effectiveness of nationalist counter-
hegemony, it has to be recognised as the emerging strategy of the Indian national
movement in the early twentieth century. As a strategy, furthermore, it began to shift
88 During November the Punjabee reproduced comment from the Bengalee, the Indian Patriot,
A,nrita Bazaar Pairika, Indian Social Refor,ner, Hindu Patriot, Indian Mi rror, the Advocate,
and the Spectator.
89	 Gordon's analysis of the 1915 UP Provincial Committee of the Hindu Sabha indicates the
prominence of Sanatani representation. He also states that "not one member of the committee
has been identified as belonging to the Arya Samaj", although there was strong representation
from the UP Social Conference - See R Gordon, "The Hindu Mahasabha and the Indian
National Congress, 1915-1926" (in Modern Asian Studies Vol. 9, 1975, pp. 145-204), p.154.90	 The new name was bestowed at the Hardwar session of the Sabha, 1921.
91	 See Section 2.1 of this thesis.
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the parameters of political discourse which occupied both middle class nationalists and
the state at this time. For this reason it is significant.
One important feature of this shift was that representation now emerged as a site of
political struggle. The state claimed always to act in the best interests of the people as a
whole, and it supported this idea by persistently reiterating its dual image of colonial
order and indigenous disorder, fragmentation, potential anarchy. Nationalists sought to
counter this claim by illustrating the inherent contradictoriness of British benevolence,
claiming that nationalism, and not the state, represented the interests of the people.
This battlefield of representation was made more complex by the intra-nationalist
struggle. Leaders like Tilak hoped to extend the representative quality of nationalism
by wresting its organisational machinery (principally the Congress) from the control of
the moderates. Leaders like Gokhale remained convinced that the state was ultimately
benevolent, and so needed to be approached on its own terms, employing the quasi-
parliamentary idioms dictated by the colonial discourse of organisation.
The state undoubtedly capitalised on this struggle, attempting to marginalise extremism
by confirming the success of moderatism, through the offer of constitutional reform.
In a fascinating reflection of its discursive framework, the reform package which
emerged in 1909 was largely insubstantial, characterised by the overriding need to
promote the image of reform. As the moderates projected themselves symbolically as
the representatives of the people, then, so the reforms to which they were committed
constituted a symbolic shift in the balance of administrative powtr. Ultimately,
moderate strategy was discredited by this association; genuine nationalists like Gokhale
were unable to escape the logic of the discursive framework in which their nationalism
was constructed.
At the same time, however, the reforms provided a window of opportunity for the more
forceful projection of a politically organised Hinduism. The incorporation of separate
electorates implicitly invoked a constituency of Hindus within a discursive framework
which confirmed symbolic representation as a legitimate form of political expression.
The constituency of Hindus could be represented, simply by providing a united image
within existing discursive parameters. It is precisely this image that the Sabha
movement attempted to project. As Lal Chand asserted during the 1909 Conference, to
create a politically significant Hinduism "all that is needed is to advocate the interests of
the community at large."
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This was not simply a reaction to the Morley-Minto reforms. It rather reflects the
development of the idea of the horizontal organisation of Hinduism, and in particular its
convergence with the idea of symbolic representation. This ideology has a history; a
history which sees it emerging as increasingly prominent as the issue of numbers
became more entrenched as a signifier of power in the colonial public space. In turn,
this entrenchment was strongly related to the emerging power and sophistication of
counter-hegemonic nationalism. It was resorted to by the state as a means of
circumventing nationalist attempts to extend the constituency of nationalists, and
consequently it reconstituted symbolic representation on the basis of these vast
projections of community as legitimate constituencies. Here, then, a divergence is
evident in the comparative trajectories of Indian and Hindu nationalism. Whilst Indian
nationalism sought to improve its representative quality and reify the constituency of
nationalists, the Hindu Sabha benefited from attempts to counter this development, by
basing its representational legitimacy precisely on the state's implicit recognition of an
imagined constituency of Hindus.
The association of numbers and power was at the heart of the two themes discussed in
the second section: the Gait Circular and U.N. Mukherji's theory of demographic
decline. Both these themes directed a sharp focus on the well-wrought issue of how to
define Hinduism; in addition, they invested the issue with an acute anxiety related to
numbers. In one way or another, both Gait and Mukheiji presented a picture of the
decline of Hinduism as a powerful force in society and politics through its numerical
size in relation to other "communities" identified by the census - principally, of course,
the Muslim "community". The urgency implied by these images of decline could be
addressed far more easily by advocates of horizontal organisation: if numbers were to
be the measure of power, then here was a means of presenting Hinduism as a
homogeneous unit which side-stepped the difficult issues of how to address division or
accommodate manifestly oppressed groups. The long term consolidation of Hindu
society projected through low caste shuddhi, on the other hand, could only highlight
such issues, thus leaving Hinduism vulnerable as a force in the arena of colonial
power.
The Sabha movement reflected these concerns. As La! Chand stated at the 1909
Conference: "numbers carry great weight in this age". The legitimacy of the Sabha as a
political force was based on its claim to represent this vast constituency: the Hindus of
the Punjab. It did so through the idea of horizontal organisation, presenting the image
of a spectrum of Hinduism through the inclusion of a series of well-established groups
in the public space. The unification of these different groups within one organisation
symbolised the unification of the constituency. Any division, therefore, would affect
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not only the legitimacy of the organisation; it would also directly impact upon the
efficacy of the projected constituency. It was on this basis that "union as opposed to
division" was to emerge as the most important feature of the 1909 Conference, despite
the latent presence of confrontation over issues related to caste and social reform. And
it was on this fragile foundation that the Sabha movement would be projected in the
1920s as the political voice of the Hindu nation.
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Chapter Six
Contextualising Hindu Nationalism: The Development of
Political Discourse in the Post-War Years
There is no doubt that the First World War and immediate post-war years had a
significant impact on the character of politics in colonial India. Most fundamentally, the
war caused lasting changes in the colonial economy, strengthening the position of the
indigenous bourgeoisie whilst at the same time radically increasing hardship for the
majority of the population.' One result of these changes was an increased level of
politicisation and class consciousness. Bourgeois wealth was stimulated by a series of
protectionist measures taken by the Indian Government and an accompanying
expansion of industries associated with war production. This led to a greater
commitment amongst industrialists to the idea of self-government, as they realised
materially just how damaging pro-British state intervention had been in the past.
Economic deprivation also increased consciousness of the contradiction between the
interests of the colonial state and those of the people, particularly amongst certain
sections of the peasantry who suffered particularly due to the rise in prices.2
In the short term, this increased politicisation was capitalised upon by elite nationalists
through the Home Rule Leagues. Engineered by Tilak and Annie Besant during 1916
and 1917, the Leagues sought to establish indigenous administration wthin the British
Empire as the overall objective of the nationalist movement. In addition, the Leagues
operated through a network of small-scale political organisations, utilising and growing
out of specific local contexts.3
In the establishment of this network, the Leagues concretised a structural model that
Tilak had been pursuing on a regional level since the 1890s. The model allowed for the
extension of elite-led nationalist politics onto district and local levels.4 As such the
See S. Sarkar, Modern India, pp. 168-78 for a good summary of these economic changes.
2	 Many better off peasants producing for the market were affected by strong differentials in price
between imports and agricultural exports; poorer peasants and landless labourers were affected
by price rises of coarse foodgrains; see Sarkar, Modern hidia, p. 170-1.
See H.F. Owen , "Towards Nationwide Agitation and Organisation: The Home Rule Leagues,
1915-1918" (in D.A. Low [ed.], Soundings in Modern South Asian History, Weidenleld &
Nicholson, London, 1968, pp. 159-195), esp. p. 183: "For the first time, a network of local
political committees covered much of British India."
Although the Leagues still drew their support mostly from middle class elements on these
levels; Jawaharlal Nehru, for example, who joined Annie Besant's League in 1916, states that
"The Home Rule Leagues were attracting not only all the old Extremists who had been kept
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Leagues played a crucial role in the preparation of the ground for the restructuring of
the Congress framework alter the Nagpur session of 1920. This restructuring provided
the framework for mass participation campaigns under Gandhi. An intimation of the
League's role here is provided by the extensive use of League machinery during the
Rowlatt Saiyagrahain 1919. In Western India particularly, League channels were used
to disseminate propaganda and guidelines for the implementation of saiyagraha. 5 In
terms of the development of counter-hegemonic strategy, the Home Rule League
structure contributed greatly to the construction of the nationalist constituency on an all-
India level. For the first time, the movement could point to an organisational network
which actively increased the legitimacy of its claims to represent the people.
The issues raised by the operation of the Leagues - representation and Home Rule - are
particularly significant in the light of the Montagu-Chelmsford reform package, which
was produced partly in response to these developments in the national movement. The
"Montford" reforms constitute a discernible shift in the strategy of the state from that of
1909. Most significant was the assertion, as part of Montagu's initial declaration in
1917, that reforms could be seen as part of a gradual process of development towards
self-rule. This was, of course, always a connotation of benevolent imperialism, but
here was an explicit statement of the objective, and of the status of reform in relation to
it. In effect, this declaration appeared to indicate the Government's complete
acceptance of the strategy of hegemonic nationalism - the moderates' policy of a state-
led progression towards swaTaj.
The implications of the 1917 declaration were again apparently reiterated by the
character of the reforms which emerged in the Government of India Act of 1919.
Increased representation and executive control were presented as the substance that
underpinned the Government's commitment. Provincial electorates were increased to
an aggregate of around five and a half million, and Provincial Assemblies became
responsible for certain areas of government. 6 This system, known as dyarchy, ceded
control of departments such as Education and Health, whilst retaining critical areas of
out of the Congress since 1907 but large numbers of newcomers from the middle classes.
They did not touch the masses." See his Autobiography (Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund,
1980), p. 31.
See Owen, "Towards Nationwide Agitation and Organisation", p. 184.6	 On the extension of the franchise, the view of the Chief Commissioner of Central Provinces,
B. Robertson, was fairly typical: "It is impossible in existing circumstances to have the
electors coming to the polls in their thousands. The basis of the franchise must be fairly
wide, but...it (is) out of the question that it should be really broad; what we desire to see is a
leavening of intelligence, which will spread to the mass as time goes on." Note by the Chief
Conunissioner, Central Provinces, on Constitutional Reforms 30 October 1918; Central
Provinces Secretariat, General Administration Dept. A Progs for February 1919, File No. 7-1
(Bhopal). The Central Provinces electorate emerged in 1920 as a modest 140 000; see P.
Robb, The Government of India and Reform: Policies towards Politics and the Constitution
1916-1921 (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1976), p. 112.
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the administration such as Finance and Law and Order. As Sarkar has pointed out, this
meant that real power still eluded indigenous control. The question remained, then,
as to whether the Government was really serious about the commitment to self-rule;
certainly the system of dyarchy and the still very limited extension of the franchise
suggested that the notion of symbolic representation remained an integral feature of
hegemonic rule in India.
One further feature of the Montford reforms which must be taken into account is the
extension of the principle of separate electorates.8 Not only did the reforms reaffirm
the notion of reserved Muslim seats; they went further, by sanctioning non-Brahman
reservations in Madras Presidency. 9 In the same manner as the Gait Circular, this
decision had a galvanising effect on the ideology of organised Hinduism, as it focused
attention yet again on the question of where to set the limits of Hinduism.
In these various contexts, then, middle class politics emerged in the post-war years as
an enormously complex arena. Examining the interplay of contesting ideologies in the
public space during this period constitutes the subject matter of this chapter, with the
objective of identifying developments in political discourse which were crucial to the
emergence of politically viable Hindu nationalism. I will concentrate on two areas: the
way in which Hindu identity became entrenched as a feature of political discourse
during this period; and before this, the way in which counter-hegemony developed as
Indian nationalist strategy, and the profound impact of this pattern of development on
established political discourses. The complex developments in these areas provide the
context for the organisation and rapid growth of Hindu nationalism as both an
ideological and an institutional presence in Indian politics from the nineteen twenties
onwards.
See Sarkar, Modern India, pp. 165-8.
8	 In Central Provinces Robertson put up some resistance to the principle: "In the Central
Provinces we are fortunately so circumstanced that the question of communal electorates can
hardly be said to anse. The Mahomedans are but a fraction of the population and are widely
scattered; it is next to impossible to suggest separate constituencies to meet their case... ." op.
cit. n.5. He was, however, forced to cede this position, accepting 29 reserved Muslim seats in
the Provincial Assembly; See D. Page, Prelude to Partition: Indian Muslims and the
Imperial System of Control 1 920-32 (Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1982), pp. 33-4. Page
points out the interesting position of Central Provinces, which emerged as the only province
where elected members of a majority community were in a position to command a majority in
the Legislature. In every other province the government used reservations to disable non-
official majorities.
Again, in Madras governor Willingdon resisted the extension of separate electorates to non-
bralunans. He nevertheless had to agree to reserve 28 out of 65 general seats in the Madras
Legislature; see Robb, The Government of India and Reform, pp. 112-3.
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6.1 Towards a New Discourse of Organisation
It is customary in nationalist hagiography to represent M.K. Gandhi's entry into Indian
politics towards the end of the second decade of the twentieth century as the beginning
of a new era of radicalism, generated by the singular personality of the Mahatma. It has
been demonstrated in this dissertation, however, that radicalism had been an emerging
force in the elite-led movement since the 1890s. Gandhi was of course a feature of this
emerging force, and when he attended the Gujarat Political Conference at Godhra in
November 1917, he signified just how far the colonial discourse of organisation had
been undermined by the nationalist challenge. In addition, the style in which he
presided over the Conference indicated what was unquestionably a fresh approach, a
new framework for political action. A hint of this framework had already been given
by Gandhi's intervention in the agricultural Champaran district during 1917. At
Godhra, Gandhi now presided over a very different kind of Conference to that which
was recognisable within the colonial discourse of organisation.'0
From the outset, he made it clear that this was to be a Conference of and for the
peasants of Gujarat. This was part of the wider assertion that the peasantry in general
were the key to nationalist success - without peasant support, there would be no
swaraf. As such, he did not go through established channels (i.e. the Bombay
Congress) before arranging the Conference. He simply invited leading nationalists to
attend. t1 In addition, he declared that as the Conference was for the peasants, all
speeches should be in Gujarati. This caused difficulty to several prominent politicians,
and Tilak insisted on speaking in Marathi, prompting the Mahatma to counsel the great
Lokamanya publicly: "Though he is advanced in years, it would be but proper if he
engages a Gujerathi teacher and picks up the language. We belong to the Bombay
Presidency and should, therefore, learn both languages in order that we might know
what the people feel." He followed this through by observing archly that "Queen
Victoria learned Urdu", 12 Lastly, Gandhi tore up the standard resolution declaring
10	 The trajectory of the Godhra Conference would not, for example, have been understood by the
architect of the 1909 Lahore Hindu conference, La! Chand, who, we may recall, had exclaime&
"I, at any rate, am at a loss to understand how resolutions passed at meetings will redress the
grievances unless it is intended - whether so addressed in form or not - that these should reach
Government and induce it to take measures for redress." Chand, Self Almegation in Politics,
p. 109; see Section 53.2.
Those that did attend were shown no special favours. When Tilak arrived late for the opening
session, Gandhi remarked tartly: "I am not responsible for his being late. We demand swaraj.
If one does not mind arriving late by three quarters of an hour at a conference summoned for
the purpose, one should not mind if swaraj too comes correspondingly late." "First Speech at
Gujarat Political Conference", 3 November 1917; Collected Works ofMa/zabna Gandhi
(hereafter CWMG), Vol. XIV (Government of India, Delhi, 1965), p. 48.
12	
"Second Speech at Gujarat Political Conference", 4 November 1917; see CWMG Vol. XIV,
p. 69.
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loyalty to the crown, reportedly commenting that "their loyalty could be presumed until
they declared themselves rebels."' 3 This resolution, of course, was an integral feature
of conference practice - a signifier, in a sense, of its status as a conference within the
public space.
Here, then, we see an indication of the way in which organisational mores were being
shifted in the context of the war and nationalist development. Following the
Conference, this new direction was confirmed by the extension of political mobilisation
in Kheda district to the point of a no-revenue campaign, in order to press the case for
remissions in the context of a poor harvest. The Kheda campaign was articulated by
Gandhi as sazyagraha. It is in this concept that we see the provision of a new
framework for political action in the elite-led nationalist movement, and through it, in
effect, the development of a new discourse of organisation.
6.1.1 Salyagraha as a Framework for Nationalist Strategy
It is clear from Gandhi's comments on the colonial predicament that he perceived the
issue of consent as central to India's subjugation: "the English have not taken India," he
comments, "we have given it to them". And again, "they are not in India because of
their strength, but because we keep them." 14 This manufacture of consent at the heart
of colonial power was articulated by Gandhi as maya, a reference to the notion of the
illusory nature of the world, which underpins the monism of Advaita Vedanta. The
maya of colonial power, then, veiled the underlying truth that the state had no power
save that which the people chose to allow it.
The truth that constituted the obverse of this colonial maya indicates the most seminal
reinterpretation in Gandhian thought. This is the idea that Truth, satya, is God - it
becomes the ultimate divine presence, to which all actions in the world are related. In
effect, Gandhi employed a mundane, everyday idea to conceptualise a Vedantic notion
of the divine. Truth became the central concept of Gandhian Hinduism - a concept to
which all could relate, and according to Gandhi, which everybody possessed, at least in
potential.
If colonial power was maya, nationalism became politics directed towards the unveiling
of satya. It had a profound spiritual significance in the quest for truth, becoming
almost a religious obligation. The means of fulfilling this obligation was by
13	 See D. Hardiman, Peasant Nationalists of Guiarat: Kheda District 1 91 7-1 934 (Oxford
University Press, Delhi, 1981), p. 89.
Quoted in B. Parekh, Colonialism, Tradition and Refor,n, p. 71.
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undertaking satyagraha. This term has been understood as non-violent resistance; as
truth-force and as soul-force, or simply as the search for truth. This variety of
understandings would perhaps not have disappointed Gandhi, as his notion of truth as
it existed in the world was always a relative truth: Absolute Truth, of course, being
God, and therefore unreali sable without the attainment of moksha. Its components are
salya - truth - and agraha - which in Gujarati means insisting on something without
becoming obstinate or uncompromising. 15 In itself, then, satyagraha expresses both
an insistence on truth and a search for truth, with the implicit understanding that this
search could entail a movement of one's original position to accommodate a newly
revealed truth.
As well as acknowledging this philosophical meaning of satyagraha it is important to
maintain a view on the context in which it was developed as a political strategy.
Gandhi first employed it in South Africa, where it conspicuously failed until it was
backed up by the indentured labourers' strike of 1913.16 After his return to India in
1915, Gandhi used the strategy selectively in a few local disputes, including Kheda and
Champaran, and progressively built in proven strategies of nationalist counter-
hegemony, such as economic, political and institutional boycott and non-payment of
taxes. It is in this sense that catyagraha provided the framework for the operation of
these strategies; it was a framework that rooted the strategies within the parameters of
Hindu tradition, and continually directed the objective of resistance back onto the
people themselves, as potential satyagrahis.
There is,, then, a confluence nf strategic and spiritual objectives implicit in the notion of
salyagraha, which in some sense is contradictory. An indication of this is given by a
speech delivered in Madras in March 1919, during the Rowlatt Satyagraha. Gandhi
refers to the mass implications of counter-hegemony, stating that "this movement is
uniloubtedly designed to prove to the Government that its authority is finally dependent
upon the will of the people and not upon force of arms, especially when that will is
expressed in terms of satyagraha." 7 The final point here illustrates a crucial
qualification to Gandhi's approach, in that it was the quality of satyagraha, rather than
the actual mobilisation of the people, which constitutes the "people's will". He
continues:
15	 Parekh, Gandhi's Political Philosophy: A Critical Evaluation (Macmillan, Basingstoke,
1989), p. 143.
16	 Parekh, Gandhi's Political Philosophy, p. 152-3
17	
"Speech at Madras", 20 March 1919; CWMG Vol. XV (Government of India, Delhi, 1965),
p. 142.
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It is not numbers so much as quality that we want. Let me, therefore,
note down the qualities required of a satyagrahi. He must follow truth
at any cost and in all circumstances. He must make a continuous effort
to love his opponents. He must be prepared to go through every form
of suffering, whether imposed on him by the Government he is civilly
resisting for the time being, or by those who may differ from him. This
movement is thus a process of purification and penance.'8
There was, then, a very strong pedagogic element in the agenda of mobilisation. "The
people" needed to be taught how to be political, in a similar manner to their need to be
taught how to protect cows during the 1893-4 movement. 19 Gandhi's call for
nationalist identification with the peasant was contingent upon the peasant's
identification with a middle class sense of morality.
The key principles of salya and ahimsa lie at the heart of this morality. "Satyagraha,"
Gandhi stated in 1919, "is like a banyan tree with innumerable branches. Civil
disobedience is one such branch, satya and ahimsa together make the parent trunk from
which all innumerable branches shoot out. "20 In formulating and testing what he
referred to as the science of ahimsa, Gandhi characteristically invoked Hindu tradition
whilst simultaneously transforming it within the logic of his political philosophy.
Loosely translated as non-violence, the concept of alzimsa can be located in both
Buddhist and Jam as well as Hindu tradition. In the latter, it is a concept associated
with the relationship between Brahman and Atman, and the idea that the cosmos has a
holistic existence. At the highest level, all creation is divine, and therefore may be
perceived as one. Because of this, there is an implicit tendency within Hinduism to
propagate the notion of respect, if not goodwill, towards all living beings. Two central
facets of modern Hinduism, vegetarianism and veneration of the cow, can be seen as
directly related to this notion.21
This is not to say that killing or harming in itself is not evident in the Hindu tradition; a
distinction is made between justified killing, required to maintain dharma, and
unjustified or malicious killing - violence or himsa. This aspect is particularly
elaborated in the epic and puranic tradition that informs bhaktiyoga. 22 Here, the notion
18	 ibid.
19	 See Section 4.3.1 for middle class interpretations of cow protection during the 1893-4
movement.
20	
'Press Statement on the Suspension of Civil Disobedience", 18 April 1919; CWMG Vol.
XV, p. 244.
21	 For a full treatment of the status of ahimsa in Indian tradition, see U. Tahtinene, Aizinisa:
Non-violence in indian Tradition (Rider, London, 1976); for an overview, see Parekh,
Colonialism, Tradition and Reform, pp. 108-12.
22	 i.e. the devotional approach to the divine which underpinned Gandhi's own religiosity, and
which is particularly influential in modern Hinduism. On the emergence of bhakti see
Klostermaier, A Survey c/Hinduism, pp. 210-225; also A. Embree [ed.], Sources of Indian
Tradition Vol.1 (Columbia University Press, 1988 - Second Edition), esp. Part III, "The
Hindu Way of Life", pp. 201-378.
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of ahimsa is both diffused and concentrated. Diffused in the sense that it underpins a
general attitude of respect for other beings, and concentrated in the sense that in terms
of actual practice it is related to a withdrawal from the world, a theological methodology
in the approach to Brahman - the preserve, as it were, of pandits and sannyasis.
Gandhi's project was to reverse this practical association between ahimsa and
withdrawal from the world. He infused the concept with worldly emotions, relating it
particularly to compassion and to love. It was, he said, a duty not only to assist those
who had been harmed, but also to prevent that harm being done in the first place.
"Non-violence," he stated, "is not a cloistered virtue to be practised by the individual
for his peace and final salvation, but a rule of conduct for society if it is to live
consistently with human dignity."23 By invoking society, Gandhi opened up what was
now the "duty" of ahimsa to all Hindus: "the religion of non-violence is not meant
merely for the rishis and saints. It is meant for the common people as well."24
Ahimsa, then, was projected as a defining religious principle, a way of being religious,
for "the common people", and it was through the adoption of this religious principle
that India would be liberated.
This, needless to say, was an immensely ambitious vision of political development. Its
trajectory is indicated by the link to morality, which situates ahimsa and satyagraha as
pathways to moral regeneration, the purification of the soul of the nation
(at,nashuddhi). Here, Gandhi drew on entrenched notions of degeneracy as the
defining feature of contemporary Hindu society, which have been linked in Chapter 3
to the colonial discourse of organisation.25 As we have seen, it was this idea, in
conjunction with the notion of the Golden Age, which underpinned a variety of middle
class approaches to Hindu tradition.
In this context, Gandhi's philosophy may be perceived as an attempt to reproduce the
concerns of middle class Hindus about their traditions on the dynamic level of popular
practice. The means of effecting regeneration was through politics, because politics
was an essential feature of dhanna for all Hindus in the Kaliyuga: "No Indian who
aspires to follow the way of true religion," he says, "can afford to remain aloof from
politics". And again, "in the circumstances that obtain today, in following the path of
23	 Quoted in Parekh, Colonialism, Tradition and Reform, p. 114.
24	 ilid.
25	 Parekh emphasises Gandhi's interpretation of degeneration as a result of the failure to develop
a Yugadlzanna appropriate to contemporaiy society; the process of aiinashuddlzi was aimed at
developing this Yugadizaima; see Parekh, Colonialism, Tradition and Reform, p.15-16 and
chapter 3, "Gandhi and Yugadharma", pp. 71-106.
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religion they [the peasantry] must take into account the political conditions."26
 Politics,
then, was for Gandhi a means of mediating the objective of moral regeneration. At the
same time, there is no doubt that the religious connotations of satyagraha and ahiinsa
were perceived by many nationalists as mediating nationalist objectives in a popular
context.27 From both angles mediation was the central issue. How to effect mass
mobilisation, mass regeneration, whilst maintaining the essentially middle class uat'nre
of the leading ideologies. The organisation of the movement was again the critical
factor.
6.1.2 Mediating Søyagraha: Nationalist Organisation and the Volunteer Concept
The meshing of ahimsa with mass mobilisation implied, as I have said, an enormously
ambitious project, characterised by Gandhi as at,nashuddhi, the purification of the
nation's soul. This was presented as a process of self-assertion which would lead to
independence not only from colonial control, but from all the oppressive, immoral,
adharmic aspects of society. The institution, as Gandhi would have it, of a new
Yugadharma. It is clear from the development of satyagraha as a strategy in India that
this process was to be mediated by a kind of vanguard, which would demonstrate,
organise and lead the people in the process of atinashuddhi. The way in which this
vanguard notion developed, from the localised satyagraha campaigns of 1917-18 to the
termination of non-cooperation in 1922, is a fascinating indication of rapid shifts in the
character of the movement and its counter-hegemonic strategy. Most importantly, by
1922 the idea of volunteers - variously perceived as workers and organisers, and
increasingly, provoca.teurs, restrainers and controllers - had become entrenched as a
basic unit in the nationalist conception of bow to articulate politics.
Enthusiasts in the nationalist cause had of course always been a feature of the
movement. From the rural campaigning of the Sarvajanik Sabha onwards, and
particularly during the anti-Partition movement, nationalism had been driven by
committed groups of volunteers. 28 In addition, this had been an integral feature of
socio-religious reform organisations since at least the 1870s. What emerged in the
immediate post-war years was, however, a somewhat different notion; a notion, as I
will illustrate, which was central to the trajectory of Indian nationalism.
26	 Both quotations from Parekh, Colonialism, Tradition and Reform, p.92.
27	 See, for example, Nehru's comment about Gandhi's emergence as a political leadec "He did
not descend from the top; he seemed to emerge from the millions of India, speaking their
language and incessantly drawing attention to them and their appalling conditions." J. Nehru,
Discovery of India (Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1989 Centenary Edition), p.358.
28 For a thorough account of the involvement of volunteers in the anti-Partition movement, see
S. Sarkar, The Swadeshi Movement in Bengal 1903-1908 (Peoples' Publishing House, New
Delhi, 1973), pp. 336-360.
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In issuing instructions to volunteers during the Kheda Sa!yagraha in 1918, Gandhi
stated that:
The volunteers must remember that this is a holy war. We embarked
upon it because, had we not, we would have failed in our dharma. And
so all the rules which are essential for living a religious life must be
observed here too.29
Gandhi's volunteers - in this case the workers entrusted with the task of facilitating a
peasant withholding of land revenue - were to present themselves as archetypal
satyagrahis. They were to observe "all the rules" of a "religious life", and in so doing
they would inspire the peasants to do the same. The volunteers, then, had a critical role
in the mediation of the idea of salyagraha in its full religious sense, because it was
principally through their demeanour that this meaning of satyagraha would be
transmitted to the people. In addition, satyagraha could be taught in the direct
pedagogic sense noted above, and it was the volunteers who were also the source of
this teaching. But it was the behaviour of the volunteers that was crucial. Gandhi
issued the statement quoted here as part of a fifteen point set of instructions, of which
nine dealt explicitly with the issue of behaviour. 3° The most striking was that related to
rudeness:
Rudeness has no place in satyagraha. Perfect courtesy must be shown
even to those who may look upon as their enemies (sic) and the villagers
must be taught to do the same. Rudeness may harm our cause and the
struggle may be unduly prolonged. The volunteers should give the
most serious attention to this matter and think out in their minds as many
examples as possible of the advantages accruing from courtesy and the
disadvantages resulting from rudeness and explain them to the people.
The incitement to withhold land revenue, then, was to be accompanied by a very middle
class sense of propriety. It was important not to alienate authority through any overt
demonstration of subalternity, which may have led to the marginalisation of the
movement. As well as the religious significance of salyagraha, therefore, the
volunteers were required to teach the peasants some manners.
This point was reiterated in the instructions to volunteers issued at the beginning of the
Rowlatt Salyagraha some eleven months later. To become a salyagrah.i an individual
bad to sign the Salyagraha Pledge to resist the oppressive Rowlatt legislation.
Volunteers were assigned the task of explaining the significance of the Pledge to every
potential signatory, and weeding out unsatisfactory or unprepared candidates. Part of
the Pledge was in the form of a vow. The volunteers' instructions state that: "Here the
signatory affirms that he will refuse civilly to disobey certain laws. Volunteers must
29	
"Instructions to Volunteers," 17 April 1918; CWMG, vol. XIV, p. 350.
30	 ibid; points 1-9 deal with behaviour.
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explain to the signatory the full significance of the word "civilly". For instance, to
break moral laws is not civil disobedience. Nor is it civil disobedience to be
discourteous to officials with whom one may have to deal, while disobeying laws."31
The meaning of civil disobedience, then, is made twofold. First, it is civil because it
implies the withdrawal of co-operation with the state and its various institutions. In
addition, however, it is civil in a behavioural sense - the opposite, in fact, of "uncivil"
disobedience. This approach may be seen as part of Gandhi's particular notion of
ahimsa. Satyagraha relied for its success on the complete absence of himsa, and himsa
included "insulting, demeaning or humiliating others, diminishing their self-respect,
speaking harsh judgements, anger and mental cruelty." 32 This was to develop, as the
power and popularity of satyagraha developed during the Non-cooperation Movement,
into a frequently elaborated theory of the difference between social (especially caste-
based) boycott as himsa, and political boycott as ahimsa.33 The invocation of civility
as a feature of ahimsa, however, was a more problematic nuance. Apart from anything
else, the need for it appeared to contradict the established nationalist image of the
peasantry as a diffident mass, oppressed to the point of mute acceptance of authority.
As elite nationalism progressed towards its objective of mass mobilisation, this image
was increasingly undermined by the eager sell-assertion of subaltern groups.
Gandhi was to become increasingly aware of this self-assertion, and its incompatibility
with the kind of self-assertion he was trying to propagate through the dignified
discipline of salyagraha. A speech at Idgah, Karachi, in July 1920, shortly before the
launch of non-cooperation, began with a stern reproach:
Before coming to the reasons for my visit to Karachi, I wish to refer to
the scene at the railway station. We were to arrive this morning, but
owing to an unfortunate railway accident and subsequent blocking of the
line, we did not arrive until 9pm. The Karachi City station was
overcrowded; many were in the sheds and many were whistling. What
impression did I get from this? I realised your affection for me, but
affection does not mean obstructing the platform and preventing me, the
one you love, getting out. This is the result of lack of education and
knowledge. What is the use of volunteers if they are unable to control
crowds and do not obey their officers? Work cannot proceed under
these circumstances.34
Gandhi referred to this kind of unruly behaviour as "mobocracy", and was concerned
that it would jeopardise the success of non-cooperation, as well as the general principle
31	
"Instructions to Volunteers" February 26 1919; CWMG, Vol. XV p.119.
32	 Parekh, Colonialism, Tradition and Reform, p. 117.
See R Guha, "Discipline and Mobilize" (in P. Chatterjee and G. Pandey [eds.], Subaltern
Studies VII, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1993, pp. 69-120), pp. 92-95.
"Speech at Idgah", 22 July 1920; CWMG Vol. XVIII (Government of India, Delhi, 1965),
p. 80. For similar examples see Guha, "Discipline and Mobilize", pp. 105-7.
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of satyagraha.35 As a result, volunteers began to assume a new role. What is the use
of volunteers, Gandhi asked at Idgah, if they could not control crowds?
Here, the volunteer is projected with a very different function to that of the archetypal
sazyagrahi. They are useful because they can control crowds; they can, in other words,
mediate the more unfortunate ramifications of a strategy based on mass mobilisation.
As Gandhi himself described them in 1920, they should be "people's policemen".36
As this role became more significant, the importance of volunteers' discipline was
enhanced:
Much greater discipline, method and knowledge must be exacted from
volunteers, and no chance corner should be accepted as a full-fledged
volunteer. He only hinders rather than helping. Imagine the
consequence of the introduction of one untrained soldier finding his way
into an army of war. He can disorganise it in a second.37
The images of organisation and disorganisation refer us strikingly back to comments
made in Chapter 3 about the relative projections of the state and society in colonial
India. Volunteers had to be organised, and their role was to transmit this organisation
to the "mob". As the Non-cooperation Movement progressed, it became clear that
Gandhi remained dissatisfied with volunteers' ability to keep the movement on course.
Nationalist agitations became increasingly marred by violence, culminating in the death
of twenty-two police constables at Chauri Chaura in February 1922.
This act of violence caused Gandhi to suspend the Non-cooperation Movement. The
Congress Working Committee resolutions confirming the stoppage began by
condemning the "inhuman conduct of the mob at Chauri Chaura." Resolution 8 dealt
specifically with the failings of volunteers:
Complaints have been brought to the notice of the Working Committee
that in the formation of Volunteer Corps great laxity prevails in the
selection and that insistence is not laid on the full use of hand-spun and
hand-woven khaddar, and on full observance by Hindus of the rule as
to the removal of untouchability, nor is care being taken to ensure that
the candidates believe fully in the observance of non-violence in intent,
word and deed, in terms of the Congress resolution, the Working
Committee call upon all Congress organisations to revise their lists and
remove from them the names of all such volunteers as do not strictly
conform to the requirements of the pledge.38
35	 see, for example, his article in Young india 8 September 1920, entitled "Democracy vs.
Mobocracy"; CWMG XVIII, pp. 240-244. See also Guha, "Discipline and Mobilize", pp.
107-14.
36	
"Democracy vs. Mobocracy", CWMG XVIII p.240; he uses the phrase when complaining
that "volunteers often become demonstrators instead of remaining people's policemen."
CWMG XVIII, p. 242.38	
"Working Committee Resolutions at Bardoli", 12 February 1922; CWMG XXII
(Government of India, Delhi, 1966), p. 377-8
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The suggestion, then, was almost of a purge of the Volunteer Corps, in order to ensure
that similar acts oF violence were avoided. Interestingly, however, volunteers were not
to be expelled because of lack of discipline or failure to control crowds, but rather
because of failures in their observance of non-violence or of other aspects of their role
as ideal salyagrahis. This is consonant with the original Gandhian position that
salyagraha was essentially directed at moral regeneration. Subaltern violence and the
failure of volunteers to control it, therefore, was really a reflection of a breakdown of
the process of atmashuddhi, as propagated by Gandhi himself and his ideal
saiyagrahis. 39 A few days after the Bardoli Resolutions, Gandhi was quoted in a
newspaper as commenting: "the incident at Chauri Chaura would have been impossible
if the Congress and the Khilafat organisations were perfect. It is all a question of
perfecting the Congress organisation." 4° Perfecting the organisation meant perfecting
the conduct of volunteers. As the interface between the elite leadership and the mass of
non-cooperators, the volunteers now formed the most vital element in the
implementation of nationalist strategy.
The importance of their position is illustrated by the very different view of volunteers
adopted by Government at this time. Judith Brown records the perception of
volunteers first and foremost as an intimidatory force, "undisciplined mobs of rowdies
who could be called out to enforce non-cooperation but over whom the real political
leaders had virtually no controL"4 ' She goes on to quote the Officiating Chief
Secretary to the Government of Bengal as noting in 1921 that volunteers "are now
distinctly of a lower class than at first, and are backed by the riffraff of the town,
recruited on a payment of a daily wage to do whatever work is demanded of them."42
Perhaps not surprisingly, the Government's perceptions of nationalist volunteers were
replete with images of disorder and disorganisation - the opposite, as it were, of the
state's own image of order and organisation.
At the same time, these are precisely the images that Gandhi feared most: "undisciplined
mobs" over whom nationalist leaders had "virtually no control"; "riffraff" who joined
the nationalist cause not because of any desire to bring about independence or to purify
the soul of the nation, but rather in return for "payment of a daily wage". Every report
Guha notes that on those occasions when violence did break out during the Non-cooperation
Movement, "politics as a collective secular activity was made to yield to spiritualised politics
in its ultimate monadic form as the Mahatma, atoning for the violence of the masses,
subjected himself to the ritual of a punishing and purifying fast" "Discipline and Mobilize",
p. 118.
40	 Bombay Chronicle 18 February 1922; CWMG XXII p. 407.
.1. Brown, Gandhi's Rise to Power: Indian Politics 1915-1 922 (Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 1974), p. 316.42	 Quoted in ibid.
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of intimidation, every act of violence in which volunteers were implicated, brought the
fear of this second scenario closer for the nationalist leadership. Having conceived of
volunteers as a means of shepbercling mass nationalism into the ambit of elite nationalist
hegemony, the leadership could not divorce itself from the fear that they would in the
end constitute an unruly and uncontrollable intrusion of subalternity into the discrete
world of middle class politics. As Ranajit Guha has pointed out, this fear is indicative
of the failure of the Gandhian leadership to "assimilate the class interests of peasants
and workers effectively into a bourgeois hegemony."43 The language of this failure is
that of organisation: it is a failure to "control" and "discipline" subalternity in the
interests of the middle class leadership.
The position of the volunteers in the national movement remained fraught with
problems. The leadership was unable to decide whether it bad created a people's police
force, disciplining and containing the presence of subaltern elements, or a band of ideal
satyagrahis, sent out to inspire the people with the example of their soul force. Even
for Gandhi, the integration of these roles was problematic; for other nationalists it was
compounded by confusion over the Mahatma's notion of ahimsa. Nehru illustrates this
when commenting on resistance at the Cocanada Congress of 1923, to the setting up of
the Congress volunteer organisation, the Hindustani Seva Dal: "We were surprised",
he says, "to find out later how much opposition there was to the Seva Dat among
leading Congressmen. ...At the back of the mind of some was the notion that the idea
of having trained and drilled volunteers was somehow inconsistent with the Congress
principle of non-vio1ence."' This indecision was a crucial dislocation in the
development of both a nationalist counter-hegemony, and the organisation to fulfil this
strategy. In the mid-twenties, the new, dynamic nationalist strategy began to acquire a
formulaic quality, divorced from its specific objectives. This quality allowed it to be
appropriated in a variety of contexts, as a means of political expression; in short, it
became a central feature in the development of a new discourse of organisation.
6.13 Institutionalising Nationalist Strategy as Political Expression
Throughout this thesis it has been illustrated how nationalist strategy developed in
dynamic relation to a state-engendered political discourse. It has also been shown how
other political ideologies (i.e. non-Indian nationalist ideologies) - such as, for example,
some forms of low caste assertion, and of course the nascent ideology of Hindu
nationalism - have been affected by this relationship; how, in fact, the nationalist-
colonialist nexus set the parameters for the possibilities of political expression in the
See Guha, "Discipline and Mobilize", p. 102.
'	 J. Nehru, Autobiography (Nehru Memorial Fund, New Delhi, 1980), p. 121.
159
public space.45
 The nationalist strategy of counter-hegemony, developed gradually
through the 1890s and the first two decades of the twentieth century, was the driving
force behind the dynamism of this relationship. The state was forced time and again to
shift its strategy in order to combat more effectively the potential of nationalist counter
hegemony. The Non-cooperation Movement may be seen as the culmination of this
dynamic relationship as the overwhelmingly dominant force in Indian politics. After
1922, a whole host of ideologies and organisations began to impinge on the arena of
politics in the public space. Indian nationalists could no longer speak for "the people"
in the same way. Other forces were able to claim a legitimate representative position in
the public space.46 As I have suggested in the previous section, this shift may be
attributed to the inability of the middle class leadership of the Congress to follow the
logic of its strategy and accommodate all the conflicting interests of those to whom it
appealed for support; to become, in Guha's words, a "supra-class representative of the
nation."47 The failure of the Congress to assume this position is indicated by the
increasing importance of discipline as a feature of mass mobilisation. Again refening
to Guha, this represents an attempt to settle for "dominance without hegemony. "48
This is not to say, however, that the strategy of counter-hegemony as employed by the
Gandhian Congress was not sigiñficant, nor that it did not have a lasting impact on the
structure of Indian politics. This is particularly so in relation to the discourse of
organisation - the way of "being political", in colonial India. In this section I will argue
that key elements of the strategy as developed by Gandhi - salyagraha and the use of
volunteer corps - became institutionalised as central features in a new discourse of
organisation, liberated from the nationalist-colonialist nexus. Despite its distaste for
both volunteers and the idea of sazyagraha, the state was forced to accommodate them
as recognisable, legitimate features of a new political landscape.
In the aftermath of the Non-cooperation Movement several sustained satyagraha
campaigns were launched. An example is provided by the National Flag Salyagraha in
Nagpur.49 This action developed out of a comparatively minor incident, when a
This of course does not deny the existence of political expression outside the public space; but
this kind of expression was not legitimised, was not accepted as political expression, in the
eyes of the state.
46 See Guha, "Discipline and Mobilize", pp. 99- 103 for an indication of how the claim of the
Congress to speak for all was being contested more and more vigorously on both the major
axes - that is, the communal and class axes - of Indian politics."
Ouha., "Discipline and Mobilize", p. 97. One reason for this failure was the inability evident
in this thesis of the middle class to speak with one voice - to have one ovemding ideological
position in relation to the nation and the state.
48	 Guha, "Discipline and Mobilize", p. 103.
'	 Other examples include the satyagraha campaigns of Guru-ka-Bagh, Jaito, Tarakeshwar,
Borsad, Vaikom - all launched 1922-3; see Sarkar, Modern India, p. 228-9.
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procession carrying the Congress flag to mark the end of National Week in April 1923
was refused entry beyond the Civil Lines, ostensibly out of respect for the national
sensibilities of the British residents of Nagpur. 5° The stand-off developed into a
formal salyagraha campaign from May 1 onwards, with satyagrahis courting arrest by
attempting to carry the flag into the Civil Lines area. Although the agenda of the
campaign was obviously nationalist, it is clear that it was a local mobilisation which
only latterly received Congress support. The Pranavir, a Hindi bi-weekly published in
Nagpur which supported the satyagralza throughout, called on nationalist figures to
support the campaign some two weeks after it was launched;
The leaders should come forward and offer themselves for arrest as
soon as their organising work is finished with a view to meeting the
objection of the detractors of the movement that the leaders are keeping
themselves in the background while sending small boys and common
people to the front. (The Pranavir) deplores the attitude of the
Maharashtriyan (sic) leaders who...refused to give any active help to the
movement... 51
Wider support did eventually emerge, with the Gujarat Provincial Congress sending
substantial numbers of volunteers.52 In August, Vallabhbhai Patel negotiated a
somewhat muted settlement, whereby a limited flag procession was allowed to pass
through the Civil Lines along a prescribed route with a heavy police escort.53
The significance of the Flag Satyagraha in our context is not so much its success or
failure, but rather the way in which it arose, and the fact that it was sustained amid
considerable opposition. Immediately prior to the launch of the campaign, in March
1923, a similar incident at Jubbulpur had set in motion a half-hearted satyagraha which
was scuttled by the opposition of the All-India Congress Committee. 54 The Nagpur
campaign was launched despite negative comment in much of the local press, 55
 and the
lacklustre backing of the national Congress. My point is that it was nevertheless
launched and sustained because satyagraha had, in the wake of no-cooperation, become
an accepted form of political expression in localised contexts. The Nagpur nationalists
chose this form of expression as appropriate to their needs, where twenty or even ten
50	 For a full account, see F'wiavir 15 April 1923; Reports on Indian Newspapers Published in
the Central Provinces and Berar (hereafter PIN CP&B), No. 16 of 1923.
51	 Panavir, 13 May 1923; see PIN CP&B No.20 of 1923.
52	 Many of whom were arrested before they reached Nagpur - see Tarun Maharashtra 14 July
1923; PIN CP&B No.29 of 1923.
The Malzarashira, the newspaper with the widest circulation in Central Provinces, called it
"abject surrender on the part of the satyagrahis." 29 August 1923; PIN CP&B No. 35 of
1923.
See Maharaslth-a 28 March 1923; PIN CP&B No. 13 of 1923.
See, for example, editorials in the Karmavir, the Lokniitra and the Prajapukrha; PIN CP&B
No. 22 of 1923.
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years previously they may have opted for a meeting of "representatives of the people of
Nagpur" and a petition to the local government.56
The Flag Saiyagraha illustrates the way in which the Gandhian strategy had been
adapted and extended in the context of localised nationalist politics. There is however a
further, less formal way in which the strategy interceded in forms of politics during this
period. Another incident in Nagpur in 1923 illustrates this point. In the run up to the
Ganapati festival in September tension mounted in Nagpur over the proposed route of
the immersion procession. This route was to take the processionists past a newly
constructed gate to the Masjid in the Ganesh Peth locality. Representatives of the
Masjid applied to the District Magistrate to prevent the procession passing the gate, and
in the context of rising tension the Magistrate granted an injunction.57
Although initially the injunction was complied with, tension continued, and in October
Hindus began taldng processions out in defiance of the injunction. This defiance was
expressed in Gandhian terms. The Khobar, a recently-launched Marathi daily
published in Nagpur, stated that "this is perhaps the fittest occasion for the Hindus to
have their long standing right of taking (out) religious processions established by
means of satyagraha." Similarly, the established Nagpur Marathi weekly the
Maharashtra suggested that "it is a noble endeavour of the Hindus to awaken a feeling
of broadmindedness in their Muslim brethren by self-suffering and courting prison."58
K.B. Hedgewar's biographers take up the story:
In October the Bhajan groups had to pass through the same route.
Muslims objected to this also. But ignoring their protests, the Bhajan
groups went through the same route for two or three days. But later on
the police sided with the Muslims and started obstructing the Bhajan
processions. Dr. Hedgewar and other Hindu leaders went from house
to house and mobilised a large number of people to join the Bhajan. On
8th November, 41 prominent leaders including Dr. Hedgewar, Dr.
Paranjpe, Dr. Cholkar and others took part in the Satyagraha.
Thousands of people gathered. On 11 December, Raja Lakshmanrao
Bhonsle also joined the movement. Over forty thoicand pecple bd
congregated to witness this rare sight of Hindu resurgence.59
56	 In addition, it should be noted that because of the nationalist boycott of Legislative
Assemblies, the channels for middle class nationalist complaint were further limited in the
early twenties.
See W. Anderson and S.D. Damle, The Brotherhood in Saffron: The Rashtriya Swayamsevak
Sangh and Hindu Revivalism (Vistaar, New Delhi, 1987), p.32; B.V. Deshpande and S.R.
Ramaswamy (edited by H.V. Seshadxi), Dr. Hedgewar: The Epoch-Maker (Sahitya Sindhu,
Bangalore, 1981), p. 69-70.58	 KJarMaJ,Jra 31 October 1923; RIN CP&B No.44 of 1923.
Deshpande and Ramaswamy, Dr. Hedgewar: The Epoch-Maker, p. 70.
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Again the pattern is seen of small groups systematically defying a government order in
the name of satyagraha, watched by larger groups of interested by-standers.60
Throughout November the defiance of the injunction continued, and many middle class
people took part. B.S. Moonje noted that "shastris, pandits, doctors, pleaders,
merchants, all offered themselves for arrest and were actually arrested... "61 The
Pranavir reported that a total of 500 Hindus were arrested during this month.62
The issue of music before mosques, of course, is one of the most persistent themes of
communal tension during the twenties, and I will return to this particular example in
Section 6.23.63 What is to be noted here is the references to the Gandhian strategy,
with its attendant implication of the presence of a body of volunteers ready to go to
prison in support of the cause. Although obviously not formalised by applications for
recognition from the Congress machinery, the strategy and the language of satyagraha
was again used in a local context as a recognised form of political expression. The two
simple prerequisites were a body of willing volunteers and a law or ordinance to break.
Here, a similarity emerges between the Flag Salyagraha and the Ganesh Peth incident,
which illustrates the adaptation of the Gandhian strategy as an independent means of
political expression. Gandhi's campaigns up to this point had all been meticulously
preplanned as a means of countering an identified injustice perpetrated by the state - a
means, as it were, of advancing the cause of truth. Both the "campaigns" discussed
here, however, were designed to defy measures taken by authority specifically to
control the original campaigners. The Flag Satyagraha was instigated in response to a
local injunction preventing the carrying of the flag through certain areas in the first
place. Similarly, satyagraha at Ganesh Peth was invoked in response to a District
Magistrate order preventing a procession passing the Masjid. It is the potential
salyagrahis who set the agenda in both cases - creating the situation by pushing at the
limits of the law in a general sense, then courting arrest over a "law" created specifically
to control this push. The Nagpur activists had taken advantage of a subtle change in the
position of the law in relation to the public space; a change that occurred as a result of
the institution cf Gandhian satyagraha as mainstream nationalist strategy. For the first
time, breaking the law was a legitimate way of being political. As an act of politics, in
other words, it had a recognisable position within the public space. By invoking
satyagraha, activists were now able simultaneously to assert new "rights" whilst
remaining within the public space. This was a critical slippage of state control, but -
60	 The Mahraita, 18 November 1923, stated that 20,000 were involved in one procession; see
Anderson and Damle, The Brotherhood in Saffron, p. 32.61	 See Baker, Changing Political Leadership in an Indian ProvLnce, p. 100.62	 Panavzr 2 December 1923; RIN CP&B No.49 of 1923.
63	 For other examples, see 0. Thursby, Hindu-Muslim Relations in British India, pp. 89-101.
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that it opposed the Allied destruction of the Turkish Empire in the wake of the First
World War. As a Congress Enquiry later commented:
In 1920 and 1921 the Congress Committees were full of Musalmans
and Hindu Chairmen and Secretaries of Khilafat Committees could be
counted by the score. The Hindus began to realise how closely was the
problem of the Middle East linked with the fate of India. . ..It was a
glorious time in the history of Indian nationalism.66
The Turkish Sultan had a disputed claim to the khilafate - the position of spiritual
protector of Islam - and the post-war settlement effectively removed his ability to fulfil
this role. There are two senses in which the adoption of this issue extended the
parameters of nationalist politics in India. First, it was an international issue, where the
national movement had previously been steadfastly internal. Secondly, of course, it
was an issue self-consciously related to religious faith, when again the concerns of the
national movement had previously been operationally secular, even when they were
presented as religious imperatives. This religious issue, then, lay at the heart of a
movement which was articulated by Gandhi as the first national salyagraha - i.e. a
movement conducted on the basis of the "religion" of ahimsa.
Religion, then, was brought right to the foreground of nationalist politics. Not only did
it underpin one of the principal objectives of the movement; it also permeated the very
structure of that agitation. Significantly, when he suspended the movement in 1922,
Gandhi did so precisely because the religion of ahimsa had been transgressed. For the
AIKC, this caused the collapse of the alliance with Congress and the realignment of
Khilafat as an exclusively Muslim issue. The Khilafat cause was soon completely
undermined, when the new Turkish National Assembly first separated the office of
Caliph from the government of the Turkish state in November 1922, and then abolished
the Caliphate altogether in March 1924 67 The leadership vacuum created by the
collapse of the AIKC was quickly filled by the Muslim League, who in 1924 held their
annual conference separate from Congress for the first time since 1918.
Both during and after this course of events, there was an unprecedented wave of
communal rioting across British India. 68 It is this succession of riots which
established violent communalism as a regular, if not systematic, feature of Indian
politics. Undoubtedly, a sense of identity was engendered amongst Hindus as a result
of this process of communalisation; as it was, of course, amongst Indian Muslims. In
66	
"Congress Cawnpore Riots Enquiry Committee Report"(1931), reprinted in N.G. Barrier
[ed.], Roots of Communal Politics (Heinemann, New Delhi, 1976), pp. 218-9.
67	 See P. Hardy, The Muslims of British India (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1972),
p. 197.
68	 See "Congress Cawnpore Riots Enquiry Committee Report", p.228, for a list of major riots,
totalling 43, between 1921 and 1931.
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this section (6.2) I will examine the nature of this sense of (Hindu) identity. In
particular, I will look at the way in which certain "Others" emerged as a feature of
Hindu identity,69 and their relationship with the ideology of Hindu organisation which
was, of course, reacting to and developing in the context of this heightened tension.
6.2.1 "Stigmatising and Emulating Threatening Others"
Christophe Jaffrelot has used two expressions to describe the development of Hindu
nationalist ideology. In earlier work he has expressed the development as "strategic
syncretism": "syncretic because it has been culled from cultural values of groups
perceived as being antagonistic to the Hindu community and strategic because it
underlies an ideology that seeks to dominate the 'others' in terms of prestige as well as
on a concrete socio-political plane."7° In his recent book, however, he has revised his
approach, citing ideological development as a strategy of "stigmatisation and
emulation": "...a process of cultural reorganisation" which "redefined Hindu nationalist
identity in opposition to... 'threatening Others' while - under the pretext of drawing
inspiration from a so-called Vedic 'Golden Age' - assimilating those cultural features of
the Others which were regarded as prestigious and efficacious in order to regain self-
esteem and resist the Others more effectively."7'
The shift in terminology is subtle: Jaffrelot eschews syncretism as a facet of Hindu
nationalist ideology because the implication of some kind of cultural synthesis is seen
as inappropriate in this blatantly exciusivist context. The agenda of cultural synthesis is
rather attributed to movements such as the Brahmo Samaj - in some sense a more
"innocent", less threatening accommodation of the Other. Hindu nationalism,
however, with its apparent roots in the aggressive exclusivism of the Arya Samaj, is
perceived as emulating facets of another culture in order to resist a perceived threat from
that culture. There is, in a sense, a double instrumentality in this model. First, certain
proponents of the other culture present a threatening image of that culture; second,
Hindu elites appropriate aspects of the threatening image in order to rebuff it.
Jaifrelot describes this process as a cycle. In the late nineteenth century there was the
cycle of Arya-led stigmatisation and emulation, with the colonial state and the Christian
69	 Others as a feature of identity in the sense developed by Edward Said in Orientalism
(Routledge, London, 1978) and Culture wid Imperialism (Chatto & Windus, London, 1993); a
"fundamentally static notion of identity" based on the idea that "there is an 'us' and a 'them',
each quite settled, clear, unassailably self-evident." This notion of identity is described by
Said as "the hallmark of imperialist cultures as well as those cultures trying to resist the
encroachments of Europe." See Culture and Imperialism, p. xxviii.
70	 Jaffrelot, "Hindu Nationalism: Strategic Syncretism in Ideology Building", p.517.
71	 See Jaffrelot, The Hindu Nationalist Movement in India, p.6.
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missions constituting the threatening Other. This cycle led to the development of "Arya
nationalism", or "proto-Hindu nationalism". A second cycle occurred, Jaffrelot states,
in the early twenties, and this led to the development of Hindu nationalism and the idea
of sangathan, The threatening Other in this case was a particular projection of Muslim
culture - as Jaffrelot puts it, "a mobilisation on the part of the Muslims".72 This was
the Khilafat movement. The Muslim mobilisation, he continues, "degenerated in some
instances into anti-Hindu riots," an example being the Moplah or Mappila rebellion of
1921. The internal unity displayed by Muslims during this period forms the basis -
through emulation - for the ideological development of sangathan.
Surprisingly, then, it is "the Muslims" who bear a fair brunt of the responsibility for the
emergence of Hindu nationalism in Jaifrelot's model. It is their mobilisation over
Khilafat, and its degeneration into anti-Hindu riots, which constitute the threatening
Other responsible for the cycle of stigmatisation and emulation amongst Hindu elites
which produced the sangathan movement. This historically truncated conclusion, I
would say, illustrates the limitations of the "stigmatise and emulate" model. In the first
instance, it cannot accommodate the idea of Khllafat as an Indian nationalist concern.
As stated above, the collaboration between the All-India Khilafat Committee and the
Congress is indicative of a composite nationalism and fairly widespread feeling of co-
operation during this period which cannot be dismissed.73 Secondly, some scholarly
work has illustrated that the anti-Hindu character of the Moplah rebellion was a
secondary feature, emerging only in the context of the institution of oppressive martial
law, and in many ways attributable to this oppression.74 Thirdly and most importantly,
Jaffrelot himself has noted that "the cohesion attributed to the Muslim community was
grossly exaggerated." The cycle of emulation is therefore related to stereotypes of
Islamic unity which had "taken shape between about 1890 and 1910." This
introduces a new, highly ideological element into the cycle: the idea of Hindu nationalist
sangaihan built not so much on the emulation of threatening Islam symbolised by
Khllafat, as on pre-formulated stereotypes of Muslim cohesion. Later, in relation to
RSS sangathan, Jaffrelot takes a different line, splitting the process of stigmatisation
and emulation between the two over-arching images of the British and the Muslims.
"From the Hindu nationalist point of view," he says, "Muslims fulfilled the role of
72	 Jaffrelot, The Hindu Nationalist Movenent in India, p.19.
'	 The classic symbol of this time being Swami Shraddhanand's address from the pulpit of the
Delhi Jama Masjid during the beady days of the Rowlatt Salyagraha. See Jordens, Swami
Shraddhananda, p. 109.
'	 See, for example, K.N. Punikkar, "Peasant Revolts in Malabar in the Nineieenth and
Twcntictb Centurics" (in A.R. Dcsai, Peasant Struggles in India, Oxford University Press,
Bombay, 1979, pp. 601-630); for a summaiy see B. Chandra et al, India's Struggle for
Independence, p. 201-3.
'	 Jaifrelot, The Hindu Nationalist Movement in India, p. 24.
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"threatening Others" while the British colonialists represented the Other to be
emulated."76 In this equation the model is particularly untenable, as it contradicts the
fundamental idea that the ideology is built precisely by appropriating what it sees as
threatening.
Evidently, then, there are problems. These problems, I would say, derive from the
initially limited idea of ideology as a specifically appropriated facet of culture, an idea
that recalls the earlier discussion of Jaffrelot's presentation of the relationship between
reforming elites and Hindu tradition.77 To recap briefly, Hindu tradition is perceived in
this relationship as what I have described as a "cultural supermarket" - the reforming
elites are presented as turning to it and picking and choosing aspects of that tradition
particularly suited to their purpose. It is a model that renders tradition as an undynamic
tool in the creation of an ideological perspective - what sociologists might call a
"cultural object".78 In Chapter 2 1 argued that this objectification of culture, and the
concomitant idea of instrumentalist manipulation, is too isolated from the complexities
of ideological development in the nineteenth century, even in the comparatively limited
arena of the colonial public space. This is also the case with the model of stigmatisation
and emulation. Jaifrelot overlooks the historical development of the ideology of Hindu
nationalism over a more enduring period. By acknowledging the historical
independence of ideologies, and their position as a means through which culture is
defined (i.e. in terms of Hall's "mental frameworks"), this complex development may
be accommodated.
This is a point, of course, which lies at the very heart of this thesis. What it underlines
here is the whole problem of "Others". Where did they stand in relation to this
ideological development; what was their role in the construction of a pan-Hindu
identity; how and why were particular images projected by Hindu elites? I will argue in
the following sections that the particular projection of these images - the way in which
they were presented as "Others" - was dependent on the growing influence of the
ideological stream that has been identified in this thesis as Hindu organisation. It is this
ideology, then, which projects particular characteristics onto its Others, rather than the
objective existence of these characteristics being picked up and extended by particular
groups or individuals bent on the self-interested development of a particular ideology.
This may be related precisely to the definition of ideology as constituting "mental
frameworks" through which culture, and cultures, are defined.
76	 Jaifrelot, The Hindu Nationalist Movement in India, p. 50.
See Section 2.4; Jaifrelot's notion of ideology as a facet of culture is developed from Clifford
Geertz' work - see Section 2.1.
78	 On the concept of "cultural objects", see W. Griswold, Cultures and Societies in a Changing
World (Pine Forge Press, London, 1994), p. 11-12.
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6.2.2 Representing The Moplah Rebellion
Examining press comment on the rise of communal tension in various parts of India
during the mid-twenties, one particular incident emerges as seminal, a defining symbol
of a self-conscious Hindu predicament. This is the Moplah, or Mappila, rebellion of
1921, which occurred in Malabar, far from the focal points of communal tension in the
north. The Moplahs were a community of Muslim leaseholders and cultivators with a
history of revolt against the oppression of local (Hindu) landlords. In 1921 the
Moplahs led a rebellion on a massive scale in Malabar, which was brutally suppressed
by the British. In order to gain an idea of the significance of this rebellion, it is not
necessary to look at local press comment, because from the point of view of national
politics, it was very much an event within the public space. As such it was scrutinised
at length by the Central Provinces press, a press which in 1921 was relatively
unaffected by communal tension, because of the absence of communal incidents in the
Provinces. I will argue that the reason for the prominence of Moplah even in this press
environment was its association with the idea of conversion (I am deliberately omitting
the prefix of "forced" which is so closely linked to Moplah) - an idea which is
immediately associated with key themes of Hindu organisation.
The Moplab rebellion of 1921 has been presented in a variety of forms7 9 Not
surprisingly, the British administration in Malabar cast it as the work of a handful of
Muslim "fanatics", whipped into a frenzy by Khilafat agitators, who thcn became the
perpetrators of mass forced conversions of local Hindus. 80 This view has been
progressively broken down in historical accounts, presenting the rebellion more as a
peasant-based and peasant-led outbreak of violent resistance against British rule and
landowners' oppression, which assumed a communal form in the wake of massive
repression.8 ' Sarkar records that the first case of forcible conversion occurred on 10
September 1921, the rebellion having been sparked by a police raid on Tirurangadi
mosque on 20 August. Tbursby's coverage of the western and northern press,
however, shows that reports of forced conversion were being aired prior to this date,
For an overview of differing views of the rebellion, see R. Hardgrave, "The Mappilla
Rebellion 1921: Peasant Revolt in Malabar" (in Modern Asian Studies vol. 11, no. 1, 1977,
pp. 57-99) pp. 92-99.
On reasons for the Government's angle, see Thursby, Hindu-Muslim Relations in British
India, p. 138.81	 See D.N Dhanagare, Peasant Movements in India 1 920-1 950 (Oxford University Press, Delhi,
1983) pp. 78-82; K.N. Panikkar, "Peasant Revolts in Malabar in the Nineteenth and
Twentieth Centuries", pp. 623-4; S. Sarkar, Modern India, pp. 216-7; B. Chandra et a!,
India's Struggle for Freedom, p. 197-209.
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and that the numbers involved varied quite widely. 82 As this suggests, accuracy was
never a particularly important feature of reporting in relation to the rebellion. In the first
instance, events were occurring at such a vast distance, both geographically and
politically, from the normal ambit of northern and western reportage. In addition, the
class character of the rebellion encouraged a rather ambiguous attitude from middle
class Indians, as a result of which religious fanaticism was sometimes seen as a more
palatable motivation for the unresL83
In contrast to some of the northern and western press, however, the whole tenor of
reporting in Central Provinces at the time of the rebellion was to reject the idea of forced
conversion as significant. "We put absolutely no credence," states the Young Patriot
on 12 September, "in the stories of forced conversion of the Hindus by the Moplahs.
They all seem to be concocted to deal a death blow to Hindu-Muslim entente." 84
 As it
became clear that some forced conversions had taken place, newspapers continued to
play down its significance. The Samajsewak of Nagpur comments towards the end of
September: "The Moplah riots will serve as a proof of the extent to which the
Govermnent is bent upon thwarting the Non-cooperation Movement. The unfortunate
incident of the forcible conversion of a few Hindus to Islam was made use of by the
Government to cause a split between the two communities by giving exaggerated
accounts of some conversion." 85 In addition, reports began to isolate the
characteristics of Moplahs, regarding them as a somewhat uncivilised community
unrepresentative of Indian Islam.86
The response to the growing realisation that forced conversion had occurred was
expressed in terms of the desire to effect reconversion. Due to its experience with
shuddhi, the Arya Samaj was able to respond particularly promptly in this area. 87 But
the desire to see reconversion effected in Malabar was far more widespread than this.
In Nagpur, the Nagpur Samachar noted that the "orthodox section" of local Brahmans
supported reconversion. The Lokmatt reported that a "Commission" had been
82	 The Times of India states that 200 had been converted by 7 September; the Pioneer that 1200
had been converted by 8 September; see Thursby, Hindu-Muslim Relations in British India,
p. 140.
83	 Certainly some newspapers displayed a callous contempt for the value of a Moplah peasant's
life; for example, the "special correspondent" of the Madras Mail states on 14 November
1923: "I voice the sentiments of a host of victimised Hindus in Malabar when I say that it is
their fervent desire, after their terrible experience, that the Moplahs as a race should be
exterminated from their country." Quoted in Hargrave, "The Mappilla Rebellion 1921",
p. 94.84	 PIN CP&B No. 38 of 1921; see also Sankalpa 10 September "We are not disposed to believe
in the alleged forcible conversion of the Hindus to Islam," in ibid.
85	 Samajsewak 29 September 1921; RIN CP&B No. 41 of 1921.86	 See PIN CP&B Nos. 39 and 40 of 1921 for evidence of this approach.87	 See Thursby, Hindu-Muslim Relations in British India, pp. 141-2.
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appointed "by the Nagpur public" to enquire into the forced conversions and their
reversal. This "Commission", which included the prominent Nagpur Tilakite and
future Hindu Mahasabha president B.S. Moonje, was supported by the Shankaracharya
of Karweer Pith, Dr. Kurtkoti, who had "broken off with the blind traditions of the
hoary past and kept abreast of the times. Such an attitude is bound to lead to a
resuscitation of the Hindu religion."88 This last comment indicates the way in which
the Moplah conversions were being appropriated as a feature of the Hindu ideology of
organisation. Here, it appeared, was an opportunity to put the idea of Hindu
organisation into practice in an entirely non-threatening manner. Not only were the lost
Hindus of Malabar a seemingly soft target because they had been forced into Islam and
their caste could be easily identified, but in addition they were part of a distant world,
viewed fmm the north at anns length as a kind of "laboratory" for the practice of Hindu
organisation.89
The Nagpur "Commission" on the Malabar conversions led to the production of a
report, some two years later, written by Dr. Moonje.90 In the context of the rising
tensions of summer 1923, this report projects the aspirations of organised Hinduism
onto Islam:
The Hindus are divided into so many water tight compartments, each
having a social culture and life of its own, that there is hardly any
association between them in the wider field of social activities and
amenities of the community as a whole...; so that if one section
happens to come into conflict with the Mahomedans, the other sections
hardly ever consider it worth their while to come to its help. . . .The
Mahomedans, on the other hand, form one organic community,
religiously well-organised and disciplined so that any injury done to any
part of the community anywhere is felt as keenly all through out.91
The comparative indifference with which the northern Muslim communities viewed the
vicious suppression of the Moplah rebellion provides us with a counterpoint to
Moonje's argument here. 92 But this is not the point of Moonje's discourse; the threat
he is highlighting is not so much the organic unity of Muslims, as the chronic disunity
of Hindus. The image of Islamic unity is set up as a paradigmatic Other, incorporating
precisely those characteristics which have been shown to have developed as ideals in
the ideology of Hindu organisation. Conversion stands as an indication of the failure
88 NagpurSamachar27 September 1921, Lobnatt 30 September 1921; RIN CP&B No.41
of 1921. For Kurtkoti's contribution to the sangathoJz movement, see Jaffrelot, The Hindu
Nationalist Movement in india, pp. 23-4.
The significance of Moplah for the development of shuddhi in the twenties will be discussed
in 7.1.2.
90	
'Forcible Conversions in Malabar - Dr. Moonje's Report", Nagpur, 4 August 1923; Moonje
Papers (NML); see Jaffrelot, The Hindu Nationalist Movement in India, pp. 20-191	 Quoted in Jaffrelot, The Hindu Nationalist Movement in India, p. 20.
92	 See Thursby, Hindu-Muslim RelatiolLs in British India, pp. 139-41.
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of Hinduism to attain these ideals. Not only forced conversion, but any conversion
exists as a marker of the continued inability of Hindus to become organised. This point
is illustrated by comment in the Karinavir early in 1923:
We cannot shut our eyes to the deplorable condition of the untouchables
who for want of sympathy from their brethren are fast becoming
converts to Christianity or Islam and are thus depleting the strength of
the society. We have been rendered incapable of defending ourselves
and our rights. Thc atrocities perpetrated by the Moslems on the Hindu
population at Multan and in Malabar are not yet effaced from our
memory.93
The Karmavir blends two apparently contradictory images: on the one hand, the image
of untouchables voluntarily converting bccause of the evident oppressions of
Hinduism; on the other, the image of Malabar (as well as that of Multan, where a riot
had occurred in September 1922), where the "atrocity perpetrated" was forced
conversion of Hindus. The reason the paper gives for this atrocity was the oppression
and disunity of Hinduism, as characterised by voluntary conversion. Muslim agency is
almost entirely incidental here.
Malabar emerges, then, as a symbol of the "loss of strength" of Hindu society, caused
by lack of unity. What this suggests is that rather than stigmatising and emulating the
"other culture" of Indian Islam, the ideology of Hindu organisation was primarily in
dialogue with itself, addressing its own historically defined preoccupations.
6.2.3 Music Before Mosques as Hindu Self-Assertion
This point is reiterated through an examination of the nature of developing tension
during the twenties over the playing of music in Hindu processions which passed
mosques, particularly during prayer times (nainaz). This kind of tension was not a new
phenomenon in the twenties. It had emerged sporadically as a public order problem in
various areas from the late nineteenth century onwards. 94 In Nagpur in 1903-4, for
example, there was protracted tension over this issue, which was settled by the ruling
of the Divisional Commissioner. 95 As another Divisional Commissioner of Central
Provinces stated in 1914:
Karmavir 13 January 1923; RIN CP&B No.3 of 1923.
See Thursby, HLndu-Muslim Relations in British India, p. 89; he records an incident in
Madras Presidency in 1874. He then points to Tilak's development of Ganapati processions in
the 1890s, citing riots in Poona in 1894 and Dhulia in 1895.
The Malzraiia, 11 October 1903, blamed the dispute on the intervention of the Deputy
Superintendent of Police in Nagpur City, who issued a ruling before the Dussehra holiday that
"no music was to be allowed to the Hindus for about 10 paces on either side of a mosque
under any conditions".
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By far the most common form of dispute (between Hindus and
Muslims) is regarding the playing of music when passing places of
worship, and when friction arises regarding that matter it is almost
always due to some temporary ill-feeling which takes advantage of the
very delicate nature of the music question to stir up strife. Processional
music must have been played for centuries without dispute so long as
the obvious restraints dictated by good feeling were observed. But
when good feeling is at an end, there is a demand for freedom from all
restraint on the one side and for prohibition or excessive restraint on the
other that calls for intervention by the authorities who consult the leaders
on both sides as to what is fair and in accordance with custom.96
Unlike cow protection, the issue of music before mosques never developed the
characteristics of a movement. As the Commissioner comments, it was rather an outlet
for underlying tension. Its presence in the public space was ensured not through the
setting up of organisations, but rather through the "intervention of authorities" and the
"consultation of leaders", as well as the reporting of incidents in the press. It
represents a sporadic assertion of "rights": either of the Hindu "right" to carry on
processions unhampered on public highways; or of the Muslim "right" to offer namaz
in an appropriate environment. As the dispute in Nagpur in 1903-4 unfolded, for
example, the police ruling preventing the playing of music before mosques was
described by the Poona weekly the M*a#a as a denial not of "pleasure or privilege",
but of "rights immemoriably enjoyed by the whole Hindu community".97 It is
important to note that these assertions were projected as the existing rights of the
respective communities; the job of authority was to adjudicate whose rights were more
genuine, more established.98
As this suggests, the articulation of disputes over this issue returns us directly to
Victoria's Proclamation and the position of "religious communities" in relation to the
state. Representation, of course, was a central feature of this quasi-constitutional
relationship. The occurrence of disputes, as the Commissioner suggests, would lead
naturally to the consultation of community leaders - individuals recognised by local
authority as representing the interests and views of local Hindus or Muslims. This
was, however, always a localised, unformalised pattern, reflecting the centrality of
symbolic representation in the colonial discourse of organisation. Interestingly, the
above comments are made in the context of a resolution moved in the Imperial
96	 j Walker, Nerbudda Commissioner to Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, Central
Provinccs Policc Dcpt7Dcccmbcr 1914; Ccntral Provinccs Sccrctariat (Policc Dcpt) A Progs
May 1915, No. 1 - 19: "Proposed formation of Conciliation Boarth for the Composition of
Disputes Between Hindus and Mohammedans."
Mahraita 11 October 1903.
98	 The Mahra#a suggested in relation to the Nagpur situation that "a test civil suit
would...afford a suitable solution of the important question of whether the Police have such
authority as they have arrogated to themselves in prohibiting music for 10 paces on either side
of a mosque." Ibid.
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Legislative Council to form permanent "Conciliation Boards" consisting of local
representatives, in an effort to forestall the build up of tension. This formalisation was
unanimously rejected by Central Provinces District Commissioners whose opinions
were solicited, one remarking: "There is no system of election or nomination in this
country, and none could be devised, whereby the representatives of Hindus and
Muhammedans would be elected by a unanimous vote of their people and we have no
guarantee that the people would with one consent follow the leaders approved."99
Formalisation was meaningless, then, without proper structures of representation, and
these structures were inappropriate to Indian conditions ("no system of election or
nomination...could be devised"). The Central Provinces Government therefore advised
the Government of India that existing arrangements, recognising local leaders through
the knowledge and judgement of the state's local representative, were sufficient.100
This arrangement was sustainable whilst the state retained control of the public space.
As we have seen, however, the post-war years witnessed a shift in the balance of
power over the public space, indicated by the emergence of a new discourse of
organisation. In this context, music before mosques developed into a means of
asserting new "rights" in the public space, in the manner noted in Section 6.13. The
1923-4 Ganesh Peth incident and its aftermath in Nagpur again provides us with an
example of how this strategy was employed as a means of consolidating Hindu
identity. In particular, it illustrates how music before mosques was utilised as a
practical means of countering the "loss of strength" of Hindu society which had been
symbolised in the public space by the Moplah conversions. As one newspaper
commented in relation to the dispute in October 1923: "It is high time the Hindus
realised the value of organisation in their society, which alone will save them from the
persecution of people of other religious persuasions." 101 And again in November:
The fact is that ever since the Hindu society became dead to its sense of
honour and self-respect, any community can insult it with impunity....
If the Hindus at all want to survive such humiliations, they ought,
without delay, to organise themselves into a compact whole and be
prepared to act in the world more manfully than they have hitherto
done.102
The fact that the dispute was originally cast as a kind of Hindu sa!yagraha increased the
emphasis on organisation during this period. Courting arrest in a systematic fashion
was symbolic of the wider concerted effort of Hindus to resist "humiliation". The
The Deputy Commissioner, Betul, in 'Proposed formation of Conciliation Boards for the
Composition of Disputes Between Hindus and Mohamniedans', op. cit. iT. 97.
100	 See letter from J.T. Marten, secretary to Chief Commissioner, Central Provinces to Secretary
to Government of India, Nagpur 18 May 1915; in ibid.
101	 Aliabar 31 October 1923; RIN CP&B No.44 of 1923.
102	 SwatantraHindusthan, 17 November 1923; RIN CP&B No.47 of 1923.
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Ganesh Peth dispute dragged on into 1924, and was eventually settled, alter rioting in
the summer, through the arbitration of Motilal Nehru and Maulana Azad. 103 The terms
of the settlement were that five specified processions were permitted to pass mosques
with music at all times, whilst others were required to stop music during pjilO4
Note that the dispute was settled not through government, but through nationalist
intervention.
In the aftermath of Ganesh Peth, playing music before mosques began to assume the
position of a display of Hindu strength in unity. A year later, an Urdu weekly
published in Nagpur, the Al Haq, commented that: "This year the dindi processions,
attended by thousands of Dr. Munje's followers armed with lathis, passed peacefully
before the Nagpur mosques, where their pace suddenly slackened to give them full
opportunity to play the music with the utmost noise." 105
 The reference to "Munje's
followers" is an indication of the Doctor's central position in these displays. D.R.
Goyal states that Moonje was the leader of the Ganesh Peth agitation, whilst Dr.
Hedgewar, who was to become leader of the RSS, "acted as the stormtrooper".106
Together they subsequently formed a kind of local "service" to Hindus taking out
processions. In 1927, for example, Moonje records in his diary that he was consulted
by a worried father intending to take out a marriage procession which would have to
pass a city mosque. Moonje writes that he "told him to consult Dr. Hedgewar
but...warned him not to stop music."' 07 Several other sources corroborate this view of
Hedgewar as a source of protection for Nagpur's Hindu processionists.108
The tone of these remarks suggest the emergence of music before mosques not so much
as an issue of disputed religious "rights", in the sense denoted by the Proclamation, but
rather as a symbol of Hindu assertion, embellished by the defiance of the "Other" of
Muslim organisation. Although it would be unhistorical to completely efface Muslim
agency in these disputes, it is clear that the small Muslim community in Nagpur was
becoming increasingly terrorised through this kind of aggressive Hindu self-assertion.
103	 Maharashtral8 January 1925; PIN CP&B No.4 of 1925.
104	 The five specified processions were Raja's Ganapati, Raja's Dasehra, Raja's Bhadrapadya
Ganapati, Jagnath Dindi and Raja's Ram Navami; see "Reference from the Bombay Govt.
regarding the procedure adopted in the matter of Hindu-Muslim disputes in Central Provinces,"
Central Provinces Government, Political and Military Department (Confidential), 1927, File
No. 113-I (Bhopal).
105 AlHaq 15 November 1925; PIN CP&B No.47 of 1925.
106	 D. R. Goyal, Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (Radhakrishna Prakashan, New Delhi), p. 49.
107	 Moonje's Diary 13 June 1927; Moonje Papers Reel 1.
108	 See Deshpande and Ramaswamy, DrHedgewar: the EpochMaker, p. 71: "Because of the in-
built fear of the Muslims among the Hindus, the band troupes sometimes shirked to play
before the Masjid. On such occasions, Doctorji himself would take over the drums and rouse
the dormant manliness of the Hindus." A similar story was also told by Vasant Rao Oke in
interview, 16 December 1995.
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In the immediate aftermath of the 1927 riot in Nagpur (see Chapter 7), the normally
mildly pro-Hindu Hitavada comments:
It is no use disguising the fact that the Mabommedans in Nagpur have
become very nervous and terror-stricken. .. .Whatever views one might
hold about the causes of the trouble, the fact remains that many
Mahommnedan families have left Nagpur and that most of the
Mahommedan residents in the city are afraid to leave their homes and
move freely in the localities where there is a preponderance of the Hindu
element.109
In this context, the issue of music before mosques may be seen as a further indication
of the tendency of the ideology of Hindu organisation to construct a dialogue with
itself, employing the "Other" of Muslim aggressiveness as a rationalising or
legitimising agent. The objective existence of a "threatening Other" is of minimal
importance here.
6.2.4 Hindu Organisation and Low Caste Mobilisation
The political energy that so characterised the India of the early 1920s did not just
signify the extension of nationalism and communalism. Other forces were developing:
socialism was to emerge in the thirties as a major force in Indian politics, for example;
equally significant was the development of low caste movements. Already strong in the
south, the independent mobilisation of low castes and untouchables developed across
much of the country during the nineteen twenties. Phule's legacy provided an
ideological and organisational basis for development in the west, and this was to lead in
the late twenties to the emergence of Ambedkar as a leader of national importance.
The development of ideologies and movements based on caste - far more than those
based on Islam - constituted a specific threat to the ideology of Hindu organisation. It
has been noted in Chapter 4 how Phule's work challenged the claims of high caste
dominated organisations to represent a Hindu "community" that included low castes
and untouchables. Mobilisation in the twenties extended this work. The historical
distinction which Phule made between the original inhabitants of India and the Aryan
"invaders" was to become a central feature of non-Brahman identity. This kind of
ideology undermined the image of Hinduism as the religion of the soil, of RharatMata,
and questioned the boundaries of Hinduism as stipulated by the all-embracing ideology
of Hindu organisation.
In Nagpur low caste mobilisation was driven by leaders from the Mahar caste. This
was an untouchable caste which formed about one sixth of the population of Nagpur
109	 Hilavada 11 September 1927.
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district, and had by the turn of the century demonstrated significant tendencies towards
independent organisation.' 10 Mahars also formed some 40% of workers in Nagpur's
powerful textile industry."! As early as 1909 the Mahar leader Kisan Faguji Bansode
was distinguishing low castes from Hindus by reference to the Aryan conquest,
proclaiming: "At that time we were your conquest, you treated us even worse than
slaves and subjected us to any torture you wanted. But now we are no longer your
subjects, we have no service relationship with you, we are not your slaves or serfs....
We have had enough of the harassment and torture of the Hindus." 112 Again following
the example of Phule, Mahar leaders were particularly critical of what were perceived as
high caste attempts to alleviate the condition of low castes. Thus in 1923 the Nagpur
weekly BahishkritBharat, published by the Mahar Ganesh Akaji Gawai, commented
on a recent meeting of the Maharashtra Hindu Dharma Parishad in Yeotmal. Here, a
resolution was passed stating that untouchability should not be observed in public
spaces "barring temples, sacred places and public tanks or wells." The Bahishkrit
Bharat describes this as a "shameless resolution (which) only adds insult to the injury
of the depressed classes." "Under the name of the defence of Hindu religion," the
editorial continues, "attempts are made to perpetuate the religious and social
predominance of the priestly class over the non-Brahman and depressed classes."113
The final comment here indicates a recognition of the relationship between low caste
"uplift" and high caste anxiety over the welfare of Hinduism in the modern world. The
ideology of low caste mobilisation specifically counters the logic of this relationship,
which by mid-1923 was emerging as central to the notion of Hindu sangathazi.
Because of this, low caste mobilisation became increasingly the most threatening
"Other" for the ideology of Hindu organisation. This is illustrated by the way in which
low caste mobilisation was perceived by the high caste press, including the nationalist
press. The 1925 Central Provinces and Berar Non-Brahman Conference at Wardha
was described by the Hitavada as a "separatist movement". 114
 The Maharashtra
apparently confirmed the Hitavada's suspicions by noting disapprovingly the
Conference's decision to omit "Hindu" from its title, and by describing the "wild and
vulgar attacks on Brahmins" during proceedings." 5
 Reports such as these are replete
with a sense of horror at the apparently uncontrollable nature of low caste mobilisation,
110	 The 1908 District Gazetteer noted that Mahars had "combined to dig wells and in Nagpur have
opened a school for members of their community". Central Provinces District Gazetteers,
Nagpur District Vol. A, p. 85.
111	 G. Omvedt, Dalit Visions: The Anti-Caste Movement and the Construction of wi Indian
identify (Orient Longman, New Delhi, 1995), p. 35.
112	 Quoted in ibid.
113	 iJahzshkritBharat24 February 1923; RIN CP&B No.9 of 1923.
114	 Jiltavada 27 May 1925; RIN CP&B No. 22 of 1925.
'	 Maharashtra 31 May 1925; RIN CP&B No.23 of 1925.
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its "wildness" and "vulgarity". This sense is encapsulated by the persistent reference to
the movement as a kind of disease. The Wardha Conference was described by other
papers at the time as evidence of the "anti-Brahmin infection" and the "contagion of
anti-Brahmin feeling." 6
 Similarly, B.S. Moonje, commenting on a Dr. Powar of
Mohad in his personal diary in 1926, is thankful that he was not "affected by the virus
of the non-Brahmin controversy." t17
 This persistent representation of low caste
consciousness as a virus or disease is indicative of its status in the ideology of Hindu
organisation. It simply cannot be located within the parameters of recognisable political
discourse. The only way of comprehending it, rather, is by presenting it as an
unfortunate natural disorder.
This of course is a rather drastic representation, but it does indicate an attitude of
incomprehension that runs through virtually all high caste attempts to effect
amelioration of the low caste predicament through "uplift" - such a characteristic
feature, as we have seen, of the horizontal approach to Hindu organisation. This is
illustrated by an examination of Gandhi's heartfelt attempts to eradicate untouchability.
It is possible, I would say, to situate Gandhi as an advocate of horizontal organisation
in this context because of his attitude towards caste.
Prior to 1925, Gandhi supported the idea of caste in its contemporary form. He
produced a whole series of arguments in its defence, which generally responded to
western critiques based on its supposed non-egalitarian nature. 118
 Very briefly,
Gandhi presented what he saw as the basic principles of the caste system - heredity and
occupational differentiation underpinned by the theological imperatives of karma and
rebirth - as the framework of a social order based on harmonious integrated
relationships, rather than competition and class war, which were so manifest in western
"egalitarian" social orders. Where caste was defended, however, untouchability was
unequivocally rejected. Gandhi rationalised this by making a conceptual distinction
between the two. Whereas caste was an integral part of the Hindu way of life,
untouchability was "not a sanction of religion" but rather "a device of Satan". It was a
"sin" which went directly against the "spirit of the Vedas", a spirit that represented
"purity, truth, innocence, chastity, simplicity, forgiveness, godliness and all that makes
a man or woman noble and brave." 119
 Atoning for this sin was perceived by Gandhi
as an essential feature of the creation of a new society in India; as essential, and in fact
inextricably bound up with, the need for independence:
116	 See SwatanliyaHindusthan and Lok,natt 31 May 1925; RIN CP&B No. 23 of 1925.
117	 Moonje's diaiy 2 April 1926; Moonje Papers Reel 1 (NML).
118	 For a summary, see Parekh, Colonialism, Tradition and Reform, p.226.
119	
"The Sin of Untouchability", in Young India 19 January 1921; see CWMG Vol. XIX
(Government of India, Delhi, 1966), pp. 242-3.
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I have often told English officials that if they are friends and servants of
India they should come down from their pedestal, cease to be
patrons...and believe us to be equals in the same sense they believe
fellow Englishmen to be their equals. .. .1 have gone a step further and
asked them to repent and to change their hearts. Even so is it necessary
for us Hindus to repent of the wrong we have done, to alter our
behaviour toward those whom we have "suppressed" by a system as
devilish as we believe the English system of the government of India to
be. We must not throw a few miserable schools at them, we must not
adopt the air of superiority toward them. We must treat them as our
blood brothers as they are in fact. We must return to them the
inheritance of which we have robbed them. And this must not be the act
of a few English-knowing reformers merely but it must be a conscious
voluntary effort on the part of the masses. We may not wait till eternity
for this much belated reformation. We must aim at bringing it about
within this year.... It is a reform not to follow Swaraj but to precede
it."120
On the basis of a paralleling of the two oppressions - colonial and caste - the eradication
of untouchability is integrated with the objective of swalaj, bringing a sense of urgency
to Gandhi's approach. There is, however, a shift in the weight of required agency
between the two oppressions. Whereas he may appeal individually to British officials
to "repent and change their hearts" in relation to India, the main burden of agency lies
with the people to mobilise and actively work - through salyagraha - towards the
attainment of liberation. In the case of the oppression of untouchables, however, the
burden of agency is reversed - it is the job of the oppressors to effect liberation. The
urgency of the need for the eradication of untouchability is directed towards caste
Hindus and their need for repentance; the call is for a moral shift in order that
untouchables be accommodated "as our blood brothers". Untouchables themselves
have little to do except be patient and wait for this to happen.
This point is illustrated by Gandhi's attitude towards the Vaikom Satyagraha. A major
temple in this village in the princely state of Travancore was targeted by the District
Congress Committee due to its practice of disallowing untouchable access to roads
surrounding the temple.' 2 ' Satyagraha was launched in March 1924, with the District
Congress sanctioning mixed groups of caste and untouchable salyagrahis to breach the
temple bar on road use, which by this time was backed up by a prohibitory order of the
120	 ibid.
121	 This was an extension of the principle of theendal, or unapproachability. Two castes
prevalent in Kerala, the Ezhava.s and Pulayzs, were ban-ed from approaching higher castes
nearer than 16 feet and 72 feet respectively; See B. Chandra et al, India's Struggle of
independence, p. 230. Eleanor Zelliot notes that the local Congress resolve was "also an
outgrowth of the Ilavas (Ezhavas) own movement to gain political and religious rights. It
came in the wake of the Ilavas' 1918 appeal to the Travancore government for the opening of
state temples to all Hindus and their 1921 threat to convert in a body to Christianity." Zelliot,
"Gandhi and Ambedkar A Study in Leadership" (in J.M. Mahar [ed.] The Untouchables in
Contemporary India, Univ. of Arizona, Tucson, 1972, pp. 69-96), p. 80.
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District Magistrate. Although he supported the satyagraha campaign, Gandhi was
opposed both to its extension to other temples, and to the involvement of the national
Congress organisation; he treated it as a purely local dispute.' 22 When he eventually
visited Vaikom in March 1925, it was not to bolster or take charge of the satyagraha
campaign. Rather it was to enter into dialogue with the pandits of the temple who bad
spearheaded resistance to the campaign. "I have come," he said, "to reason with my
orthodox friends." 23 His objective, then, was to institute a process of repentance in
the manner described above. Gandhi plunged into a theological debate in which he
attempted to assert mutual respect and love between Hindus as the "spirit of the Vedas".
His acceptance of the central principles of caste, karma and rebirth, however, meant
that he conspicuously failed to make any in-roads into the beliefs of the pandits in
relation to untouchability.' 24 In effect, he failed to realise the conceptual distinction
between caste and untouchability which his approach claimed to make. He therefore
left Vaikom without effecting any form of compromise. The situation was resolved
later that year, although it is unclear from source material whether the Brahmans
capitulated or resorted to the ingenious measure of moving the road further away from
the temple. In any case untouchables were denied actual entry to the Vaikom temple
until 1936.125
Alter this experience Gandhi shifted his approach towards caste. He developed a
vision of a reformed system based on an archetypal varna vyavastha. This was a
partially open system, in which each varna had some practical access to the qualities of
the others:
All are born to serve God's creation, a Brahman with his knowledge, a
Kshatriya with his power of protection, a Vaishya with his commercial
ability and a Shudra with bodily labour. This, however, does not mean
that a Brahman for instance is absolved from bodily labour, or the duty
of protecting himself and others. His birth makes a Brahman
predominantly a man of knowledge, the fittest by heredity and training
to impart it to others. There is nothing, again, to prevent the Shudra
from acquiring all the knowledge he wishes. Only, he will best serve
with his body and need not envy others their special qualities for
service. But a Brahman who claims superiority by right of knowledge
122	 See Interview with The Hindu 15 April 1924: "I do not think that the leaders from all the
parts of India can spare themselves and concentrate their energy directly on the movement.";
see CWMG Vol. XXIII (Government of India, Delhi, 1967), p. 440; see also Jordens, Swami
Shraddhanandu, p.146; Shraddhanand, who visited Vaikom in May, attempted to persuade
Gandhi to widen the objectives of the campaign.
123	 Quoted in Parekh, Colonialirm, Tradition and Reform, p. 223.124	 For some fascinating excerpts from these exchanges, see Parekh, ColonialLrrn, Tradition and
Reform, pp. 220-3.125	 See Zelliot, "Gandhi and Ambedkar A Study in Leadership", p. 80; for Ambedkar's criticism
of Gandhi's handling of the Vaikom affair, seep. 81.
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falls arid has no knowledge. And so with the others who pride
themselves upon their special qualities.'26
The system, then, continued to operate on the basis of heredity and functional
differentiation. This differentiation, however, was not absolute; there was some room
for manoeuvre, based on the idea of equality of status and mutual respect. The system
depends for its smooth operation on the absence of any sense of superiority or of envy.
"Varnashrama," Gandhi helpfully adds, "is self-restraint." What appears, therefore, to
be a fresh approach based on structural change as a means of eradicating the idea of
untouchability as a feature of caste, continued to base itself on a rather vague assertion
that equality lay at the heart of the system. If only this equality could be realised, the
oppressions of the system - including untouchability - would fall away.
Despite its somewhat radical appearance, then, Gandhi's post-Vaikom approach to
caste and untouchability seems to reiterate the basic principles of horizontal
organisation: the binding together of Hindu society based on the idea of mutual respect,
effected through the moral transformation of caste Hindus. This is certainly borne out
by his approach to the problem of untouchability and his attitude to low caste
mobilisation in later years. As Parekh comments, in the wake of Vaikom "he modified
his language of discourse, intensified the educational campaign (amongst caste Hindus)
and increased the harijan welfare work. However, he neither reconsidered his strategy
nor mounted a new initiative." 27 Gandhi continued to oppose any low caste
mobilisation that emerged as antagonistic to caste Hinduism. Duncan records that
when a "deputation of Scheduled Castes" asked Gandhi's advice as to how they could
alleviate their predicament, he advised them that "instead of working for separate
treatment for themselves, they should 'endeavour to merge themselves in the ocean of
Hindu humanity. That is the only possible way to free India." 128 In the early thirties
he undertook a "fast unto death" in response to the government's proposal to grant
separate electorates to untouchables, and when he established the Harijan Sevak Sangh
in 1932, it was made clear that "while the League will work by persuasion among the
caste Hindus to remove every vestige of untouchability the main line of work will be
constructive, such as the uplift of Depressed Classes educationally, economically and
socially which itself will go a great way to remove untouchability." 129
 Even the idea of
"persuasion" of caste 1-lindus, then, was to be secondary to the work of low caste
"uplift".
126	 Quoted in R.. Duncan [ed.], The Writings of Gandhi (Fontana, London, 1971), p. 179.
127	 Parekh, Colonialism, Tradition and Reform, p. 235.128	 Duncan, The Writings of Gandhi , p. 183.
129	 Quoted in Parekh, Colonialism, Tradition and Refonn; p. 239.
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Gandhi's attitude is indicative of the strength of the ideology of Hindu organisation in
the twenties and early thirties. Where his position was far removed from leaders such
as Moonje, Parmanand and Savarkar on the issue of, say, satyagraha as nationalist
strategy, the issues of caste reform and low caste mobilisation brought them somewhat
closer together.' 3° The idea of Hindu unity, it appears, had by the twenties emerged as
a pervasive force in political discourse.
6.3 Summary of Discussion
Chapter 6 has examined the development of some aspects of political discourse in the
years alter the end of the First World War. Two broad aspects have been identified as
central. First, the emergence of a new discourse of organisation as a result of
developments in nationalist strategy during this period. This discourse challenged the
colonial discourse of organisation as the principal means of organised political
expression in the public space. It allowed for the articulation of ideologies in what I
have termed a "decentred" manner - a manner, that is, which was not constricted by the
colonialist-nationalist nexus that had previously set the parameters for the possibilities
of political expression in the public space. Gandhi's intervention was crucial in this
respect. His development of satyagraha as political strategy transported the national
movement into previously unchartered waters, shifting the focus of political objectives
firmly towards mass mobilisation and transforming the language of politics altogether.
What has been illustrated in the first part of this chapter, however, is the failure of the
Gandhian Congress to follow through the counter-hegemonic implications of this
strategy. Ultimately this hampered the ability of the Congress to realise mass-based
nationalism; more immediately it prevented Congress nationalism from assuming a
hegemonic position in the new discourse of organisation. Consequently in the twenties
this discourse was populated by a host of ideologies that struggled to establish
themselves within the public space.
The second part of this chapter has examined the development of Hindu identity in the
context of further political developments in the early twenties. This period was
characterised by an extraordinary divergence of political events. On a national level, the
130	 Compare, for example, Gandhi's approach with that propagated by Moonje during a tour of
Maharashtra in 1927. Moonje states that the "time has come for the declaration of equal
public rights to all castes in social and religious matters...." "The non-Brahmans of
Maharashtra," he continues, "ought to be satisfied if such a public declaration is made by the
leaders," saying that full equality can only be established by "educating public opinion."
Moonje says that this public declaration would be "an epoch-making leap of complete self-
abnegation from our long established vested interests and rights of the caste system." Press
Statement, Hitavada 17 July 1927.
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Non-cooperation Movement represented mobilisation on the conscious platform of
Hindu-Muslim unity. Even during the Movement, however, and particularly alter it,
various (mostly urban) centres were struck by communal rioting, an unprecedented
display of Hindu-Muslim antagonism. Nagpur was one centre in which this
antagonism was prominent. I have illustrated how Hindu identity developed in this
context not so much through the threat of Muslim aggression, as through the increasing
importance of the ideology of Hindu organisation, the strength of its position as a
recognised feature of the political landscape. The "Other" of Islamic unity was
constructed as an integral feature of this ideology, and was often invoked without
reference to any objective threat. Indeed the one persistent objective threat to this sense
of Hindu identity - the steady growth and increased sophistication of low caste
mobilisation - was consistently marginalised in the ideology of Hindu organisation.
The latter failed to pick up the trajectory of low caste mobilisation - its long term
political significance - precisely because of the direct threat it posed to the central
principles of Hindu organisation. It is interesting to note that these two sets of
ideologies have now developed into arguably the most powerful opposing forces in
contemporary Indian politics.
The analysis of Gandhi's approach to low caste mobilisation has demonstrated the
pervasive character of the ideology of Hindu organisation during this period, and how
the dynamic ideological movements of the twenties helped to consolidate it as a feature
of Hindu identity. In the next chapter I will examine the way in which this ideology
became embedded in modern political discourse asHindunationalism.
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Chapter Seven
Organisation and the Development of Hindu Nationalism in
the Twenties
The nineteen twenties was a period of intense ideological dynamism in Indian politics.
Even within the confines of the colonial public space, a variety of ideologies engaged
with one another and attempted to gain a dominant position, a position of power in
political discourse. Hindu nationalism emerged as one of these ideologies, challenging
with other political ideologies for the hearts and minds of ordinary Indians. The
objective of this chapter is to understand this process of emergence. It will become
apparent that this was not a process of linear development. Rather, it was a process in
which the varying ideological trends which have been identified as informing
approaches to the political and social organisation of Hinduism struggled for
dominance. At the heart of this struggle was the idea of sangathan - the strident
assertion of organisation as the principal ideal of the Hindu "nation". The divergent
ways in which this ideal was pursued, I will argue, are an indication of discursive splits
in the approach of the middle class to political representation, splits which were to
inform many of the dislocations of post-independence politics in India.
Two major proponents of Hindu nationalism are examined: the Hindu Mahasabha and
the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (kSS). There is a great deal of difference between
the two. The Mahasabha was by the mid-twenties a fairly high profile organisation on
the national political scene; it carried with it the weight of its self-image as the
representative body of the Hindus, an image which was sustained, as we shall see, by
reference to the colonial discourse of organisation. Within this framework, it could
operate on the basis of a "template of polarisation", through which it gained legitimacy
as the obverse of the Muslim League (i.e. in the same manner as the Arya Samaj -
Sanatana Dharma Sabha template - see 3.3). Thus by 1930 Mahasabha delegates
(Moonje, Nanak Chand and N.C. Kelkar') were present at the first Round Table
Conference in London, where they deliberated along with the British Government, the
Muslim League, the Liberals and a big contingent from the Princely States on the
possibilities of a federal assembly (the Congress, of course, was not represented, as it
was at that time engaging the Government of India in the Civil Disobedience campaign,
1	 See Indra Prakash, Hindu Mahasabha: Its Coniribia ion so India's Potitic (Akhil Bharatiya
Hindu Mahasabha, Delhi, 1966), p. 42.
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as a result of which most of its leaders, including Gandhi and Nehru, were in jail).2
The RSS, on the other hand, which was formed in 1925, was a small organisation
struggling to establish itself in Central Provinces and across Maharashtra. It was not
until after our period, the late thirties and early forties, that it began to establish a
presence in northern India, and so began to have an impact on national affairs. In
giving so much weight to the RSS in this chapter, I am following the logic of the loose
regional focus of this thesis, which has led me to turn to Nagpur as an example of
localised responses to the flow of middle class ideologies in the public space. I am
also, however, taking advantage of historical perspective, in the sense that the later
expansion of the Sangh was to have a profound impact on Indian politics. Its early
development, therefore, the ideologies and orgathsational models through which it
situated itself in the public space, are of particular importance. The comparison with
the Mahasabha will illustrate the development of an alternative strategy in the RSS, a
strategy which capitalised on wider political developments in an innovative manner. In
the first instance, however, I will examine the Mahasabha within the context of these
developments.
7.1 The Organisation of Hindu Nationalism 1: The Hindu Mahasabha
At the fifth session of the Punjab Hindu Sabha, held at Ambala in December 1913, the
following resolution was passed:
This Conference is strongly of the opinion that in order to deliberate
upon measures for safeguarding the interests of the Hindu community
throughout India and elsewhere it is highly desirable that a General
Conference of the Hindus of India be held at Hardwar on the occasion
of the Kumbh in 1915, and it requests the following gentlemen to make
the necessary arrangements for the purpose.3
In recalling this resolution, Swami Shraddhanand notes that "Hindu leaders from all
parts of the country were nominated to the Committee". He then goes on to state,
however, that only a handful of activists from Punjab and U.P organised the 1915
Inaugural Session.4 This image of a grand front - "a flourish of trumpets", as
Shraddhanand called it - supported by a rather desultory, skeletal framework is
indicative of the character of the All-India Hindu Sabha (renamed the Mahasabha in
B.P.S. Roy, the President of the National Liberal Foundation in the early forties, commented
that "the (Muslim) League and the Mahasabha are the two communal organisations running at
a tangent and fighting for a share in political power." See Roy, Parliamentary Government in
India (Thacker, Spink & Co., Calcutta, c. 1943), p. 373.
Quoted in Shraddhanand, Hindu Sangathan, p. 107.
ibid: "only five gentlemen attended when the first preliminary meeting was held at Dehradun
on 24 September 1914 - and three of these belonged to Dehra Doon (sic) itself."
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1921) during its early phase. As is suggested by its derivation from the Punjab Sabha,
the All India organisation was conceived as a body that would represent the "Hindu
community" in a symbolic fashion, within the colonial discourse of organisation. It
was also committed to the "union and solidarity" of this community as "one organic
whole", without identifying itself with any particular sect or sects of the Hindu
community."5 In other words, it pursued the objective of horizontal organisation. The
same ideological meshing which was evident in the Punjab Sabha, then, is also evident
here.
It was noted in relation to the Punjab Sabha that this meshing was linked to the central
importance of sanaana dharma for the movement. In 1915 the All-India organisation
was dominated by Sanatanists; in particular, the U.P. Sabha was closely integrated
with the sanatana dharma movement.6
The organisation remained semi-dormant until the early twenties, when in the context of
non-cooperation it began to assume a more significant role in politics. 7 After a lapse of
two years, the Mahasabha met at Hardwar in April 1921 and reconfigured itself as a
nationalist style organisation.8 The 1922 Session at Gaya, presided over by M.M.
Malaviya,9 elaborated this image by creating an Organising Committee to establish
Sabhas in all provinces, with a view to extending the organisation onto a village level.
In addition, it called for the creation of local volunteer groups to protect Hindu interests
in communal riots. Although these resolutions were not generally backed up by
practical measures,'° they did at least signify a new dynamism of thought in the
Mahasabha. The nature of the resolutions, of course, reflects the influence of the
Shraddhanand,HinduSangathan, p. 109-10.
6	 Gordon's analysis of the 1915 UP Provincial Committee of the Hindu Sabha indicates the
prominence of Sanatani representation. He also states that 'not one member of the committee
has been identified as belonging to the Arya Samaj', although there was strong representation
from the UP Social Conference - See R. Gordon, "The Hindu Mahasabha and the Indian
National Congress, 1915-1926" (in Modern Asian Studies Vol. 9, 1975, pp. 145-204),
p. 154.
7	 See Shraddhanand's dismissive attitude to the early years, Hindu Sangathan, p.1 14; See also
Indra Prakash' two works, Review of the History and Work of the Hindu Mahasabha and the
Hindu Sanghatan Movement, and Hindu Mahasabha: Its Contribution to Indian Politics,
neither of which devotes much space to the Mahasabha before 1923.
8	 Shraddhanand notes with satisfaction the removal of the "loyalty" clause in the objectives of
the Sabha at this Session, and its replacement by a clause committing the Sabha to the
objective of a "united and self-governing Indian nation"; see Hindu Sangathan, p. 1 16
Although India Prakash, Hindu Mahasabha - its Contribution to India's Politics, says Swami
Shraddhanand was president this year, both R. Gonlon, "The Hindu Mahasabha and the Indian
National Congress", p. 169, and Shraddhanand himself in Hindu Sangathan, p. 119, indicate
that Malaviya presided.
10	 From the Central Provinces, these developments drew interested but somewhat frustrated
comment; of the resolution on organisational development, the Karrnavir opines: "It should
not be allowed to remain on record only, but should at once be translated into action." 13
January 1923; RIN CP&B No.3 of 1923.
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Congress, and the development of the new discourse of organisation during this
period. It was this dynamism of thought, however, which underpinned the emergence
of the sangathan movement as an integrated articulation of the ideology of Hindu
organisation.. The Mahasabha provided the framework for this articulation, and its
next Session, at Benaras in August 1923, was crucial in deciding the trajectory of the
movement.
7.1.1 Swami Shraddhanand and the Articulation of Sangathan
The first conscious articulation of sangathan as a distinct movement in the 1920s is a
difficult occurrence to locate. Certainly in the run-up to the Mahasabha session in 1923
the press - particularly Malaviya's Leader - referred repeatedly to the need for Hindus to
become organised as paramount:
Nothing is now left for the Hindus but to organise themselves.... They
must as a community inspire respect before they can have unity on
reasonable and equal terms with the Muslims. Their first duty, in their
own interest, in the interest of the country, and also in that of Hindu-
Muslim unity, is that they should organise, organise, organise.11
In the context of this thesis, however, it may be seen that only a greater sense of
urgency distinguishes this statement from earlier examples of the ideology of Hindu
organisation. It has already been illustrated how this idea dominated the Lahore
Conference of 1909. A further example is provided by Rampal Singh's Presidential
Address to the 1918 session of the Mahasabha in Delhi. Referring to the Hindu
"community", he says that
We have lost sight of the high ideals which used to pulsate and animate
the hearts of our forefathers. The chief cause is that we are disorganised
and disunited. It is for the Hindu Sabha to organise and unite the
scattered atoms of our Community and to devise means for the
amelioration of the whole, so that we might rise again to the same
pinnacle of glory and civilisation which our forefathers had attained.12
When this plea for organisation was translated into the evocative invocation of
sangathan, however, is not clear. Prakash suggests that the first usage was by
Malaviya during the Congress Enquiry into the riot at Multan in September 1922.'
11	 Leader2April1923.
12	 Quoted in Indra Prakash, Review of the History and Work of the Hindu Mahasabha and the
Hindu Sanghatan Movement, p. 86.
13	 See Review of the History and Work of the Hindu Mahasabha and the Hindu Sangha tan
Movement, p. 25. Other sources are not explicit about the origin of the term: See Jordens,
Swami Shraddhananda, p.134; Jaffrelot, The Hindu Nationalist Movement in India, p. 20-22.
Certainly the Multan riot prompted a rash of press statements on the need for Hindu
organisation. The Vedic Magazine, for example, an Arya monthly published in Lahore,
commented in its September edition that "the tragedy, deplorable as it is, has a lesson for its
victims. Organise yourselves. Evolve unity in your own ranks. Develop strength, develop
character." See Punjab Press Abstracts, 1922, No. 40.
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Other evidence suggests that the concept was developed only in conjunction with the
campaign begun early in 1923 to reclaim through shuddhi a large group of nominal
Muslims in Agra district of U.P., known as Malkana Rajputs.' 4 This crucial shuddhi
campaign will be discussed in the next section. Its presence here is an indication of the
influence of the Arya Samaj, and in particular the radical leader of the Gurukul
educational movement, Swami Shraddhanand, who was the main organising force
behind the shuddhi campaign.
Shraddhanand's involvement with the Mahasabha was relatively recent. Since taking
sannyas in 1917, he had become increasingly involved in politics. He played a
prominent role in the Rowlatt Satyagraha in Delhi in 1919, and also in the Non-
cooperation Movement. Throughout this period he had attempted to put the issue of
untouchability on the nationalist agenda, believing it to be the perfect constructive
counterpoint to the essentially destructive campaign of non-cooperation.' 5 The
apparent reluctance of the Congress to address this issue in any practical sense was a
major factor in Shraddhanand's eventual abandonment of mainstream politics:
"Noticing even the Congress powerless to absorb the untouchable," he said early in
1923, "I have made it the sole mission of my remaining life."16
It was only in 1923, then, that Shraddhanand turned wholeheartedly to the Hindu
Mahasabha. His involvement was linked very much to his determination to tackle
untouchability, although this objective was overshadowed during 1923 by his strong
cormuitment from February onwards to the Malkana shuddhi campaign. During the
summer of 1923, as he toured Punjab and UP to gather support for the shuddhi
campaign, Shraddhanand referred to the idea of sangashan, and its promotion by the
Mahasabha. 17 He defined sangathan here as a movement "to resuscitate the ancient
glory of Arya civilisation and to counteract the symptoms of degeneration displayed by
the Hindus in the crises of Malabar and Multan."18
During 1923, it is difficult to find a more precise definition of sangathan than this rather
vague invocation of the Golden Age and degeneration, suffixed by the urgency of
current "crises". A comprehensive exposition is provided by Shraddhanand somewhat
later, in his pamphlet Hindu Sangathan: Saviour of the Dying Race. Though completed
14	 See Thursby, Hindu-Muslim Relations in British India, p. 164.
15	 For an account of Shraddhanand's struggle to put untouchability at the heart of the nationalist
agenda, and particularly his disagreements with Gandhi over the issue, see Jordens, Swami
Shraddhananda, pp. 142-47.
16	 Letzkr 7 February 1923; quoted in Jordens, Swami Shraddhananda, p.131.
17	 Thursby, Hindu-Muslim Relations in British India, p. 164.18	 ibid.
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in 1924, this pamphlet was not published until 1926. From the outset, Shraddhanand
articulates sangathan in classic Arya terms: "The ancestors of the present day Hindus,
the Ancient Aryans, who gave their name to our motherland (the ancient Aryavarta)
were a highly civilised and organised race." 19 Sangathan, then, was the natural state of
Arya society and the Aryan people ("an organised race"), a facet of the Golden Age.
Detetioration from this state was the result of four central causes: first, conversion,
either by force or aggressive missionary activity; secondly, perversion of the merit-
based varna system, leading to proliferation and rigidity of castes, the introduction of
idol worship and superstition, and the emergence of untouchability; thirdly, child
marriage and lack of remarriage of widows; and lastly, the dislocation of ashrama
dhanna - in particular, the loss of the ideal of brahinachazya as the framework of
adolescent and young adult life. Shraddhanand pinpoints much of this debilitating
decline as stemming from the great war between the Kauravas and the Pandavas, the
focus of the Mahabharata. Alter this, he says, "adharma took the place of dharma,"
"the ancient organisation of the Aryas was cut asunder by mutual jealousies and pride,"
and "disorganisation became the order of the day."2°
The ideal of sangathan, then, is located by Shraddhanand very much as an attribute of
the Aryan Golden Age. It is characterised first and foremost by the smooth operation
of varnashrama dharma. Within this framework, the function of brahmachaiya is
given paramount importance: "control of the senses through right study and by the
practice of plain living and high thinking," he says, provides the discipline, aspiration
(i.e. in terms of the allocation of varna on merit) and order upon whicn society is
constructed.21 Without the moral discipline of brahmachazya, for example, strict
adherence to the dharma of the grihastha, the householder, is not possible, thus
"undermining the physical and moral health of the nation." 22 Shraddhanand's
emphasis on the key role of brahmachwya may be related to his position in the Gurukul
movement - his remedy for the degeneration of brahmacharya, not surprisingly, is the
full revival of the Guru kul system. It is nevertheless reminiscent of Gandhi's emphasis
19	 Shmddhanand, Hindu Sangathan, p. 1.
20	 Shmddhanand, Hindu Sangathan, pp. 78, 94.
21	 Shraddhanand, Hindu Sangathan, p. 103; "...the whole fabric of the Ashram Dhanna," he
says, "hinged on one pivot i.e. the brahniacharya. Until all the functions of the human
organism were properly and rightly trained and a harmonious development of the physical
body, the organs of action, the organs of sense, the mind, the intellect, the memory and the
ego was accomplished, the three later stages of human life could not work in unison with the
laws of nature."
22	 See ibid. Grihasthad/zarrna, Shraddhanand states, meant that "the married couple should only
cohabit for bringing forth healthy progeny. During the 25 years of married life they ought to
procreate ten children only (sic!), a period of two and a half years being devoted to the
nourishment of each child from the date of conception, during which period the couple should
abstain from sexual intereourse."
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on and practice of brahinacha,ya, and this provides us with the basis for an instructive
comparison of their approach towards caste.
Both Gandhi and Shraddhanand saw morality and self-discipline as key attributes of
brahnachwya. For both of them, therefore, the loss of this institution was the key to
the moral degradation of contemporary society. Untouchability constituted one of the
central features of this moral degradation, and both pointed to it as symptomatic of the
weakened state of Hindu society. As Shraddhanand states, "the question of uprooting
the curse of untouchability was the 'sine qua non' of Nationality in India." 23 Their
approaches to the problem, however, were quite different. As we have seen, Gandhi
attempted to eradicate untouchability through the moral transformation of caste
Hinduism. Shraddhanand, on the other hand, referred unerringly to the compact,
closed Hinduism of Swami Dayananda. Eradicating untouchability meant nothing more
than untouchables "regaining their former position," because "it is plain...that they
come from the same stock from which sprang the Brahman, the Kshatriya and the
Vaishya."24 Shuddhi was the practical means through which this reintegration could be
achieved, and the Arya vision of varnashramadharma would form the framework of
the reintegrated, reorganised society. If Gandhi's approach was a reflection of the
influence of horizontal organisation, then, Shraddhanand's was very much a reflection
of that of vertical organisation.
In fact Shraddhanand embellished his Arya-based vision of sangathan with a very
familiar institutional notion:
The first step which I propose is to build one Hindu Rashtra Mandir at
least in every city and important town, with a compound which could
contain an audience of 25 thousands and a hall in which katha from
Bhagavad Gita, the Upanishads and the great epics Ramayana and
Mahabharata could be daily recited.25
Here, the Samaj Mandir, such an important feature of the Arya Samaj's transformative
trajectory in relation to caste Hinduism, is replicated in the wider context of Hindu
sangathan. In many ways Shraddhanand had simply transposed the central
transformative principles of Arya ideology onto this widened context. The sangathan
movement became an opportunity for the realisation of Dayananda's original objective
of a transformation of Hindu samaj. Nowhere is this intention more clear than in
Shraddhanand's approach to shuddhi as a feature of sangathan. Indeed, it is over this
issue that the movement witnessed a decisive internal battle during the Mahasabha
23	 Shraddhanand, Hindu Sangathan, p. 89.
24	 Shraddhanand, Hindu Sangathan, p. 85.
25	 Shraddhanand, Hindu Sangathan p. 140.
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session of August 1923, and the special Session that followed it in February 1924. Yet
again the old tensions over horizontal and vertical organisation underpinned this battle.
7.1.2 Shuddhl, Sangathan and the Triumph of Horizontal Organisation
The re-emergence of shuddhi as an issue of critical importance during and after the
Moplah rebellion provided the context for this struggle. When the news of the Malabar
conversions reached northern India in September 1921, it was the Arya Samaj which
responded proactively. The College wing Pratinidhi Sabha in Punjab, under the
leadership of Hans Raj, immediately launched an appeal for funds and dispatched an
updeshak (missionary), Pandit Rishi Ram, to organise a programme of reclamation.
The United Provinces Pratinidhi Sabha subsequently campaigned vigorously to raise
funds to support Hans Raj's initiative. 26 The Arya Samaj was able to respond
promptly to this crisis for two reasons. First, it had the institutional structure to
generate a response, both in terms of finance and appropriate personnel. Secondly, the
Samaj had years of experience in shuddhi work, and it was clear from the start that,
despite the widespread destruction of homes and businesses during the Moplah
rebellion, the principal objective of relief work was to be the reclamation of forcibly
converted Hindus.
Rishi Ram and his fellow Aryas in the Malabar mission did not have the Samaj
structure to fall back on, as the Samaj was still very weak in the South. 27 Their
approach to shuddhi had therefore to be somewhat different if it was to have any real
impact. They had no alternative but to work closely with representatives of local
orthodoxy.28 In fact, it is unclear exactly how much influence the Samaj had in
bringing about the reconversions in Malabar. 29
 Local orthodox leaders appear to have
26	 Thursby, Hindu-Muslim Relations in British India, p. 142-3.
27	 R.K. Ghai states that Rishi Ram was joined from the Punjab by Lala Khushat Chand; Ghai's
text then suggests that they recruited other Arya.s locally; see Shuddhi Movetnent in
india, pp. 86-88.
28	 An interesting counterpoint to the Arya approach in Malabar is provided by the Tinnevelly
conversions of 1899, when the Shanars, a caste of toddy tappers, were converted to Islam.
The Samaj sent two updeshaks to Tinnevelli, but they failed to effect reconversion because of
the solid opposition of the local brahmans. See H. Fischer-Tine, "Kind Elders of the Hindu
Biradri': The Arya Samajes Struggle for Influence and its Effect on Hindu-Muslim Relations
1880-192.5" (Unpublished Conference Paper, Copenhagen 1996). This comparison is cited,
however, with the caution that there is obviously a vast difference between reclaiming a caste
of toddy tappers and the converted Hindus of Malabar, who were largely drawn from high
caste, landowning families.
29	 J.R. Graham states that "without the stimulus of the Arya Samaj, the orthodox
would have done nothing towards readmiuing the unfortunates." See Graham "The Arya
Samaj as a Reformation in Hinduism", p. 509. Thursby, however, could find no independent
evidence to support this, and notes that the Madras Government makes no mention of the
Samaj in its report on the meeting of Pandits in Calicut that eventually led to the
reconversions; see Hindu-Mu.sllm Relations in British India, p. 143 a. 50.
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taken the initiative, and the actual processes of reconversion were decided at a meeting
of pandits in Calicut in 1922, under the auspices of the ruling prince of Calicut,
Zamorin Raja. These processes were highly ritualistic, and would almost certainly
have been rejected by a northern Shuddhi Sabha. 30 A significant point, however, was
that they were guided by a fourth or fifth century document known as the Devala
Smriti. The Smriti was a short Sanskrit document giving details of ritual activities to be
followed as a result of pollution through contact with mlecchas, or non-Hindus.31
Whatever the extent of Arya involvement in the reconversions, the Samaj certainly did
not object to the use of this Smriti and its prescribed rituals, which resulted in the
reclamation of between 2500 and 3000 Hindus.32
For Sanatanists, this apparent orthodox sanction of shuddhi provided a fresh impetus
for involvement in the field of purification and, more significantly, reconversion. The
Malkanashuddhi campaign was the testing ground for this involvement. The so-called
Malkana Rajputs were nominal Muslims living in villages across the western part of
United Provinces. Although a great deal of their religious practice could be considered
Hindu, they had no social contact with caste Rajputs, and, crucially, they were
consistently returned as Muslim in census reports. 33 A Rajput Shuddhi Sabha had
been organised as early as 1907 by local caste organisations, but had little sustained
success.34 At a meeting in Agra early in 1923, Shraddhanand proposed the foundation
of a fresh organisation, the Bharatiya Hindu Shuddhi Sabha, to which he was duly
appointed president. The Sabha was at first a genuine coalition of forces, incorporating
Sikhs and Jams as well as Sanatanists and of course Aryas. It is this practical coalition
which made the Malkana shuddhi such an important symbol of the sangathan
movement. Aryas again showed a willingness to subsume their own beliefs in order
to ensure Sanatani involvement. Commenting on a shuddhi ceremony in March 1923,
the Leader notes that "Sanatani Hindu Pandits conducted the formal ceremony of yaggi
in the presence of Swami Shraddhanand."35 Even the radical Shraddhanand, then,
30	 See Ghai, Shuddhi Movement in India, p. 87 for an account of the kind of ritual involved.
31	 Both Graham (p. 511 n. 1) and Thursby (p. 144) state that the Devak2 Smriti was 'discovered'
at this time. The credit for this 'discovery' was claimed at the time by none other than 8.S.
Moonje. See his Presidential Speech to the 1926 All-India Shuddhi Sabha Conference,
reproduced in Iliiavada 18 April 1926; Moonje says that he discovered the Devala Smriti
whilst studying the smritis that I could get hold of in the libraries of Nagpuru alter
witnessing the problems of the Moplah converts in gaining readmission to Hinduism.
32	 Fischer-Tine, "Kind Elders of the Hindu Biradri", p. 12.




appears to have turned a blind eye to ritual as a feature of the ceremony in the interests
of a united front.36
The Malkana Rajputs constituted an ideal target for a unified shuddhi campaign,
principally because of their clear link into high caste Hinduism. They could claim
descent from the Jadun Rajput caste, having been nominally converted in return for
land rights during the Mughal period, the name 'Malkana' deriving from 'milkayat' or
ownership of land.37 From the point of view of Sanatanists, therefore, the dilemma of
how to accommodate purified Malkanas did not arise; they were simply absorbed into
their nominal biradri. 38 The collaboration was undoubtedly strengthened by the
presence of Muslim organisations in the area, working to counter the influence of the
shuddhi campaign through tabligh (an Islamic "equivalent" of shuddhi, in the sense of
an organised movement seeking conversion to Islam). Tensions nevertheless existed
between Aryas and Sanatanists working within the campaign. Aryas were unhappy
with the idea of Malkanas being "removed from one form of false religion and
placed in another"39 - i.e. being reclaimed by the orthodox biradrL. Sanatanists were
uncomfortable about working with Aryas, and a purely Sanatanist organisation, the
Punah Samskar Samiti, was set up soon after the Bharatiya Hindu Shuddhi Sabha
began work.
Tension was brought to a head at the 1923 Session of the Mahasabha at Benaras.
Shraddhanand tabled three resolutions, based on the Arya vision of vertically organised
Hinduism, which informed his approach to sangathan. The first dealt with
untouchables, calling for practical concessions (access to wells, schools etc.) as a
prelude to their assimilation into the "organic whole in the great body of the Aryan
fraternity" (i.e. through shuddhi). The second dealt specifically with the Malkana
Rajputs. The third dealt more generally with shuddhi as a process of conversion from
other religions, calling for the acceptance "by the whole Hindu community" of converts
regardless of which 'sect' bad performed the shuddhi rites. This alludes to the
theoretical recognition of merit-based wima, in the sense that reclaimed Aryas would be
36	 Although I have been unable to find any direct reference toit, Moonje implies in his
Presidential Speech to the 1926 All-India Shuddhi Sabba Confexence that the Devala. Smriti
was used as the basis of the purification ceremony in the Malkana campaign; See H1tawia 18
April 1926.
See Y. Sikand & M. Katju, "Mass Conversions to Hinduism among Indian Muslims",
p. 2216.
38 At a meeting of "Benaras Sanatanists" in April 1923 "all spoke supporting the Malkana
Shuddhi movement as allowed by the religious books and traditions of Sanatan Dharm";
see Leader 30 April 1923.
Thursby, Hindu-Muslim Relations in British India, p. 153.
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invested with twice-born status in accordance with Dayananda's flexible varna
structure.40
The oniy resolution dealt with immediately was that referring to the Malkana Rajputs.
The resolution that emerged stated that the Malkanas "should be taken back into the
Hindu fold in the castes to which they originally belonged."41 This was doing no more
than confirming the righteousness of the shuddhi campaign as it stood.
Both of Shraddhanand's other resolutions, however, were referred to a committee of
pandits for consideration. This committee, consisting of 75 pandits, met in January
1924, and the results of their deliberations were adopted as Mahasabha policy at a
special session in February. Concession was made in relation to the first resolution on
the issue of untouchability, in that access to wells, temples and schools was generally
encouraged. At the same time, however, the resolution tabled made it clear that this
concession would not stretch to a consideration of shuddhi amongst untouchables,
stating that it was "against scripture and the tradition to give the untouchables
yajyopavit [i.e. investiture with sacred threadi, to teach the Vedas and to interdine with
them... •"42 Although Samajists present at this meeting were able to amend this
resolution by qualifying it as the belief of a "very large body of Hindus, i.e. the
Sanatanists," it was clear that many of the shuddhi rites conducted by the Samaj
amongst low caste and untouchable groups would not be recognised by the Mahasabha.
40	 Leakr, 8 August 1923; the full text of the resolutions reads:
J. With a view to do justice to the so-called depressed classes in the Hindu community and to
assimilate them as part of an organic whole in the great body of the Aryan fraternity, this
conference of Hindus of all sects holds:
a) that the lowest among the depressed classes be allowed to draw water from common public
wells.
b) that water be served to them at drinking posts freely as is done to the highest among other
1-lindus.
c) that all members of the classes be allowed to sit on the same carpet in public meetings and
other ceremonies with the higher classes and
d) that their children (male and female) be allowed to enter freely and, at teaching time, to sit
in the same form with other Hindu and non-Hindu children in government, national and
denominational institutions.
2. Looking to the splendid enthusiasm which has been aroused among the Hindu public in the
work of reclamation of Malkana Rajputs and their entry into their brotherhood this conference
decides once and for all that all such Neo-Muslims whether they be Rajputs or Brahurmns,
Vaishyas, Jat or Gujars etc, who have always conformed to the Hindu customs and rites be
taken back into their several bi-otherhoods and be treated as Hindus for all intents and purposes.
3. In view of the fact that an overwhelming majority of Indian Mahomedans and Christians ate
the descendants of Hindu converts and in view of the catholicity of the ancient Vedic Dhanna
which absorbed non-Aryans into the community - this conference reso'ves that non-Hindus
converted by any sect of the Hindus according to the purification (prayashchit) rite presciibed
by the representative body of that sect be considered Hindus to all intents and purposes by the
whole Hindu community.
41	 Leader, 24 August 1923.
42	 Leader, 8 February 1924.
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The other referred resolution, dealing with conversions, emerged with conditions
attached. "Any non-Hindu was welcome to enter the fold of Hinduism," the adopted
resolution ran, "though he could not be taken into any caste". 43 This curious statement
again ensured the preservation of the existing caste structure, whilst attempting to
confront the problem of shuddhi as conversion. The implication of Shraddhanand's
original text - that the Mahasabha should recognise the theoretical validity of merit-
based varna - was resolutely rejected. Significantly, however, the new policy did not
rule out conversion, and this indicates an expansion of the idea of horizontal
organisation. Conversion without caste was possible, as converts could be channelled
into the alternative structure of the Arya Samaj, from where the purity of caste Hindus
could be affected only remotely. In effect, the statement could make sense only if the
Arya Samaj was perceived as part of the horizontal organisation of Hinduism.
This is indicative of the predicament of the Arya Samaj as a facet of the sangathcm
movement. It has been shown how even in the context of the 1909 Hindu Conference,
Punjabi Samajists eschewed reformism in the name of consolidation. By the mid-
1920s, as the country became more embroiled in an unprecedented wave of communal
rioting, the Samaj was increasingly drawn into the ideology of sangathan at any cost.
The idea of a catholic, horizontal unity based on the perceived tolerance of the Hindu
tradition, encompassing all sects and dishing out theoretical respect to all levels of
Hindu society, became the defining principle of Hindu representation. No discord
could be expressed without negating this defining principle. Instead, the Mahasabha
promoted signifiers of Hinduism which reflected this idea of unity and consensus - cow
protection, the promotion of Hindi, Sanskrit and Nagari, swadeshi as a facet of Hindu
culture, service to widows and low caste/untouchable groups (but, again, no change in
status). In contrast, controversial issues relating to the nature of organised Hinduism,
such as shuddhi, and the relationship of untouchables to caste Hindus generally,
became increasingly subject to the parameters of this uthty.
ibid.
'	 The later history of the shuddhi movement illustrates this, in the way that the purification of
untouchables becomes increasingly subordinated to that of Christian and Muslim converts, and
the focus of the movement has tended towards 'soft targets' among the latter. This tendency
has been examined in a recent article , which links the shuddhi activity of the Arya Samaj to
that of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad in more recent years. The authors note that "Muslim
castes which have been particularly vulnerable to Hindu missionary efforts... am generally
only nominally Muslim and still retain many Hindu customs and beliefs. Most of the mass
conversions have occurred among Muslim Raj put groups". Sikand & Katju, "Mass
Conversions to Hinduism among Indian Muslims", p. 2219. My argument here disputes the
view taken by Walter Anderson that Sanatanists were alienated from the Mahasabha during the
twenties. He states that "Because of the strong reformist Arya Saniaj inclination of the
dominant group, the Sanatanists withdrew behind their own orthodox associations (i.e. Bharat
Mahainandal)." He offers no evidence to support this view. See his "The Rashtriya
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An example of this overriding attitude is provided by the Central Provinces Provincial
Conference of the Hindu Sabha in 1927. The Central Provinces Sabha tried hard to
encompass the Maharashtrian non-Brahman movement,45 and at the 1926 Session a
strong non-Brahman contingent attended. Waman Rao Ghorpade, a prominent Mahar
leader, attempted to move a resolution calling for the abolition of caste. Moonje records
the attempts of Lajpat Rai, who was presiding, to persuade Ghorpade to withdraw the
resolution, "as it is against the present policy of the Hindu Mahasabha which holds in
itself all shades of thought and opinion though the conference has full sympathy with
the resolution." Although Ghorpade complied, Moonje comments that "there was one
Mahar man...wbo gave a fiery harangue from his place in Ghorpade's group in the
large audience but we smothered it in expressions of sympathy and the unpleasantness
was avoided."46 This indicates precisely the approach of the Mahasabha towards low
caste reform. A surfeit of sympathy, but no "unpleasantness". It was an attitude which
Swami Shraddhanand was unable to accommodate. In 1926 he resigned from the
Mahasabha, commenting in his resignation statement that
the Mahasabha does not consider it its duty to work for those social
improvements which are utterly essential in order to save the Hindu
community from total ruin, and the Sabha even puts obstacles in the
way of its members who try to fulfil that very duty.47
By this time, then, Shraddhanand had conceded that his notion of sangathan could not
be effected through the Mahasabha.
This consolidation of horizontal organisation as the basis of Mahasabha sangathan was
accompanied by a continued commitment to symbolic representation. Throughout the
twenties and thirties the Mahasabha remained a relatively unstructured organisation with
little local level organisation. The 1929 Session at Surat did pass resolutions designed
to "organise Hindu Sabhas in every village and town", and called on "all Hindu
leaders" to establish Sabhas "in places where they do not exist at present."' These
somewhat vague appeals, however, were still not supported by a specific programme
of organisational development.49
Swayamsevak Sangh, II: Who Represents the Hindus?" (in Economic and Political Weekly,
Vol. 7, No. 12, 18 March 1972, pp. 633-640) p. 634.
'	 Moonje was particularly concerned to draw non-Bralmans into the Hindu Sabha; see Baker,
Changing Political Leadership in an Indian Province, p. 100.
46	 Moonje's Diary 4 April 1927; Moonje Papers Reel 1.
liberator, 23 September 1926; quoted in .Jordens, Swwni Shraddhananda, p.156.
48	 See Indra Prakash, Review of the History and Work of the Hindu Mahasabha and the Hindu
Sanghatan Movement, p.183.
At the 1937 Mahasabha Session at Allahabad, held in the wake of Congress triumph in the
first elections under the provisions of the 1935 Govemmcntf India Act, Savarkar concluded
his first session as President by declaring that the Mahasabha was in a position "similar to the
position of the Congress 20 years ago when it passed pious resolutions. If Hindu voters
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Nevertheless the Mahasabha created the space for the elaboration of Hindu organisation
as a significant ideology in Indian political discourse. It was the natural focal point for
middle class Hindus looking to extend these notions of organisation, to find a more
cogent expression of them in the modern world. The idea of Hindutva was
increasingly to encapsulate this expression.
7.1.3 V.D. Savarkar and the Articulation of Hindutva
A good deal of work has been done recently on Hindutva, or 8Hinduness", as the
defrning principle of Hindu nationalism. 50 This concept appears to encapsulate the
cultural justification of Hindu nationalism. Because of this, its first full articulation as a
Hindu nationalist "manifesto", in Vinayak Damodar Savarkar's 1923 work
Hindutval Who is a Hindu? (hereafter Hindulva), is often cited as the first time the idea
of the Hindu nation had been fully expressed. 51 Undoubtedly, Savarkar's short book
has been a major influence for many Hindu nationalists, providing a compact statement
of the ideological components of Hindu nationalism. In addition, it was adopted as a
kind of long-term statement of objectives for the Hindu Mahasabha, and its author was
to become the foremost leader of the Sabha in the run-up to independence and partition.
This thesis, however, presents Hindu nationalism as a gradual ideological
development. The themes to which Savarkar returns repeatedly in Hindutva revolve
around the now familiar idea of boundaries, defining the limits of Hinduism and its
relationship with external forces. Such preoccupations situate Hindutva as a feature of
this ideological development.
The idea of the Hindu nation is an example of this. Its development can be identified in
the articulation of Hindu organisation. The Sabha movement in the Punjab was
examined in Chapter 5 as an attempt to encompass Hinduism by recruiting
representatives of a kind of spectrum of beliefs. This idea was extended and developed
by the Mahasabha, and the general notion of sangathan as articulated after the effective
voted at the next election for Hindu candidates standing on the ticket of the Mahasabha they
would come into power." Quoted in N.N. Mitra [ed.], Indian Annual Regicter 1937 Vol.11
(Annual Register Office, Calcutta, 1938), p. 422. This ambitious vision was of course far
from fulfilled. As Anderson states, "The Hindu Mahasabha...was never effectively organised
nor did it ever seriously challenge the Congress for the support of Hindus." See his "The
Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh. II", p.635.
50	 See Jaffrelot, The Hindu Nationalist Movement in India; and also his "The Idea of the Hindu
Race in the Writings of Hindu Nationalist Ideologues in the 1920s and 1930s: a Concept
between Two Cultures" (in P. Robb [ed.], The Concept of Race in South Asia, OUP, 1995);
0. Pandey, "Which of Us are Hindus?"; Ram-Prasad, "Hindutva Ideology Extracting the
Fundamentals" (in Contemporary South Asia Vol. 2, No. 3, 1993, pp. 285-309).
See Jaffrelot, The Hindu Nationalist Movement in India, p. 25; Pandey, "Which of Us are
Hindus?", p. 242.
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defeat of Shraddhanand's resolutions is a reflection of this. The Hindu "conunumty"
was entreated to become organised, it should in some sense pull together and become a
more forceful, a more "real" unit in the modern world. For those seeking to effect this
ideal, articulating the unit was of course central. What emerges is a gradual
development from a community made up of several components, towards the
composite notion of a nation; a unit, a constituency, with real meaning in the modern
world.
This development is evident in the campaign to establish Benaras Hindu University.
The first prospectus of the University, published in 1906, states that the University will
"train teachers of religion for the preservation and promotion of Sanatana Dharina
which is inculcated by the Srutis, Smritis and Puranas, and which recognises varna and
ashrama," and further that "all religious work (will) be under the control of Hindus
who accept and follow the principles of the Sanatana Dharma." 52 By 1911 this
approach had been modified. In his statement on the University during this year,
Malaviya comments that "every nation cherishes its own religion (and) the Hindus are
no exception to that rule." He then goes on to express the mutuality of this nation,
stating "there is visible at present a strong desire for greater union and solidarity among
all the various sections of the community, a growing consciousness of common ties
which bind them together and which make them sharers in sorrow and in joy... ."53
Malaviya, then, reflects a movement towards composite solidarity expressed in the idea
of the nation, shedding the somewhat aggressive exciusivism of the earier commitment
to sanatana dharma.
Even in the Bharat Dharma Mahamandal, the nation had begun to supersede orthodoxy
as the projected constituency. In 1915 the Mahamandal announced its impending
session at Benaras by describing it as an "All-India Conference of Hindus", stating that
"invitations would be sent.. .to every Hindu gentleman who can speak for his sect,
order, class or caste. The representative character of the conlerence...would be so
thorough, complete and beyond question as to impart to its decisions the prestige and
authority of the united voice of the Hindu nation." 54
 The representative sweep of the
52 
"First Prospectus of the Benaras Hindu University", produced by M.M. Malaviya in March
1906. Reproduced in V.A. Sundaram (ed.), Benaras Hindu University 1905-1 935 (Benaras
1936), p. ii - iii.
M.M. Malaviya, "Benaras Hindu University: Why it is Wanted and What it Aims at", (no date
- Reproduced in ibid.), p. 35.7. I have cited this document as produced in 1911 on the basis of
a statement in the text as to the desire to have the foundations of the University laid "in
December next, in the happy and auspicious days when His Majesty, the King-Emperor will
be in our midst." (p.56). This is presumably a reference to the visit of George V during this
year.
54	 Announcement from the Bharat Dharma Mahamandal Head Office, Benaras, 31 July 1915; see
Tilak Papers Reel I (Correspondence), (NML).
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Mahamandal, then, had moved on from the 1902 invocation of "the whole of the
orthodox classes of the Hindus in India", to "the united voice of the Hindu nation".
Of course, in both these cases the nation is expressed very much in religious terms, and
it is invoked in a symbolic manner, as a means of representing the idea of a composite
solidarity - a religious sangathan. This, in one sense, is a further indication of the
influence of symbolic representation in Indian politics, particularly politics related to
religious representation. Savarkar moved away from this by stepping self-consciously
out of the realm of religion and into the realm of culture. In discussing the ancient term
Arya he states that "it must be clearly pointed out that the definition is not based on any
theological hair-splitting or religious fanaticism." Rather, he says, it meant "all those
who had been incorporated as parts integral in the nation and people that flourished on
this our side of the Indus whether Vaidik or Avaidik, Brahmana or Chandal... ." By
the same token, "Mlechcha" referred to "foreigners nationally and racially and not
necessarily religiously."55 On this basis Savarkar's notion of Hindutva was a radical
extension of the idea of horizontal organisation, cutting through the problem of internal
division and tension with a grandiloquent catholicity. This unproblematic approach
was quite singular in the context of the early twenties, reflecting the singular conditions
in which the book was produced.
In his early years Savarkar, a Chitpavan Brabman from Ratnagiri in Maharashtra, was a
revolutionary nationalist. In 1909 he was implicated in the Jackson assassination case,
and a year later, after his dramatic temporary escape in Marseilles, he was finally
sentenced to transportation for life to the harsh conditions of the cellular jail in
Andaman. His escape and re-arrest on French soil led to a questioning of the actions of
the Government in international law, and this ensured that Savarkar maintained a high
profile in the public space even after his incarceration.56 Not only was Savarkar
perceived as an ardent and committed nationalist; he had also been the victim of
manifestly unjust treatment from the Government. The writing of a man with such
impeccable nationalist credentials, then, was bound to have an impact.
The very production of Hindutva, furthermore, was an indication of Savarkar's heroic
resistance. As the Preface to the Second Edition states, "it was on the whitewashed
walls of his solitary cell in the Andamanees (sic) prison that the first outlines of this
book were sketched, chapters and points fixed and the definition versified." 57 Having
Savarkar, HindutvafWho is a Hindu? (S.S. Savarkar, Bombay, 1989 - 6th Edition; 1st Edition
1923), p. 33.
	
56	 See D. Keer, Veer Savarkar (Popular Prakashan, Bombay, 1988), pp. 93-98.
	
''	 Reproduced in Savarkar, Hindutva, p. iii-iv.
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been transferred back to a series of mainland jails in 1921, he wrote out the manuscript
and "through various surreptitious channels parts of it continued to be cleverly
smuggled out of those Indian Prison walls till at last the whole work reached its
destination." The book itself, then, seemed to echo the acts of heroism and sacrifice
which it highlights as aspects of Hindu history. It was in itself a symbol of the
projected quality of Hindu nationalism.58
As well as giving the book an aura of heroism, this context meant that it was written in
comparative isolation. Not only had Savarkar been in prison for some twelve years by
the time the book was published; before this he had been in Europe for five years. I
would suggest that the unproblematic catholicity of Hindutva is partly a product of this
distance from the debates around the organisation of Hinduism. 59 A comparison with
Shraddhanand's Hindu Sangathan is revealing. Whereas the latter is preoccupied with
the problems of contemporary Hinduism - in particular the problem of untouchability,
the "sine qua non of Nationality in India", Savarkar easily encompasses untouchables
as an integral feature of Hindutva. In the "prolonged furious conflict" to protect their
nationality, he says, "Sanatanists, Satnamis, Sikhs, Aryas, Anaryas, Marathas and
Madrasis, Brahmins and Panchamas - all suffered as Hindus and triumphed as
Hindus."60
 And again: "Some of us are Brahmans and some Namashudras or
Panchamas; but Brahmans or Chandalas - we are all Hindus and own a common
blood."61
This notion of common blood or race is particularly significant in the legitimation of
horizontal organisation in Hindutva. It is one component of Savarkar's first formula
for the identification of Hindus: rashtra-jati-sanskriti, or nation-race-culture.62 In
effect, Savarkar reverses the idea of jati (most commonly translated as caste - i.e. as
distinct from varna) as divisive, making it the touchstone of the racial unity of the
Hindus:
The very castes which you owing to your colossal failure to understand
and view them in the right perspective, assert to have barred the
common flow of blood into our race, have done so more truly and more
effectively as regards the foreign blood than our own. Nay is not the
58	 As Swami Shraddhanand commented somewhat grandiosely: "It must have been one of those
Vedic dawns indeed which inspired our Seers with new truths, that revealed to the author of
'Hindutva' this 'Mantra', this definition of Hindutva!!"; quoted in ibid. p. vii.
Although it should be noted that Savarkar claimed to have intmduced a shuddhi ceremony and
persuaded other prisoners to accept his definition of Hindu whilst in Andaman; see Savarkar,
My Tran.tporiaiion for Life (S. S. Savarkar, Bombay, 1984), pp. 316-323.60	 See Savarkar, Hindutva, p. 45.
61	 Savarkar, Hindulva, p. 89.
62	 The second formula being Piiribhumi.Punya b/i wni, or fatherland-holy land; see Savarkar,
I-Ii.'zdulva, pp. 102-116.
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very presence of these present castes a standing testimony to a common
flow of blood from a Brahman to a Chandal?63
Savarkar rationalised this argument by reference to the idea of sanctioned inter-
marriage.64 It is this idea, he says, which created the caste system, endlessly
proliferating through the union of members of different castes. All castes, therefore,
were bound by the same blood, the same race. In addition, a further co-mingling has
been caused by the existence of caste rules. Those who break the rules would be
outcast, and after all, he states rather pragmatically,"being outcast from a caste, which
is an event of daily occurrence, is only getting incorporated with some other."65
Here, then, Savarkar rejects the stigma of hierarchical oppression almost entirely,
through what he sees as the overriding commonality of Hindu blood. All castes,
untouchables and adivasis are part of the same organic whole which is Hindutva. The
caste system exists simply as a rationalising and ordering network within this whole:
All that the caste system has done is to regulate its tioble blood on lines
believed - and on the whole rightly believed - by our saintly and patriotic
law-givers and kings to contribute most to fertilise and enrich all that
was barren and poor, without famishing (sic) and debasing all that was
flourishing and nobly endowed.66
The idea of horizontal organisation, the binding together of Hindus without disrupting
contemporary caste status, was thus eloquently reiterated by Hindutva, precisely at a
time when it was most severely under attack from Shraddhanand and the Arya attempt
to install caste reform as the principal Mahasabha ethos.
Underpinning this approach to organisation and caste was a perception of Indian
history which resisted to a remarkable degree one of the principal structures of
Orientalism - the idea of Hindu degeneration. Caste proliferation is certainly perceived
as historical, as it is, for example, by Shraddhanand. But whereas the latter sees it as
both cause and effect of the decline from the Golden Age of Vedic Hinduism, Savarkar
perceives it simply as a facet of historical development that only helped to preserve and
expand the influence and power of the Hindu race. This was particularly so in the
wake of Buddhist decline in India - a decline of sorts, when the Hindu race fell pray to
the excessive "universalism" and "passivity" of Buddhism, before the national
sensibility of the race reasserted itself. 67 But the Mughal invasions, so important in
63	 Savarkar, Hindutva, p. 85- Savarkar is addressing an imaginary sceptic who expresses the
"not unoften interested objection that carpingly questions 'but are you really a race? Can you
be said to possess a common blood?'"
64	 The system of Anuloma and Pratiloma; see ibid. For an explanation of these concepts, see
Jaifrelot, The Hindu Nationalist Movement in IndIa; pp. 20-21.
Savarkar, Hindutva, p. 88.66	 Savarkar, Hindutva, p. 86.
67	 Savarkar, Hinduiva, p. 27.
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previous versions of "Hindu history" as a catalyst to degeneration, are not presented as
a symptom of Hindu decline. Rather, "peace and plenty" lulled Hindus into a false
sense of security, which was shattered by the forces of Islam, the "veritable human
Sahara whirling and columning up bodily in a furious world storm." The invasions are
presented as part of a pan-Islamic attack on Asia and Africa, in which India alone
resisted suppression: "Day alter day, decade after decade, century after century, the
ghastly conflict continued and India single-handed kept up the fight morally and
militantly?68
 Consistently, then, Savarkar refuses to accept the notion of
degeneration. By side-stepping this overriding issue, the patriotic rhetoric of his quasi-
historical account constructs a more brazen, aggressively triumphalist vision of the
Hindu nation, unburdened by the problems and preoccupations of other ideologues of
Hindu organisation.
Hindutva also stands out because it does not dwell self-consciously on the issue of
sangathan, when this notion dominated Hindu politics of the period. There is a
reference in the last few pages to the need to "consolidate the race", for the "Hindu
people (to) get fused and welded into an indivisible whole." There is also a veiled
threat to low caste movements and potential converts ("Those of you who in a fit
suicidal...dare to disown the name Hindu will find to their cost that in doing so they
have cut themselves off from the very source of our racial life and strength"). 69 The
principal objective of the book, however, is to establish a broad definition of what it
means to be Hindu and proclaim the history of this "Hindu race" or nation with a quite
unbridled sense of triumphalism. 7° Nevertheless it must be emphasised that the issues
that Savarkar addresses are the same issues that underpin the articulation of sangathan.
Organisation in this sense is implicit in his vision of the Hindu nation.
Hindutva was unquestionably a text designed for a middle class readership. Not only
is it in English, but it is also characterised by what is at times a most obscure and florid
rhetoric. The first sentence of the book makes it abundantly clear that this text is not for
the un - or even traditionally - educated:
We hope that the fair Maid of Verona who made the impassioned appeal
to her love to change a name that was 'nor hand, nor foot, nor arm, nor
face, nor any other part belonging to a man' would forgive us for this
68	 Savarkar, Hi.ndutva, pp. 42-4.69	 Savarkar,Hindutva, p. 141.
70 This is not to say, however, that Savarkar was unconcerned with the plight of low castes and
particularly untouchables. He was, for example, aclively engaged in work with untouchables
during the period after his release in 1924 when he was confined to Ratnagiri. In particular, he
worked to increase untouchable access to Government maintained schools; see Miscellaneous
Conespondence 1925-37, Savarkar Papers Reel 22, (NML).
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our idolatrous attachment to it when we make bold to assert that,
'Hindus we are and love to remain so!'7'
The irony apparent in Savarkar's "idolatrous" defiance of Shakespearean wisdom only
increases the impression of this work as directed at a very limited audience - precisely
the audience, in fact, that the Hindu Mahasabha appealed to for active support.
English-educated, high and middle caste Hindus, fearful for their political position and
their employment prospects in the post-Montford polity.
Nevertheless Hindutva had nothing to say in terms of practical steps towards the
consolidation and expansion of this support base. Despite the frequent characterisation
of the text as a "scientific analysis" of what it means to be a Hindu, 72 it has been noted
that Savarkar did not deal explicitly with the issue of sangathan. As such, Hindutva
reaffirmed the tendency in horizontal organisation to overlook the means of effecting
organisation, and hence to drift again towards a reiteration of symbolic representation
as a means of bringing the nation into being. A related and supporting feature here was
the continued reliance of the Hindu Mahasabha on aristocratic support. In the absence
of a popular organisational structure the Mahasabha was heavily reliant on the
patronage of conservative notables and princes such as Laxmanrao Bhonsla, the heir to
the disestablished kingdom of Nagpur who supported Moonje's activities quite heavily.
This inter-related reliance on symbolic representation and aristocratic support severely
limited the political position of the Mahasabha in the post-Independence periocL73
A parallel development of the ideology of Hindu organisation, however, signalled a
quite radical departure from this pattern of development. The establishment and growth
of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh in Nagpur channelled the idea of sangathan into a
different discursive framework.
71	 Savarkar, Hindulva, p.1.
72	 See Keer, Veer Savarkar, p. 162.
On the post-Independence electoral performance of the Mahasabha,, see Jaffrelot, The Hindu
Nationalist Movement in India, pp. 107-113. Also, Anderson, "The Rashtriya Swayanisevak
Sangh, II", p. 635, notes that :"RSS members have frequently told the author that the Hindu
Mahasabha was a collection of rich talukdars and zaniindars with no real organisation capable
of defending Hinduism."
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7.2 The Organisation of Hindu Nationalism II: The Rashtriya
Swayanisevak Sangh
Like Savarkar's Hindutva, the historical and ideological development of the RSS is a
subject which has been quite comprehensively covered by a variety of scholars.
Christophe Jaffrelot is the most recent to examine these issues in detail, and little would
be gained by duplicating his excellent coverage, which draws both on earlier quite
thorough accounts, and on a variety of new sources, including the valuable contribution
of oral history accounts.74 Almost inevitably, however, the development of the
argument in this thesis leads me to disagree with some aspects of Jaifrelot's analysis,
particularly in relation to the early development of the RSS. For Jaffrelot, the
emergence of the RSS is a further example of the strategy of stigmatisation and
emulation of threatening Others which built on that developed by Savarkar. Part of this
process was the incorporation of notions of asceticism and the "egalitarian sect"
(sampradaya) as conduits for the emulation of "western individualistic values".75 I will
argue against this analysis by highlighting key elements of RSS development in the
context of themes raised in this thesis, and in contrast to the pattern of development in
the Mahasabha. In keeping with the way in which such developments have been
viewed, the emergence of the RSS will not be perceived as a "natural" culmination of
the ideological development of Hindu nationalism. Rather, I will illustrate it as a
seminal clashing of discursive forms, which effectively constituted a fissure in the
ideological meshing previously noted between horizontal organisation and symbolic
representation. My argument suggests that this was a highly significant departure in the
history of Hindu nationalist ideology.
7.2.1 Early History of the RSS: the Pattern of Expansion
RSS literature cites the founding of the Sangh in 1925 as the work of Dr. Keshav
Baliram Hedgewar, who would later go on to become the first Sarsanghchalak, or
'	 See Jail relot, The Hindu Nationalist Movement in India; Pandey, "Which of Us are
Hindus?"; T. Basu et al, Khaki Shorts Saffron Flags; W. Anderson and S.D. Damle, The
Brotherhood in Saffron; D.R. Goyal, Rashlriya Swayamsevak Sangh; W. Anderson, "The
Rashtnya Swayamsevak Sangh, 1: Early Concerns (in Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 7
No. 11, 11 March 1972, pp. 589-97); J.A. Curran, Militant Hinduism in Indian Politics: A
Study of the RSS (Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, 1951). In addition, there is a
large body of RSS-sponsored literature that perpetuates a hagiographic view of the
organisation's development. I have referred to two of these accounts fairly extensively: K.R.
Malkani, The RSS Story (Impex India, New Delhi, 1980); and Deshpande and Ramaswamy,
Dr. Hedgewar: The Epoch-Maker.
7	 Jaffrelot, The Hindu Nationalist Movement in India, p. 43-5.
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absolute leader of the Sangh.76 Hedgewar was a Deshastha Brahman; his family was
resident in Nagpur and his father followed a traditional priestly occupation. They were
by no means well-off, and when both his parents died of plague in 1902, Hedgewar
was left at the age of thirteen to fend largely for himself. It does appear, however, that
he received substantial help even in his early years from B.S. Moonje, a close associate
of Tilak and, as we have seen, a budding Hindu nationalist.77
This Tilakite association was continued into the twenties, and some non-RSS sources
cite the involvement of several Tilakite politicians in the establishment of the Sangh in
1925.78 Certainly, it is evident from Moonje's own diaries that his association with
Hedgewar was fairly close. Whenever Moonje was in Nagpur, Hedgewar is a
consistent presence in the diaries. RSS members, however, are referred to as
"Hedgewar's volunteers" and the actual organisation of the Sangh does not appear as a
concern of this national level politician. 79 This is perhaps not surprising, as the Sangh
was at this time an extremely small organisation. Hedgewar's association, however,
with more prominent politicians - established particularly since his involvement in the
Nagpur Congress of 1920 - almost certainly gave the organisation a particular public
profile in the locality.80
This profile was quickly enhanced by the Sangh's first formal public action. This was
during the Ram Navami festival in April 1926. Ram Navami was celebrated as a
regional mela at the temple complex of Ramtek near Nagpur. 8 ' Melas at Ramtek were
76	 H.V Seshadri describes the Sarsanghchalak as the "guide and philosopher of the Sangh"; see
his ESS: A Vision in Action (Jagarana Prakashana, Bangalore, 1988), p. 321. Hedgewar
became Sarsanghchalak in 1929.
77	 Deshpande and Ramaswamy state that Hedgewar first worked for Moonje during the "Paisa
Fund" agitation 1901; later, after taking his matriculation he stayed with Moonje, and the
latter was influential in his decision to enrol at the National Medical College in Calcutta; see
Dr. Hedgewar: The Epoch-Maker, p. 7, 15.78	 D.R. Goyal, Rashtriya Swayamsevak Saugh , p. 59 cites the five original members as
Moonje, Paranjpe, Tholkar, Babarao Savarkar (Vinayak Daniodar's elder brother), and
Hedgewar. See also Basu et al, Khaki Shorts Saffron Flags, p. 16.
79	 See, for example, Moonje's Diary 1927: entries on 4 May, 4 June, 11 June, 13 June; Moonje
Papers Reel 1 (NML).
80	 Hedgewar's high profile organisational work at the Nagpur Congress (see below) was overseen
by Paranjpe - see Anderson, "The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, I", p. 591; his involvement
with Moonje, as stated, was long established, but the particular model of "leader" and
"stonntrooper" developed after the establishment of the Nagpur Hindu Sabha in 1923, and the
subsequent violence at Ganesh Peth - see Goyal, Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, p. 49; in
relation to this, it is interesting to note that the swayainsevak and former prominent
p-acharak Vasant Rao Oke, who joined the Sangh in 1926, recalled how he first caine to know
of Hedgewar through the latter's confrontational strategy of supervising the playing of music
before mosques - the issue, of course, which sparked the Ganesh Peth not; interview with
Oke, 16 December 1995.
81	 There were in fact two annual melas at Ramtek: the April niela was far smaller than the 15
day long main event in November. Interestingly, Ramtek's religious significance derives from
a story of assertive low caste devotion to Rain. Rain was said to have visited the site in order
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characterised by a certain amount of chaos and crime, and Hedgewar led the
swayamsevaks in a stewarding role, enforcing queues, providing drinking water, and
expelling corrupt practitioners. 82 Significantly, this was the first occasion on which the
swayamsevaks wore their now familiar uniform of khaki shorts, white shirts and caps.
This was the same uniform as that worn by the organisational force directed by
Hedgewar at the 1920 Congress Session in Nagpur.83 At Ramtek, then, the Sangh
presented itself specifically as a force of order and organisation in the context of a
public gathering. Although there was obviously a religious agenda here, the RSS role
was not necessarily communally inspired: the swayamsevaks are reported to have
"driven off" both "Muslim fakirs and brahmin pandits". 84 The emphasis is more on the
bringing of order and justice for the benefit of ordinary pilgrims. This formula of
mixing organisational work with a kind of social service has been an enduring feature
of Sangh activity.85
The first permanent unit, or shakha, of the Sangh was established soon after this, at
Mohite Wada in the Mahal district of Nagpur city. 86 By the end of that year three other
shakhas had been established in the Mahal area, as well as one in the Sitabaldi area of
the city.87 These small, very localised units acted as the building blocks of RSS
expansion. Over the next few years the organisation expanded gradually across
Maharashtra, through the establishment of shakhas, often after a visit to the area from
Hedgewar or one of his associates.88 Shakha activities ranged from physical games,
through marching and lathi training, to singing and ideological discussion (bauddhik
classes). Three aspects of the shakha structure need to be emphasised here.89 Firstly,
to cut off the head of a Shudra named Shambuka, who had so upset the natural order of things
by practising Brabman-style austerities that he caused the death of a Brahman's son. Whilst
accepting his fate as an honour, Shambuka "prayed to Rama that he would abide forever at
Raxntek. ...So Rama took up his abode on the hill, and the Shudra was turned into a linga
over which the temple of Dhumreshwar Mahadeo was built." See Central Provinces District
Gazetteers, Nagpur District, A Volume (1908), p. 331.82 Anderson and Damle, The Brotherhood in Saffron, p. 35; this role was confirmed by Vasant
Rao Oke, who recalled that Swayamsevaks "went together by bicycle to Ramtek to manage
the
83	 See Anderson, "The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, I", p. 593; and Anderson and Damle, The
Brotherhood in Saffron, p. 35, n. 55.84	 Anderson and Damle, The Brotherhood in Saffron, p. 35; again supported (undemonstratively)
by oral evidence from Oke.
85	 During Partition, for example, the RSS was active in relief work for refugees from the newly
created Pakistan. Anderson, "The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, II", p. 638, notes that this
riot only enhanced the Sangh's reputation, but also assisted directly its expansion: "As the
refugees spread out over northern and western India, they took the RSS with them and served
as the membership nucleus for new shakhas."
86	 28 May 1926; see Deshpande and Ramaswamy, Dr. Hedgewar: The Epoch-Maker, p. 83.87	 Evidence from Vasant Rao Oke, who joined the Sitabaldi shakiza in 1926.
88	 N.B. Lele, interviewed 20 January 1996, explained that he joined the RSS as one of "a dozen
students" in his home town of Jalgaon in Maharashtra after a visit from one of Hedgewar's
associates in 1934.
89	 I will look at shakizas in further detail in the next section.
206
shakhas convened at the same times each day. RSS hagiography cites Sister Nivedita,
the Irish-born disciple of Vivekananda, as the inspiration for this, through an
apparently Christian notion of religiosity: "Congregate and pray together for fifteen
minutes everyday, and Hindu society will become an invincible society." 9° This
synchronisation of activity became more powerful as the organisation expanded. Thus
the second Sarsanghchalak, M.S. Goiwalkar, was able to point to it as a symbol of the
national significance of the RSS:
Throughout the length and breadth of Hindusthan, not only in towns
and cities but in far off hamlets, hills and dales, these inspiring scenes
and soul-stirring songs greet us regularly and punctually at the time of
sunrise, sunset or at night everyday. We call it shakha."91
Secondly, recruitment to the shakha was directed at the very young. 92 Dr. S.B.
Warnekar was only nine years old when he joined the Mohite Wada shakha in 1927.
He recalls that most of the boys he saw in the shakha were older than him. However,
when he asked Dr. Hedgewar if he could join, he was told that he should collect ten
boys of his age, then he would be able to join. The next day he brought ten boys from
his neighbourhood and so gained entry.93 This brings us to the third point to note in
relation to the shakha: recruitment occurred very much through local word of mouth.
Warnekar described it as a "friends' circle" approach to recruitment. As a result,
recruitment during this early period was confined to a particular social/caste stratum:
middle class and lower middle class, upper caste (mostly Brahman) boys. Much has
been made of this high caste, middle class profile.94 There is no doubt that the
disciplining of high caste youth was a feature of the organisation; as Moonje
commented in 1927, "I wish that many more young Brahrnin lads go though such
discipline and experience." 95 Considering the ideological trajectory and middle class
base of the RSS, however, this high caste domination was not extraordinary. It had
also, after all, been a feature of socio-religious reform organisations like the Arya
Samaj and the Ramakrishna Mission, and indeed of the early Congress organisation.
90	 Quoted in M.S. Goiwalkar, Bunch of Thoughts (Vikram Prakashan, Bangalore, 1966), p. 368;
also recalled by K.S. Sudarshan, former joint General Secretary of the RSS, in Basu et al,
Khaki Shorts Saffron Flags, p. 16.
91	 Golwalkar, Bunch of Thoughts , p. 334; Jaffrelot has pointed to this aspect of the shaklui as
evidence of the Sangh's pmjection of an imagined community, in the manner described by
Benedict Anderson as a key feature of nationalist consciousness; see The Hindu Nationalist
Movement in India, p. 64.
92	 Of the five Swayanisevaks I interviewed who had joined the organisation in the first nine years
of its existence, only one had reached his teens when he joined.
Interview with S.B. Warnekar, 22 April 1996.
See Goyal Rashtriya Swayarnsevak Sangh, p. 60; Basu et al, Khaki Shorts Saffron Flags,
pp. 16-7; for an opposing view, see Curran, Militant Hinduism in Indian Politics, p. 11.
Diary 11 June 1927; Moonje Papers Reel One (NML); also see his press statement in
Ritavada 17 July 1927.
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These three elements help us to establish a profile of RSS expansion during these early
years. The accent on youth and "friends' circle" recruitment emphasises the localised
nature of expansion; the synchronisation of s/zak/ia activity continually puts this local
setting into a wider and ever expanding context. This simple model allowed the RSS to
expand in Maharashtra and later, in the thirties, in the north, relying on similar urban
and semi-urban middle class settings, where the three elements had the most impact.
One further element also needs to be taken into account: the communal riot. In
September 1927 a serious riot occurred in Nagpur city. Three days of rioting resulted
in twenty deaths and 131 wounded. The estimated economic cost was Rupees 50 000
per day.96 The riot had something of a manufactured quality to it, having been
preceded by stagey processions by both Hindus and Muslims. 97 The Hitavaiia stated
that "the Hindus, who had anticipated a challenge from the Mahommedans, were not
unprepared," and that certain areas of Nagpur were guarded by Hindu volunteers who
were "constantly patrolling the streets." 98 This suggestion of RSS involvement is by
no means denied in RSS literature:
The warlike posture of Muslims sent shock-waves through the hearts of
the Hindus. But a little over hundred young men of the Sangh were
determined to protect the Hindu society. Anna Sohani had divided them
into sixteen groups and stationed them in strategic places in different
Hindu areas. As planned, Muslim goondas began abusing the Hindus
and attacking them. However, they were in for a rude shock.
Swayamsevaks, who were on the alert, repelled the attacks instantly.
The Muslims were totally taken aback at this unexpected turn of events
and found it hard even to make a get-away. Seeing the swayamsevaks
repulsing the Muslims, other Hindus also felt emboldened and joined
the fray - many of them barely dressed, some in their silk dhoti
customarily worn during pooja!
Anna Sohani was a close associate of Hedgewar's, and his marshalling of the
swayamsevaks is shown to have "repulsed Muslim attacks". It is possible that the RSS
involvement in the riot has been over-emphasised in RSS literature - there is no mention
of the organisation, for example, in the Government communiqué on the matter - but
certainly the occasion led to a higher profile for the organisation. S.B. Warnekar
commented that alter the riot "people looked to the RSS...with some hope." Baparao
Wharadpandey, another Nagpur swayamsevak, also recalled that the RSS expanded
after the riot due to the spread of ideas about "Hindu society as one entity".'°°
96	 MtaRida 11 September 1927.
See Local Government Communiqué on the riot, published in Hitawida 13 September 1927.
98	 Ffitawida 8 September 1927.
Deshpande and Ramaswamy, Th. Hedgewar: The Epoch-Maker, p. 95-6.
100	 IntiewwithBaparaoWhdpandey,ex-Nagpurpachw, in Nagpur 21 April 1996;
interview with Warnekar op. cit. note 84; Deshpande and Ramaswainy, Dr. Hedgewar: The
Epoch-Maker, pp. 96-7, comment 'After the riot the name of the Sangh as well as its
founder Doctor Hedgewar spread throughout the length and breadth of Central Provinces.'
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An interesting feature of Deshpande and Ramaswamy's comment on the riot above is
the reference to the involvement of Hindus "in their silk dhotis". This is preceded by
an assertion that the Muslim "plan" was to "loot the Hindus belonging to the rich and
middle classes." For the RSS, then, this was not simply an occasion of low class
slippage into anarchy and disorder. The 1927 riot is presented as an occasion when the
middle classes, inspired by the actions of the swayamsevaks, began to fight back.
",Thether or not this was the case is difficult to establish, but the implication is clear the
RSS is presented as the embodiment of a middle class .-led sangathan, capable of
defending itself and of teaching a few lessons in the process.. 101 It is notable that in the
wake of the 1927 riot swaya,nsevaks were invited to attend the Mahasabha Session at
Ahmedabad, where another of Hedgewar's associates, Balaji Huddar, gave a speech
that "reflected the conquering zeal of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh." "This was
how the leaders of the various provinces were introduced to the Sangh," Deshpande
and Ramaswamy comment, "it was natural that all of them developed great warmth
towards the Sangh."°2
This rapid popularisation was underpinned by the steady expansion of the shakha
network. By the beginning of 1929, there were eighteen shakhas, mostly in Nagpur
and Wardha. By August that year the number had increased to thirty four. 103
 It is
clear that Hedgewar perceived Nagpur as the centre of the Sangh, an example for
expansion in other areas. He repeatedly emphasised this notion in letters, particularly
during those periods when he was himself absent from Nagpur.'° 4 The strength of
Nagpur then formed the basis for a methodical and controlled approach to expansion.
By the early thirties Hedgewar had instituted monthly reports to himself as a duty of all
shakha leaders (pramukhs). The practice was instigated at a meeting in Nagpur of all
pramukhs on 9 and 10 November 1929. The policy of ekchalakanuvartita (following
one leader) - the central idea of RSS discipline - was evidently adopted at this meeting.
The most significant act in the adoption of this policy is often cited as 1-ledgewar's
formal assumption of the position of Sarsanghchalak. 105 Equally important, however,
was the range of information pramukhs were required to bring to the meeting. This
included the precise size of their shakha and a profile of their swayamsevaks; the size of
the town in which they operated, and the proportion of Hindus, Muslims and
Christians in the town; and also the nature of any opposition to the Sangh in the
101	 Wharadpandey, Oke and Warnekar all commented that after the '27 riot, the Nagpur Muslims
"did not cause trouble again".
102	 Deshpande and Ramaswamy, Dr. Hedgewar: The Epoch-Maker, p. 97.
103	 Hedgewar to Dadar Paramarth 21 August 1929; Hedgewar Letters No.5 of 1929.
104	 See for example, Letter Nos. 1, 5, 6 of 1929; No. 2 of 1931.
105	 See, for example, Anderson, "The Rashtriya Swayarnsevak Sangh", p.593.
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area. 106 Hedgewafs power, it appears, was constructed on the basis of a precise
knowledge of the nature and extent of the organisation, and the environment in which it
operated. Over the next few years Hedgewar's correspondence consistently refers to
the maintenance of this flow of information, not only in relation to shakhas but also to
functions and camps hdd in different regions, and festivals attended by
swayamsevaks.'°7
This approach to knowledge is reminiscent of the zeal of the colonial bureaucracy. As
noted in Chapter 3, knowledge operated as a key feature of the colonial image of order
and organisation. With this interesting linkage in mind, I will now examine in further
detail the organisational models which underpinned the RSS structure as it emerged
towards the end of the twenties.
7.2.2 Organisational Models
In examining the emergence of the RSS organisation, several models have been
highlighted by scholars. One of the most persistent has been the akhara, a localised
unit of young men which bears a strong resemblance to the shakha.' 08 The aithara is
most commonly associated with physical fitness gymnasiums and the art of wrestling,
but also with forms of cultural performance (theatre, music, poetry), medicine and even
"the organisational structure used by mendicants". Sandria Freitag has cited the akhara
as a significant organisational form in the public arena: "a basic unit for mobilising for
collective action of various kinds...akharas represented a potentially diverse and
distinctly voluntary form of social organisation."'°9 To some extent, akharas had a
religious association, in that many included temples to Hanuman in their grounds."° It
should also be noted, however, that particularly during the second half of the nineteenth
century the akhara institution played an increasingly fluid role in popular organisation,
often being adapted as a means of gaining popular patronage by cultural practitioners
who had previously received aristocratic or royal support. Such adaptations were given
106	 Circular letter, Hedgewar to all pramukhs, 1 Nov. 1929; Hedgewar Letters No.9 of 1929.
107	 See, for example, Letter to Niikantrao Sadaphal 24 April 1932, No. 7 of 1932, and to
Balasaheb Dani 13 August 1933, No. 44 of 1933.
108	 See Jaffrelot, The Hindu Nationalist Movement in India, p. 35; Anderson and Damle, The
Brotherhood in Saffron, p. 35; J. Alter, "Somatic Nationalism: Indian Wrestling and Militant
Hinduism" (in Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 28 No. 3, 1994, pp. 557-88).109	 See S. Freitag [ed.], Culture and Power in Banaras: Community, Perfor,nance and
Environment, 1800-1980 (Univ. of California 1989) p. 120-1.
110	 Jaifrelot, The Hindu Nationalist Movement in India, p. 35.
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legitimacy by maintaining familiar structures as a feature of the organisation, such as,
for example, the teacher-disciple relationship.!"
Certainly the way in which the RSS emerged confirms the connection between akharas
and the shakha unit. Before the daily shaklza was introduced in May 1926, Hedgewar
encouraged his volunteers to attend an althara.' 12 Early swaywnsevaks interviewed in
relation to this project all stated either that they had joined the RSS via an akhara, or that
they had been attracted by the "physical tricks" of shakha activity and viewed it as "a
new kind of aithara" P113 This reflects very much the increased prominence of akharas
as a feature of politics in the mid-twenties. Anderson and Damle note a leap in the
number of aitharas in Nagpur district over this period from 230 to 570.' 14 It is also
evident that the sangathan movement had to some extent encouraged the idea of akhara
attendance as a feature of the revitalisation of Hindu society." 5
 Jaffrelot has noted the
expansion of akhara activity in relation to the spread of extremist nationalism, and
Freitag has noted the setting up of akharas as a feature of the Congress-led Municipal
Board in Kanpur in the nineteen twenties. 116
 To some extent, then, the akhara had
become entrenched as a feature of political life, if not a symbol of political intent, by the
mid-twenties. With its implication of physical, or even quasi-military, preparation (the
Kanpur akharas bad been started "to teach the art of warfare") this organisational form
appears to have represented a counterpoint to the supposed passivity, or, as Ashish
Nandy has suggested, femininity, of Gandhian ahimsa as a basis for mobilisation.117
In this context the adaptation of the akhara model in the RSS has a clear implication: it
was an appropriate form for an organisation which resisted the trajectory of Gandhian
ahima.
See Freitag, Collective Action and Community, p. 122; I emphasise this partly in reaction to
Jaffrelot's citation of the teacher-disciple relationship as a feature of the religious significance
of the akham form, which I believe is over-emphasised.
112	 Malkani notes that "Most of them went to Anna Khote's Nagpur Vyayamshala." The RSS
Story, p. 15.
113	 V.R. Oke and B. Wharadpandey joined via akhwug; S.B. Warnekar and M.G. Vaidya
(interviewed 22 April 1996) were attracted by the physical exercises; N.B. Lele recalled that he
and his friends saw the RSS as a new kind of akhanz".
114	 Anderson and Damle, The Brotherhood in Saffron, p. 35; Nagpur District had by far the
largest concentration of 1iaras in Central Provinces and Bemr - the figures for the whole area
over the period are 466 in 1921, and 1338 in 1931; see Census of India 1931 Vol. XII,
Central Provinces and Berar, Pt. 1: Report (Government Printing, Nagpur, 1933), p.296.
115	 Shiaddhanand included an akhwa as a necessary feature of his Rashtra Mandirs - see Hindu
Sangathan, p. 140; it is also interesting to note that in the context of the Ganesh Peth tension
in 1923, the Pra,xzvfr called for the construction of a temple to Ganesh in the area, to include a
branch office of the Mahasabha and an Akizara in its grounds - see Panavfr29 November
1923; RIN CP & B No.49 of 1923.
116	 See Jaffrelot, The Hindu Nationalist Movement in India, p. 36; Freitag, Collective Action and
Community, p. 225.
117	 See Jaffmlot's comments and citation, The Hindu Nationalist Movement in india, p. 46.
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Interestingly, however, other aspects of the Gandhian strategy evidently had their place
as models of RSS organisation, and this may be related to the argument developed in
Chapter 6 concerning the emergence of a new discourse of organisation in the twenties.
The volunteer model is perhaps the most immediate. It has been mentioned that
Hedgewar took charge of a large body of volunteers at the 1920 Congress. Under the
direction of Paranjpe, he supervised some of the work of the 1200 strong force that
managed the Congress tamasha. 118 The experience obviously had some impact on
Hedgewar. As we have seen, when the swayamsevaks appeared in their first crowd
management role at Ramtek in 1926, they were required to wear the same uniform as
the volunteers at the 1920 Session. Earlier, when Hedgewar was appointed Joint
Secretary of the Provincial Congress in 1922, he had attempted to raise a permanent,
district-based volunteer force as part of the Congress. In doing so he faced some
opposition, and was unable to raise an effective force. 119
 Here, it appears, he
confronted the indecision of the Gandhian Congress in relation to volunteers.
Deshpande and Ramaswamy state that "those who had taken the Gandhian vow of non-
violence were basically opposed to such an organisation."120
As we have seen, the concept of volunteers was central to Gandhi's notion of
salyagraha. Nevertheless the nervousness with which the elite leadership reconciled the
volunteer corps with the strategy of non-violence led to a repeated misconception of the
meaning of the corps in the context of mass mobilisation. Because it was not related to
the strategy of non-violence, the ideology of Hindu organisation was able to
appropriate the concept of disciplined volunteering without this kind of ideological
anxiety. The volunteer concept reflected perfectly the desire to present Hindu society as
a homogenous, co-ordinated unit, working in a dedicated and organised fashion. It
was, in effect, the perfect vehicle for the articulation of sangathan as the salvation of
Hindu society.
Part of the reason for this confluence between volunteering and sangathan was,
ironically, the proximity of volunteering in the political discourse of the twenties to the
idea of salyagraha. It has been illustrated how Gandhian salyagralza was conceived as
operating through a double layer of activists. Front-line salyagrahis were people who
had taken the satyagraha oath and were prepared to break the law and fill the prisons in
the name of the cause. These sazyagrahis were ordinary people - peasants, workers,
government servants, traders etc. - who had been drawn into the movement for
liberation. They were the life-blood of the strategy of mass mobilisation. Behind them
118	 Anderson and Damle, The Brotherhood in Saffion, p. 31
119	 Deshpande and Ramaswainy, Dr. Hedgewar: The Epoch-Maker, p. 66.120	 ibid.
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were the full-time workers of Gandhian nationalism - the "ideal salyagrahis" who not
only managed the movement, but practised satyagraha as a way of life. It was these
workers who would effect, through their example, the process of aimashuddhi. As
students of Truth, these workers were also brahmachaiyas, and celibacy was an
important feature of their commitment. "Those who want to perform national service,"
Gandhi comments in 1916, "or those who want to have a glimpse of the real religious
life, must lead a celibate life, no matter if married or nmarri12'
A double layer of activists is also evident in the RSS from an early date.' 22
 The
swayamsevaks form the front-line of RSS activity. They demonstrate their allegiance
through daily attendance at the shakiza as well as through the oath of allegiance, 123
 and
are called upon to put in service to the Sangh as and when required. They remain,
however, ordinary people with college, job, family and other commitments. Behind
them are the pracharaks, the full-time workers of the Sangh, 'who organise Sangh
activities within a given area and provide guidance to all swaywnsevaks within that
area.' 24
 Again, pracharaks are presented as "ideal" workers. They are wholly
committed to the objectives of the Sangh, live in Sangh accommodation, and remain
unpaid. In addition, they generally remain unmarried and live a life of celibacy.' 25 The
prachara/c ideal, then, is also replete with ideas of brahmachwya. Indeed, Gandhi is
said to have appreciated this quality in Hedgewar,' 26 although the pracharak ideal is
generally perceived as a more tonventional approach to ashrainadhanna than that
propagated by the Mahatma.127
From this comparison it may be seen that the basic structure of the RSS was drawn
from standard nationalist idioms, developed in the broad context of the search for an
121	
"Speech on Ashram Vows", at YMCA Madras, February 1916; quoted in R. Iyer, The
Essential Writings of Mahatma Gandhi (Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1991), p. 286.
122	 N.B. The first pnichamks, the "higher" level of activists, were appointed out of the first
Officer Training Camp in Nagpur in 1927.
123	 See Anderson, "The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh 1", p.593.
124 This idea of a double layer refers to the activist manifestation of the organisation. The Sangh
also has a hierarchical structure of command (in the same way as the Gandhian Congress had a
structure of command, although of a somewhat different nature). For a full picture of the RSS
organisation, see Anderson and Damle, The Brotherhood in Saffron, pp. 84-9.
125	 Anderson and Damle, The Brotherhood in Saffron, p. 88; also Jaffrelot, The Hindu Nationalist
Movement in India, p. 40, 43.
126	 The Mahatma's visit to the Sangh camp at Wardha in 1934 is recalled in Anonymous, RSS:
Spearheading National Renaissance (Prakashan Vibhag, Bangalore 1985), p. 15: "The spirit of
rigorous simplicity and self-sacrifice of the swayamsevaks in bearing the entire burden of the
organisational expenses...had especially impressed Gandhiji. And when he came to know that
Doctorji had neither taken to any profession not to a married life, he exclaimed 'Ah, that
explains the remarkable degree of your success in such a short time.'"
127	 Anderson and Damle note that although becoming a przchamk was theoretically a lifelong
commitment, many "intended to sacrifice several years of their lives for the nation and then
fulfil their duties as a householder." See The Brotherhood in Saffron, p. 88.
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elite-led strategy of mass confrontation with the state. Hedgewar's innovation was to
use these idioms as a means of propagating the ideology of Hindu nationalism, whilst
much of the Hindu nationalist movement from which he drew ideological inspiration
remained wedded to the notion of symbolic representation. Hedgewar had been
intimately involved in the Indian national movement, and his establishment and
development of the Sangh must be seen in this context. In particular, it must be seen in
the context of the new discourse of organisation which had emerged as a result of the
reconfiguration of nationalist strategy. What Hedgewar was doing was drawing on
structures and idioms of political mobilisation made available to him through this
discourse.
Interestingly, the model of British-style bureaucratic organisation also emerges in this
context. As we have seen, after 1929, when the policy of ekehalaic anuvartita was
adopted, Hedgewar consistently pressed his associates to provide a regular flow of
information to him in Nagpur on the status of the Sangh and its immediate
environment. At the same time, local units of the Sangh were left to run themselves,
under the guidance of the local pracharak. The strength of the Sangh organisation,
then, was based on the flow of knowledge from local to central points, whilst at the
same time leaving local leaders to react to local situations, within the framework of
Sangh ideology. As Jaffrelot has pointed out, this model meant that the idea of
organisation superseded any individual practitioner in the RSS; loyalty was owed to
this organisation (and its symbol, the "guru" of the RSS, the Bhagwa Dhwaj, or
saffron flag), rather than to Hedgewar or his successors. 128 This model is reminiscent
of the way in which colonial bureaucracy operated, because of the self-image of that
bureaucracy as the representative of state organisation, a symbol of order within the
disorganised state of Indian society. 129 At the same time, however, it recalls Gandhis
emphasis on the organisation, and the volunteers as its constituent parts, as the real path
to swara). As he said, Chauri Chaura could not have happened "if the Congress and
the Khilalat organisations were perfect. It is all a question of perfecting the
organisation."
This argument is presented as a counterpoint to the image of the Sangh as based on
semi-mystical/religious organisational models. Much academic work on the Sangh has
emphasised these models as a reason for the Sangh's ability to sustain itself and expand
128	 See Jaffrelot, The Hindu Nationalist Movement in India, pp. 62-4.
129	 See Section 3.1.2 - Bureaucracy is presented here as a "tool for the organisation of colonial
society, through the acquisition and processing of information"; Baparao Wharadpandey stated
in interview that the basic model used by Hedgewar to promote organisation was the British;
he "never criticised the British" because of this awareness of the "organisation of British
society."
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its organisational base quite remarkably over the past seventy years. In particular,
Christophe Jaffrelot characterises the Sangh as a nationalist "sect" (swnpradaya) and
pracharaks as ascetic kannayogins. His argument is that these "traditional" models
were utilised by Hedgewar and later Goiwalkar as "a means of developing the
sociological structure of an egalitarian, united nation." 130
 The sampradaya structure is
presented here as "the only system within Hindu society where an egalitarian form of
individualism can be observed," and it is this form of individualism which is needed for
the construction of the idea of nation. In this sense, Hedgewar is presented as
appropriating this traditional structure as a means of strategically emulating the western
individualistic values which underpin the nation concept.131
The immediate problem with this argument is the way in which it extracts the
sainpradaya structure from its wider context. Jaffrelot draws on Dumont's work to
oppose the structure to the caste system, "in so far as the first represents the domain of
the individual and the second forms a holistic system in which the individual has no real
place."' 32 This overlooks the fact that caste and sainpradaya have a complementary
significance. They have integrated roles in the maintenance and change of Hindu socio-
religious structures. 133 To extract the sanipradaya structure from this equation as a
societal model ignores the fact that this structure is inextricably linked into the wider
societal model provided by the caste-sampradaya nexus.
A second problem with the argument derives from the agency invested in Hedgewar
and Goiwalkar as ideological architects of the RSS. Jaifrelot is forced into the position
of presenting the first two Sarsanghchal.aks as consciously manipulating "traditional"
symbols in order to impute alien notions of nationality to a gullible public. Much as
this may gratify the tendency of RSS ideologues to present their leaders as the sole
source of inspiration for the movement, it can present only a limited, instrumentalist
view of how ideologies are constructed and how they operate in the world. My point is
that Hedgewar's project can only be given full meaning by placing it within the
historical context of ideological and organisational development. The RSS was able to
establish a presence in Nagpur and begin to extend it within Maharashtra precisely
because it presented itself in the familiar idioms of nationalist organisation. Naturally,
this format meant that the same groups who had been the driving force of the nationalist
agitations of the early twenties were influential in the development of the Sangh: i.e. the
younger generation of middle class and lower middle class Hindus, disaffected with
130	 Jaffrelot, The Hindu Nationalist Movement in India, p. 45.
131	 Jaffrelot, The Hindu Nationalist Movement in india, p 44.
132	 Jaifrelot, The Hindu Nationalist Movement in India, p. 43.
133	 See A. Eschmann, "Religion, Reaction and Change", eSp. p. 3-4.
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colonial government and eager to assert a self-confident sense of nationality. Evidence
from oral accounts supports this, through the assertion by most of the early
swayamsevaks I interviewed that one of their principal reasons forjoining the RSS was
in order to be part of the national movement.134
The point illustrates the way in which the ideologies of Indian nationalism and Hindu
nationalism still merged together during this period. They emanated from the same
middle class base and attracted the same middle class people as activists. The RSS in a
sense increased this confluence, because of its operation within the new discourse of
organisation which had emerged from the political dynamism of the early twenties. It
was nevertheless a resolutely Hindu nationalist organisation, bringing all the attributes
of the model of the horizontal organisation of Hindu society into this new discursive
arena. In the next section! will examine how this model of society was articulated.
7.2.3 Sangathan in RSS Ideology: Conceptualising Hinduism and Hindu Society
The objectives of the RSS were drawn directly from the idea of sangathan as the
horizontal organisation of Hindu society. Sangathan, that is, not in Shraddhanand's
sense, but in the sense of a non-confrontational binding together of Hindu society,
eschewing reform whilst at the same time encouraging respect for all castes as part of
the "organic" whole. As we have seen, whilst this idea was at the heart of the
movement of the mid-twenties, an overall strategy for effecting sangathan was not
developed, because of the constrictions of the political discourse in which it was
expressed. The development of the localised, volunteer-based structure of the RSS, on
the other hand, created the opportunity for the elaboration of sangathan along these
lines. This section will look at how this elaboration took place, by examining the
relationship between this idea of sangathan and later RSS articulations of Hinduism
and Hindu society.
In RSS ideology, the path to sangathan was perceived as a revitalisation of the Hindu
nation, through an awakening of consciousness: "Awakening is knowledge and
knowledge is the capacity to realise unity in diversity, to find harmony in place of
conflict, and to worship society in the place of self." It is important to realise that this
process was seen, as revitalising what had previously existed:
134	 Oke, Wharadpandey and Warnekar all stated this as an important reason for their joining the
RSS. N. B. Lele, who joined somewhat later in 1934, was not attracted by Indian
nationalism, saying that because of his commitment to the Sangh he had "no time" for
politics. Indeed, as an active swayamsevak in Bombay in the late nineteen thirties, he recalled
that he faced opposition from Congress workers, who perceived RSS members (wrongly, LeJe
emphasised) as working on behalf of ihe Hindu Mahasabha.
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...We believe that the present perversions and misconceptions are only a
passing phase. Our cultural roots are too firm and too deeply struck into
the springs of immortality to be easily dried up. They are bound to
assert their age-old vigour and vitality and throw out the parasitic
growth of the past few centuries and sprout forth once again in all their
pristine purity and grandeur.'35
These passages, written by Golwalkar, reflect the elaboration of sangathan in a new
discursive framework. The objective was to transform the fragmented state of the
Hindu nation , by breaking the shackles of "foreign" domination. The cultural tradition
of Hindu society was perceived as having its own independent existence: it was just a
case of guiding the people towards it. The RSS objective was to provide this guidance;
sangathan meant transforming the consciousness of Hindu society, in the same way as
the counter-hegemonic strategy of the Congress aimed to transform the consciousness
of the Indian people. Similarly, what Jaifrelot describes as the RSS's "sangathanist"
method of organisation was adapted from the Gandhian model of mass mobilisation -
transforming consciousness on a microcosmic level.!36
How then, was consciousness to be transformed; what was the meaning, in other
words, of RSS sangathan? The catholicity apparent in Savarkar's work, which as we
have seen is necessarily implicit in the idea of sangathan, was developed by the RSS'
self-image of cultural nationalism. Culture here is defined as "a value system
established through a long and intricate process of history", and based on the idea of
dzarma. Dharma is a "moral principle of universal harmony" which governs processes
of integration. Religion is part of this dharma, in the sense that it represents an
individual's integration with God, but it is not the whole of dhanna. The Hindu
rashtra, in this conception, is a vision of dhanna in a cultural, social and historical
sense, but not in a religious sense. Sangathan relates specifically to the social aspect of
dharma.137
Religion, then, is removed from the vision of an organised Hindu society, in a manner
again reminiscent of Savarkar's Hindutva. It becomes a private concern, a matter of
one's personal relationship with God. 138 This is a classic statement of the "tolerance"
135	 M.S. Goiwalkar, Bunch of Thoughts, p. 29, 32.
136 This Gandhian strategy was to give way in the Congress to the "aggregationist" strategy, as
that body withdrew from the mass implication of counter hegemony; see Jaffrelot, "The BJP
in Madhya Pmdesh: Networks, Strategies and Power" (in G. Pandey, Hindus and Others, pp.
110-145). p. 111.
137	 This paragraph is based on an interview with the RSS I3audhikPramukh Baburao M.G.
Vaidya on 22 April 1996. Quotations are direct transcripts from this interview.
138	 Vaidya goes as far as to decry the notion of punyabhu , or holy land, as a qualifying
stipulation of Hindu nationality. "It is not essential", he says, and Christians and Muslims
can "become Hindu" as long as they accept the notion of Hindu society.
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of Hinduism, which draws on the universalist tendencies of Advaita Vedanta. It differs
markedly from the reformism of the late nineteenth century - in particular the Arya
Samaj, with its insistence on the Vedas as the source of all Truth.
This distinction is also apparent in the RSS attitude towards caste. Because of the
restriction of religion as a private concern, caste becomes a social issue; it therefore
comes within the self-proclaimed ambit of RSS concerns. The ideal Hindu rashtra is a
casteless society, in which all Hindus are one, united as a kind of cultural
brotherhood.' 39
 The Sangh is a reflection of this ideal, in that shakhas and camps do
not officially recognise caste distinctions, and swayainsevaks are required to perform
all tasks whilst in this environment.140
In consonance with the idea of horizontal organisation, however, this attitude is not
supported by a programme of reform in relation to caste. The attitude is rather
described as "erosion", a gradual process of change through the example of
swayamsevaks.' 4 ' In fact, Jaffrelot has noted that the idealised vision of a casteless
society was supplemented by a defence of caste, based on the dharmic quality (i.e. in
terms of social harmony) of the varna system. 142 This point is supported by Balasaheb
Deoras, the third Sarsanghchalak of the Sangh, in a speech in Pune in 1974. Giving an
account of the proliferation of castes on the basis of varnavyavastha, he stated:
The whole society was visualised as a single living entity, personified
into a magnificent figure with a thousand heads, a thousand eyes and a
thousand feet. Such a glorious concept does not permit the perverse and
ridiculous notion that the thighs are superior to the feet, hands are
superior to the thighs or the head is superior to the hands. The idea is
that all these limbs are equally essential for the proper functioning of
society. 143
This defence was tempered by the assertion that the system "has to die and is already
dying a natural death." The policy of erosion was then cited by reference to the
example of Hedgewar
139	 The maleness of RSS ideology is, of course, always already assumed as a central feature of
"traditional Hindu society"; Hedgewar, for example, often referred to the importance of the
Nagpur Sangh as the "father" of the organisation; op. cit. a. 104; for an interesting account of
the position of women within this ideology, see Tanika Sarkar, "Women's Agency within
Authoritanan Communalism: The Rashtrasevika Saniiti and Ramjanmabhoomi" (in G.
Pandey, Hindus and Others, pp. 24-73).140	 Anderson and Damle note that participants in Officer Training Camps "are required to take
their turn at cleaning the latrines, sweeping and other 'defiling' activities." See The
Brotherhood in Safftn, p. 95. This is another feature of the Wardba camp which Gandhi is
supposed to have warmly approved in 1934. - see Deshpande and Ramaswamy, Dr. Hedgewar:
The Epoch-Maker, pp. 146-50.
141	 The process was explained to me in these terms by M.G. Vaidya.
142	 Jaffrelot, The Hindu Nationalist Movement in India, p. 45.143	 B. Deoras, Social Equality and Consolidation (Jagarana Prakashana, Bangalore, 1974), p. 9.
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I was present in the first Sangh camp. In that there were quite a number
of Mahaar (untouchable) brethren. At the time of meals, some began
hesitating to sit along with them. They had never before in their life sat
for meals with the Mahaars. They placed their problem before Doctorji.
But he did not enforce the discipline of the camp and ask them to get
out. Doctorji simply said "our practice is to sit together. We shall sit
accordingly." All of us sat together for meals. Those few that were
hesitant sat in a separate line. But, for the next meals these very people
came to Doctorji and apologised and sat with us of their own accord.'44
Of course, if this incident did take place - and one has to be sceptical of the idea that
"quite a number of Mahaar brethren" took part in an early Sangh camp - the weight of
peer group pressure on young minds needs to be taken into account in the process of
erosion. Nevertheless it expresses the idea of non-confrontational example which is
confirmed by other accounts.145
The Sangh, then, has developed an approach to Hinduism and reform which draws
much from the horizontal approach to organisation. It does not deny that society needs
to be changed, but assumes that change is occurring "naturally", as a feature of the
homogenisation of society. Caste identity, as it was explained to me, is being replaced
by Hindu identity. This is a fascinating idea, in that it side-steps the old dilemma of
horizontal organisation about how to consolidate Hinduism without disturbing caste;
caste being perceived precisely as essential to Hindu identity. The RSS notion in effect
presents an alternative organising principle in Hindu society, in a similar manner noted
as the function of the Arya Samaj's Mandirs: in this case the alternative is the RSS
itself. As Vaidya states, the RSS "is not an organisation in society, but of society"; its
objective is to be "coterminous with Hindu society.""6 The difference between this
and the Arya Samaj's structural intervention is that the RSS organisation does not
confront caste in the same way, because it is not backed up by a radical, transformative
ideology, like that of Dayananda. Nevertheless it is something of an anomaly in the
context of a horizontal approach to organisation.
Ideologically, in fact, the RSS is quite flexible. It has the ability to appropriate
powerful symbols and adopt different strategies as and when they are needed, without
threatening its basic principles or sense of identity.' 47 This is because it is based as
much on a catholic sense of cultural inclusivism as it is on anti-Muslim exciusivism. I
144	 Deoras, Social Equality and Consolidation, p. 13.
145	 Forexample, Bapurao Wharadpandey recalled "persuading" other nvaywnsevakc that
commensality was the way forward "it was the logical step from the idea of one Hinduism.TM
Similarly, S.B. Warnekar informed me that although he saw caste rigidity as damaging, and
dissipating the strength of Hindu society, he was nevertheless committed to the sub-caste
marriage of his son. The RSS, he said, would not object to this.
146	 Interview with M.G. Vaidya.
147	 This is a point which JalTrelot's book makes repeatedly.
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have argued that this cultural inclusivism, having its roots in the idea of hoiizontal
organisation, was extended and developed because of the localised structures through
which the RSS has worked, integrating itself into local cultural norms. It is these
localised structures which broke the ideological link between horizontal organisation
and symbolic representation, and so for the first time opened up opportunities for the
development of elite Hindu nationalist ideology as a strategy of mass mobilisation,
drawing on and accommodating microcosmic experiences of what it means to be a
Hindu. On this basis the RSS developed its image as a cultural force, removed from a
primary involvement in politics. In most cases it has maintained this image, developing
associate organisations to effect overt interventions in state-level politics. As an adjunct
to this I would say that the Congress' own dislocation from questions of cultural
development, cultural identity, resulted precisely from the elite leadership's continued
concentration on this level of politics, stemming from its inability to carry through the
counter-hegemonic strategy of the early twenties. As a result it was unable to draw on
or accommodate those same microcosmic experiences of identity - of what it meant, in
this case, to be an Indian.
This is not to say, however, that the RSS developed as a "popular" or democratic
organisation as such. As we have seen, ideologically it is rooted firmly in the middle
class, and its leadership, right down to pracharak level, has remained a high caste,
middle class preserve. 148 This is a reflection of the trajectory of Sangh ideology,
emanating from this middle class, high caste base. As such, low caste mobilisation has
never formed the principal source of opposition for the Sangh; it could not, because as I
have illustrated, low caste mobilisation even in the twenties operated on an entirely
different discursive plane. Rather, the Sangh finds it easier to encompass (in an
ideological sense) low caste movements than to oppose them. Neither does Islam form
this opposition - of course it is strongly reviled and emerges as the most persistent
Other in RSS ideology, but apart from in intensely communal situations, this Other is
not an opposition - indeed, it is a key feature of the inclusivist Hindu identity. Rather,
the principal opposition emerges as the "pseudo-secularists" and "territorial
nationalists" of the Congress. The opposition is strongest precisely because of the
discursive commonality of these singularly middle class forms of nationalism. Nothing
illustrates this commonality more clearly than the ease with which the Sangh
appropriated and developed organisational forms which had initially emerged as a
mechanism for the realisation of counter-hegemonic Indian nationalism.
148	 See Jaffrelot, The Hindu Nationalist Movement in India, p. 45; Anderson and Damle, The
Brotherhood in Saffron, p. 88: "the typical pracharak is recruited in his early twenties. He is
well educated, usually a college graduate. He is fluent in English and Hindi, besides the
language of the area in which he works. Most of those we met were science graduates. He
tends to come from an urban middle-class, upper-caste background."
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7.3 Reviewing Approaches to the Organisation of Hinduism
What we see in the twenties, then, is a contrapuntal movement of ideologies on the two
inter-related levels of the organisation of Hinduism that have been examined in this
thesis.
First, on the level of religious ideology - the way in which organisation came to be
articulated as an ideal to which Hindus could legitimately aspire - a convergence is
evident. The tensions apparent in the opposition of horizontal and vertical approaches
were consumed by the urgency of the time, and particularly by the increasingly
systematic appearance of the communal riot as a feature of modern politics. From 1923
onwards, the idea of a vertical restructuring of Hindu society, eradicating incipient
oppressions through a radical transformation of the religion, became increasingly
marginalised in the arena of Hindu politics. The unstructured catholicity of horizontal
organisation, particularly in its new formulation of Hinduiva, now dominated the social
vision of politically oriented Hinduism.
Secondly, on the level of political mobilisation - the way in which Hindus became
organised as a political force - a divergence is evident. The emergence of a new
discourse of organisation on the basis of forms of politics developed by the Gandhian
Congress created the opportunity for new ways of being political in the public space.
The divergent ways in which the Mahasabha and the RSS established themselves
during the nineteen twenties is indicative of this new context in Indian politics.
Although they developed with fairly similar notions of how the Hindu nation was to be
conceptualised, then, their ideas about how to pursue this ideal - their comparative
political strategies - were radically different. This is evident in the hostility of
Hedgewar from a very early stage to suggestions from powerful figures within the
Mahasabha, including his old mentor Dr. Moonje, that the two organisations should be
formally associated. 149 The Sangh, it was clear, was to plot a very different path. The
difference may be schematised as follows:
149	 V.D. Savarkar suggested in 1929 that the RSS should become a part of the Mahasabha.
Hedgewar rejected the suggestion outright, and when Savarkar persisted he "cut all ties with
the Sabha." In 1932, Hedgewar rejected overtures from Moonje on the sane issue, causing a
split between the two. See Baker, Changing Political Leadership in an Indian Province,
p. 106. Jaffrelot, however, demonstrates that the two organisations maintained some degree of
contact during the 1930s, with tension arising only in the context of these Mahasabha
attempts to absorb the Sangh. After Goiwalkar became Sarsanghchakzk in 1940, a complete
break was effected. See The Hindu Nationalist Movement in India, pp. 72-74. Nevertheless
any resistance to Mahasabba overtures is notable in the context of the considerable financial
difficulty which the Sangh experienced during its early period. This is persistently evident in
Hedgewar's letters. See, for example, Letter No. 5 of 1929, Hedgewar to Dadar Paramarth, 21
August 1929; No. 51 of 1932, Hedgewar to Bhaiya Saheb Tatade, 2 December 1932.
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Represented symbolically transformation of
consciousness
Addressed to: 	 The (Colonial) State	 The (Hindu) People
Form of politics:	 Constitutional	 Populist,"organic", cultural
Principal opposition: 	 Muslim League	 Congress
("pseudo-secularists")
The Mahasabha continued to operate within the colonial discourse of organisation,
consolidating its position in relation to the state as the representative of "the Hindus", a
counterpoint to the Muslim League as the representative of "the Muslims". I have again
described this position as a "template of polarisation", recalling the relationship between
the Arya Samaj and Sanatana Dharma Sabhas in the public space in the late nineteenth
centuiy. The anonymity of the Mahasabha in post-Independence politics is indicative
of the operation of this template, as the image of a counterweight to the Muslim League
was of greatly reduced significance in domestic politics after the creation of Pakistan.
The RSS, on the other hand, articulated a strategy in the context of the emerging
discourse of organisation, separated from the colonialist-nationalist nexus and distanced
from the state. This was a populist, "organic" form of politics in which middle class
culture was able to express itself politically (i.e. away from the constrictions of state-led
politics), and it is this culture which the RSS has been able to adapt, fashion and exploit
in the course of its gradual development into a politically significant bloc. Consistently,
this form of politics has enabled the RSS to work towards expanding the constituency
of Hindus (i.e. the Hindu nation) by transforming consciousness on a microcosmic
level.
As it has expanded, the RSS has become involved in other discourses, other forms of
politics. The advantage of ending this study in 1930 is that there is a clarity in the
trajectory of both organisations, the RSS and the Hindu Mahasabha. These established
trajectories demonstrate the structure of elite-led politics, as India entered the most
turbulent phase of her political history during the colonial period. The position of
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culture in this political structure is of particular significance. The dislocation of culture
from politics in the "constitutional" strategy represented by the Mahasabha only serves
to emphasise its integration in the strategy represented by the RSS. The success of the
RSS version of Hindu nationalism can be strongly related to this privileged position in
terms of the ideological interpretation of culture. Developments in the discourses of
organisation in the nineteen twenties, particularly on the basis of the increased
sophistication of Indian nationalist strategy, were seminal in the establishment of the
RSS on this level of elite-led politics.
7.4 Summary of Discussion
This chapter has demonstrated how the key concept of organisation configured the
development of ideas of the Hindu nation and its representation in the arena of middle
class politics in the nineteen twenties. It has concentrated on two organisations as
examples of divergent approaches in this development.
The Hindu Mahasabha provided the principal forum for debate in the early twenties. It
continued to operate through the idea of a spectrum of religious affiliation in order to
legitimise its claim to represent Hindus as a homogeneous "community".
Unsurprisingly, this spectrum produced different ideas about what it meant to be a
Hindu, and how the "community" should be represented. The idea of a sa.ngathan
movement focused these differences, leading to the tension apparent within the
Mahasabha during 1923-4. The lines of debate over sangathan were drawn particularly
between the conflicting notions of horizontal and vertical organisation. Swami
Shraddhanand's presentation of sangathan as a coherent programme designed to "save
the dying race" was based precisely on the transformative core of Arya reformism.
Within the Mahasabha, this ideal was ranged against notions of horizontal organisation
which perceived sangathan in far less explicit terms. The issue of shuddhi, with its
persistent questioning of the boundaries of Hinduism, was the battleground on which
these conflicting notions were articulated. It has been demonstrated that horizontal
organisation was decisively triumphant in this conflict, and that consequently ideas of
the vertical restructuring of society were increasingly marginalised in the field of Hindu
politics. As if to confirm this trend, Savarkar's Hindutva emerged as a major text of
Hindu nationalism. This text provided an ideological framework for the projection of
horizontal organisation as a Hindu ideal. Characteristically, this framework was not
explicit about how the ideal was to be realised.
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In the second half of the chapter I have argued that the RSS began to develop a strategy
of mobilisation aimed at effecting such a realisation. My argument is based on the idea
that the RSS drew heavily on models of organisation developed in the context of Indian
nationalism, as explained in Chapter 6. These models provided the RSS with a
recognisably modem form in the political arena of the nineteen twenties, enabling it to
establish its position amongst politically active middle class Hindus. The trajectory of
the RSS was singular, in that it eschewed the idea of symbolic representation
altogether, aiming instead to "create" its constituency in the emergent discourse of
organisation, removed from the centrality of the colonialist-nationalist nexus. Despite
the gradualism inherent in this trajectory, I have nevertheless argued that this was a
radical departure in the history of middle class Hindu politics. This radicalism is to
some extent evident in the development of the organisation's approach towards
Hinduism and Hindu society. It has been demonstrated that the RSS maintained an
approach to these concepts based on horizontal organisation. The logic of its trajectory,
however, has led it to introduce the idea of an alternative to caste as an organising
principle in Hindu society. This organising principle is the Sangh itself. On an ideal
level, then, the RSS pursuit of Hindu sangathan implies the rejection of caste, a view
of Hindu society which is the antithesis of horizontal organisation. It is perhaps a
reflection of the ideal nature of the Hindu nation itself that this dichotomy is not




Hindu nationalism emerged from the nineteen twenties as an established feature of
modern Indian politics. Its presence is clear both in an institutional sense, in the form
of the Mahasabha and other organisations, including the RSS, 1 and in an ideological
sense, as it blended and clashed with Indian nationalism in the Congress, and in the
"mental frameworks" of politically aware Hindus. The discrete lines of development
towards this situation, always a problematic feature of modern Indian history, have
been the subject of this dissertation. My thesis has been that Hindu nationalist identity
was constructed as a result of certain projections of colonial hegemony, and the
elaboration of the colonial polity within this context. In particular, I have posited that
the state's self-image of organisation was enormously influential; that, in fact, it
developed a specific discourse on this basis which attempted to set the parameters of
political expression in the colony. Hindu nationalist identity was a product of this
discourse of organisation, in the sense that certain Hindus used it as a means of
articulating their "Hinduness" in certain public situations. If this sounds a little
obscure, it is only because it is necessary to be cautious about using terms which have a
tendency towards universalism - notably "Hindus" and "public" - when their meanings
in the context of colonial India are multi-layered, defined by context and trajectory.
In this concluding chapter I will review the objectives set in Chapter 1, and examine the
way in which they have or have not been met by the thesis. I will also look again at
some of the questions raised in Chapter 2 in relation to Hindu nationalism and the
position of ideology in Indian politics, and review them in the light of the findings of
this dissertation. Leadiug on from this I will suggest some areas of further research
which arise out of my work.
In Indra Prakash, Review 0/the HLrtory and Work of the Hindu Maluzsabha and the Hindu
Sanhatan Movement, written in 1938, the following organisations are listed as
representative of Hindu nationalist objectives: the Hindu Youth movement, the shuddhi
movement, the Bhonsala Military School, the RSS, the cow protection movement, and the
Hindu Seva Ashram. Other "institutions, associations, missions, samajas, ashramas etc." are
referred to, but not covered in the review; see p. xv-xvi.
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8.1 Reviewing Objectives
(1) Organisation and Hindu identity
I have demonstrated how the idea of organisation impinged on Hindu identity as it was
perceived in the public space of colonial India in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
century. One feature of colonial control was the persistent focus on Hinduism as an
entity: how it was to be recognised as a religion, and what distinguished it from other
religions. Initially, this was a project of Orientalism, which attempted to define
Hinduism by reference to its essential" texts. Increasingly, however, colonisers and
colonised alike were confronted with the inability of this kind of definition to
encompass the realities of people's perception of their religiosity. At the same time,
certain forces - notably missionaries, Hindu reformers, incipient low caste movements,
census enumerators - focused attention on the boundaries of Hinduism. The question
was persistently asked as to who could safely be identified as a Hindu, and who could
safely be identified as not a Hindu.
The organisation of Hinduism emerged in the context of this persistent questioning.
The idea of consolidating the religion, of firming up these boundaries, developed along
two principal paths. First, the vertical restructuring of the religion, eradicating
manifest oppressions through a complete overhaul of what it meant to be a Hindu.
Implicitly, this would entail the deconstruction of caste as a central feature of Hindu
identity. Secondly, the horizontal binding together of the various strands of religiosity
and caste identity in the name of a composite catholicity and tolerance. Whereas the
first path presented itself as an act of reform, the second appeared to be little more than
a symbolic act of will - unity and consolidation being conferred through a kind of
collective imagining. Ironically, this comparative theoretical weakness strengthened the
position of horizontal organisation, because of the nature of the discourse within which
both approaches operated. This discourse naturally favoured a symbolic approach to
issues of political significance. The idea of an organised Hinduism nevertheless
developed through the dynamic relationship of these two positions, culminating in the
ascendance of horizontal organisation after the Mahasabha sessions of 1923 and 1924.
(ii) Organisat ions and Movements
These ideas of organisation were expressed in a series of religious and political bodies
and movements. In this dissertation I have examined the following as progressive
examples of the various approaches: the Arya Samaj; the Sanatana Dfiarma Sabhas and
the Bharat Dharma Mahamandal; the cow protection movement of the early eighteen
nineties; the shuddhi movement; the Hindu Sabha movement; the Hindu Mahasabha
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and the sangarhan movement; and the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh. This is not an
exhaustive list of bodies and movements concerned with the organisation of Hinduism.
Such organisations as the Nagari Pracharini Sabha, the Ramakrishna Mission, the
Theosophical Society, as well as numerous smaller organisations, all contributed to the
debate about the nature and extent of Hinduism, and its position in the colonial polity.2
I have examined organisations and movements on the basis of their centrality in the
debate, and their contribution to the development of Hinduism as a political force.
It has been argued that the nature of these bodies and movements was configured by the
dominant discourse of organisation. Even movements which clearly had an existence
outside of this discursive arena, such as the cow protection movement in the early
eighteen nineties, were represented principally as manifestations of Hindu consolidation
within this arena. The Sabha movement of the early twentieth century formalised this
position through its explicit linking of horizontal organisation to the notion of symbolic
representation, as illustrated in Chapter 5.
The strength of this linkage meant that the developments apparent in the Indian National
Congress towards a more palpable form of representation - through the strategy of
counter-hegemony - were resisted strongly in organisations that represented this sense
of Hindu identity. This is evident in the perceived "loyalism" of the Mahasabha ( a
more complex position than simple reactionary conservatism, as it has often been
presented) in the nineteen thirties and forties. The political context of the twenties,
however, did change this situation. The development of a new discourse of
organisation in the public space allowedlor the articulation of consolidated Hinduism in
a different relation to its projected constituency. The emergence of the RSS signified a
break in the link between horizontal orgamsation and symbolic representation. This
was a departure of profound significance in the history of Hindu nationalism.
(iii) Religious Reform and Hindu Nationalism
In this dissertation I have argued against the direct historical link that is often made
between the reform movements that developed in the nineteenth century - particularly
the Arya Samaj - and Hindu nationalism. The Samaj has been presented as the key
advocate of vertical restructuring as the means of effecting the organisation of
Hinduism. It has been illustrated that on the level of ideology, the core values of the
Arya Samaj which informed this approach diverged from the emergent milieu of Hindu
nationalism. The Samaj as a reform movement was structured by Dayananda as having
2	 On the Nagan Pracharim Sabha, see C. King, One Language, Two Scripts: the Hindi
Movement in Nineteenth Century North India (Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1994)
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a transformative role in Hinduism. This role was projected through two central features
of Arya ideology: first, the assertion that certain texts constituted the fixed canon of the
Hindu faith; and secondly, the attempt to undermine caste as the central institution of
Hinduism, to be replaced by an idealised, merit-based varna system. The Samaj was
confronted with the dilemma of how to work towards these objectives whilst remaining
a part of the very structure that it sought to repudiate. Increasingly, the objectives of
the Samaj were compromised by this dilemma.
The shuddhi movements of the early twenties, and the concomitant articulation of
sangathan, brought this situation to a head. During this critical period, the central
ideology of the Arya Samaj was unable to assert its hegemony over the wider
movement. Instead it was drawn into the idea of organisation as an over-riding
objective. Sangathan emerged as a catholic, horizontal unity, based on the perceived
tolerance of the Hindu tradition and the theoretical equality of castes and their functions
in society.
This is not to say that the Arya Samaj did not contribute to the development of Hindu
nationalism. It brought considerable expertise and experience in terms of disseminating
propaganda, and the extensive network of local Samajes in the north were an invaluable
source of support for campaigns such as the Malkana shuddhi. The Samaj also
produced some important advocates of the organisation of Hinduism - most notably Lal
Chand and Swami Shraddhanand - and later supplied leaders to the Mahasabha such as
Bhai Parmanand. Even in terms of ideology, the Samaj undoubtedly created sustained
pressure within the Mahasabha for the extension of uplift programmes and other
progressive initiatives. But the core of Arya ideology - the transformative values which
defined it as a reform movement - were persistently rejected by emergent Hindu
nationalism.
This is important, because it disrupts the representation of Hindu nationalism as an
extension of the reformist approach to Hindu religion, with its attendant baggage of
"purifying" Hindu practice. The search for the antecedents of Hindu nationalism has
focused too sharply on revivalism as a product of this reformist approach. This
dissertation has argued that the real point of significance is the middle classness of this
approach to Hinduism - whether it be reformist or non-reformist. This is one reason
why the focus on Nagpur City is so important in this study: it presents a picture of the
development of Hindu nationalism which is not blurred by the presence of a strong
reformist movement like the Arya Samaj. Its significance is rather located simply in its
status as a city of colonial India in which the middle class had a powerful voice.
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(iv) The Status of Sangathan
It is interesting to note that in his preface to Indra Prakash's Review of the History and
Work of the Hindu Mahasabha and the Hindu Sanghatan Movement, written in 1938,
V.D. Savarkar refers to sangathan as a movement that incorporates a whole host of
organisations working towards the same goal of consolidation. "All these Hindu
Sanghatanist institutions," he says, "even though they are not formally affiliated to each
other, are still allied with one another in the common cause. All of them aim at the
regeneration of the Hindu Race, moulding it into a free and mighty Hindu Nation."3
The Mahasabha is perceived as the leading institution, but nevertheless it is still part of
the wider sangathan movement, the movement towards nationhood. This is something
of a shift from the articulation of sangathan in the nineteen twenties, where the
movement was perceived as a project sanctioned and supervised by the Mahasabha, in
the same manner as the Malkana shuddhi campaign.
The shift reflects the significance of the idea of sangathan in the ideology of Hindu
nationalism. By the late thirties, it had become the common denominator of a group of
organisations (including, of course, the RSS) which operated in the name of Hindu
nationalism. This centrality is indicative of the defining importance of the idea of
organisation in the development of the ideology. From the late nineteenth century
onwards, middle class Hindus, responding to a variety of pressures, were drawn
increasingly into the political representation of their Hinduism on the basis of ideas of
organisation. In particular, these ideas defined the parameters of a constituency of
Hindus - a constituency which required representation in the rapidly developing
political arena. As representation became a key battlefield in the struggle between the
state and Indian nationalism in the early twentieth century, this constituency of Hindus
gained prominence as a counterpoint to Indian nationalists' attempts to reify their own
constituency. As well as reiterating the value of symbolic representation, the Morley-
Minto reforms' incorporation of separate electorates implicitly recognised this
constituency of Hindus as a politically significant bloc. It has been illustrated in
Chapter 5 that the idea of horizontally organised Hinduism as propagated by the Hindu
Sabha developed precisely as a means of projecting this constituency. Chapter 7 has
illustrated that the nation developed as a symbol of this constituency.
In this sense, then, organised Hinduism as it was debated in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth century set the parameters for the conceptualisation of the Hindu nation.
The articulation of this nation in the twenties was hence less of a revelation than has at
3	 Indra Prakash, Review of the History and Work of the Hindu Mahosabha and the Hindu
Sanghatan Movement, pp. xv-xvi.
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times been suggested in academic accounts. Indeed, it has been illustrated that it was
used quite unproblematically at earlier points, and that its central importance was as a
meaningful symbol of the constituency of Hindus in the discursive arena of Indian
politics.
(v) Hindu Nationalism and Indian Nationalism
A very strong inter-relation has been demonstrated between the ideology of Hindu
nationalism and that of elite-led Indian nationalism. The strength of this inter-relation is
based upon the production of these ideologies in a common arena, the arena of middle
class consciousness, using the same set of discursive tools. This emphasises the
similarity of the two ideologies in terms of their structure and the way in which they
were articulated as political strategies, even though they remained very much distinct in
terms of their objectives and their comparative interpretation of Indian culture. In
Chapter 2 1 have argued that this similarity is not problematic if an appropriate
conceptual distinction is made between the ideology of Hindu nationalism and the
ideological framework of communalism. Communalism, I have argued, is an
alignment, rather than an autonomous ideology in itself. By making this distinction,
the historical necessity of implacable opposition between Indian nationalism and Hindu
nationalism is removed. What emerges instead is the more easily reconcilable notion of
two ideologies developing contemporaneously in the same discursive terrain, blending
and clashing together, often being expressed almost simultaneously by various
individuals. This is evident, for example, in the work of V.D. Savarkar, Swami
Shraddhanand, Lajpat Ral: all three of these "architects" of Hindu nationalism had been
in prison because of their activities as Indian nationalists, and all were perceived as -
and perceived themselves as - genuine Indian nationalists during the nineteen twenties.
This argument is supported by the fact that organisation was also a significant factor in
the development of elite-led Indian nationalism. The thesis has illustrated how this
nationalism was expressed initially within the colonial discourse of organisation.
Because of its grounding in an economic critique of colonialism, however, it had a far
more progressive trajectory in relation to this discourse. It has been demonstrated that
developments in the way of being political in the colonial public space were driven by
the increasing challenge of elements within the Congress to colonial hegemony. This
challenge was based largely on the exposure of the contradiction between the economic
interests of the state and those of the people. Progressively, the Congress developed a
strategy of confronting the state which enabled it to expose the contradiction more
effectively. In its necessary development of the mass base of the party, this strategy
eroded the power of the colonial discourse of organisation, leading to the development
of a new, alternative discourse in the nineteen twenties.
230
These developments were significant for the ideology of Hindu nationalism, precisely
because of its proximity to that of Indian nationalism in terms of structure and strategy.
Hindu nationalism benefited from the Congress' challenge to state hegemony, initially
through the state's encouragement of an alternative to the Congress as an appropriate
representative of "Hindu opinion" (in the sense implied by symbolic representation),
and later through the development of a new discourse of organisation to challenge that
of the state. As we have seen, the latter liberated Hindu nationalist ideology from its
strong relationship with the colonial discourse. Ironically, it was henceforth able to
deploy its interpretation of culture on a far more effective, resonant level.
8.2 Implications
The issues raised in this dissertation are connected to the problem of the representation
of religion and culture in colonial politics. I have focused on this problem as it was
manifested in the ideologies produced by one particular class: the middle class. In
terms of the dominant ideologies of modern political discourse, I have argued that the
middle class has been a particularly important social bloc. This importance derives
from the position of this middle class in relation to the colonial state and its attempt to
gain hegemony in India. Unquestionably, this was a position of power which the
middle class utilised to effect its own bid for hegemony in the emerging arena of
colonial politics. In making this bid, the middle class attempted to encapsulate the
religion and culture of those over whom it claimed hegemony - the ideologies which
were produced have had an enduring impact in terms of the character of post-colonial
politics.
To say that this class had an ideological position, however, is to misconstrue the class-
ideology relationship. As Gramsci stated, classes are more often than not cross-cut by
various, often conflicting ideologies, and this was certainly the case with the middle
class in colonial India. This dissertation has shown how the ideologies of Hindu and
Indian nationalism contested the terrain of middle class consciousness, often in a non-
explicit manner. Both these ideologies claimed to represent the interests of vast,
amorphous constituencies the Indian nation, the Hindu community, and progressively,
the Hindu nation. Within the colonial discourse of organisation, the co-existence of
these projected constituencies was less problematic. As the Congress began to
challenge the forms of the discourse, however, by extending its structure and
increasing the participation of the people whom it claimed to represent, the opposition
between these ideological positions was more manifest.
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The crucial developments in this direction, which occurred in the early nineteen
twenties, produced opposition, but did not effect ideological polarisation. Congress
drew back from the full implementation of its strategy of mass mobilisation, because it
was unable, ideologically, to accommodate the well-developed political positions of
subaltern elements. Reiterating Guha, the Congress "failed to assimilate the class
interests of peasants and workers effectively into a bourgeois hegemony." 4 Reiterating
Hall, it failed to concretise sufficient "tendential alignments" on the basis of an ideology
of Indian nationalism. 5 This drawing back was critical in two ways: first, it created
space for the development of a "decentred" politics on the basis of the new discourse of
organisation, as noted in Chapters 6 and 7; secondly, it left Congress itself in two
worlds, oscillating between the two discourses, as it were - the one directed towards
the state, the other directed towards the people. This oscillation was to characterise the
strategy of the Congress leading up to independence; it has also influenced the
operation of Congress as a party in post-colonial politics. It may be useful to look at
the "aggregationist" mode of politics so effectively employed by Congress, for
example, as indicative of the continued importance of the colonial discourse of
organisation. Certainly the idea of "vote banks", where political parties recruit the
support of local notables whose followers vote according to their instructions, appears
to echo the key principles of symbolic representation and imagined constituencies in a
democratic framework.6
Oscillation between the two discourses is also the principal reason for the Congress'
inability to effectively combat the ideology of Hindu nationalism. The nineteen
twenties, as I have said, did not represent ideological polarisation, despite the posturing
of the Congress on the issue of communal violence. This was precisely because of the
Congress retreat on the strategy of mass mobilisation, which meant that its
representation of the people maintained a strong symbolic element. Only by attempting
to reify its constituency (i.e. the Indian nation) fully, would it have come into direct
opposition with the Hindu nation as a constituency. As it was, and is, the coexistence
of the two ideologies even within the Congress organisation remained largely
unproblematic.
Guba, "Discipline and Mobilize", p. 102; see Section 6.1.2.
On tendential alignment see Hall, "The Problem of Ideology: Marxism without Guarantees",
p. 42. For my discussion see Section 2.1.6	 See Jaffrelot, "The BJP in Madhya Pradesh: Networks, Strategies, Power", p.11 1: "The
process of building a party consists mainly...in accumulating sufficient vote banks to ensure
electoral majorities in the constituencies and the retuni of pledged candidates to legislative
assemblies and the Lok Sabha."
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This is not to say, however, that there was no polarisation during the twenties. What I
have said is that there was no ideological polarisation, that ideologies continued to co-
exist in a relatively unproblematic manner. There was nevertheless a new dialectic in
Indian politics which is closely related to the ideologies of Hindu and Indian
nationalism: the dialectic between communalism and secularism. Gyan Pandey has
noted the development of communalism in the nineteen twenties as concurrent with the
development of what he has termed "pure" nationalism, "unsullied, in theory, by the
'primordial' pulls of caste, religious community etc." 7 The defining characteristic of
this form of nationalism was its secularism - its perception of individuals only as
citizens with equal, democratic rights, regardless of their religion or caste.
The paralleling of communalism and secularism in this way suggests an interesting
proposition on the nature of secularism. As communalism has been described as a
framework or structure that aligns the interests of a particular imagined community
against the interests of others, so secularism may also be conceived of as a framework,
a way of aligning the interests of the imagined nation against those of other - religiously
configured - nations. This is at least hinted at by Akeel Bilgrami in a recent article:
For three decades before independence the Congress under Nehru
refused to let a secular policy emerge through negotiation between
different communal interests, by denying at every step in the various
conferrings with the British, Jinnah's demand that the Muslim League
represents the Muslims, a Sikh leader represents the Sikhs, and a harijan
leader represents the untouchable community. And the ground for the
denial was simply that as a secular party they could not accept that they
did not represent all these communities.8
The idea of secularism, then, forms the framework of opposition. Through it, Indian
nationalist ideology was aligned politically against the ideology of Muslim separatism,
Sikh consciousness, low caste consciousness and, one might add, Hindu nationalism.
The actual ideologies themselves were not necessarily implacably opposed in this
sense, but the imperative of the secularism versus communalism model demanded an
oppositional stance. Interestingly, the opposition is expressed precisely in terms of
representation; it revolved around the theoretical (or symbolic) question of who could
represent who in the political arena of modem India. This model of bow secularism
and communalism operate as structural formations in the relationship of state and
society perhaps allows for a clearer understanding of how seemingly oppositional
ideologies appear to co-exist operationally in political parties with an expectation of
state power. Ideological "purity" is not a necessity, because the contest for state power
/	 See Pandey, The Colonial Construction of Communalism, p.235.
8 Bilgranii, TMTwo Concepts of Secularism: Reason, Modernity and the Archimedean Ideal" (in
Economic and Political Weekly Vol. 29 No. 28, 9 July 1994, pp. 1749-1761), p. 1754; this
number includes a series of useful articles on secularism, modernity and the state.
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is based around these structural oppositions and how they are utilised by the various
parties. This is a possible basis for understanding apparent anomalies in contemporary
Indian politics. For example, the recent electoral alliance which brought together the
Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party and the low caste Bahujan Samaj Party in Uttar
Pradesh. Here, a seemingly direct and implacable ideological conflict is overlooked in
the context of the assumption of state power. One effective way of extending this
analysis would be to examine the development of the idea of secularism in Indian
politics; a historical analysis, similar to the analysis of Hindu nationalism in this
dissertation. This would require a further examination of the role of Hindu reformism
in the development of national culture. The conceptual de-linking of reformism and
Hindu nationalism which I have argued for in this thesis has implications here. Does
the transformative ideology of nineteenth century reformism have more to contribute to
representations of Indian secularism, after all, than to those of communalism?
Other than reformism, two further concepts have emerged from this study as significant
in terms of the development of modern Hinduism. The first, of course, is sangathan.
This concept has been examined very much in terms of its impact on the articulation of
a specifically political Hinduism. There is evidence, however, that this articulation has
had ramifications for the representation of Hinduism in contexts which are not, at least
explicitly, political. This is particularly so as Hinduism has developed a self-conscious
image of itself as a "World Religion", part of the global "club" of great, universalising
religious traditions. Within this context, certain Hindus appear to be pursuing a
somewhat familiar ideal. As Klostermaier states at the end of his Survey of Hinduism,
"Hinduism is organising itself, it is articulating its own essentials, it is modernising,
and it is carried by a great many people with strong faith. It would not be surprising to
find Hinduism the dominant religion of the twenty-first century." 9 Exploring the
emergence of sangathan, and of the idea of a pan-Hindu identity, in this context may
help to locate such developments more precisely in the context of post-colonial India.
The second concept is that of sanatana dhanna. The appearance of this concept as a
middle class signifier of orthodoxy in the late nineteenth century has been demonstrated
in this thesis. In the context of modern Hinduism, however, it has developed an
indistinct, amorphous quality. Scholars of religion tend to marginalise it, either as
simply another - and perhaps a more respectful, more 'Indian' - term for Hinduism,10
or alternatively as a universali sing signifier that has no real place in the complex reality
IQostermaier, A Survey of HinduLsm, p. 413.
10	 See, for example, Zaehner, Hinduism, p. 2: "The Hindus themselves call their religion the
sanatana dharma."
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of Hindu practice. 11 In both cases, sanatana dharina is perceived as an articulation
that is cosmetic, rather than signifying any particular structure of belief. The
relationship between this amorphous concept and the fixed meaning associated with the
term in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century needs to be explored. The
importance of sanatana dharma as orthodoxy, after all, has been demonstrated
precisely in its position as a signifier in the context of colonial modernity. Does
sanatanadharnia as a universalising signifier have a similar importance in a post-
colonial context?
One of the principal reasons for bringing this study to a close at the end of the nineteen
twenties has been cited as the advantage gained in terms of the clarity of ideological
trajectories and organisational strategies at this point. This nevertheless begs the
question of how precisely these trajectories and strategies developed during the
following, extremely dynamic, period of Indian politics. If there was, as I have stated,
no ideological polarisation during the nineteen twenties, what was the influence of
Hindu nationalist ideology within Congress in the years leading up to independence?
How far can this ideology be said to hold a congruent position in the representation of
right and left wing politics within this forum? And from this, to what extent did Hindu
nationalism as an ideology inform the position of the so-called "Hindu traditionalists"
who are represented as the core of the Congress right? These questions may be
approached particularly from the point of view of the articulation of different
communities as constituencies during the nineteen thirties and forties.
A further implication related to the nineteen thirties and forties concerns the
development of the Hindu Mahasabha. The final section of Chapter 7 appears to
consign the Mahasabha to a somewhat muted, unproductive fate. Yet in the late
nineteen thirties it undoubtedly gained prominence under the leadership of V.D.
Savarkar. This formidable politician and prolific ideologue demands further attention.
How did his leadership of the Mahasabha and his development of the idea of sangathan
impact upon politics during this period? As well as being the author of Hindutva, it has
been noted that Savarkar had also been a significant figure in the Indian nationalist
movement, and became a symbol of nationalist sacrifice after his transportation to the
Andamans. This confluence of ideological positions makes him a particularly
See Lipner, Hindus: Their Religious Beliefs and Practices, p. 220-221: "I have yet to
discover a Hindu sanalana-dharma in the sense of some universally recognised philosophy,
teaching or code of practice. Indeed, there can be no such thing, for it presupposes that
Hinduism is a monolithic tradition in which there is agreement about some static, universal
doctrine. But...Hinduism is a pluriform phenomenon in which there are many dynamic
centres of religious belief and practice."
235
fascinating figure in the emergence of secular nationalism and communalism as
symbolic opposites in the modem political arena.
The co-existence of ideologies is a point which has been noted in Chapter 7 as evident
in the early development of the RSS. In a sense, this contradicts the image of the RSS
as rigidly devoted to certain normative ideological positions. The initial rigidity of the
RSS, I would say, is to be found in its organisational form, which enabled it to
replicate itself in a singularly effective manner as a kind of "organic" cultural order,
immersed in local contexts across central, west and north India. It is by following the
logic of a Congress-inspired discourse of organisation that this "organic" growth
became entrenched, allowing for the development of elite Hindu nationalist ideology,
and its tendential alignment with other, non-elite, ideologies, in the arena of Indian
politics. How this alignment occurred in the nineteen thirties and forties constitutes a
further area of research. What were the precise mechanics of RSS expansion during
this period? How was "decentred" politics practised, and how was the cultural
trajectory of the RSS articulated in localised settings? These questions could only be
addressed by a detailed study of the period.
To sum up, then, research implications have been identified in a variety of areas. The
"discursive oscillation" model implies a reinterpretation of strategies of mobilisation in
mainstream Indian politics; in particular, the operation of vote banks in the post-
Independence polity. The presentation of communalism as an ideological structure
informed by certain ideologies - among them Hindu nationalism - suggests an
examination of the idea of secularism as a similar kind of structure. Tracing the
development of ideologies which informed this idea of secularism would entail a
reassessment of reformism as a facet of national culture. Other significant concepts
identified in this thesis - sangathan and sanatana dhanna - may be examined in terms of
their implications for the development of modem Hinduism as a self-conscious "World
Religion", and the conception of what it means to be a Hindu in a pluralist context. The
demonstration of a strong inter-relationship between Hindu and Indian nationalism
implies that an examination of the development of this relationship is necessary. I have
suggested two ways in which the examination could be extended: first, through the
operation of Hindu nationalist ideology within Congress during the nineteen thirties and
forties; and secondly, through the political and ideological development of V.D.
Savarkar. Finally, the identification of the RSS as operating through a new discourse
of organisation points to the need for a detailed examination of the development of the
Sangh in the period leading up to Independence. In particular, how the Sangh used this
discursive framework to develop its distinctive cultural trajectory.
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The cultural trajectory of the RSS has, of course, since become increasingly involved in
mainstream politics, and it is in this "re-entry" that the image of ideological rigidity
noted above emerges. The RSS is singular in national politics in that its strength is
derived from its position in the decentred discourse of organisation. It draws its
resources from this discourse, launching them into the discourse of mainstream politics
in the form of political parties - the Jan Sangh and the BJP. This singularity is signified
by the continued presence of the headquarters of the RSS in Nagpur - making it
perhaps the only self-proclaimed national organisation of political significance not to
base itself at the centre of state power, in New Delhi. This approach engendered
problems which have been illustrated well by Jaffrelot in his analysis of the relationship
between the RSS and the BJP. 12 Tension has repeatedly emerged in this relationship,
as the BJP periodically attempts to divert attention away from the cultural objectives of
the parent organisation, and towards more pragmatic policies of socio-economic
populism in its bid for power. At the same time, the implication of leading BJP figures
in corruption scandals and the breakdown of discipline in states with BJP governments
has led to a disillusionment amongst RSS cadres with the pitfalls of mainstream politics
- this was hardly reconcilable with the ideal of Hindu sangathan.' 3 In this sense, the
ideological "rigidity" which the RSS has displayed in national politics is more to do
with the projection of ideals developed and sustained in the decentred discourse in this
wider arena - an arena still dominated by the power of symbolic representation.
Significantly, Jaffrelot concludes his book by reiterating the strength of RSS
organisation on an "organic" level, looking at the development of social welfare and
educational programmes - areas where state provision is still relatively weak. "This
trend," he says, "could help. ..to crystallise a Hindu nationalist identity which in the
long term could challenge the durability of India's multi-cultural society."' 4 The
operation of Hindu nationalism in this area, away from the limelight of state power, is
precisely directed towards the achievement of the ideal of sangathan - a consolidated,
catholic Hindu culture, in which personal religious and caste identity is subordinated to
the greater good of Bharat Mata. Identification with non-Hindu cultures (religious or
12 See Jaffrelot, The Hindu Nationalist Movement in india, esp. chapter 9, pp. 314-337, chapter
13, pp.449 - 481, and also pp. 547 - 549; see also Jaffrelot, The BJP and the 1996 Elections
(Unpublished Conference Paper. Copenhagen 1996).
13	 For an overview of RSS-BJP tension, see N.K. Singh's article "Hindu Divided Family" in
India Today, 15 December 1996. Although he notes this tension, Jaifrelot's indication in
The BJP and the 19% Elections is that the image of the BJP as comparatively untainted by
corruption still appeared to carry weight with the electorate in the 1996 election, despite the
high profile indictment of the party president, L.K. Advani, in the so-called "hawala" case; see
pp. 32-3.14	 Jaffrelot, The Hindu Nationalist Movement in india, p. 532.
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otherwise) in this paradigm implies the acceptance by the adherents of such cultures of
the position of second-class citizen in the Hindu nation.
Challenging the ideal of sangathan means engaging the ideology of Hindu nationalism
on this decentred, localised discursive level, where cultural and religious identities are
formed and sustained. Throughout this dissertation it has been illustrated that
ideologically, the one position which Hindu nationalism has been unable to situate or
accommodate fully is that of low caste consciousness. Here, the idea of a composite,
horizontal organisation of Hinduism has been challenged repeatedly by the assertion of
autonomous indigenous cultures which have refused to accept these parameters.
Identity politics associated with these cultures continue to emerge as significant
formations, developing in local contexts but producing ramifications in national
politics.' 5 As this thesis has shown, the impact of such formations is felt precisely
because of their distance from the discourses of elite-led politics. Unlike both Hindu
and Indian nationalism, the dominant ideology of low caste consciousness has emerged
from a non-middle class social bloc. The development of a coherent movement on this
basis appears as the most credible and effective trajectory of resistance to the continuing
entrenchment of elite-led Hindu nationalist identity as a force in Indian politics.
15	 This point has recently been demonstrated in A. Wyatt, "Dalit Christianity and Identity
Politics in India", (Unpublished Conference Paper, Bath, 1997). Here, the organisation of
dalit consciousness is presented as "positive" identity politics, a way of countering
discursively the "negative" identity politics of communalism.
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Against order or moral law, vice.
Oiiginal inhabitant; tribal.
'Non-duality' i.e the monistic school of Vedanta;
exponent: Shankara.
4 stages of life: student, householder,
hermit/recluse, ascetic; also a religious retreat
(ashram).
Eternal self, 'soul' (obverse of Brahman).
Purification of the soul.
Devotion.
RSS intellectual training classes - regular part of
shakha activity.
RSS chief ideologue.
Saffron flag: the "guru" of the RSS.
Ultimate reality or oneness of universe; the supreme
spiritual being.
Moral law which sustains the world, human society
and the individual - a non-static concept.
Text that codifies sacred law.
"Following one leader": the core idea of RSS
discipline.
Cow protection.
(Jayatri	 The most sacred verse of the Rig-Veda, repeated
daiiy by Brabmans (the Gayatrimantra)
Community, caste, (later) race/nation.
Jati-vyavasiha	 Caste system as it exists today (i.e. not varna
vyavastha).
Kaliyuga	 Age of strife, the last period in each kalpa, or world
era equivalent to one day of Brahma (432 million
years).
Karma	 'doing' - deeds, action, work - result or fruit of
work, produced by the law of cause and effect.





























"Council of five"; the traditional caste or village
authority.
I3rahinan teacher; learned man.
Ancestral/father land.
RSS chief organiser.





Literally, "what is handed over"; a religious tradition
founded by a sage or saint, extant in a religious
Order. In modern Hinduism it has also come to
mean religion itself, as in "l-lindu-sampra&ya".
Cycle of rebirth.
The eternal dharma, sometimes used instead of
"1-linduism"; C19 and early C20: orthodoxy.




The ordered universe in the Rig Veda; existence.
Performance of duty in accordance with dharma,
bringing about a state of harmony with sat; hence
truth.
RSS cell/meeting of cell.
Philosopher and commentator on texts, inc. Vedanta
Sutras. Main influence in establishing predominance
of Vedanta.
Shruti	 Revelation, as found in the Vedas.
Shuddh!	 Purification, (re-)conversion.
Smriti	 Tradition, as in interpretation or codification of
Shruti.
Swadeshi	 "Of one's own country"; indigenous production.








Literally "appearance", "colour"; the four socio-
religious orders or classes: Brahman, Kshatriya,
Vaishya, Shudra.
The ordained duties of the four classes and the four
stages of life.
Varna-vyavastha	 Varna system.
Vedanta	 "End of the Vedas"; i.e. Upanishads
V/ayaDashami	 Festival celebrated by RSS - Ram's victory over
Ravana; occasion supposedly chosen by Hedgewar
for founding of the Sangh in 1925.
Vya vastha	 System, order, arrangement; also ruling or
judgenient.
Yuga	 Era, age; hence yugadharma, moral law and way of
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